No. 80-72
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1980
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE
OF MABEL I. COX
Appeal from: District Court of the Tenth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Fergus.
Honorable LeRoy McKinnon, Judge presiding.
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant:
Parrish, Knopp and O'Hare, Lewistown, Montana
Bradley Parrish argued, Lewistown, Montana
For Respondent:
William Berger argued, Lewistown, Montana
Submitted: November 20, 1980
Decided: BEc 2 4 1980
Filed: E 2 4 l$o$
C
Mr. J u s t i c e J o h n C. Sheehy d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n o f t h e
Court.
Appellant, Raymond Cox a p p e a l s from a n o r d e r of
t h e Tenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t Court, Fergus County,
admitting the holographic will of Mabel I. Cox to
probate.
The determinative question is whether a will,
bearing unexplained markings through its text when
discovered, h a s been r e v o k e d by c a n c e l l a t i o n p u r s u a n t
t o s e c t i o n 72-2-321, MCA. W hold
e that such a w i l l
shall be presumed canceled by the testator with the
i n t e n t t o revoke, u n l e s s proven otherwise.
Mabel Cox died on May 16, 1979, leaving six
children as survivors. The d e c e d e n t ' s h o l o g r a p h i c w i l l
was f o u n d i n h e r bedroom n i g h t s t a n d t h e f o l l o w i n g d a y
by r e s p o n d e n t R i c h a r d Cox, p r o p o n e n t o f t h e w i l l .
The w i l l is written entirely in decedent's
handwriting with two d i f f e r e n t - c o l o r e d inks, on a
s i n g l e p a g e of n o t e b o o k p a p e r . I t i s s i g n e d and d a t e d
May 3 0 , 1973. The w i l l c o n s i s t s o f seven paragraphs
l i s t e d down t h e p a g e , p l u s a n e i g h t h p a r a g r a p h s l a n t e d
i n t h e lower right-hand corner. Eight large X ' s have
b e e n drawn on t h e s h e e t s u c h t h a t a l l p a r a g r a p h s e x c e p t
the slanted writing have markings through them or
p a r t i a l l y t h r o u g h them. A d d i t i o n a l l y , t h e words " W i l l
and T e s t a m o n y " ( s i c ) which begin the w i l l have been
lined out three times. Thus, the will appears as
follows:
I
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v-- - ---I77 i, i $ -i ,f Y -~
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- -(7 i J'VtL:: ; Sq
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- I: k p*g ; 4 ~'a k 4 J d A? ~~~~9~~
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4,
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. -- L. b .I/C L Gc 1
1 '/GU-$
. -
The principal asset of the Cox estate is
decedent's home, which would pass under the will to
Richard Cox. Other assets include certificates of
d e p o s i t v a l u e d a t a p p r o x i m a t e l y $2,500 a p i e c e , one h e l d
i n j o i n t t e n a n c y b e t w e e n d e c e d e n t and e a c h c h i l d e x c e p t
Richard; and household furnishings which would pass
v a r i o u s l y t o a l l s i x c h i l d r e n under t h e w i l l .
On June 11, 1979, Raymond Cox petitioned the
District Court for an adjudication of intestacy and
appointment of a p e r s o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e . Thereafter,
R i c h a r d Cox p e t i t i o n e d t h e c o u r t f o r f o r m a l p r o b a t e o f
the w i l l . The p e t i t i o n s w e r e c o n s o l i d a t e d f o r h e a r i n g .
Neither party presented evidence at the hearing
which explained the origin of the markings. The
evidence was also inconclusive as to decedent's
intended disposition of her estate. Testimony
indicated t h a t during the period s h o r t l y preceding her
d e a t h , d e c e d e n t had i n d i c a t e d t h a t s h e w i s h e d t o t r e a t
a l l children equally, and t h a t s h e wished Richard to
receive the house. Since the home comprised the
largest portion of the estate, these expressed
i n t e n t i o n s were m u t u a l l y e x c l u s i v e .
