No. 14255
IN THE SUP= CCUI~TOF THE STATE OF mmm
1978
S A E O ICNIYUA,
T T F
P l a i n t i f f ax3 Respondent,
-VS-
WlLLIAM ORIE COOPER,
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal f r m : D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eighteenth Judicial D i s t r i c t ,
nora able Jack D. Shanstran, Judge presiding.
Counsel of Record:
For Appllant:
Michael Sand argued, Bozeman, Mntana
For Reqmndent :
Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, mntana
Sheri K. Sprigg argued, Assistant Attorney General, Helena,
Mntana
Donald White, County Attorney, Bozgnan, mntana
Gregory R. Todd argued, Deputy County Attorney, B o z m , mntana
Sdmitted: October 23, 1978
Decided: dkf? -- "3
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Filed: - - I
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Mr. J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of
t h e Court.
~efendant
was c h a r g e d by i n f o r m a t i o n w i t h one c o u n t of
a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t and one c o u n t of a s s a u l t . A jury t r i a l
w a s h e l d o n J a n u a r y 26 and 27, 1978, t h e Honorable J a c k D.
Shanstrom p r e s i d i n g . A f t e r t h e jury returned a g u i l t y
v e r d i c t on b o t h c o u n t s , d e f e n d a n t w a s s e n t e n c e d t o f i v e
y e a r s on Count I and s i x months on Count 11, t h e s e n t e n c e s
t o run concurrently. One and one-half y e a r s were t h e n
suspended. Defendant a p p e a l s .
Between 1:00 and 1:30 a.m. on D e c e m b e r 9, 1977, d e f e n -
d a n t and f i v e f r i e n d s e n t e r e d t h e Sacajawea B a r , l o c a t e d i n
t h e basement of t h e Sacajawea Motel i n T h r e e F o r k s , Montana.
S h o r t l y t h e r e a f t e r , t h r e e Mexican-American b r o t h e r s , P a u l ,
David, and Caesar V i l l a r r e a l , e n t e r e d t h e b a r from t h e
u p s t a i r s where t h e y w e r e s t a y i n g . A f o u r t h Mexican-American,
named Tano, e n t e r e d sometime l a t e r . When d e f e n d a n t saw
t h e s e men o r d e r a six-pack of b e e r and n o t i c e d one w a s n o t
wearing a s h i r t , h e remarked: "No s h i r t , no s h o e s , no
service." H e a p p a r e n t l y walked o v e r t o t h e men m u t t e r i n g
t h i n g s a b o u t " s p i c s " and "wetbacks" and proceeded t o knock
t h e s i x - p a c k o u t of t h e hands of P a u l V i l l a r r e a l . A scuffle
ensued and o n e of t h e Mexican-American b r o t h e r s had a
knife. Soon b a r s t o o l s and p o o l c u e s w e r e b e i n g used as
weapons. A f t e r a s h o r t t i m e , d e f e n d a n t l e f t t h e b a r , went
t o a c a r , and p i c k e d up a gun. H e f i r e d a t l e a s t one s h o t
w h i l e on t h e s i d e w a l k n e x t t o t h e b a r e n t r a n c e . H e then
r e e n t e r e d t h e b a r p o i n t i n g t h e gun and h e l p e d one of h i s
f r i e n d s o u t of t h e bar.
Defendant d r o v e t o Bozeman and w h i l e e n r o u t e threw t h e
gun away. I t w a s never recovered. The n e x t a f t e r n o o n ,
D e t e c t i v e Bruce LaRue of t h e G a l l a t i n County s h e r i f f ' s
department found a .25 c a l i b e r a u t o m a t i c c o l t p i s t o l c a r -
t r i d g e c a s e near t h e t o p of t h e s t a i r s where a w i t n e s s had
s e e n d e f e n d a n t f i r e t h e gun t h e n i g h t b e f o r e .
Defendant p r e s e n t s s i x i s s u e s f o r review which can be
summarized and s t a t e d i n t h e f o l l o w i n g manner:
1. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n g i v i n g I n s t r u c -
t i o n No. 20 concerning t h e d e f e n s e of j u s t i f i a b l e u s e of
force.
2. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n g i v i n g I n s t r u c -
t i o n No. 9 concerning i n t e n t .
3. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n e x c l u d i n g t h e
testimony of two d e f e n s e w i t n e s s e s .
4. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n r e f u s i n g t o
g i v e d e f e n d a n t ' s o f f e r e d I n s t r u c t i o n No. 1 2 .
5. Whether d e f e n d a n t was denied h i s r i g h t t o a f a i r
and i m p a r t i a l t r i a l because of e r r o r s on t h e p a r t of t h e
D i s t r i c t Court.
