No. 80-147
IN THE SUPREMI3 COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1980
IN THE MATTER OF N.B.
Appeal from: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial
District,
In and for the County of Yellowstone.
Honorable Diane G. Barz, Judge presiding.
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant:
James D. Johnson, Montana Legal Services, argued, Warm
Springs, Montana
For Respondent:
Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Sheri Sprigg argued, Assistant Attorney General,
Helena, Montana
Harold F. Hanser, County Attorney, Billings, Montana
Submitted: November 21, 1980
Decided :
ftE0 2 4 1980
Filed:
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Mr. J u s t i c e J o h n C. Sheehy delivered the Opinion of the
Court.
N.B. a p p e a l s from an o r d e r o f the Thirteenth Judicial
District Court, Yellowstone County. After a nonjury
hearing, t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t made a finding t h a t N.B. was
s e r i o u s l y m e n t a l l y ill. He was i n v o l u n t a r i l y c o m m i t t e d t o
Warm S p r i n g s S t a t e H o s p i t a l f o r t h r e e months o f e v a l u a t i o n
and t r e a t m e n t . This appeal r a i s e s the following issues f o r
our c o n s i d e r a t i o n :
1. Did t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t commit e r r o r i n i t s f i n d i n g s
by using "reasonable medical certainty" as the legal
standard of persuasion necessary to find N.B. seriously
mentally i l l ?
2. Does t h e c l a u s e " e x c e p t t h a t m e n t a l d i s o r d e r s s h a l l
be evidenced to a reasonable medical certainty" found in
section 53-21-126(2), MCA, lower the legal standard of
persuasion required in civil commitment proceedings below
t h e " c l e a r and c o n v i n c i n g " s t a n d a r d r e q u i r e d by F o u r t e e n t h
Amendment d u e p r o c e s s ?
3. Can t h i s C o u r t c o n s i d e r t h e s e i s s u e s where N.B. I s
commitment may be m o o t , and where t h e i s s u e s were n o t r a i s e d
i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court?
We hold that these issues are properly before us.
Although w e b e l i e v e t h e s t a t u t o r y l e g a l s t a n d a r d f o r proving
s e r i o u s mental illness is constitutional, we reverse and
dismiss the order of the District Court. The D i s t r i c t
C o u r t e r r e d by u s i n g t h e s t a n d a r d f o r j u d g i n g t h e c o m p e t e n c e
of a medical witness1 testimony i n p l a c e of the required
legal standard of persuasion for d e t e r m i n i n g whether N.B.
was s e r i o u s l y m e n t a l l y i l l . The meager e v i d e n t i a r y r e c o r d
developed i n t h i s case does not support a remand of this
case t o t h e D i s t r i c t Court. N.B. i s n o t shown i n t h e r e c o r d
b e f o r e u s t o be s e r i o u s l y m e n t a l l y i l l by t h e r e q u i r e d l e g a l
s t a n d a r d o f p e r s u a s i o n o f c l e a r and c o n v i n c i n g p r o o f .
On December 5, 1979, Scott Schreiber, a counselor-
therapist of the South Central Montana Regional Mental
H e a l t h C e n t e r , r e q u e s t e d t h e Y e l l o w s t o n e County A t t o r n e y t o
f i l e a p e t i t i o n a l l e g i n g N.B. t o be s e r i o u s l y m e n t a l l y i l l
and d a n g e r o u s . S c h r e i b e r r e q u e s t e d t h a t N.B. be c o m m i t t e d
t o a s t a t e mental h o s p i t a l . A formal p e t i t i o n f o r N . B . ' s
commitment was filed that same day. From information
included i n the p e t i t i o n , t h e D i s t r i c t Court determined t h a t
probable cause e x i s t e d t o b e l i e v e t h a t N.B. was s e r i o u s l y
mentally ill. The court ordered that N.B. undergo a
p s y c h o l o g i c a l e x a m i n a t i o n a d m i n i s t e r e d by a p r o f e s s i o n a l o f
the South C e n t r a l Montana Regional Mental Health Center.
Apparently to satisfy this order, Schreiber visited with
N.B. for 30 minutes and sent a letter to the county
a t t o r n e y ' s o f f i c e i n d i c a t i n g t h a t N.B. was " u n m a n a g e a b l e on
a n o u t p a t i e n t b a s i s " and " i n need o f l o n g - t e r m treatment.''
I n t h i s l e t t e r , S c h r e i b e r recommended t h a t N . B . be committed
to t h e Warm Springs S t a t e Hospital for a period of three
months.
