No. 14837
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1980
MARY PETRITZ ,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
VS.
ALBERTSONS, INC.
an Idaho corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from: District Court of the Second Judicial District,
In and for the County of Silver Bow.
Honorable James D. Freebourn, Judge presiding.
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant:
Poore, Roth, Robischon & Robinson, Butte, Montana
Donald Robinson argued, Butte, Montana
For Respondent:
Michael J. McKeon argued, Anaconda, Montana
David L. Holland, Butte, Montana
Submitted: February 27, 1980
Api~
Decided : ii -19a
Filed: 5
4
-2
-
Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of
the Court.
This is an action alleging unlawful discharge in
employment. Plaintiff-respondent, Mary Petritz, filed a
compl-aint.
against defendant-appellant, Albertsons, Inc., on
August 16, 1977, in the District Court of the Second Judi-
cial District, in and for the County of Silver BOW, alleging
that she was unlawfully discharged from her employment with
Albertsons, Inc., where she was employed as a meat wrapper.
The complaint alleged that her discharge was discriminatory,
in violation of both the Montana State Constitution and a
labor agreement between the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and
Butcher Workmen of North America, Local No. 333, AFL-CIO, of
which she was a member. Plaintiff sought back wages, seniority
benefits, and general damages.
Defendant filed an answer to plaintiff's complaint on
December 28, 1977, denying the allegations of the complaint
and asserting certain affirmative defenses. On the same
day, a pretrial conference was held at which the District
Court ordered that, if the parties desired to introduce
exhibits in addition to those listed at the pretrial con-
ference, they would supply copies of such exhibits to op-
posing counsel at least ten days prior to trial. The
District Court also entered a similar order with respect to
witnesses, requiring that counsel serve a list of any addi-
tional witnesses upon opposing counsel at least twenty days
before trial.
Defendant engaged thereafter in extensive pretrial
discovery, taking several depositions. The case was set for
a trial by jury on April 3, 1979.
~ive
days prior to trial, on March 28, 1979, defendant
was served with a list of witnesses plaintiff intended to
call at the time of trial. The list contained the names of
seven people who had not been listed as witnesses at the
pretrial conference. Accompanying the list was a notice for
the taking of the depositions of two witnesses whose names
were supplied at the conference. The time set for the
taking of these depositions was April 2, 1979, the day
before trial.
On March 29, 1979, defendant filed a motion for a
directed verdict and a brief in support thereof. Defendant
also filed a motion in limine to exclude the testimony of
the new witnesses and a motion to quash the taking of the
deposition of the two witnesses. Hearings were held with
regard to these motions on March 30, 1979. The District
Ccurt granted the motion to quash and reserved a ruling on
the motion in limine until trial.
On the day before trial, April 2, 1979, plaintiff filed
a motion for voluntary dismissal of the action without
prejudice to her right to refile another action against
defendant. The motion was filed pursuant to Rule 41 (a)(2),
M.R.Civ.P. A hearing was held upon the motion. At the
hearing, plaintiff argued that the motion for voluntary dis-
missal should be granted because new witnesses had been
discovered which would support an additional theory of
liability against the defendant for wage and sex discrimi-
nation. Plaintiff advised the court that these witnesses
had not been known prior to ~ p r i l2 , and that, when they
were discovered, their names were immediately served upon
counsel for defendant. Defendant opposed the motion for
dismissal on the grounds that it had engaged in extensive
p r e t r i a l d i s c o v e r y , t h a t t h e motion was b e i n g employed a s a
t a c t i c t o a v o i d a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t , and t h a t i f t h e t r i a l
were d e l a y e d , d e f e n d a n t would i n c u r a n o t h e r y e a r ' s l i a b i l i t y
f o r back wages i f a v e r d i c t f o r p l a i n t i f f were e v e n t u a l l y
recovered.
