Tureman v. Tureman

No. 80-121 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1980 LIN TUREMAN, Petitioner and ~espondent, VS . SALLY TUREMAN, Appellant and Respondent. Appeal from: District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial ~istrict, Honorable Joseph B. Gary, Judge presiding. In and for the County of Gallatin. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Morrow, Sedivy, Olson and Scully, Bozeman, Montana For Respondent : Larry D. Whitman, West Yellowstone, Montana Submitted on briefs: August 13, 1980 - Clerk Mr. J u s t i c e Daniel J. Shea delivered the Opinion of the Court. S a l l y Tureman, t h e w i f e of L i n Tureman, a p p e a l s from t h e p o r t i o n o f a m a r r i a g e d i s s o l u t i o n d e c r e e e n t e r e d by t h e G a l l a t i n County D i s t r i c t C o u r t d e t e r m i n i n g t h a t s h e was n o t entitled to a share of the property accumulated by the husband s i n c e t h e p a r t i e s ' separation eight years earlier. S h e a l s o a p p e a l s from t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n t h a t s h e was n o t e n t i t l e d t o r e t r o a c t i v e c h i l d s u p p o r t p a y m e n t s f o r the previous eight years. W a f f i r m t h e judgment. e The focal point of the wife's contentions is two a g r e e m e n t s e n t e r e d i n t o by t h e p a r t i e s when t h e y s e p a r a t e d . One of t h e s e a g r e e m e n t s g a v e c u s t o d y o f t h e p a r t i e s c h i l d t o t h e w i f e and r e q u i r e d t h e h u s b a n d t o p a y $75 p e r month i n child support. The o t h e r a g r e e m e n t was a b u y - o u t agreement where the husband would pay $22,400 to the wife for her s h a r e of t h e p a r t i e s ' major a s s e t , a b a r and r e s t a u r a n t i n West Y e l l o w s t o n e . The w i f e c o n t e n d s t h e s e c o n d a g r e e m e n t was n o t a p r o p e r t y s e t t l e m e n t a g r e e m e n t and s h o u l d n o t h a v e been r e c o g n i z e d a s s u c h by the trial court. She f u r t h e r contends both agreements are unconscionable, and were e n t e r e d i n t o by means o f f r a u d , d u r e s s and undue i n f l u e n c e and are thus void. She requests one-half of the estate a c c u m u l a t e d by the husband since the s e p a r a t i o n and asks t h a t s h e be g i v e n back c h i l d s u p p o r t o f $200 p e r month. The p a r t i e s e n t e r e d i n t o a common l a w m a r r i a g e a r o u n d 1957. T h e r e was one c h i l d b o r n t o t h e m a r r i a g e , the child h a s s i n c e t u r n e d 1 8 , j o i n e d t h e m i l i t a r y and i s f i n a n c i a l l y independent. During the marriage, the couple earned a l i v i n g t h r o u g h v a r i o u s means i n c l u d i n g g a m b l i n g and d e a l i n g cards. In 1968, t h e y borrowed money t o acquire a liquor l i c e n s e and t a k e a l e a s e on a b a r . Shortly afterwards, they added a restaurant. In 1970, the parties separated permanently. A c o n t r a c t d a t e d A p r i l 1 5 , 1970 was s i g n e d whereby t h e wife agreed t o s e l l her interest in the bar-restaurant to t h e husband. The b u s i n e s s was g i v e n a n e t v a l u e o f $ 4 4 , 8 0 0 . The h u s b a n d a g r e e d t o p a y t h e w i f e o n e - h a l f o f t h a t amount i n c a s h i n s t a l l m e n t s o v e r t h e n e x t f o u r y e a r s a t which t i m e t h e w i f e would s i g n o v e r t o him h e r i n t e r e s t i n t h e l i q u o r license. He also agreed to assume responsibility for $50,000 in debts on the bar-restaurant and $10,000 in d e l i n q u e n t l e a s e payments. By a s e c o n d a g r e e m e n t a l s o d a t e d April 15, 1970, t h e w i f e assumed c u s t o d y o f t h e c h i l d and t h e h u s b a n d a g r e e d t o p a y t h e w i f e $75 p e r month f o r c h i l d support. A Bozeman a t t o r n e y a s s i s t e d i n preparing t h e s e agree- ments. Both p a r t i e s v i g o r o u s l y a s s e r t t h a t h e was c o n t a c t e d f i r s t by t h e o t h e r p a r t y , and t h e n a c t e d s o l e l y on b e h a l f o f that party. The evidence does not support e i t h e r side, however. The a t t o r n e y was a v a i l a b l e and t e s t i