An i n - c h a m b e r s h e a r i n g was h e l d on December 11, 1 9 7 9 ,
r e g a r d i n g t h e p e t i t i o n f o r commitment. N.B. was p r e s e n t a t
the hearing and was represented by counsel. The only
witness to testify in favor of N.B.'s commitment was
Schreiber. Schreiber indicated that h e was q u a l i f i e d to
t e s t i f y a s a " p r o f e s s i o n a l person" i n t h e t r e a t m e n t of t h e
m e n t a l l y ill. S c h r e i b e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t he b e l i e v e d N.B. was
a danger to himself and to others and that N.B. was
seriously mentally ill. In cross-examination, Schreiber
a d m i t t e d t h a t he d i d n o t have a d e g r e e i n p s y c h o l o g y and
that his commitment r e c o m m e n d a t i o n was based in part on
events not personally known by him. Schreiber further
a d m i t t e d t h a t N . B . ' s b e h a v i o r improved w h i l e N.B. was t a k i n g
tranquilizing medication. In his own defense, N.B.
testified that his e r r a t i c behavior can be controlled by
medication. He t e s t i f i e d t h a t h i s r e c e n t e r r a t i c b e h a v i o u r
o c c u r r e d a f t e r he " r a n o u t " o f m e d i c a t i o n .
I n t h e absence of the presiding judge from c h a m b e r s ,
another d i s t r i c t judge signed a s t a t e m e n t of f i n d i n g s and
order for N.B.'s i n v o l u n t a r y commitment. Finding of fact
no. 7 made by t h e c o u r t r e a d a s f o l l o w s : "The R e s p o n d e n t
(N.B.) is t o a reasonable medical c e r t a i n t y seriously
mentally ill as defined in Section 53-21-102(14) Montana
Code A n n o t a t e d , 1979." (Emphasis added.) N.B. was then
involuntarily committed t o t h e Warm S p r i n g s M e n t a l H e a l t h
facility for t h r e e months. By the time this a p p e a l was
submitted to this Court, N.B. had been released from t h e
facility.
Two c a r d i n a l r u l e s o f t h i s Court provide t h a t w e w i l l
not render an o p i n i o n c o n c e r n i n g a n i s s u e t h a t i s moot and
t h a t a p a r t y may n o t r a i s e a n i s s u e f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e on
appeal to this Court. Counsel for N.B. fears we may
classify the i s s u e s he raises a s moot because of N.B.'s
release from t h e Warm S p r i n g s f a c i l i t y . Counsel for the
S t a t e , a s respondent i n t h i s appeal, argues t h a t t h e i s s u e s
r a i s e d by N . B . s h o u l d be d i s m i s s e d b e c a u s e N.B. failed to
r a i s e them d u r i n g t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t h e a r i n g . Although t h e
State acknowledges that the District Court erred in its
f i n d i n g of f a c t no. 7, it contends t h a t N.B. should f i r s t
r e t u r n t o t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t and move t h a t c o u r t t o c o r r e c t
i t s f i n d i n g s and e n t e r a new o r d e r .
The i m p o r t a n t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l questions presented here
are not rendered moot by N.B.'s release from the Warm
S p r i n g s mental h e a l t h f a c i l i t y . During o r a l argument, we
were i n f o r m e d by counsel that a p p r o x i m a t e l y 100 Montanans
each year a r e i n v o l u n t a r i l y committed for t h r e e months o f
t r e a t m e n t and e v a l u a t i o n i n t h e Warm S p r i n g s f a c i l i t y . The
t i m e l y a p p e a l o f an o r d e r o f i n v o l u n t a r i l y commitment by a n y
of these persons be£ o r e release is virtually impossible
g i v e n o u r r u l e s of a p p e l l a t e p r o c e d u r e . The c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
problem p r e s e n t e d i n t h i s a p p e a l t h e n " c o u l d be c a p a b l e o f
repetition, yet could evade review." See, Roe v. Wade
( 1 9 7 3 ) , 410 U.S. 1 1 3 , 93 S . C t . 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147. This
C o u r t r e s e r v e s t o i t s e l f t h e power t o e x a m i n e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
issues that i n v o l v e broad p u b l i c concerns t o avoid f u t u r e
litigation on a point of law. We reject the State's
a r g u m e n t t h a t t h i s a p p e a l s h o u l d be d i s m i s s e d f o r f a i l u r e t o
raise these issues for the first time on appeal if the
a l l e g e d D i s t r i c t Court e r r o r af f e c t s t h e s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s
of a litigant. See, Halldorson v. Halldorson ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 175
Mont. 1 7 0 , 573 P.2d 1 6 9 .
