No. 80-51
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1980
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF
MERRIE DAWN MARKEGARD ,
Petitioner and Appellant,
VS .
JOHN ERIC MARKEGARD ,
Respondent and Respondent.
Appeal from: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Yellowstone.
Honorable Diane G. Barz, Judge presiding.
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant:
Davidson, Veeder, Baugh, Broeder & Poppler, Billings, Montana
For Respondent:
Berger, Anderson, Sinclair & Murphy, Billings, Montana
Submitted on briefs: April 24, 1980
~ecided
: A11 6 2 ;1988
Filed: /\u & 2 ,
M r . J u s t i c e D a n i e l J. Shea d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e
Court.
Merrie Markegard ( h e r e i n r e f e r r e d t o a s t h e mother)
a p p e a l s from t h a t p o r t i o n of a m a r r i a g e d i s s o l u t i o n d e c r e e
e n t e r e d i n Yellowstone County D i s t r i c t C o u r t awarding cus-
t o d y of t h e p a r t i e s ' twenty-month o l d son t o John Markegard
(herein referred t o a s the father).
The mother c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d i n t h e
following respects: (1) t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t i g n o r e d t h e
r e l e v a n t f a c t o r s i n s e c t i o n 40-4-212, MCA, w i t h r e g a r d t o a
d e t e r m i n a t i o n of c u s t o d y ; (2) t h a t the t r i a l court f a i l e d t o
p r o p e r l y c o n s i d e r t h e presumption t h a t a mother i s e n t i t l e d
t o c u s t o d y o f a c h i l d of t e n d e r y e a r s ; and ( 3 ) t h a t t h e
d e c i s i o n i s bottomed on a d e t e r m i n a t i o n which i n e s s e n c e
d i s c r i m i n a t e s a g a i n s t t h e mother b e c a u s e s h e i s now a n
Oregon r e s i d e n t . W v a c a t e t h e o r d e r of t h e t r i a l c o u r t
e
b e c a u s e i t d i d n o t c o n s i d e r t h e a p p r o p r i a t e f a c t o r s con-
t a i n e d i n s e c t i o n 40-4-212.
The m a r r i a g e was of s h o r t d u r a t i o n . The p a r t i e s w e r e
m a r r i e d on May 30, 1976 and i n October 1978, t h e mother
f i l e d a p e t i t i o n t o d i s s o l v e the marriage. A son was b o r n
of t h e m a r r i a g e . The mother i s a n u r s e and c u r r e n t l y r e s i d e s
i n P o r t l a n d , Oregon, where h e r p a r e n t s a l s o r e s i d e . The
f a t h e r l i v e s on a farm between L a u r e l and P a r k C i t y , Montana.
He h a s r e s i d e d i n Montana a l l of h i s l i f e and farms l a n d
l e a s e d from h i s f a t h e r .
A f t e r f i l i n g a d i s s o l u t i o n a c t i o n , t h e mother c o n t i n u e d
t o l i v e i n Montana f o r a s h o r t t i m e , l i v i n g with friends.
She w a s , however, u n a b l e t o f i n d employment and moved from
B i l l i n g s t o P o r t l a n d i n November 1978 t o f i n d employment.
She had temporary c u s t o d y of t h e c h i l d and t h e f a t h e r w a s
p a y i n g temporary c h i l d s u p p o r t .
A f t e r a h e a r i n g on c h i l d c u s t o d y , t h e t r i a l c o u r t
e n t e r e d judgment f i n d i n g t h a t b o t h p a r e n t s l o v e d t h e c h i l d ,
b o t h w e r e f i t and p r o p e r p a r e n t s , and b o t h p a r e n t s wanted
c u s t o d y . The c o u r t concluded t h a t a l l t h i n g s b e i n g e q u a l ,
t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t s of t h e c h i l d would be b e t t e r s e r v e d by
k e e p i n g t h e c h i l d i n Montana and t h e r e f o r e awarding c u s t o d y
t o the father. The a p p a r e n t r e a s o n i n g of t h e t r i a l c o u r t i s
t h a t a c o u r t of t h i s s t a t e would be a b l e t o c o n t i n u e t o
p r o t e c t t h e c h i l d and promote t h e c h i l d ' s w e l f a r e and b e s t
interests. Why a c o u r t i n Oregon, s h o u l d t h e need a r i s e ,
n o t be a b l e t o do t h e same t h i n g , we a r e n o t informed. The
mother was g i v e n v i s i t a t i o n r i g h t s . This appeal followed.