The D i s t r i c t C o u r t g r a n t e d p l a i n t i f f ' s motion and
e n t e r e d a n o r d e r t h a t t h e a c t i o n be d i s m i s s e d w i t h o u t
prejudice. Defendant t h e r e a f t e r f i l e d a motion t o a l t e r o r
amend t h e o r d e r , o r t o c o n d i t i o n s u c h d i s m i s s a l upon t h e
attachment of c e r t a i n conditions. I n s u p p o r t of i t s motion,
d e f e n d a n t f i l e d a f f i d a v i t s of a t t o r n e y f e e s , c o s t s and
e x p e n s e s which i t f e l t c o u l d n o t be o f b e n e f i t i n any f u t u r e
action. The c o s t s t o t a l e d $881.93. Defendant a l s o e s t i -
mated i t s p o t e n t i a l l i a b i l i t y f o r back wages i n a f u t u r e
a c t i o n t o be a p p r o x i m a t e l y $17,573.34. Defendant moved f o r
a n o r d e r t o l l i n g back-pay l i a b i l i t y from t h e day which had
been o r i g i n a l l y s e t f o r t h e t r i a l t o t h e t i m e of t h e e n t r y
o f a judgment i n any f u t u r e a c t i o n .
I n response t o t h e s e motions, t h e D i s t r i c t Court e n t e r e d
a n o r d e r on A p r i l 2 4 , 1979 amending i t s A p r i l 2 o r d e r . That
o r d e r d i r e c t e d p l a i n t i f f t o pay d e f e n d a n t $85 f o r f i l i n g
c o s t s and a t t o r n e y fees presently incurred, i f the p l a i n t i f f
sought t o i n s t i t u t e another a c t i o n i n t h e f u t u r e . The
D i s t r i c t C o u r t r e f u s e d t o c o n s i d e r , however, t h e t o l l i n g of
any back-pay l i a b i l i t y d u r i n g t h e pendency of any new
action.
On May 1 8 , 1979, p l a i n t i f f f i l e d a n o t h e r s e p a r a t e
a c t i o n a g a i n s t d e f e n d a n t and h e r union i n which s h e a l l e g e d
t h a t s h e had been u n l a w f u l l y and d i s c r i m i n a t o r i l y d i s c h a r g e d
from h e r employment. I n t h e complaint, p l a i n t i f f sought a l l
l o s t wages, s e n i o r i t y b e n e f i t s and g e n e r a l damages. hat
a c t i o n i s s t i l l pending.
Defendant a p p e a l s from t h e r u l i n g of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t
i n i t s A p r i l 2 and A p r i l 24 o r d e r s .
Three i s s u e s a r e r a i s e d f o r o u r c o n s i d e r a t i o n upon
appeal :
1. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d i n g r a n t i n g p l a i n -
t i f f ' s motion t o d i s m i s s w i t h o u t p r e j u d i c e on t h e day b e f o r e
trial?
2. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d i n r e f u s i n g t o
t o l l back-pay l i a b i l i t y o f d e f e n d a n t which w i l l a c c r u e from
t h e d a t e o r i g i n a l l y scheduled f o r t r i a l t o t h e d a t e of e n t r y
o f any judgment r e c o v e r e d i n a p o s s i b l e f u t u r e a c t i o n ?
3. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d i n r e q u i r i n g t h a t ,
as a condition precedent t o p l a i n t i f f bringing another
a c t i o n , p l a i n t i f f pay d e f e n d a n t a sum i n t h e amount of $85
f o r a t t o r n e y f e e s and f i l i n g c o s t s a l r e a d y i n c u r r e d ?
The i s s u e s r a i s e d by d e f e n d a n t i n t h i s case r e q u i r e
t h i s C o u r t t o i n t e r p r e t Rule 4 1 ( a ) ( 2 ) of t h e Montana R u l e s
of C i v i l Procedure. This r u l e i s i d e n t i c a l i n a l l r e s p e c t s
t o Rule 4 1 ( a ) ( 2 ) o f t h e F e d e r a l R u l e s of C i v i l P r o c e d u r e ,
which h a s been i n t e r p r e t e d by many a u t h o r i t i e s . The i n t e r -
p r e t a t i o n s under t h e f e d e r a l . r u l e have p e r s u a s i v e a p p l i c a -
t i o n t o a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e s t a t e r u l e b e c a u s e o f t h e
i d e n t i c a l language.