6. Whether t h e r e was s u f f i c i e n t evidence t o s u p p o r t
t h e v e r d i c t s of g u i l t y .
I n s t r u c t i o n No. 20 r e a d :
"You a r e i n s t r u c t e d t h a t a d e f e n s e of j u s t i -
f i a b l e u s e of f o r c e i s an a f f i r m a t i v e d e f e n s e
and t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t has t h e burden of pro-
ducing s u f f i c i e n t evidence on t h e i s s u e t o
r a i s e a r e a s o n a b l e doubt of h i s g u i l t . "
Defendant contends t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n p l a c e s t h e burden of
proving s e l f - d e f e n s e on him. The S t a t e contends t h i s i n s t r u c -
t i o n p l a c e s t h e "burden of producing evidence" on d e f e n d a n t
b u t n o t t h e "burden of p e r s u a s i o n " . The Montana County
A t t o r n e y s A s s o c i a t i o n , a p p e a r i n g a s amicus c u r i a e , a r g u e s
t h a t " a criminal defendant a s s e r t i n g t h e a f f i r m a t i v e defense
of j u s t i f i a b l e u s e of f o r c e [should be] r e q u i r e d t o prove
t h a t d e f e n s e by a preponderance of t h e evidence."
The United S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t , i n t h e landmark c a s e
of I n r e Winship ( 1 9 7 0 ) , 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S . C t . 1068,
1073, 25 L Ed 2d 368, 375, e x p l i c i t l y h e l d t h a t " t h e Due
P r o c e s s C l a u s e p r o t e c t s [an] accused a g a i n s t c o n v i c t i o n
e x c e p t upon proof beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t of e v e r y f a c t
n e c e s s a r y - c o n s t i t u t e t h e crime w i t h which he i s c h a r g e d . "
to
(Emphasis added.) S u b s e q u e n t l y , i n a Maine homicide c a s e ,
t h e Supreme C o u r t h e l d t h a t " t h e Due P r o c e s s C l a u s e r e q u i r e s
t h e p r o s e c u t i o n t o prove beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t t h e
absence of t h e h e a t of p a s s i o n on sudden p r o v o c a t i o n when
t h e i s s u e i s p r o p e r l y p r e s e n t e d i n a homicide c a s e . " (Em-
p h a s i s added.) Mullaney v . Wilbur ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 4 2 1 U.S. 684,
Defendant r e l i e s on Mullaney by analogy and a r g u e s t h e
S t a t e s h o u l d be r e q u i r e d t o prove t h e absence of t h e " j u s t i -
f i a b l e u s e of f o r c e " t o c o n v i c t d e f e n d a n t of a g g r a v a t e d
assault. Such a c o n t e n t i o n i g n o r e s t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between
t h e s t a t u t o r y scheme o u t l i n e d i n t h e Mullaney c a s e and t h e
s t a t u t o r y scheme p r e s e n t i n Montana. A s i m i l a r distinction
was a d d r e s s e d by t h e Supreme Court i n P a t t e r s o n v. N e w York
( 1 9 7 7 ) , 432 U . S . 197, 97 S . C t . 2319, 53 L Ed 2d 281. In
P a t t e r s o n t h e i s s u e was " t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y under t h e ..
. Due P r o c e s s C l a u s e of burdening t h e d e f e n d a n t i n a N e w
York S t a t e murder t r i a l w i t h p r o v i n g t h e a f f i r m a t i v e d e f e n s e
of extreme e m o t i o n a l d i s t u r b a n c e a s d e f i n e d by New York
law." P a t t e r s o n , 432 U.S. a t 198, 97 S . C t . a t 2320, 53 L Ed
2d a t 284. I n f i n d i n g t h a t r e q u i r i n g t h e defendant t o prove
h i s a f f i r m a t i v e d e f e n s e by a preponderance of t h e e v i d e n c e
d i d n o t v i o l a t e due p r o c e s s , t h e Supreme C o u r t s t a t e d :
"We ... d e c l i n e t o adopt a s a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
i m p e r a t i v e , o p e r a t i v e countrywide, t h a t a s t a t e
must d i s p r o v e beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t e v e r y
f a c t c o n s t i t u t i n g any and a l l a f f i r m a t i v e de-
f e n s e s r e l a t e d t o t h e c u l p a b i l i t y of an accused.