S e c t i o n 40-4-212 s e t s forth the c r i t e r i a for a t r i a l
c o u r t t o c o n s i d e r and weigh i n d e c i d i n g t h e i s s u e of c h i l d
c u s t o d y . Although t h r e e of t h e f i v e f a c t o r s a r e n o t p e r -
t i n e n t h e r e , t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s on t h e o t h e r two
f a c t o r s a r e n o t h i n g more t h a n c o n c l u s o r y s t a t e m e n t s , n o t
reflecting a t a l l the evidentiary basis f o r the decision.
I n d e t e r m i n i n g c h i l d c u s t o d y , t h e t r i a l c o u r t s must c o n s i d e r
t h e s t a t u t o r y c r i t e r i a , Counts v . Chapman ( 1 9 7 9 ) , - Mont.
,
- 589 P.2d 151, 36 St.Rep. 89, 93; and a s a r e v i e w i n g
c o u r t w e c a n o n l y d e t e r m i n e i f t h e p e r t i n e n t f a c t o r s were
c o n s i d e r e d and i f t h e t r i a l c o u r t s made a p p r o p r i a t e f i n d -
ings with r e l a t i o n t o these c r i t e r i a . I n Re M a r r i a g e of
Capener (1978) , - Mont. -, 582 P.2d 326, 328, 35 St.Rep.
1026.
Admittedly, s e v e r a l f a c t o r s s e t f o r t h i n t h e s t a t u t e
are n o t p e r t i n e n t t o t h i s case. S e c t i o n 40-4-212(3), how-
ever, requires the t r i a l c o u r t t o consider the i n t e r a c t i o n
and i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p of t h e c h i l d w i t h h i s p a r e n t o r
p a r e n t s , h i s s i b l i n g s , and any o t h e r p e r s o n who may s i g n i -
f i c a n t l y a f f e c t t h e c h i l d ' s b e s t i n t e r e s t . The f i n d i n g s w i t h
r e s p e c t t o the f a t h e r a r e s u f f i c i e n t b u t they a r e i n s u f f i -
c i e n t w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e mother. W e cannot overlook t h i s
f a c t o r i n l i g h t of t h e f a c t t h a t t h e c h i l d l i v e d with t h e
mother i n P o r t l a n d f o r a p p r o x i m a t e l y one y e a r b e f o r e t h e
d i s s o l u t i o n h e a r i n g and t h a t t h e c h i l d ' s m a t e r n a l g r a n d -
parents a l s o l i v e i n Portland.
S e c t i o n 40-4-212 ( 4 ) , MCA, requires the t r i a l court t o
c o n s i d e r t h e c h i l d ' s a d j u s t m e n t t o h i s home, s c h o o l , and
community. School i s n o t a f a c t o r h e r e , b u t t h e c h i l d ' s
a d j u s t m e n t t o h i s home i s a n i m p o r t a n t f a c t o r which must b e
c o n s i d e r e d and f i n d i n g s made. N such f i n d i n g s were made
o
here.
S e c t i o n 40-4-212(5), MCA, r e q u i r e s t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o
c o n s i d e r t h e m e n t a l and p h y s i c a l h e a l t h of a l l i n d i v i d u a l s
i n v o l v e d . There a r e no f i n d i n g s a t a l l w i t h r e l a t i o n t o t h i s
f a c t o r . Although t h e r e c o r d i s r e p l e t e w i t h e v i d e n c e re-
l a t i n g t o t h e m o t h e r ' s m e n t a l and p h y s i c a l h e a l t h , t h e r e a r e
a b s o l u t e l y no f i n d i n g s w i t h r e l a t i o n t o h e r h e a l t h . Further-
more, t h e c h i l d h a s a n e y e problem which h a s r e q u i r e d m e d i c a l
and s u r g i c a l a t t e n t i o n which was n o t e x p r e s s l y a d d r e s s e d .
A 1 though w e must v a c a t e t h e judgment and remand f o r
a n o t h e r h e a r i n g , t h e r e a r e two m a t t e r s t h a t w e w i l l a d d r e s s .
