State v. Fife

No. 14900

I N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE O M N A A
F OTN

1980

STATE O MONTANA,
F

P l a i n t i f f and R e s p o n d e n t ,

vs.

H R L MELVIN FIFE,
A OD

D e f e n d a n t and A p p e l l a n t .

Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Thirteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
H o n o r a b l e C . B. Sande, J u d g e p r e s i d i n g .

C o u n s e l o f Record:

For Appellant:

C a l v i n J . S t a c e y a r g u e d , B i l l i n g s , Montana

F o r Respondent :

Hon. Mike G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , Montana
Mark Murphy a r g u e d , A s s i s t a n t A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a ,
Montana
H a r o l d H a n s e r , County A t t o r n e y , B i l l i n g s , Montana

W. C o r b i n Howard a r g u e d , Deputy County A t t o r n e y , B i l l i n g s ,
Montana

Submitted: February 2 1 , 1980

Decided: ,

*>
Filed: ' '
C
'/ . -
-
Mr. J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e C o u r t .

On January 1 5 , 1979, a n i n f o r m a t i o n w a s f i l e d i n t h e

T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t of t h e S t a t e of Montana, in and

f o r t h e County of Yellowstone, c h a r g i n g d e f e n d a n t and R o b e r t

C. Rodgers, a/k/a R o b e r t G. Lee, w i t h r o b b e r y . Defendant

e n t e r e d a p l e a of n o t g u i l t y . On A p r i l 1 7 , 1979, a f t e r

s e v e r a n c e of t h e c a s e s , t r i a l i n t h i s m a t t e r was had. The

c o u r t s a t w i t h a j u r y , which r e t u r n e d a v e r d i c t of g u i l t y .

Defendant a p p e a l s from t h e f i n a l judgment and a d e n i a l of

h i s motion f o r a new t r i a l .

Defendant and Rodgers were c h a r g e d w i t h a r o b b e r y a t

t h e home of M r . and M r s . C u r t i s Workman of L a u r e l , Montana,

on December 1 4 , 1978.

Mrs. Workman t e s t i f i e d t h a t on t h e n i g h t i n q u e s t i o n ,

two men, armed w i t h guns and a k n i f e , f o r c i b l y e n t e r e d h e r

home. Both men w e r e wearing d a r k s k i c a p s w i t h nylon s t o c k -

i n g s o v e r t h e i r f a c e s and c o n v e r s e d u s i n g t h e names of

" B i l l y Boy" and "George." M r s . Workman s t a t e d t h a t t h e two

men t a l k e d d u r i n g t h e r o b b e r y and t h a t s h e had a good l o o k

a t " G e o r g e ' s " f a c e and p h y s i c a l s t a t u r e . The two men took

c a s h and v a r i o u s o t h e r i t e m s i n c l u d i n g a p l a s t i c jug used by

M r s . Workman's b r o t h e r , Dale Wolford, t o s t o r e c o i n s .

The Workmans' r e s i d e n c e i s n e x t d o o r t o a n a p a r t m e n t
r e n t e d by V e r n a l Miller, h i s common-law w i f e Roxana Clymore,

and d e f e n d a n t . On J a n u a r y 9 , 1979, a s e a r c h w a r r a n t w a s
i s s u e d f o r M i l l e r ' s a p a r t m e n t and d u r i n g i t s e x e c u t i o n , a

p l a s t i c jug was r e c o v e r e d from t h e t o p of a d r e s s e r i n

M i l l e r and Clymore's bedroom. Dale Wolford, who r e s i d e d

w i t h t h e Workmans, t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e p l a s t i c jug w a s t h e

o n e t a k e n by t h e two r o b b e r s . H e a l s o s t a t e d t h a t on a

p r i o r o c c a s i o n he had shown Clymore and M i l l e r h i s c o i n

collection.
 Mrs. Workman indicated that there was a strong pos-
sibility she would be able to identify the individual known
as "George" if he appeared in a lineup. A lineup was held,

