No. 79-15
IN THE SUPIZEME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1980
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF:
SZCZEPAN KOROL,
Petitioner and Appellant,
vs .
GWENDOLYN LOCKE KOROL,
Respondent and Respondent.
Appeal from: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Cascade.
Honorable Joel G. Roth, Judge presiding.
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant:
Cameron Ferguson argued, Great Falls,Montana
For Respondent :
Barry T. Olson argued, Great Falls, Montana
Submitted: April 17, 1980
Decided: July 22, 1980
Filed:
Mr. C h i e f J u s t i c e F r a n k I. H a s w e l l d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n of the Court.
Appellant Szczepan Korol sought t h e r e t u r n of h i s son t o
h i s custody through a p e t i t i o n for habeas corpus. The C a s c a d e
County D i s t r i c t Court denied h i s p e t i t i o n and he a p p e a l s .
S z c z e p a n a n d Gwen K o r o l , the natural parents, obtained a
d i v o r c e i n Cascade County i n October, 1976. Mr. K o r o l was
awarded t h e custody of their child, S t e p h e n , who w a s b o r n i n M a y ,
1977. I n March, 1 9 7 8 , Gwen K o r o l a n d h e r m o t h e r , V e r n a L o c k e ,
went t o P e n n s y l v a n i a and brought the c h i l d back t o Great F a l l s .
There i s c o n f l i c t i n g testimony as t o whether t h e p a r t i e s had
a g r e e d t o t r a n s f e r c u s t o d y o r w h e t h e r a m e r e v i s i t was intended.
Gwen K o r o l g a v e M r . Korol a s t i p u l a t i o n t o modify the custody
p r o v i s i o n s of the divorce decree, but he did not sign it a t t h a t
time and has not signed it t o t h i s date.
It appears that t h e c h i l d r e s i d e d w i t h Gwen K o r o l for a
s h o r t p e r i o d of t i m e and when s h e became ill and l o s t h e r job in
A p r i l 1978, Richard and Verna Locke, Gwen's parents, took physi-
c a l custody. Szczepan Korol r e q u e s t e d t h e r e t u r n of Stephen
a f t e r l e a r n i n g i n e a r l y September, 1978, that t h e c h i l d was in
t h e physical custody of the grandparents.
On S e p t e m b e r 2 2 , 1978, t h e Lockes p e t i t i o n e d the District
Court f o r custody of the child. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t a w a r d e d tem-
p o r a r y c u s t o d y t o t h e Lockes and i s s u e d a temporary r e s t r a i n i n g
o r d e r which r e s t r a i n e d Szczepan Korol from removing t h e c h i l d o r
d i s t u r b i n g t h e Lockes. On O c t o b e r 2 4 , 1978, Mr. Korol filed a
m o t i o n t o quash t h e temporary r e s t r a i n i n g o r d e r and p e t i t i o n e d
for a writ of habeas corpus. A h e a r i n g was h e l d upon t h e p e t i -
t i o n o n November 1 4 , 1 9 7 8 . The t e m p o r a r y c u s t o d y o r d e r was
d i s m i s s e d because of the grandparent's failure t o cornp1,y w i t h
t h e a f f i d a v i t p r a c t i c e p r o v i s i o n s of s e c t i o n 48-340, R.C.M. 1947,
now c o d i f i e d i n a m e n d e d f o r m i n s e c t i o n 4 0 - 4 - 2 2 0 , MCA.
The o n l y i s s u e p r e s e n t e d w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e h a b e a s corpus peti-
t i o n w a s who w a s e n t i t l e d t o c u s t o d y o f Stephen as between t h e
n a t u r a l f a t h e r Szczepan Korol and t h e m a t e r n a l g r a n d p a r e n t s .
Following the hearing, the D i s t r i c t Court issued an order
o n November 1 5 , 1 9 7 8 , which q u a s h e d t h e t e m p o r a r y r e s t r a i n i n g
order, but t h e grandparents were once a g a i n g i v e n temporary
custody of Stephen. The p e t i t i o n f o r h a b e a s c o r p u s r e l i e f was
taken under advisement. On J u l y 9 , 1979, the D i s t r i c t Court entered an
o r d e r which found: t h a t a habeas corpus proceeding is
a p p r o p r i a t e t o determine whether custody of a minor should be
changed; that the f a t h e r agreed t o s u r r e n d e r custody of the
c h i l d t o t h e mother i n March, 1978; t h a t t h e f a t h e r agreed t o
a m o d i f i c a t i o n t o change t h e custody from t h e c u s t o d i a n t o t h e
noncustodian, the mother; t h a t the minor c h i l d ' s present
environment w i l l b e t t e r s e r v e h i s w e l f a r e and b e s t interest;
that the custody of t h e minor c h i l d should be "assigned" to the
mother u n t i l f u r t h e r order; and t h a t t h e f a t h e r is finan-
c i a l l y a b l e t o c o n t r i b u t e $100 p e r month i n support u n t i l the
child reaches majority. The p e t i t i o n f o r h a b e a s c o r p u s was
dismissed and custody assigned t o t h e mother.