Rule 4 1 ( a ) , M.R.Civ.P. provides i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t :
"Voluntary d i s m i s s a l - e f f e c t t h e r e o f .
(1) By p l a i n t i f f - by s t i p u l a t i o n . Subject
t o t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f Rule 2 3 ( c ) , of Rule 6 6 ,
and of any s t a t u t e of t h e s t a t e of Montana,
a n a c t i o n may b e d i s m i s s e d by t h e p l a i n t i f f
w i t h o u t o r d e r o f c o u r t ( i )by f i l i n g a n o t i c e
o f d i m i s s a l a t any t i m e b e f o r e s e r v i c e by t h e
a d v e r s e p a r t y o f a n answer o r of a motion f o r
summary judgment, which e v e r f i r s t o c c u r s , o r
(ii)by f i l i n g a s t i p u l a t i o n of d i s m i s s a l
s i g n e d by a l l p a r t i e s who have a p p e a r e d i n t h e
a c t i o n . Unless otherwise s t a t e d i n t h e n o t i c e
of d i s m i s s a l o r s t i p u l a t i o n , t h e d i s m i s s a l i s
without prejudice.
" (2) By order of court. Except as provided
in paragraph (1) of this subdivision of this
rule, an action shall not be dismissed at the
plaintiff's instance save upon order of the
court and upon such terms and conditions as the
court deems proper. ... Unless otherwise
specified in the order, a dismissal under this
paragraph is without prejudice."
It is clear that the granting of a motion for voluntary
dismissal under Rule 41 (a)(2) is within the sound discretion
of the trial court and is reviewable only for an abuse of
discretion. Armstrong v. Frostie Co. (4th Cir. 1971), 453
F.2d 914, 916; La-Tex Supply Co. v. Fruehauf Trailer Divi-
sion, Fruehauf Corp. (5th Cir. 1971), 444 F.2d 1366, 1368.
It is not a matter of right. In using its discretion, the
court should consider the expense and inconvenience that
will result to the defendant, other prejudicial consequences,
and whether terms and conditions attached to the dismissal
may make the defendant reasonably whole. Barron and Holtzoff,
Federal Practice and Procedure, 5912 at 116-117.
"It is the prejudice to the defendant, rather
the convenience of the court, that is to be
considered in passing on a motion for dismissal.
If the motion is made at an early stage of the
case, before much has happened, it is more like-
ly to be granted. Although dismissal may still
be allowed at later stages, an especially strong
showing is required to warrant voluntary dismis-
sal without prejudice after the plaintiff has
concluded his evidence or the defendant has moved
for a directed verdict or a verdict has been
directed for defendant." Wright and Miller, Fed-
eral Practice and Procedure, 52364 at 1 6 9 - 1 7 0 7
The general rule is that dismissal should be allowed
unless the defendant will suffer some plain legal prejudice
other than the mere prospect of a second lawsuit. Moore's
Federal Practice, Vol. 5, 1141.05 at 41-72; Wright and Miller,
supra, S2364 at 165. It is no bar to a dismissal that the
plaintiff may obtain a tactical advantage. Barron and
Holtzoff, supra, 5912 at 114; Moore's Federal Practice,
supra. The p u r p o s e of Rule 4 1 ( a ) ( 2 ) " i s p r i m a r i l y t o p r e -
v e n t v o l u n t a r y d i s m i s s a l s which u n f a i r l y a f f e c t t h e o t h e r
s i d e , and t o p e r m i t t h e i m p o s i t i o n o f c u r a t i v e c o n d i t i o n s . "
Wright and M i l l e r , supra.