and Mr. and Mrs. Workman were given the opportunity to view
defendant and others wearing the exact clothing worn by
"George." The persons in the lineup also repeated the words
"George" had uttered during the robbery. Mrs. Workman,
however, failed to identify defendant as "George."
About three months after defendant's arrest, some
pantyhose were found behind the seat of defendant's pickup.
The pantyhose were discovered when the police stopped Vernal
Miller, who was driving the pickup. Miller testified that
he had used defendant's pickup on various occasions. There
was testimony that Roxanna Clymore and Thomas ~ightmeir,
defendant's brother-in-law, had also used the pickup since
defendant's arrest.
Roxanna Clymore testified that defendant and Rodgers
were at her apartment the night of the robbery. She stated
she saw two men force their way into the Workmans' residence
that evening. She also stated that defendant made certain
remarks to her about the robbery. She also testified that
the plastic jug belonging to Wolford was found by the police
in her bedroom. Defendant testified and denied that he had
participated in the robbery.
The following issues are presented for consideration on
appeal:
1. Did the District Court abuse its discretion by
denying defendant's motion for continuance so that a material
subpoenaed witness could be brought to court and present
testimony in support of the defense? In the alternative,

did the District Court err by not allowing the defense to
read into the record the statement of the absent witness?
 2. Did t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t err by a l l o w i n g i n t o e v i -

d e n c e , o v e r d e f e n d a n t ' s o b j e c t i o n , t e s t i m o n y and e x h i b i t s

r e l a t i n g t o Lee, a/k/a Rodgers, t h u s c o n f u s i n g t h e j u r y w i t h

i r r e l e v a n t and p r e j u d i c i a l e v i d e n c e n o t l i n k e d t o t h e d e f e n -

dant o r the i s s u e s presented i n t h i s case?

3. Did t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t err by p r e v e n t i n g t h e d e f e n -

d a n t from i n q u i r i n g i n t o a p o s s i b l e m o t i v e t h a t t h e w i t n e s s

Clymore may have had t o f a b r i c a t e a s t o r y a g a i n s t t h e d e f e n -

dant?

4. Did t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t err by f a i l i n g t o s u p p r e s s

a s e v i d e n c e t h e p a n t y h o s e and t h e p l a s t i c jug?

5. Did t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t err by r e f u s i n g t o g i v e

d e f e n d a n t ' s proposed i n s t r u c t i o n nos. 7, 1 2 and 14?

Defendant c o n t e n d s t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t abused i t s

d i s c r e t i o n by denying h i s motion f o r c o n t i n u a n c e n e a r t h e

end o f h i s c a s e - i n - c h i e f . The c o n t i n u a n c e w a s r e q u e s t e d

b e c a u s e a c r u c i a l d e f e n s e w i t n e s s , R u s s e l l Brohaugh, under

subpoena by d e f e n s e f a i l e d t o respond a s d i r e c t e d . In the

a l t e r n a t i v e , t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d by n o t a l l o w i n g a

p o r t i o n of Brohaugh's s t a t e m e n t t o t h e p o l i c e t o be r e a d

i n t o t h e r e c o r d by t h e d e f e n s e i n l i e u o f Brohaugh's t e s t i -

mony.

The r u l e f o r c o n t i n u a n c e s i n Montana i s s e t o u t i n

s e c t i o n 46-13-202, MCA, and i n S t a t e v. D i G i a l l o n a r d o ( 1 9 7 2 ) ,

160 Mont. 379, 503 P.2d 43. The f a c t s i n t h i s c a s e p r e s e n t

no r e a s o n s why a c o n t i n u a n c e s h o u l d n o t have been g r a n t e d .

S e e , S t a t e v. Valmoja ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 56 Haw. 452, 540 P.2d 63;

S a l a z a r v . S t a t e (Alaska 1 9 7 6 ) , 559 P.2d 66.

During t r i a l a s i t u a t i o n developed where i t became

necessary, i f p o s s i b l e , f o r t h e defense t o demonstrate t h a t

d e f e n d a n t was n o t t h e r o b b e r "George," b u t r a t h e r v e r n a l
M i l l e r was. Defendant urged t h a t a p o l i c e r e p o r t f i l e d by

o n e R u s s e l l Brohaugh was c r u c i a l t o h i s d e f e n s e i n t h i s

r e g a r d and would b o l s t e r t h e d e f e n s e t h e o r y t h a t V e r n a l

Miller was t h e r o b b e r "George." The d e f e n s e moved f o r a

c o n t i n u a n c e s o t h a t Brohaugh might be l o c a t e d , o r , i n

t h e a l t e r n a t i v e , t h a t t h e p e r t i n e n t p o r t i o n of t h e p o l i c e

r e p o r t be r e a d t o t h e j u r y .