T r a d i t i o n a l l y , due p r o c e s s h a s r e q u i r e d t h a t
o n l y t h e most b a s i c p r o c e d u r a l s a f e g u a r d s be
observed; more s u b t l e b a l a n c i n g of s o c i e t y ' s
i n t e r e s t s a g a i n s t t h o s e of t h e accused have
been l e f t t o t h e l e g i s l a t i v e branch. W t h e r e - e
f o r e w i l l n o t d i s t u r b t h e balance struck i n
p r e v i o u s c a s e s h o l d i n g t h a t t h e Due P r o c e s s
Clause r e q u i r e s t h e p r o s e c u t i o n t o prove beyond
a r e a s o n a b l e doubt a l l of t h e elements i n c l u d e d
i n t h e d e f i n i t i o n of t h e o f f e n s e of which t h e
d e f e n d a n t i s charged. Proof of t h e n o n e x i s t e n c e
of a l l a f f i r m a t i v e d e f e n s e s h a s never been con-
s t i t u t i o n a l l y r e q u i r e d ; and w e p e r c e i v e no r e a -
son t o f a s h i o n such a r u l e i n t h i s c a s e and
apply it t o t h e s t a t u t o r y d e f e n s e a t i s s u e h e r e . "
P a t t e r s o n , 432 U.S. a t 2 1 0 , 97 S.Ct. a t 2327,
53 L Ed 2d a t 292.
S e c t i o n 94-3-112, R.C.M. 1 9 4 7 , provides t h a t " [ a ]
d e f e n s e of j u s t i f i a b l e u s e of f o r c e , based on t h e p r o v i s i o n s
of t h i s c h a p t e r i s an a f f i r m a t i v e d e f e n s e . " The accompanying
commission comment a f f o r d s f u r t h e r c l a r i f i c a t i o n :
"A d e f e n s e based upon any of t h e p r o v i s i o n s of
t h i s c h a p t e r i s a n a f f i r m a t i v e d e f e n s e , and i f
n o t p u t i n i s s u e by t h e p r o s e c u t i o n ' s evidence,
t h e d e f e n d a n t , t o r a i s e i t a s an i s s u e , must
p r e s e n t some evidence thereon."
By denominating t h e j u s t i f i a b l e u s e of f o r c e a s an
a f f i r m a t i v e d e f e n s e , Montana's s t a t u t o r y scheme does n o t
r e q u i r e t h e p r o s e c u t i o n t o prove t h e absence of a f f i r m a t i v e
d e f e n s e s beyond a r e a s o n a b l e doubt a s though t h e i r absence
were an element of t h e crime charged. This p o i n t i s even
more e v i d e n t when t h e elements of t h e crimes charged a r e
d i s t i l l e d from t h e s t a t u t e s d e f i n i n g t h e o f f e n s e s . Under
s e c t i o n 94-5-201 (1)( c ) , R.C.M. 1947, a person commits t h e
o f f e n s e of a s s a u l t when he (1) purposely o r knowingly, (2)
makes p h y s i c a l c o n t a c t w i t h an i n d i v i d u a l , ( 3 ) when t h e
c o n t a c t i s of an i n s u l t i n g o r provoking n a t u r e . Under sec-
t i o n 94-5-202(1) ( c ) , R.C.M. 1947, a person commits t h e
o f f e n s e of aggravated a s s a u l t when he (1) purposely o r
knowingly, ( 2 ) c a u s e s apprehension of s e r i o u s b o d i l y i n j u r y
i n another, ( 3 ) by u s e of a weapon, ( 4 ) when such apprehen-
s i o n i s reasonable. C l e a r l y , absence of j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s
n o t an element of e i t h e r of t h e s e o f f e n s e s . That being t h e
c a s e , we a r e l e f t w i t h t h e t a s k of reviewing I n s t r u c t i o n No.
20 t o s e e i f it i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h Montana law.
I n S t a t e v. Grady ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 166 Mont. 168, 175, 531 P.2d
681, 684, t h i s Court s t a t e d :
"The law i n Montana i s t h a t a l t h o u g h t h e burden
of p e r s u a s i o n remains on t h e S t a t e , i n o r d e r t o
a v a i l himself of t h e a f f i r m a t i v e d e f e n s e of s e l f -
d e f e n s e , t h e d e f e n d a n t has t h e burden of producing
s u f f i c i e n t evidence on t h e i s s u e t o r a i s e a r e a -
s o n a b l e doubt of h i s g u i l t . "
C l e a r l y t h e n , t h e D i s t r i c t Court d i d n o t e r r i n g i v i n g
I n s t r u c t i o n No. 20. I t i s a c l e a r s t a t e m e n t of t h e law i n
Montana. The Montana County A t t o r n e y s A s s o c i a t i o n a r g u e s
t h a t a g r e a t e r burden should be p l a c e d on a d e f e n d a n t - - t h a t
i s , a d e f e n d a n t should be r e q u i r e d t o prove h i s a f f i r m a t i v e
d e f e n s e by a preponderance of t h e evidence. I n s u p p o r t of
t h i s c o n t e n t i o n t h e A s s o c i a t i o n p o i n t s o u t t h a t t h i s Court
h a s a l r e a d y imposed t h a t burden f o r o t h e r a f f i r m a t i v e de-
fenses. S t a t e v. ~ c K e n z i e (1978), Mont . , 581
P.2d 1205, 1233, 35 St.Rep. 759, 795 (mental d i s e a s e o r
d e f e c t ) ; and S t a t e v. S t u i t (1978), Mont. , 576
P.2d 264, 267, 35 St.Rep. 313, 317 ( s e c t i o n 94-3-110, R.C.M.