When a t r i a l c o u r t d e c i d e s t o g r a n t a motion f o r volun-
t a r y d i s m i s s a l under Rule 4 1 ( a ) ( 2 ) , i t i s v e s t e d w i t h wide
d i s c r e t i o n i n d e t e r m i n i n g what c o n d i t i o n s may a t t a c h t o t h e
dismissal. I t may, f o r example, r e q u i r e a p l a i n t i f f t o pay
c o s t s and r e a s o n a b l e a t t o r n e y f e e s , o r i t may choose t o
impose no c o n d i t i o n s a t a l l :
"The t e r m s and c o n d i t i o n s t h a t may be imposed
upon t h e g r a n t i n g o f a motion f o r v o l u n t a r y
d i s m i s s a l a r e f o r t h e p r o t e c t i o n of a d e f e n -
d a n t , and i n t h e a b s e n c e o f p r o p e r o b j e c t i o n s
o r showing o f p r o p e r c o n d i t i o n s , t h e c o u r t may
dismiss without conditions. Each p a r t y may be
r e q u i r e d t o pay h i s own c o s t s , b u t o r d i n a r i l y
t h e d i s m i s s a l s h o u l d b e c o n d i t i o n e d upon t h e
payment of c o s t s by p l a i n t i f f . " Barron and
H o l t z o f f , s u p r a , 5914 a t 123.
P l a i n t i f f contends i n t h i s case t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t
d i d n o t a b u s e i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n d i s m i s s i n g t h e a c t i o n and
awarding d e f e n d a n t $85 f o r c o s t s and a t t o r n e y f e e s . plain-
t i f f argues t h a t t h e d i s m i s s a l w a s proper because of r e c e n t l y
d i s c o v e r e d w i t n e s s e s and t h e f a c t t h a t d e f e n d a n t had s u f -
f e r e d no p r e j u d i c e b e c a u s e t h e t r i a l had n o t y e t commenced.
P l a i n t i f f s u b m i t s t h a t t h e d i s m i s s a l was n o t s o u g h t a s a
t a c t i c a l d e v i c e t o e s c a p e t h e motion f o r a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t
o r t o a v o i d t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of t h e p r e t r i a l o r d e r .
Defendant c o n t e n d s , however, t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t
erred. Defendant a r g u e s t h a t i t s u f f e r e d s u b s t a n t i a l p r e j u -
d i c e by t h e d i s m i s s a l - - n o t o n l y had i t engaged i n e x t e n s i v e
p r e t r i a l d i s c o v e r y , b u t i t was f a c e d w i t h i n c r e a s i n g back-
pay l i a b i l i t y f o r p l a i n t i f f s h o u l d a n u n f a v o r a b l e judgment
e v e n t u a l l y be r e c o v e r e d .
I n c o n s i d e r i n g t h e p o s i t i o n s of t h e p a r t i e s , w e n o t e
f i r s t t h a t t h e r e i s supporting f e d e r a l a u t h o r i t y f o r both
sides. O o n e hand, f e d e r a l c o u r t s have a l l o w e d p a r t i e s t o
n
d i s m i s s when t h e y have d i s c o v e r e d new e v i d e n c e l a t e i n t h e
proceedings. S e e , Gold v . Geo. T. Moore S o n s , I n c . (1943),
3 F.R.D. 2 0 1 ; Union N a t . Bank of Youngstown v. S u p e r i o r
S t e e l Corp. ( 1 9 4 9 ) , 9 F.R.D. 117. The U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme
C o u r t h a s a l s o e x p r e s s e d i t s a p p r o v a l o f a motion t o d i s m i s s
u n d e r Rule 4 1 ( a ) ( 2 ) i n t h e s i t u a t i o n where t h e r e h a s been a
motion f o r a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t and t h e c o u r t b e l i e v e s t h a t ,
a l t h o u g h t h e r e i s a t e c h n i c a l f a i l u r e of p r o o f , there is
nevertheless a meritorious claim. Cone v . W e s t V i r g i n i a
Pulp & P a p e r Co. ( 1 9 4 7 ) , 330 U.S. 212, 67 S.Ct. 752, 91
L.Ed. 849. On t h e o t h e r hand, f e d e r a l c o u r t s have d e n i e d
m o t i o n f o r v o l u n t a r y d i s m i s s a l where a n a c t i o n h a s been
p e n d i n g f o r a l o n g t i m e and a p a r t y was n o t d i l i g e n t i n
discovery. Pace v. S o u t h e r n E x p r e s s Co. (7th C i r . 1969),
409 F.2d 331; P a t u r z o v . Home L i f e I n s . Co. (4th C i r . 19741,
503 F.2d 333; S h a f f e r v . Evans ( 1 0 t h C i r . 1 9 5 8 ) , 263 F.2d
134; Walker v . S p e n c e r ( 1 0 t h C i r . 1 9 4 1 ) , 1 2 3 F.2d 347.
