Matter of NB

No. 80-147 IN THE SUPREMI3 COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1980 IN THE MATTER OF N.B. Appeal from: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, In and for the County of Yellowstone. Honorable Diane G. Barz, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: James D. Johnson, Montana Legal Services, argued, Warm Springs, Montana For Respondent: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Sheri Sprigg argued, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana Harold F. Hanser, County Attorney, Billings, Montana Submitted: November 21, 1980 Decided : ftE0 2 4 1980 Filed: *PC J)I~[L - :h ~ u Mr. J u s t i c e J o h n C. Sheehy delivered the Opinion of the Court. N.B. a p p e a l s from an o r d e r o f the Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County. After a nonjury hearing, t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t made a finding t h a t N.B. was s e r i o u s l y m e n t a l l y ill. He was i n v o l u n t a r i l y c o m m i t t e d t o Warm S p r i n g s S t a t e H o s p i t a l f o r t h r e e months o f e v a l u a t i o n and t r e a t m e n t . This appeal r a i s e s the following issues f o r our c o n s i d e r a t i o n : 1. Did t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t commit e r r o r i n i t s f i n d i n g s by using "reasonable medical certainty" as the legal standard of persuasion necessary to find N.B. seriously mentally i l l ? 2. Does t h e c l a u s e " e x c e p t t h a t m e n t a l d i s o r d e r s s h a l l be evidenced to a reasonable medical certainty" found in section 53-21-126(2), MCA, lower the legal standard of persuasion required in civil commitment proceedings below t h e " c l e a r and c o n v i n c i n g " s t a n d a r d r e q u i r e d by F o u r t e e n t h Amendment d u e p r o c e s s ? 3. Can t h i s C o u r t c o n s i d e r t h e s e i s s u e s where N.B. I s commitment may be m o o t , and where t h e i s s u e s were n o t r a i s e d i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court? We hold that these issues are properly before us. Although w e b e l i e v e t h e s t a t u t o r y l e g a l s t a n d a r d f o r proving s e r i o u s mental illness is constitutional, we reverse and dismiss the order of the District Court. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d by u s i n g t h e s t a n d a r d f o r j u d g i n g t h e c o m p e t e n c e of a medical witness1 testimony i n p l a c e of the required legal standard of persuasion for d e t e r m i n i n g whether N.B. was s e r i o u s l y m e n t a l l y i l l . The meager e v i d e n t i a r y r e c o r d developed i n t h i s case does not support a remand of this case t o t h e D i s t r i c t Court. N.B. i s n o t shown i n t h e r e c o r d b e f o r e u s t o be s e r i o u s l y m e n t a l l y i l l by t h e r e q u i r e d l e g a l s t a n d a r d o f p e r s u a s i o n o f c l e a r and c o n v i n c i n g p r o o f . On December 5, 1979, Scott Schreiber, a counselor- therapist of the South Central Montana Regional Mental H e a l t h C e n t e r , r e q u e s t e d t h e Y e l l o w s t o n e County A t t o r n e y t o f i l e a p e t i t i o n a l l e g i n g N.B. t o be s e r i o u s l y m e n t a l l y i l l and d a n g e r o u s . S c h r e i b e r r e q u e s t e d t h a t N.B. be c o m m i t t e d t o a s t a t e mental h o s p i t a l . A formal p e t i t i o n f o r N . B . ' s commitment was filed that same day. From information included i n the p e t i t i o n , t h e D i s t r i c t Court determined t h a t probable cause e x i s t e d t o b e l i e v e t h a t N.B. was s e r i o u s l y mentally ill. The court ordered that N.B. undergo a p s y c h o l o g i c a l e x a m i n a t i o n a d m i n i s t e r e d by a p r o f e s s i o n a l o f the South C e n t r a l Montana Regional Mental Health Center. Apparently to satisfy this order, Schreiber visited with N.B. for 30 minutes and sent a letter to the county a t t o r n e y ' s o f f i c e i n d i c a t i n g t h a t N.B. was " u n m a n a g e a b l e on a n o u t p a t i e n t b a s i s " and " i n need o f l o n g - t e r m treatment.'' I n t h i s l e t t e r , S c h r e i b e r recommended t h a t N . B . be committed to t h e Warm Springs S t a t e Hospital for a period of three months. An i n - c h a m b e r s h e a r i n g was h e l d on December 11, 1 9 7 9 , r e g a r d i n g t h e p e t i t