The District Court found that there was no
explanation for the X ' s on t h e w i l l . Based on t h i s
finding, the court concluded that there was no
s u f f i c i e n t proof of an i n t e n t t o revoke t h e w i l l , and
granted t h e p e t i t i o n f o r formal probate. Opponents of
the w i l l appeal.
Appellant argues the court erred in concluding,
based on t h e f a c t u a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t t h e r e was no
proof on the record explaining the presence of the
markings, t h a t t h e r e e x i s t e d no s u f f i c i e n t p r o o f o f a n
intent to revoke the will. The correct approach,
a p p e l l a n t s u b m i t s , is t h a t t h e p r e s e n c e o f t h e m a r k i n g s
on a will discovered in the custody of a decedent
should give rise to a presumption that the a c t s of
mutilation were peformed by the testator with the
i n t e n t i o n t o revoke. I n r e Kernper's E s t a t e ( 1 9 4 4 ) , 1 5 7
Kan. 7 2 7 , 1 4 5 P.2d 1 0 3 . W agree.
e
The evidentiary burdens for will contests are
p r e s c r i b e d by s e c t i o n 72-3-310, MCA:
". . . P r o p o n e n t s of a w i l l have t h e
b u r d e n of e s t a b l i s h i n g p r i m a f a c i e
proof of due execution i n a l l c a s e s
and, i f they a r e a l s o p e t i t i o n e r s ,
p r i m a f a c i e p r o o f o f d e a t h and v e n u e .
C o n t e s t a n t s of a w i l l have t h e burden
of e s t a b l i s h i n g l a c k of testamentary
i n t e n t o r c a p a c i t y , undue i n f l u e n c e ,
fraud, duress, mistake, or revocation.
P a r t i e s have t h e u l t i m a t e burden of
persuasion a s t o matters with respect
t o which t h e y h a v e t h e i n i t i a l b u r d e n
of p r o o f . "
This procedure is essentially a codification of the
common law. See, I n r e Colbert's Estate (1904), 31
972.
Mont. 4 6 1 , 466, 78 P. 9 7 1 , / T h e r e i s no q u e s t i o n t h a t
p r o p o n e n t ' s i n i t i a l b u r d e n h a s b e e n met.
The f o c a l p o i n t o f t h e c a s e is t h e c o n t e s t a n t ' s
burden t o prove revocation. R e v o c a t i o n by a c t may be
e f f e c t e d only pursuant t o s e c t i o n 72-2-321(2), MCA: "A
w i l l or any p a r t t h e r e o f is revoked: . . . (2) by
being burned, t o r n , canceled, o b l i t e r a t e d , o r destroyed
w i t h t h e i n t e n t and f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f r e v o k i n g i t by
t h e t e s t a t o r o r by a n o t h e r p e r s o n i n h i s p r e s e n c e and
by h i s d i r e c t i o n . "
Clearly, the acts of cancellation here are
sufficient to revoke a will, although the writing
remains legible and the signature has not been
obliterated. Intent to revoke is the controlling
factor, rather than the severity of the act which
manifests that intent. The form and e x t e n t o f t h e a c t s
are then unimportant as long as they constitute a
physical token of the i n t e n t t o revoke. Kemper, 145
P.2d a t 108.
T h i s i s a c a s e of f i r s t i m p r e s s i o n i n s o f a r a s it
addresses t h e q u e s t i o n of presumed i n t e n t within the
c o n t e x t of a canceled w i l l . Nevertheless, t h i s Court
h a s p r e v i o u s l y c o n s i d e r e d t h e same q u e s t i o n w i t h i n t h e
destroyed/lost will context. Matter of Estate of
Hartman (1977), 172 Mont. 225, 563 P.2d 569.
Revocation by either destruction or cancellation is
g o v e r n e d by s e c t i o n 72-2-321, MCA. The two means o f
revocation differ, in effect, only as a matter of
degree; and we find the rationale of Hartman
c o n t r o l l i n g i n t h i s c l o s e l y analogous s i t u a t i o n .