f i e d a t t r i a l . R e l y i n g m o s t l y on h i s own r e c o r d s , h e t e s t i f i e d t h a t h e had r e p r e s e n t e d t h e w i f e on p r e v i o u s m a t t e r s , b u t i n t h i s c a s e , h e was not s u r e which p a r t y had c o n t a c t e d him f i r s t . He further testified that b o t h p a r t i e s had been part of the bargaining process, and t h e a g r e e m e n t had b e e n r e w r i t t e n a c o u p l e of t i m e s c h a n g i n g t e r m s b e n e f i c i a l t o b o t h p a r t i e s . The trial court found that the husband did pay the $22,400 t o t h e w i f e , and t h a t i n 1 9 7 4 , s h e s i g n e d o v e r h e r i n t e r e s t i n t h e l i q u o r l i c e n s e t o him. Since t h e time of s e p a r a t i o n i n 1970, the wife has invested t h e money in a cafe, and l a t e r , a bar of h e r own. By t h e time of trial, h o w e v e r , s h e had e i t h e r l o s t o r g i v e n i t a l l away. S h e was employed a t s e v e r a l d i f f e r e n t j o b s f o l l o w i n g t h e s e p a r a t i o n . S h e was a t r u c k d r i v e r , a w a i t r e s s , a n d a n a s s i s t a n t m a n a g e r of a pizza parlor earning $1,000 per month. She was a p p a r e n t l y unable t o s a v e any o f h e r e a r n i n g s . A t the time of d i s s o l u t i o n , she claimed only $1,600 worth of a s s e t s . The husband, on the other hand, was more successful financially. H e s t a y e d i n West Y e l l o w s t o n e a n d c o n t i n u e d t o operate the bar and restaurant. By the time of the d i s s o l u t i o n , he had p a i d o f f most o f h i s d e b t s , had i n v e s t e d i n a commercial f i s h i n g b o a t , a n d was m a k i n g t a x a b l e i n c o m e of $15,000 t o $18,000 per y e a r . The t r i a l c o u r t f o u n d h i s a s s e t s t o be worth $187,000. The t r i a l c o u r t f o u n d t h e w i f e was n o t e n t i t l e d t o a share of t h e s e a s s e t s . I t found t h a t t h e p r o p e r t y had been equally divided when the parties separated and that the h u s b a n d was e n t i t l e d t o a l l t h e p r o p e r t y h e h a d a c c u m u l a t e d s i n c e t h a t time. The w i f e was n o t f o r g o t t e n , though. The trial court found t h a t by reason of h e r background i n t h e f o o d and r e s t a u r a n t b u s i n e s s , s h e would be a b l e t o make a living for herself with additional training a s a chef. The trial court awarded her $600 per month while attending school for two years to become a chef. In addition to awarding maintenance, t h e c o u r t f o u n d t h a t s h e was w i t h o u t s u f f i c i e n t f u n d s t o pay h e r a t t o r n e y f e e s and o r d e r e d the husband t o pay t h e s e f e e s . The w i f e ' s f i r s t a p p r o a c h w a s t o a t t a c k t h e a g r e e m e n t s . She a s s e r t e d b e f o r e the t r i a l court that t h e agreement to sell her interest in the bar-restaurant was n o t a marital property settlement agreement. S h e made s i m i l a r assertion concerning t h e c h i l d c u s t o d y and support agreement. Both agreements were, however, entered i n t o with separation in mind and b o t h a c c o m p l i s h e d w h a t was e x p e c t e d t o h a p p e n as a result of separation. These agreements were intended to include a d i s p o s i t i o n of t h e m a r i t a l a s s e t s . The w i f e d i d not prove otherwise. The w i f e a l s o a t t a c k s t h e p r o p e r t y s e t t l e m e n t a g r e e m e n t on t h e g r o u n d s t h a t it i s u n c o n s c i o n a b l e , was s i g n e d u n d e r d u r e s s and u n d u e influence, was fraudulently procured, and therefore void. T h e w i f e t e s t i f i e d t h a t s h e had b e e n b e a t e n s e v e r a l times b e f o r e t h e p a r t i e s s e p a r a t e d a n d t h a t s h e was i n fear of further beatings. She t e s t i f i e d t h a t s h e s i g n e d t h e a g r e e m e n t s o u t o f f e a r o f b e i n g b e a t e n and b e c a u s e s h e f e l t she might l o s e her c h i l d . She f u r t h e r a l l e g e s s h e w a s denied counsel at that time. On this basis, she now contends that the trial court erred in not finding this agreement void. The h u s b a n d