The s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t c l a i m e d t o h a v e b e e n harmed is
N.B. I s r i g h t t o n o t be c o m m i t t e d t o a s t a t e m e n t a l h o s p i t a l
without clear and convincing proof that he is seriously
m e n t a l l y ill. Addington v. T e x a s ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 441 U.S. 418, 99
S.Ct. 1 8 0 4 , 60 L.Ed.2d 323. I n Addinqton, t h e United S t a t e s
Supreme C o u r t h e l d t h a t d u e p r o c e s s r e q u i r e s a s t a n d a r d o f
clear and c o n v i n c i n g p r o o f of dangerous mental illness in
involuntary commitment proceedings. The Court concluded
t h a t p r o o f by mere p r e p o n d e r a n c e o f t h e e v i d e n c e f a l l s s h o r t
o f m e e t i n g t h e demands o f d u e p r o c e s s , w h i l e t h e s t r i n g e n t
standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt could not
constitutionally be required given the subtleties and
nuances of mental i l l n e s s d i a g n o s i s . The C o u r t s e l e c t e d t h e
"clear and convincing" standard as the legal burden of
.persuasion in these proceedings after balancing the
individual's interests in not being involuntarily confined
with the State's interests in commiting the mentally
disturbed for treatment. The "clear and convincing"
standard was chosen because the loss of liberty resulting
from involuntary commitment calls for a convincing showing
that the individual suffers from dangerous mental illness.
Section 53-21-126(2), MCA, provides Montana's standard
of persuasion required in involuntary commitment
proceedings :
"The standard of proof in any hearing held
pursuant to this section is proof beyond a
reasonable doubt with respect to any physical
facts or evidence and clear and convincing
evidence as to all other matters, except that
m e n t a l d i s o r d e r s s h a l l be evidenced to a
reasonable medical c e r t a i n t y . . ."
(Emphasis added.)
Counsel for N.B. asserts that section 53-21-126 (2),
MCA, creates a "trifurcated" legal standa.rd of persuasion:
part proof beyond a reasonable doubt, part clear and
convincing proof and part proof with reasonable medical
certainty. This final part of the statutory standard, he
contends, creates an unconstitutionally low standard of
persuasion under the rule in Addington. He argues that
proof by reasonable medical certainty is less than clear and
convincing proof.
We disagree with counsel's interpretation of the
statute. We find that Montana's bifurcated standard of
persuasion for involuntary commitment is sufficient to pass
constitutional -
scrutiny under Addington. Our statute
requires part proof beyond a reasonable doubt and part clear
and convincing proof. We interpret the statute's use of
"reasonable medical certainty" only as a standard for the
medical witness testifying in commitment proceedings. A
better statement is that proof of mental disorders to a
reasonable medical certainty is s u f f i c i e n t if, considered
w i t h a l l t h e o t h e r e v i d e n c e i n t h e c a s e , t h e t r i e r of f a c t
i s l e d t o t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e m e n t a l d i s o r d e r e x i s t s by
c l e a r and c o n v i n c i n g p r o o f .
A l t h o u g h we f i n d t h i s s t a t u t e t o be c o n s t i t u t i o n a l , t h e
legal standard of persuasion it requires was far from
satisfied by the evidence produced in N.B. ' s commitment
proceeding. A "professional person" of unknown expertise
was t h e s o l e w i t n e s s p r o d u c e d t o p r o v e t h e m e n t a l d i s o r d e r
of N . B . The t e s t i m o n y g i v e n by t h i s " p r o f e s s i o n a l p e r s o n "
was substantially insufficient with reasonable medical
c e r t a i n t y t o p r o v e l e g a l l y t h a t N.B. was s e r i o u s l y m e n t a l l y
ill.
The o r d e r o f t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t i s r e v e r s e d . The c o u r t
erred by using reasonable medical certainty alone as a
sufficient standard of proof of serious mental illness.
W h i l e we f i n d t h e s t a t u t e t o be c o n s t i t u t i o n a l , we d i s m i s s
this cause because legally insufficient evidence was
p r e s e n t e d t o p r o v e t h a t N.B. was s e r i o u s l y m e n t a l l y i l l .
R e v e r s e d and d i s m i s s e d .
Justice
W e Concur:
Justices