1947, compulsion).
T h i s Court h a s e x p r e s s l y s t a t e d t h a t t h e t e s t t o be
used when c o n s i d e r i n g t h e a f f i r m a t i v e d e f e n s e of s e l f -
d e f e n s e i s " t h e burden of producing s u f f i c i e n t evidence on
t h e i s s u e t o r a i s e a r e a s o n a b l e doubt of h i s g u i l t . " Grady,
166 Mont. a t 175, 531 P.2d a t 684. W e r e a f f i r m t h a t holding
and hold t h a t when a c r i m i n a l d e f e n d a n t s e e k s t o a v a i l
himself of t h e a f f i r m a t i v e d e f e n s e of t h e u s e of f o r c e i n
d e f e n s e of a person p u r s u a n t t o s e c t i o n 94-3-102, R.C.M.
1947, he h a s t h e burden of producing s u f f i c i e n t evidence on
t h e i s s u e t o r a i s e a r e a s o n a b l e doubt of h i s g u i l t .
Defendant's second i s s u e f o r c o n s i d e r a t i o n concerns
I n s t r u c t i o n No. 9:
"You a r e i n s t r u c t e d t h a t t h e law presumes t h a t
a person i n t e n d s t h e o r d i n a r y consequences of
h i s voluntary a c t s . "
Defendant a r g u e s t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n c r e a t e s a c o n c l u s i v e
presumption of c r i m i n a l i n t e n t and i s t h e r e f o r e u n c o n s t i t u -
tional. The S t a t e responds f i r s t by p o i n t i n g o u t t h a t
d e f e n d a n t d i d n o t o b j e c t t o t h e g i v i n g of t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n
a t t r i a l ; second by p o i n t i n g o u t t h a t t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n has
been approved by t h i s Court on a number of p r e v i o u s occa-
s i o n s ; and t h i r d by a r g u i n g t h a t g i v i n g t h e i n s t r u c t i o n was
not prejudicial.
W have i n t h e p a s t c o n s i d e r e d t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n and
e
have decided t h a t it i s a proper i n s t r u c t i o n i n a c r i m i n a l
case. See S t a t e v. McKenzie, 581 P.2d a t 1 2 2 2 , 35 St.Rep.
a t 780. T h e r e f o r e , w e conclude t h e D i s t r i c t Court d i d n o t
e r r i n g i v i n g I n s t r u c t i o n No. 9 t o t h e j u r y .
Defendant's t h i r d i s s u e concerns whether t h e D i s t r i c t
Court e r r e d i n e x c l u d i n g t h e testimony of two w i t n e s s e s ,
C h a r l e s Robinson and Mark Davis. Robinson's t e s t i m o n y , t h a t
he had been a t t a c k e d i n t h e b a r by Mexican-Americans t h r e e
months p r i o r t o t h e i n c i d e n t involved i n t h i s c a s e , was
excluded a s being t o o remote i n time and because Robinson
c o u l d n o t i d e n t i f y t h e p e r s o n s who a t t a c k e d him. Addi-
t i o n a l l y , t h e r e was no proof whatsoever t h a t t h e p a r t i e s
involved i n t h e a l t e r c a t i o n s were t h e same. This testimony
was p r o p e r l y excluded. Robinson d i d n o t w i t n e s s t h e f i g h t
involved i n t h i s case. H i s testimony, o f f e r e d i n s u p p o r t of
d e f e n d a n t ' s d e f e n s e of j u s t i f i a b l e u s e of f o r c e , was i r r e l e -
v a n t under t h e s e circumstances.
Davis' testimony, that he had seen a man named Tim Van
Luchen leave the bar a week before this incident with a
broken jaw, was also excluded by the District Court. De-
fendant argues that Davis should have been allowed to testify
with respect to statements made at that time by Van Luchen
concerning how his jaw had been broken under Rule 803,
Mont.R.Evid. The portions of that rule cited by defendant
read:
"The following are not excluded by the hearsay
rule, even though the declarant is available
as a witness.