r e f u t e s t h e s e c o n t e n t i o n s . The agreement itself appears fair on its face. The t r i a l c o u r t found t h a t n o t o n l y d i d t h e husband a g r e e t o pay t h e w i f e 50 p e r c e n t o f t h e n e t v a l u e o f t h e i r a s s e t s , b u t h e a l s o assumed some $ 6 0 , 0 0 0 i n d e b t s on the business. The trial record does not establish fraud, undue influence, duress or unconscionability. The n e x t l i n e o f a t t a c k by t h e w i f e is h e r assertion that the t r i a l court erred i n not considering the factors s e t o u t i n s e c t i o n 40-4-202, MCA, e v e n t h o u g h t h e r e was a pre-existing property distribution agreement and child custody and support agreement in effect. This statute allows the court to equitably divide the marital assets considering such things as the age, health, occupation, vocational s k i l l s , estate, and l i a b i l i t i e s o f t h e p a r t i e s . But the effect of the separation agreement must be considered. S e c t i o n 40-4-201, PICA, r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e terms of the separation agreement be binding upon the court p r o v i d e d t h a t t h e terms a r e n o t u n c o n s c i o n a b l e . The t r i a l court did not find t h e agreement t o be u n c o n s c i o n a b l e and t h e r e c o r d d o e s n o t r e f l e c t an e r r o r in his failure t o do SO. The trial court found that the major assets of the p a r t i e s had been e q u i t a b l y d i v i d e d i n 1970 by a g r e e m e n t . It a l s o f o u n d t h a t t h e h u s b a n d was e n t i t l e d t o h i s s u b s e q u e n t a c q u i s i t i o n s of p r o p e r t y and t h e a p p r e c i a t i o n i n v a l u e d u e to inflation. The wife cannot now claim that she is e n t i t l e d t o a s h a r e of t h e h u s b a n d ' s a c c u m u l a t e d e s t a t e on t h e b a s i s of t h e i r marriage. S i n c e 1970, t h e marriage has only existed legally--the p a r t i e s had l o n g s i n c e g o n e t h e i r s e p a r a t e ways. The l a p s e o f t i m e from t h e s e p a r a t i o n t o t h e dissolution does not give the wife rights she did not o t h e r w i s e have. The t r i a l c o u r t r e v i e w e d what happened in 1970, found that t h e r e had been fair d e a l i n g s between the parties, and t h u s are bound by their agreements. A real estate salesman testified on t h e w i f e ' s behalf as to the current value of the bar-restaurant. The wife maintains that the trial court erred i n not using t h a t value i n its f i n d i n g s , b u t r a t h e r a c c e p t i n g t h e l o w e r v a l u e g i v e n by t h e husband. W note t h e salesman d i d only a quick a p p r a i s a l . e He f a i l e d t o c o n s i d e r t h e p r o p e r t y i n t e r e s t a s o n l y a l e a s e - hold i n t e r e s t e x p i r i n g i n 1 9 8 1 , and h e d i d n o t e x a m i n e t h e business records to determine the profit potential. Moreover, assuming e r r o r i n v a l u a t i o n , t h e e r r o r i s h a r m l e s s b e c a u s e t h e t r i a l c o u r t h e l d t h a t t h e w i f e was n o t e n t i t l e d to any of the husband's property acquired after the s e p a r a t i o n a g r e e m e n t and s e p a r a t i o n . Concerning child support, the wife assets that the t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d i n f a i l i n g t o f i n d t h a t t h e h u s b a n d owed back c h i l d s u p p o r t and f a i l i n g t o i n c r e a s e i t r e t r o a c t i v e l y from t h e t i m e o f s e p a r a t i o n from $ 7 5 p e r month t o $200 p e r month. The w i f e had no c o m p l a i n t s a s t o t h e a d e q u a c y o f t h e child support agreement during the eight year separation. Her claim for retroactive increased child support payments for the eight-year period is more than hollow. Furthermore, the trial court considered the wife's contention that the husband failed to make the $75 per month payments pursuant to the written agreement, but found that the evidence did not preponderate in favor of either party on this issue, and therefore denied her claim. The record supports this decision. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 99 dA Justic We Concur: ChieE Justice