The f o l l o w i n g i s s u e s h a v e b e e n c o n s i d e r e d on a p p e a l :
( 1 ) Whether t h e d e n i a l of the natural father's petition
f o r habeas corpus is appealable; and
( 2 ) Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n
awarding custody t o t h e n a t u r a l mother, a nonpetitioning party.
The r e s p o n d e n t strenuously contends t h a t the D i s t r i c t
Court's order denying a w r i t of habeas corpus is not appealable.
The b a s i s of t h i s contention is that t h e c o u r t merely awarded
temporary r e l i e f and t h a t a n o t h e r remedy e x i s t s s i n c e t h e
grandparents' p e t i t i o n f o r modification is s t i l l pending.
Respondent a l s o analogizes the present situation t o the seeking
of a w r i t of habeas corpus i n a criminal case i n s t a t i n g that the
s o l e i s s u e i s t h e l e g a l i t y of restraint, and it is t h e r e f o r not
appealable.
I n reviewing the D i s t r i c t Court's f i n d i n g s and
c o n c l u s i o n s we f i n d t h a t t h e c o u r t p u r p o r t e d t o make a f i n a l
d e t e r m i n a t i o n of custody. I n addition, no p e t i t i o n i s p e n d i n g a s
a result of s e c t i o n 48-339, R.C.M. 1947. Although this section
was amended by t h e 1 9 7 9 l e g i s l a t u r e i t was in effect in the
f o l l o w i n g form throughout the D i s t r i c t Court proceedings.
" ( 1 ) No m o t i o n t o m o d i f y a c u s t o d y d e c r e e may b e
made e a r l i e r t h a n two ( 2 ) y e a r s a f t e r i t s d a t e ,
u n l e s s t h e c o u r t p e r m i t s it t o b e made on t h e
b a s i s of a f f i d a v i t s t h a t t h e r e i s r e a s o n - to
b e l i e v e t h e c h i l d ' s p r e s e n t e n v i r o n m e n t may
e n d a n g e r s e r i o u s l y his p h y s i c a l , m e n t a l , m o r a l ,
o r emotional health." ( ~ m ~ h a s i s ded.)
ad
T h i s p r o v i s i o n i s j u r i s d i c t i o n a l and r e q u i r e s the
D i s t r i c t Court t o find t h a t the c h i l d is s e r i o u s l y endangered i f
a motion f o r a change of c u s t o d y i s b r o u g h t w i t h i n two y e a r s of
t h e e n t r y of a divorce decree. S t r o u f v. Strouf (19781,
M o n t . -8 5 7 8 P.2d 746, 35 St.Rep. 626; Olson v. Olson (1978),
Mont. , 5 7 4 P.2d 1 0 0 4 ; 35 St.Rep. 1 7 5 ; S c h i e l e v. Sager
(19771, 1 7 4 Mont. 5 3 3 , 5 7 1 P.2d 1 1 4 2 ; G i a n o t t i v. McCracken
(1977), 1 7 4 Mont. 209, 5 6 9 P.2d 929. Olson a l s o reveals t h a t the
e x c e p t i o n t o t h e two-year l i m i t a t i o n i s n o t t o be liberally
applied.
I n o u r p r e s e n t c a s e t h e m o t i o n t o m o d i f y c u s t o d y was
brought w i t h i n t h e two-year limitation, and t h e D i s t r i c t Court
failed t o find that the child's h e a l t h was s e r i o u s l y e n d a n g e r e d .
N e i t h e r does t h e r e c o r d r e v e a l any e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e c h i l d would
be endangered i n t h e custody of h i s father. As a r e s u l t , there
i s no j u r i s d i c t i o n a l b a s i s f o r t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t t o c o n s i d e r t h e
grandparents' p e t i t i o n f o r a change of custody.
Since the District Court's order is expressed i n terms of
a f i n a l determination of child custody, t h i s Court is e n t i t l e d to
review the District Court's d e n i a l of the father's petition. In
addition, a d i s t i n c t i o n e x i s t s concerning a p p e a l a b i l i t y between
who i s e n t i t l e d t o c u s t o d y i n a h a b e a s c o r p u s p r o c e e d i n g a n d t h e
t y p i c a l c r i m i n a l habeas corpus i s s u e of whether t h e r e s t r a i n t
exercised i s legal. See S t a t e ex r e l . G r a v e l e y v. District Court
(1978), M o n t . -9 5 8 2 P.2d 775, 35 St.Rep. 1049.