W t h e r e f o r e h o l d t h a t where a w i l l h a s b e e n i n
e
t h e c u s t o d y o f t h e t e s t a t o r and i s d i s c o v e r e d among h e r
effects in a canceled or defaced condition, the
testator s h a l l be presumed t o have done t h e a c t w i t h
t h e i n t e n t t o revoke. Hartman, supra; Atkinson, W i l l s
5 1 0 1 , a t 554. P a g e , The Law o f W i l l s § 29.140 a t 700-
01.
A w i l l c o n t e s t a n t may, i n t h i s and o t h e r s i m i l a r
instances, utilize this rebuttable presumption in
meeting his burden of proving revocation. The
proponent then has the burden of going forward with
s u f f i c i e n t evidence regarding r e l e v a n t f a c t o r s and
circumstances t o rebut t h e presumption. Hartman, 563
P.2d a t 574.
Proponent, at argument, emphasized three
opponents' momentary p o s s i b l e access to the w i l l and
o p p o r t u n i t y t o d e s t r o y i t on t h e e v e n i n g o f Mrs. Cox'
decease. However, the f a c t that the w i l l contestants
had a f l e e t i n g o p p o r t u n i t y t o tamper w i t h t h e w i l l d o e s
not, of itself, overcome t h e p r e s u m p t i o n ; but, rather
is a c i r c u m s t a n c e w h i c h m u s t be c o n s i d e r e d w i t h o t h e r
proof. Matter of Travers' Estate ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 121 Ariz.
282, 589 P.2d 1 3 1 4 . Here t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t d e t e r m i n e d
t h e r e was no e x p l a n a t i o n f o r t h e m a r k i n g s . Proponent's
c o n j e c t u r e regarding t h e o r i g i n of t h e markings a s i d e ,
the finding is n o t a c l e a r l y erroneous e v a l u a t i o n of
the record and may not be set aside. Rule 52(a),
M.R.Civ.P. The presumed revocation, standing
unrebutted, therefore controls.
Proponent finally submits that if the will is
deemed r e v o k e d , i t s h o u l d be a d m i t t e d t o p r o b a t e u n d e r
the doctrine of dependent r e l a t i v e revocation. Under
the rules set forth in Matter of Estate of Patten
(1978), Mont . , 587 P.2d 1307, 35 S t . R e p .
1983, t h a t doctrine c l e a r l y cannot apply here, where
there i s no superseding w i l l and no e v i d e n c e o f any
i n t e n t t o e x e c u t e one.
This Court has n o t y e t s p e c i f i c a l l y adopted the
doctrine of dependent relative revocation in a case
requiring that consideration. Authorities indicate,
however, that dependent relative revocation only
a p p l i e s where t h e r e i s a c l e a r i n t e n t o f t h e t e s t a t o r
t h a t t h e r e v o c a t i o n o f a n o l d w i l l b e c o n d i t i o n a l upon
t h e v a l i d i t y of t h e new w i l l . The c o n d i t i o n m u s t be
p r o v e n by s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e o f p r o b a t i v e v a l u e , and
e v i d e n c e of t h e i n t e n t c a n n o t be l e f t t o s p e c u l a t i o n ,
supposition, conjecture or possibility. Further, there
m u s t be a n i m m e d i a t e i n t e n t t o make a new w i l l , and t h e
new w i l l m u s t be e x e c u t e d c o n c u r r e n t l y w i t h o r s h o r t l y
after destruction of the old. Patten, 587 P.2d at
1309. None o f t h e s e c r i t e r i a h a v e b e e n e s t a b l i s h e d .
Reversed and remanded with instructions to grant
t h e p e t i t i o n f o r a d j u d i c a t i o n o f i n t e s t a c y and t o d e n y
t h e p e t i t i o n f o r formal probate.
W Concur:
e
Chief J u s t i c e
Justices /