i o n f o r commitment. N.B. was p r e s e n t a t the hearing and was represented by counsel. The only witness to testify in favor of N.B.'s commitment was Schreiber. Schreiber indicated that h e was q u a l i f i e d to t e s t i f y a s a " p r o f e s s i o n a l person" i n t h e t r e a t m e n t of t h e m e n t a l l y ill. S c h r e i b e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t he b e l i e v e d N.B. was a danger to himself and to others and that N.B. was seriously mentally ill. In cross-examination, Schreiber a d m i t t e d t h a t he d i d n o t have a d e g r e e i n p s y c h o l o g y and that his commitment r e c o m m e n d a t i o n was based in part on events not personally known by him. Schreiber further a d m i t t e d t h a t N . B . ' s b e h a v i o r improved w h i l e N.B. was t a k i n g tranquilizing medication. In his own defense, N.B. testified that his e r r a t i c behavior can be controlled by medication. He t e s t i f i e d t h a t h i s r e c e n t e r r a t i c b e h a v i o u r o c c u r r e d a f t e r he " r a n o u t " o f m e d i c a t i o n . I n t h e absence of the presiding judge from c h a m b e r s , another d i s t r i c t judge signed a s t a t e m e n t of f i n d i n g s and order for N.B.'s i n v o l u n t a r y commitment. Finding of fact no. 7 made by t h e c o u r t r e a d a s f o l l o w s : "The R e s p o n d e n t (N.B.) is t o a reasonable medical c e r t a i n t y seriously mentally ill as defined in Section 53-21-102(14) Montana Code A n n o t a t e d , 1979." (Emphasis added.) N.B. was then involuntarily committed t o t h e Warm S p r i n g s M e n t a l H e a l t h facility for t h r e e months. By the time this a p p e a l was submitted to this Court, N.B. had been released from t h e facility. Two c a r d i n a l r u l e s o f t h i s Court provide t h a t w e w i l l not render an o p i n i o n c o n c e r n i n g a n i s s u e t h a t i s moot and t h a t a p a r t y may n o t r a i s e a n i s s u e f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e on appeal to this Court. Counsel for N.B. fears we may classify the i s s u e s he raises a s moot because of N.B.'s release from t h e Warm S p r i n g s f a c i l i t y . Counsel for the S t a t e , a s respondent i n t h i s appeal, argues t h a t t h e i s s u e s r a i s e d by N . B . s h o u l d be d i s m i s s e d b e c a u s e N.B. failed to r a i s e them d u r i n g t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t h e a r i n g . Although t h e State acknowledges that the District Court erred in its f i n d i n g of f a c t no. 7, it contends t h a t N.B. should f i r s t r e t u r n t o t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t and move t h a t c o u r t t o c o r r e c t i t s f i n d i n g s and e n t e r a new o r d e r . The i m p o r t a n t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l questions presented here are not rendered moot by N.B.'s release from the Warm S p r i n g s mental h e a l t h f a c i l i t y . During o r a l argument, we were i n f o r m e d by counsel that a p p r o x i m a t e l y 100 Montanans each year a r e i n v o l u n t a r i l y committed for t h r e e months o f t r e a t m e n t and e v a l u a t i o n i n t h e Warm S p r i n g s f a c i l i t y . The t i m e l y a p p e a l o f an o r d e r o f i n v o l u n t a r i l y commitment by a n y of these persons be£ o r e release is virtually impossible g i v e n o u r r u l e s of a p p e l l a t e p r o c e d u r e . The c o n s t i t u t i o n a l problem p r e s e n t e d i n t h i s a p p e a l t h e n " c o u l d be c a p a b l e o f repetition, yet could evade review." See, Roe v. Wade ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 410 U.S. 1 1 3 , 93 S . C t . 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147. This C o u r t r e s e r v e s t o i t s e l f t h e power t o e x a m i n e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l issues that i n v o l v e broad p u b l i c concerns t o avoid f u t u r e litigation on a point of law. We reject the State's a r g u m e n t t h a t t h i s a p p e a l s h o u l d be d i s m i s s e d f o r f a i l u r e t o raise these issues for the first time on appeal if the a l l e g e d D i s t r i c t Court e r r o r af f e c t s t h e s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s of a litigant. See, Halldorson v. Halldorson ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 