The mother c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t d i d n o t c o n s i d e r o r
a p p l y t h e presumption t h a t a mother i s e n t i t l e d t o c u s t o d y
o f a c h i l d of t e n d e r y e a r s . T h i s presumption i s no l o n g e r
statutory, W e s t a t e d i n t h e c a s e of I n R e ~ a r r i a g e
of
Tweeten ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 172 Mont. 404, 409, 563 P.2d 1 1 4 1 , 1 1 4 4 , t h a t
t h i s presumption s t i l l e x i s t s . R e f l e c t i o n on t h i s q u e s t i o n ,
however, c a u s e s u s t o b e l i e v e t h a t t h e presumption s h o u l d
n o t e x i s t i n t h e a b s e n c e of a p a r t i c u l a r s t a t u t e s o d e c l a r -
ing. W e do n o t b e l i e v e t h a t t h e r e i s a sound t h e o r y o r
r a t i o n a l e i n s u p p o r t of a j u d i c i a l d e c l a r a t i o n t h a t such a
presumption e x i s t s . W e f u r t h e r b e l i e v e t h a t t h i s presump-
t i o n i s o u t d a t e d i n l i g h t of t h e enactment of t h e Uniform
M a r r i a g e and Divorce A c t i n t h i s s t a t e . The presumption
s e r v e s o n l y t o c o n f u s e t h e p a r t i e s and t o burden t h e c o u r t s .
For t h i s r e a s o n , w e o v e r r u l e Tweeten w i t h r e s p e c t t o the
t e n d e r y e a r s presumption.
The second m a t t e r upon which w e choose t o comment i s
t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t t h e c h i l d would b e
b e t t e r o f f i n Montana. Although we c a n n o t s a y t h a t resi-
dence w a s t h e s o l e b a s i s underlying t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s d e c i -
s i o n awarding c u s t o d y t o t h e f a t h e r , i t a p p e a r s from t h e
t r i a l c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s t h a t t h e r e s i d e n c e of t h e p a r t i e s was
a n i m p o r t a n t c o n s i d e r a t i o n . Under s e c t i o n 40-4-212, MCA,
residency i s a f a c t o r t o be considered i n determining custody.
But t h e c l e a r i m p l i c a t i o n h e r e i s t h a t somehow t h e Montana
c o u r t s c o u l d p r o t e c t t h e w e l f a r e of t h e c h i l d b u t t h e Oregon
c o u r t s could not. Because t h e r e i s no e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e
c h i l d needed c o u r t p r o t e c t i o n o r i n t e r v e n t i o n - - b o t h p a r t i e s
w e r e d e c l a r e d f i t and p r o p e r and b o t h wanted custody--we see
n o t h i n g t h a t a Montana c o u r t c o u l d do t h a t a n Oregon c o u r t
c o u l d n o t a l s o do. Any c o n c e p t of p a r e n s p a t r i a e under t h e s e
f a c t s i s misapplied. To h o l d c o n t r a r y would r e s u l t i n
p e n a l i z i n g a p a r e n t b e c a u s e he o r s h e h a s moved t o a n o t h e r
state. T h e r e i s n o t h i n g i n t h e r e c o r d h e r e t o show t h a t a
c o u r t p r o b a b l y would be i n v o l v e d i n t h e f u t u r e w i t h r e l a t i o n
t o the child.
W e vacate t h e decree with r e l a t i o n t o c h i l d custody
and remand f o r a n o t h e r h e a r i n g , and d i r e c t t h a t a p p r o p r i a t e
f i n d i n g s and c o n c l u s i o n s be e n t e r e d c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h i s
opinion.
W concur:
e
-
Chief ~ u s t c c ;
Mr. J u s t i c e John C. Sheehy c o n c u r r i n g i n p a r t and d i s s e n t i n g
i n part:
I concur w i t h t h e m a j o r i t y t h a t t h e mother s h o u l d n o t
have c u s t o d y of a c h i l d of t e n d e r y e a r s a s a matter of
presumption. However, t h e m a j o r i t y o p i n i o n d o e s n o t s t a t e ,
a s I t h i n k i t s h o u l d , t h a t when a c h i l d i s o f t e n d e r y e a r s
i n a c u s t o d y d i s p u t e , t h e t e n d e r a g e of t h e c h i l d s h o u l d be
a f a c t o r i n c o n s i d e r i n g whether c u s t o d y s h o u l d be g i v e n t o
t h e mother.
A s t o t h e rest of t h e o p i n i o n , I dissent.