I n Montana, m o t i o n s f o r c o n t i n u a n c e i n c r i m i n a l t r i a l s

a r e p r o v i d e d f o r by s e c t i o n 46-13-202, MCA, which s t a t e s :

" (1) The d e f e n d a n t o r t h e s t a t e may move
f o r a continuance. I f t h e motion i s made
more t h a n 30 d a y s a f t e r a r r a i g n m e n t o r a t
any t i m e a f t e r t r i a l h a s begun, t h e c o u r t
may r e q u i r e t h a t i t be s u p p o r t e d by a f f i -
davit .
" ( 2 ) The c o u r t may upon t h e motion of
e i t h e r p a r t y o r upon t h e c o u r t ' s own mo-
t i o n order a continuance i f t h e i n t e r e s t s
of j u s t i c e s o r e q u i r e .

" ( 3 ) A l l m o t i o n s f o r c o n t i n u a n c e are ad-
dressed t o t h e d i s c r e t i o n of t h e t r i a l
c o u r t and s h a l l be c o n s i d e r e d i n t h e l i g h t
o f t h e d i l i g e n c e shown on t h e p a r t of t h e
movant. T h i s s e c t i o n s h a l l be c o n s t r u e d t o
t h e end t h a t c r i m i n a l c a s e s are t r i e d w i t h
due d i l i g e n c e c o n s o n a n t w i t h t h e r i g h t s of
t h e d e f e n d a n t and t h e s t a t e t o a speedy
trial. "

S i n c e s u b s e c t i o n ( 3 ) r e q u i r e s t h a t s u c h m o t i o n s be d i r e c t e d

t o t h e d i s c r e t i o n o f t h e t r i a l c o u r t , w e must c o n s i d e r

whether t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s t r e a t m e n t of t h i s matter was an

abuse of d i s c r e t i o n . S t a t e v . D i G i a l l o n a r d o , 503 P.2d a t

I n D i G i a l l o n a r d o , t h i s C o u r t a d o p t e d g u i d e l i n e s which

I l l i n o i s had e s t a b l i s h e d i n P e o p l e v. Hudson ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 97

Ill.App.2d 362, 240 N.E.2d 156, t o d e t e r m i n e whether t h e r e

was a n a b u s e of d i s c r e t i o n . These g u i d e l i n e s were:

1. Reasonable e x p e c t a t i o n o r p r o s p e c t o f o b t a i n i n g t h e

p r e s e n c e of t h e a b s e n t w i t n e s s e s ;
 2. Whether the absent witnesses' testimony would help
the defense; and,
3. Whether the absent witnesses would testify.
In DiGiallonardo, the absent witnesses were alleged to
be co-participants in the crime. We held that the trial
court acted properly in denying defendant's motion because:
(1) the transcripts indicated appellants had no knowledge of
the whereabouts of the missing witnesses; (2) the probative
value of their testimony was speculative; and (3) there was
a question as to whether the missing witnesses could be
compelled to testify. 160 Mont. 382-384.
Defendant here seeks to distinguish DiGiallonardo and
argues that in the instant case, the missing witness was a
resident property owner in Laurel, Montana, who would there-
fore be easy to find and could not avail himself of Fifth
Amendment protections. Further, the defense demonstrated by
the police record that Brohaugh's testimony was crucial to
the defense of the case.
Defendant has suggested further that this Court apply
the standards set forth in Salazar v. State, supra. In
Salazar, the Alaskan court set out the following factors to
be considered in granting a motion for continuance:
". .. (1) whether the testimony is material to
the case; (2) whether the testimony can be eli-
cited from another source; (3) whether the testi-
mony is cumulative; (4) probability of securing
the absent witness in a reasonable time; (5)
whether the requesting party was diligent and
acting in good faith; (6) the inconvenience to
the court and/or others; and (7) the likelihood
that the testimony would have affected the jury's
verdict. . ."
559 P.2d at 72.
The State focuses on the specific language of section
46-13-202, MCA, which requires that the movant demonstrate
his diligence prior to the consideration of any of the other
factual issues. The S t a t e s u b m i t s t h a t i f t h i s C o u r t f i n d s

t h a t d e f e n d a n t a t t e m p t e d w i t h due d i l i g e n c e t o have Brohaugh

t e s t i f y , then t h i s Court should look t o t h e f a c t o r s s t a t e d

i n S a l a z a r t o d e t e r m i n e i f t h e t r i a l c o u r t abused i t s

discretion.