Turning t o the standard of review from habeas c o r p u s , we
have h e l d on numerous o c c a s i o n s that t h e D i s t r i c t Court is given
w i d e d i s c r e t i o n i n h a b e a s c o r p u s p r o c e e d i n g s a n d we w i l l n o t
i n t e r f e r e u n l e s s t h e r e i s a c l e a r abuse of discretion. In re
Thompson ( 1 9 2 6 1 , 77 Mont. 466, 2 5 1 P. 1 6 3 ; Veach v. Veach (19481,
1 2 2 Mont. 47, 1 9 5 P.2d 697. I n the present c a s e we f i n d a c l e a r
abuse of discretion.
The s o l e i s s u e b e f o r e t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t w a s who w a s
e n t i t l e d t o custody a s between t h e n a t u r a l f a t h e r and t h e c h i l d ' s
maternal grandparents. T h i s was the issue expressly presented to
t h e c o u r t by t h e p a r t i e s . The c o u r t r e f u s e d t o hear any t e s t i -
mony c o n c e r n i n g t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t of the child. However in its
order the District Court, without any evidence b e f o r e i t on t h e
subject, purported to consider the best interests of the child
a n d g a v e c u s t o d y t o t h e m o t h e r , who h a d n e v e r s o u g h t c u s t o d y .
T h i s c o n s t i t u t e s an abuse of discretion. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t is
w i t h o u t a u t h o r i t y t o award c u s t o d y t o a n o n p e t i t i o n i n g p a r t y
under ordinary circumstances.
A s between t h e n a t u r a l f a t h e r and t h e g r a n d p a r e n t s , the
n a t u r a l f a t h e r was e n t i t l e d t o p r e v a i l on t h e b a s i s o f his
superior rights as a parent a s well a s h i s c u s t o d i a l r i g h t s under
t h e divorce decree. Absent a finding of abuse, neglect, or unfit-
ness as a parent, a natural parent i s e n t i t l e d t o t h e custody of
his child. I n t h e M a t t e r o f Doney ( 1 9 7 7 1 , 174 Mont. 282, 570
P.2d 575. I n addition, t h e custody p r o v i s i o n s of the Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act, s e c t i o n s 40-4-211 t h r o u g h 40-4-221,
MCA, a r e designed t o favor custodial continuity over the r i g h t s
of t h e competing custodians. This Court has stated that
the following policy reasons underlie t h e changes c r e a t e d by t h e
Act i n the child custody area: (1) t o p r e s e r v e t h e b a s i c p o l i c y of
custodial continuity; (2) t o maximize f i n a l i t y of the custody
provisions of the divorce decree; ( 3 ) t o p r e v e n t "ping-pong"
custody litigation; and (4) t o implement t h e p r i n c i p l e t h a t
f i n a l i t y of the custody decree i s of g r e a t e r importance t o the
best i n t e r e s t of t h e c h i l d t h a n t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n of which p a r e n t
should have custody. S e e S c h i e l e v. Sager, supra; Holm v . Holm
(19771, 172 Mont. 81, 5 6 0 P.2d 905; G r o v e s v. Groves (19771, 173
Mont. 2 9 1 , 5 6 7 P.2d 459; E a s t o n v. Easton (19781, Mont.
5 7 4 P.2d 989, 35 St.Rep. 123. On t h e basis of this authority,
we f i n d that the natural father is entitled to the r e t u r n of
h i s son.
A l t h o u g h we f i n d s e v e r a l i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s in the District
Court's f i n d i n g s a n d c o n c l u s i o n s , we h a v e d e e m e d i t u n n e c e s s a r y to
a d d r e s s them, s i n c e we h a v e h e l d t h a t t h e c u s t o d i a l p a r e n t h a s
superior rights t h a n a n o n p a r e n t a n d no j u r i s d i c t i o n t o change
c u s t o d y was i n v o k e d .
W therefore reverse the District Court's
e order
d i s m i s s i n g t h e p e t i t i o n and d i r e c t t h e D i s t r i c t Court to grant
the father's petition f o r habeas corpus. Nothing in this opinion
i s t o be construed a s p r e v e n t i n g t h e mother from b r i n g i n g a subsequent
motion f o r m o d i f i c a t i o n p u r s u a n t t o s e c t i o n 40-4-219, MCA.
\
Chief J u s t i c e
JU'S
7
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ices