W a l s o n o t e t h a t t h e r e a p p e a r s t o be no w e l l - s e t t l e d
e
r u l e w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e i s s u e of whether a p a r t y ' s l i a -
b i l i t y may b e t o l l e d and a t t a c h e d a s a c o n d i t i o n i n t h e
g r a n t i n g of a v o l u n t a r y d i s m i s s a l . While a c o u r t i s g e n e r -
a l l y g i v e n wide d i s c r e t i o n i n imposing c o n d i t i o n s under Rule
4 1 (a)( 2 ) , and s u c h c o n d i t i o n s a r e n o t m e r e l y l i m i t e d t o t h e
payment o f money, c a s e s which have a d d r e s s e d a d e f e n d a n t ' s
c o n t i n u i n g l i a b i l i t y f o r p o s s i b l e f u t u r e a c t i o n s have r e a c h e d
opposite results. S e e , Union Nat. Bank o f Youngstown v .
s u p e r i o r S t e e l Corp., s u p r a ; ~ h i l a d e l p h i aGear works v .
K e r o t e s t Mfg. Co. (D.C. Pa. 1 9 5 1 ) , 1 0 1 F.Supp. 820.
--
I n u n i o n Nat. Bank, a n a c t i o n f o r i n f r i n g e m e n t upon
p a t e n t s , t h e c o u r t r e f u s e d t o a t t a c h as a c o n d i t i o n t o t h e
v o l u n t a r y d i s m i s s a l p l a i n t i f f ' s agreement n o t t o a s s e r t
a g a i n s t d e f e n d a n t any c l a i m s which w e r e based upon o t h e r
p a t e n t s which p l a i n t i f f m i g h t have p o s s e s s e d d u r i n g t h e
pendency of t h e c o m p l a i n t . Yet, i n P h i l a d e l p h i a Gear Works,
a n o t h e r p a t e n t i n f r i n g e m e n t s u i t , t h e motion t o d i s m i s s was
g r a n t e d on t h e c o n d i t i o n t h a t p l a i n t i f f would n o t a s s e r t a
c l a i m a g a i n s t d e f e n d a n t o r h i s vendees o r s u c c e s s o r s i n
title. A u t h o r i t i e s i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e s e cases a l s o a d o p t
p o s i t i o n s t h a t vary. While one a u t h o r i t y p h r a s e s t h e g e n e r a l
r u l e by s t a t i n g t h a t a c o u r t "may c o n d i t i o n d i s m i s s a l on
p l a i n t i f f ' s agreement n o t t o a s s e r t c e r t a i n c l a i m s i n a n o t h e r
a c t i o n , " another states t h a t " t h e c o u r t w i l l o r d i n a r i l y
refuse" such conditions. Wright and M i l l e r , s u p r a , 82366 a t
181; B a r r o n and H o l t z o f f , s u p r a , 8914 a t 125-26.