There i s n o t h i n g i n t h e r e c o r d t o i n d i c a t e t h a t d e f e n d a n t

f a i l e d t o a c t d i l i g e n t l y i n attempting t o secure t h e testimony

of Brohaugh. He was p r o p e r l y subpoenaed. There i s n o t h i n g

i n t h e r e c o r d t o i n d i c a t e he would n o t show up u n t i l a s h o r t

t i m e b e f o r e he was c a l l e d t o t h e s t a n d and f a i l e d t o a p p e a r .

I n f a c t , t h e r e c o r d d o e s n o t d i s c l o s e t h a t t h e c o u r t s o much

a s i s s u e d a bench w a r r a n t t o a r r e s t t h e i n t e n d e d w i t n e s s .

Both p a r t i e s h e r e s e e k t o e x t e n d t h e g u i d e l i n e s s e t o u t

by t h i s C o u r t i n D i G i a l l o n a r d o by u s e of t h e S a l a z a r f a c t o r s .

I n r e v i e w i n g t h e e v i d e n c e , however, i t becomes a p p a r e n t

t h a t under e i t h e r s e t of g u i d e l i n e s t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t a c t e d

a r b i t r a r i l y i n denying d e f e n d a n t ' s motion f o r c o n t i n u a n c e ,

o r n o t working o u t a method t o a d m i t a p o r t i o n of t h e p o l i c e

r e c o r d . I t a p p e a r s Brohaugh c o u l d have been found w i t h o u t

u n r e a s o n a b l e d e l a y , a f a c t o r which i s n o t e n t i r e l y c l e a r

from t h e r e c o r d , b u t o r a l argument r e v e a l e d t h e case went t o

t h e j u r y around 5:00 p.m. and a c o n t i n u a n c e u n t i l t h e f o l l o w -

i n g day would have p r e j u d i c e d no one. These f a c t s w e r e n o t

disputed. Brohaugh had f i l e d a p o l i c e r e p o r t on a n o t h e r

t h e f t and i n some manner i d e n t i f i e d t h e p r e s e n t d e f e n d a n t i n
t h e company of a companion o f whom h e r e p o r t e d : "They

c a l l e d him George." The word "him" would have r e f e r r e d t o

V e r n a l Gary M i l l e r . Defendant a r g u e s t h a t h i s s t a t e m e n t was

a c r u c i a l f a c t o r i n h i s d e f e n s e t h e o r y t h a t would t e n d t o

l i n k M i l l e r t o t h e r o b b e r "George."
 It was argued with some justification that there were
problems with this testimony and therefore the quality came
under attack by the State in terms of how much help it would
be to the defense. This is a hard question and one of fact.
Defendant's effort was in good faith; the testimony was not
cumulative; the testimony was material; the court would not
allow any consideration of an alternate hearsay source; the
delay would have been minimal and no one would have been
inconvenienced thereby; and, of course, the value, as stated
above, is a close question which should have been resolved
in favor of defendant, assuring him a fair trial. Conversely,
without the testimony a conviction resulted.
The District Court abused its discretion when it failed
to grant some kind of relief or continuance to defendant
when a subpoenaed witness material to the defense failed to
appear and testify.
If the evidence remains the same at a new trial, then
defendant's proposed instruction no. 7 on circumstantial
evidence must be given.
The judgment of the District Court is reversed, and the
cause is remanded for a new trial.

r

We concur:

2'dA~lbWwpe~
Chief Justice
Mr. J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n d i s s e n t i n g :

I must r e s p e c t f u l l y d i s s e n t .

I n o r d e r t o r e v e r s e a c a s e on t h e i s s u e of whether t h e

t r i a l judge abused h i s d i s c r e t i o n i n d e n y i n g t h e a p p e l l a n t ' s

motion f o r a c o n t i n u a n c e , w e must l o o k t o t h e s t a t u t e s and

t h e c a s e a u t h o r i t i e s e s t a b l i s h e d by t h i s C o u r t . I do n o t

f i n d an abuse here.

C o n t r o l l i n g t h i s m a t t e r i s s e c t i o n 25-4-501, MCA, which

provides :

"Motion t o p o s t p o n e t r i a l f o r a b s e n c e of t e s t i -
mony. motion t o p o s t p o n e a t r i a l o n g r o u n d s
o f t h e a b s e n c e of e v i d e n c e s h a l l o n l y be made
upon a f f i d a v i t showing t h e m a t e r i a l i t y of t h e
e v i d e n c e e x p e c t e d t o be o b t a i n e d and t h a t due
d i l i g e n c e h a s been used t o p r o c u r e i t . "

T h i s l a n g u a g e i s mandatory and must be c o n s t r u e d a s s u c h .