"(1) Present sense impression. A statement
describing or explaining an event or condition
made while the declarant was perceiving the
event or condition, or immediately thereafter.
"(2) Excited utterance. A statement relating
to a startling event or condition made while
the declarant was under the stress of excite-
ment caused by the event or condition."
The time element is important under either of these
exceptions. The fact that Davis did not perceive the event
which caused the injury creates a problem with respect to
this time element. Thus, the District Court's determination
to exclude the testimony was not clearly erroneous.
Assuming, for the moment, that the testimony should not
have been excluded as hearsay, the testimony was clearly
irrelevant. Like Robinson's testimony, Davis' testimony was
offered as proof of defendant's state of mind when he entered
the bar. But defendant's own testimony indicated that these
prior events were either unknown to him or had no effect on
his state of mind. Therefore, defendant was not prejudiced
by the exclusion of Davis' testimony.
Defendant's fourth issue concerns the District Court's
refusal to give defendant's offered instruction number 12:
"You a r e hereby i n s t r u c t e d t h a t a f t e r c o n s i d e r i n g
and weighing t h e evidence and r e c o n c i l i n g any
d i s c r e p a n c i e s i n t h e evidence, i f t h e r e i s any
r e a s o n a b l e h y p o t h e s i s upon which you can base a
v e r d i c t of n o t g u i l t y i t i s your d u t y t o r e t u r n
a v e r d i c t of n o t g u i l t y . "
Defendant c i t e s S t a t e v . F i t z p a t r i c k ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 163 Mont.
220, 225, 516 P.2d 605, 609, f o r t h e p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t " t o
j u s t i f y c o n v i c t i o n on c i r c u m s t a n t i a l evidence, t h e f a c t s and
c i r c u m s t a n c e s must n o t o n l y be e n t i r e l y c o n s i s t e n t w i t h
t h e o r y of g u i l t , b u t must be i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h any o t h e r
r a t i o n a l e ( i . e . reasonable) conclusion." In t h i s regard,
d e f e n d a n t i s concerned w i t h t h e f a c t t h a t t h e gun he used
when he r e e n t e r e d t h e b a r was never recovered. H e had
argued t h a t t h e gun was a harmless t e a r g a s p i s t o l and n o t a
r e a l gun.
However, i n F i t z p a t r i c k t h e S t a t e proved i t s c a s e
t o t a l l y by c i r c u m s t a n t i a l evidence. In the i n s t a n t case the
g r e a t m a j o r i t y of evidence o f f e r e d a t t r i a l was d i r e c t
evidence. C i r c u m s t a n t i a l evidence i n s t r u c t i o n s a r e only
r e q u i r e d i n a c a s e which depends e n t i r e l y on c i r c u m s t a n t i a l
evidence. S t a t e v. Mah Sam Hing ( 1 9 3 1 ) , 89 Mont. 178, 186,
295 P . 1014, 1017. It i s not error t o refuse circumstantial
evidence i n s t r u c t i o n s i f t h e r e i s d i r e c t evidence i n t r o d u c e d
a g a i n s t t h e defendant. S t a t e v. White ( 1 9 6 5 ) , 1 4 6 Mont.
Defendant's f i f t h i s s u e , r e g a r d i n g t h e e f f e c t of e r r o r s
by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t , i s merely a summary of arguments we
have a l r e a d y addressed i n t h e p r e v i o u s f o u r i s s u e s . W find
e
no m e r i t i n t h i s c o n t e n t i o n t h a t d e f e n d a n t was denied a f a i r
trial.
F i n a l l y , d e f e n d a n t contends t h e r e was n o t s u f f i c i e n t
evidence t o s u p p o r t t h e v e r d i c t s of g u i l t y e n t e r e d a g a i n s t
him. Again, d e f e n d a n t i s p r i m a r i l y concerned w i t h t h e
e v i d e n c e s u p p o r t i n g h i s c o n t e n t i o n t h a t he a c t e d i n a j u s t i -
f i e d manner. But, " [ w l h e t h e r t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s w e r e s u c h a s
t o j u s t i f y d e f e n d a n t ' s a c t i o n s i s c l e a r l y a q u e s t i o n of f a c t
f o r t h e jury." S t a t e v. Larson ( 1 9 7 8 ) , Mont. I
574 P.2d 266, 269, 35 St.Rep. 69, 73.
Defendant's conviction i s affirmed.
W e Concur:
~ 4 A %&?Q
8
Chief J u s t i c e