175 Mont. 1 7 0 , 573 P.2d 1 6 9 . The s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t c l a i m e d t o h a v e b e e n harmed is N.B. I s r i g h t t o n o t be c o m m i t t e d t o a s t a t e m e n t a l h o s p i t a l without clear and convincing proof that he is seriously m e n t a l l y ill. Addington v. T e x a s ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 441 U.S. 418, 99 S.Ct. 1 8 0 4 , 60 L.Ed.2d 323. I n Addinqton, t h e United S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t h e l d t h a t d u e p r o c e s s r e q u i r e s a s t a n d a r d o f clear and c o n v i n c i n g p r o o f of dangerous mental illness in involuntary commitment proceedings. The Court concluded t h a t p r o o f by mere p r e p o n d e r a n c e o f t h e e v i d e n c e f a l l s s h o r t o f m e e t i n g t h e demands o f d u e p r o c e s s , w h i l e t h e s t r i n g e n t standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt could not constitutionally be required given the subtleties and nuances of mental i l l n e s s d i a g n o s i s . The C o u r t s e l e c t e d t h e "clear and convincing" standard as the legal burden of .persuasion in these proceedings after balancing the individual's interests in not being involuntarily confined with the State's interests in commiting the mentally disturbed for treatment. The "clear and convincing" standard was chosen because the loss of liberty resulting from involuntary commitment calls for a convincing showing that the individual suffers from dangerous mental illness. Section 53-21-126(2), MCA, provides Montana's standard of persuasion required in involuntary commitment proceedings : "The standard of proof in any hearing held pursuant to this section is proof beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to any physical facts or evidence and clear and convincing evidence as to all other matters, except that m e n t a l d i s o r d e r s s h a l l be evidenced to a reasonable medical c e r t a i n t y . . ." (Emphasis added.) Counsel for N.B. asserts that section 53-21-126 (2), MCA, creates a "trifurcated" legal standa.rd of persuasion: part proof beyond a reasonable doubt, part clear and convincing proof and part proof with reasonable medical certainty. This final part of the statutory standard, he contends, creates an unconstitutionally low standard of persuasion under the rule in Addington. He argues that proof by reasonable medical certainty is less than clear and convincing proof. We disagree with counsel's interpretation of the statute. We find that Montana's bifurcated standard of persuasion for involuntary commitment is sufficient to pass constitutional - scrutiny under Addington. Our statute requires part proof beyond a reasonable doubt and part clear and convincing proof. We interpret the statute's use of "reasonable medical certainty" only as a standard for the medical witness testifying in commitment proceedings. A better statement is that proof of mental disorders to a reasonable medical certainty is s u f f i c i e n t if, considered w i t h a l l t h e o t h e r e v i d e n c e i n t h e c a s e , t h e t r i e r of f a c t i s l e d t o t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e m e n t a l d i s o r d e r e x i s t s by c l e a r and c o n v i n c i n g p r o o f . A l t h o u g h we f i n d t h i s s t a t u t e t o be c o n s t i t u t i o n a l , t h e legal standard of persuasion it requires was far from satisfied by the evidence produced in N.B. ' s commitment proceeding. A "professional person" of unknown expertise was t h e s o l e w i t n e s s p r o d u c e d t o p r o v e t h e m e n t a l d i s o r d e r of N . B . The t e s t i m o n y g i v e n by t h i s " p r o f e s s i o n a l p e r s o n " was substantially insufficient with reasonable medical c e r t a i n t y t o p r o v e l e g a l l y t h a t N.B. was s e r i o u s l y m e n t a l l y ill. The o r d e r o f t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t i s r e v e r s e d . The c o u r t erred by using reasonable medical certainty alone as a sufficient standard of proof of serious mental illness. W h i l e we f i n d t h e s t a t u t e t o be c o n s t i t u t i o n a l , we d i s m i s s this cause because legally insufficient evidence was p r e s e n t e d t o p r o v e t h a t N.B. was s e r i o u s l y m e n t a l l y i l l . R e v e r s e d and d i s m i s s e d . Justice W e Concur: Justices