S e e S t a t e v . Radi ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 168 Mont. 320, 325, 542 P.2d 1206.

Here, a p p e l l a n t d i d n o t f i l e an a f f i d a v i t demonstrating

t h e m a t e r i a l i t y o r t h a t h e had used due d i l i g e n c e t o g e t t h e

witness involved. I n view of a p p e l l a n t ' s f a i l u r e t o comply

w i t h t h e s t a t u t e , s e c t i o n 25-4-501, MCA, how can i t be s a i d

t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n d e n y i n g a

motion f o r a c o n t i n u a n c e . S e e , S t a t e v . Pascgo ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 173

Mont. 121, 566 P. 2d 802; S t a t e v. Harvey ( 1 9 7 9 ) , Mont.

The d e n i a l of a motion f o r c o n t i n u a n c e i s w i t h i n t h e

sound d i s c r e t i o n o f t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t , and i t c a n n o t , i n my

o p i n i o n , be e r r o r t o deny s u c h a motion u n l e s s t h e r e i s a

c l e a r a b u s e of t h a t d i s c r e t i o n . S e e , S t a t e v . Olsen ( 1 9 6 8 ) ,

152 Mont. 1, 445 P.2d 926; s e c t i o n 46-13-202, MCA.

S i n c e t h e above s e c t i o n p l a c e s t h e f i l i n g of a n a f f i -

d a v i t w i t h i n t h e sound d i s c r e t i o n o f t h e t r i a l c o u r t and no

a f f i d a v i t w a s r e q u i r e d i n t h e c a s e , a n e x a m i n a t i o n of t h e
facts and the circumstances surrounding the denial of the
motion should be looked to to determine whether the court
abused its discretion.
Appellant relies on Salazar v. State (Alaska 1976), 559
P.2d 66, which outlines certain considerations that may be
weighed in determining if the denial of the continuance is
an abuse of discretion. The factual issues as stated in
Salazar were:
". ..(1) whether the testimony is material to
the case; (2) whether the testimony can be
elicited from another source; (3) whether the
testimony is cumulative; (4) probability of
securing the absent witness in a reasonable
time; (5) whether the requesting party was
diligent and acting in good faith; (6) the
inconvenience to the court and/or others; and
(7) the likelihood that the testimony would
have affected the jury's verdict. . ."
It should be noted that the very language of section 46-13-
202, MCA, requires that the movant demonstrate his diligence
prior to the consideration of any of the other factual
issues.
Here, appellant had the clerk of the court issue a
subpoena for Russell Brohaugh on April 11, 1979. That
subpoena was served by counsel for appellant, Mr. Stacey, on
April 15, 1979. The subpoena directed Brohaugh to appear at
the Yellowstone County Courthouse at 9:00 a.m. on April 18,

Brohaugh was not called to the stand until after the
afternoon recess. There is no showing in the transcript
prior to the time Brohaugh was called that the court was
informed that he had failed to appear as ordered in the
subpoena. Nowhere in the record did Mr. Stacey, counsel for
appellant, request from the court a bench warrant for Brohaugh.
See, section 45-7-309(c), MCA. Nowhere in the record did
counsel request t h e c o u r t t o order the s h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e t o

go and p i c k up Brohaugh a s r e q u i r e d by s e c t i o n 26-2-106,

MCA. T h e r e i s no i n d i c a t i o n i n t h e r e c o r d t h a t S t a c e y

a t t e m p t e d t o c o n t a c t Brohaugh between 9:00 a.m. and t h e t i m e

S t a c e y c a l l e d Brohaugh t o t h e s t a n d .

The S t a t e d o e s n o t deny t h a t a p p e l l a n t up t o t h e t i m e

o f t r i a l ackeG. d i l i g e n t l y , b u t fr3m t h z v e r y t i m e t h a t

c o u n s e l d i s c o v e r e d Brohaugh had f a i l e d t o a p p e a r a s i n s t r u c t e d

by t h e subpoena u n t i l h e c a l l e d Brohaugh t o t h e s t a n d ,

a p p e l l a n t e x e r c i s e d no d i l i g e n c e w h a t s o e v e r . Under t h e s e

c i r c u m s t a n c e s , I would f i n d t h a t t h e c o u r t e x e r c i s e d i t s

sound d i s c r e t i o n i n denying t h e motion f o r a c o n t i n u a n c e . I

would a f f i r m t h e judgment below.