The w i f e d i d n o t come t o t h i s a p p e l l a t e c o u r t c o n t e n d i n g
t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t had n o t made f i n d i n g s on t h e c r i t e r i a
i n s e c t i o n 40-4-212(4), MCA t h a t a r e s e t o u t i n t h e m a j o r i t y
opinion. The w i f e does n o t c o n t e n d f o r t h a t i n t h i s a p p e a l
a t all. R a t h e r , t h e w i f e contended t h a t as between t h e
mother and t h e f a t h e r , " t h e t r i a l c o u r t [had] s p e c i f i c a l l y
found t h a t a l l t h i n g s a r e e q u a l between t h e p a r t i e s " and
t h a t i n t h a t s i t u a t i o n , t h e presumption e n t i t l e d t h e mother
t o t h e c u s t o d y o f t h e minor c h i l d . I n t h e language of t h e
w i f e ' s b r i e f , h e r c o n t e n t i o n under s e c t i o n 40-4-212 was:
" I f t h e presumption t h a t t h e mother i s e n t i t l e d
t o custody of c h i l d r e n of tender y e a r s i s t o
have any b e a r i n g a t a l l , s u r e l y i n t h i s c a s e
where a i l t h i n g s --- r e p e q u a l b u t a l s o
n o t only we --
were d e c l a r e d - - -e c o u r t , c u s t o d y must
s o by t h
r e s i d e i n t h e mother . . ." -
The m a j o r i t y i s t h e r e f o r e r e v e r s i n g t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t
on i s s u e s n o t r a i s e d by t h e w i f e and moreover, n o t sub-
s t a n t i a t e d by e v i d e n c e i n t h e r e c o r d a t t h e t r i a l .
For example, t h e m a j o r i t y r e f e r s t o t h e " i n t e r a c t i o n
and i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p o f t h e c h i l d w i t h h i s p a r e n t " and
s t a t e s t h a t t h e f i n d i n g s w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e f a t h e r were
s u f f i c i e n t b u t a r e i n s u f f i c i e n t w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e mother.
The r e a s o n t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t c a n make no f i n d i n g s w i t h
r e s p e c t t o t h e i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p of t h e c h i l d with t h e
-7-
mother, and the maternal grandparents, is that for some
reason not disclosed by the record, the mother offered no
evidence of how her child was reacting to the family environ-
ment in Portland where the child had been residing with the
mother and the maternal grandparents at the time of the
trial. Thus, the decision of the District Court here in
favor of the father is being reversed out of the failure of
the mother to produce the evidence which this Court says
should result in findings.
Nor do I agree that the trial court did not consider the
mental and physical health of all the individuals involved.
The mother made a point during the trial that her husband
had not kept the ch d's glasses on the child when he had
@
C
temporary child=' The father refuted this by producing
eighteen pictures of himself with Eric, all showing the
child wearing his glasses. The father's health is evident
from the fact that he is an active farmer near Laurel,
working long hours in pursuing his occupation. The mother's
health indicated that she had had a very difficult labor in
the childbirth of Eric; that she had gone to the hospital
after using hashish; that she was diagnosed as manic depressive
at the time; that she had been on a number of medications
which her second doctor thought were unnecessary; that she
"couldn't stand sitting at home" after the baby was born,
volunteered to do nursing work at Planned Parenthood, and
celebrated this occupation by going out with a Mr. Schuster
and buying him a bottle of wine. It was during her evening
with Mr. Schuster that the hashish incident happened and she
was removed to the hospital. I think the court fully considered
her health in determining the custody of Eric.
Nor do I construe the District Court's placing custody
of Eric with the father in Montana implicitly meant that Montana
-8-
was a better place than Oregon to raise children. The
finding of the District Court provides in part:
". .. that in the immediate area of the
respondent's home are the respondent's
father and mother and the respondent's brother
and sister-in-law together with their children;
that during the course of the marriage the
sister-in-law baby-sat the minor child from
time to time; that the entire Markegard family
is well thought of in the community, is a good
and substantial family, and are all concerned as
to the welfare of the minor child and his
opportunity to grow up within the family; to grow
up with his cousins, his uncles and aunts, and
his grandparents; that the welfare of the child
would be best promoted by having an opportunity
to grow up in the environment of the Markegard
community. The interest of the Markegard family
in the welfare of the minor child is so great that
a number of the aunts and uncles traveled to
Portland, Oregon, on two occasions to visit the
child, in the custody of the mother, during the
year 1979."
I do not derive any implicit statement that Montana is
a better place to grow up than Oregon from the above finding.
In the face of the lack of evidence regarding the Oregon
environment for this child, the court had no choice but to
decide that the Laurel community was in the best interests
of the child.
What the District Court did in this case was to choose
between certainty and uncertainty. If this Court had granted
custody to the mother, I should have been greatly concerned
about the uncertainty of the mother's occupation, her ability
to cope with pressure situations, of the situation at the
home of the maternal grandparents, from which home both the
mother and her sister departed because of the unrefuted
contention of the mother that her parents were "crazy".
For the foregoing reasons, I would sustain the custody
decision of the District Court.
Justice