I n t h i s c a s e , what weighs most h e a v i l y i n o u r judgment
i s t h e e x t e n t t o which t h e d e f e n d a n t was p r e j u d i c e d , i f any,
by t h e d i s m i s s a l and w h e t h e r , i f s u b s t a n t i a l p r e j u d i c e d i d
o c c u r , t h e d e f e n d a n t c o u l d have been made r e a s o n a b l y whole
by t h e i m p o s i t i o n of any c u r a t i v e c o n d i t i o n s a t t a c h e d t o t h e
dismissal. Where such c o n d i t i o n s may be a t t a c h e d , t h e
g e n e r a l r u l e f a v o r i n g t h e g r a n t i n g of t h e motion s h o u l d be
followed. The f a c t t h a t d e f e n d a n t may s u f f e r t h e p r o s p e c t
o f a second l a w s u i t o r t h a t p l a i n t i f f may o b t a i n some t a c -
t i c a l a d v a n t a g e by t h e d i s m i s s a l s h o u l d n o t b a r g r a n t i n g t h e
motion. Barron and H o l t z o f f , s u p r a .
H e r e , w e f i n d t h a t defendant suffered s u b s t a n t i a l
p r e j u d i c e by t h e g r a n t i n g o f t h e motion and t h a t t h i s p r e j u -
d i c e c o u l d have been c u r e d by imposing c o n d i t i o n s . I n view
o f t h e u n s e t t l e d s t a t e of t h e l a w w i t h r e s p e c t t o t o l l i n g
l i a b i l i t y i n f u t u r e a c t i o n s , however, we d e c l i n e t o s a y
whether t h e t r i a l c o u r t s h o u l d have a t t a c h e d t h e t o l l i n g of
any l i a b i l i t y f o r p l a i n t i f f ' s back pay a s a c o n d i t i o n t o t h e
dismissal. W l e a v e t h i s m a t t e r f o r t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s con-
e
s i d e r a t i o n i n t h e t r i a l o f t h e second a c t i o n .
W e do f i n d , however, i n view of t h e l a t e n e s s of p l a i n -
t i f f ' s motion f o r d i s m i s s a l , and t h e e x t e n s i v e p r e p a r a t i o n
on t h e p a r t of t h e d e f e n s e , t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t s h o u l d have
a t t a c h e d a s a c o n d i t i o n t o t h e d i s m i s s a l a more r e a s o n a b l e
award of c o s t s and a t t o r n e y f e e s . It is well s e t t l e d t h a t
a n award of a t t o r n e y f e e s be based upon competent e v i d e n c e .
F i r s t S e c u r i t y Bk. of Bozeman v. Tholkes ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 169 Mont.
422, 429, 547 P.2d 1328, 1331; P h e n n i c i e v. P h e n n i c i e ( 1 9 7 9 ) ,
Mont. , 604 P.2d 787, 791, 36 St.Rep. 2378, 2383.
Here, t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t awarded d e f e n d a n t $10 f o r c o s t s and
$75 f o r a t t o r n e y f e e s . D e s p i t e t h i s f a c t , d e f e n d a n t sub-
m i t t e d d e t a i l e d documentation t o t h e c o u r t t h a t i t had
expended $881.93 i n c o s t s and l e g a l f e e s . The r e c o r d d o e s
n o t r e v e a l whether p l a i n t i f f d i s p u t e d t h e amount o r d e s c r i p -
t i o n s o f t h e s e r v i c e s and e x p e n s e s . Nor d o e s t h e r e a p p e a r
any r a t i o n a l e by t h e t r i a l c o u r t f o r t h e award o r any con-
s i d e r a t i o n o f p l a i n t i f f ' s f i n a n c i a l a b i l i t y t o pay. The
award a p p e a r s t o be n o t h i n g more t h a n a n a r b i t r a r y f i g u r e
t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court s e l e c t e d .
T h e r e i s l i t t l e from which a n a p p e l l a t e c o u r t c o u l d
r e v i e w t h e r e a s o n a b l e n e s s o f t h e award. I n view of t h e
documents and e x h i b i t s s u b m i t t e d i n t h e r e c o r d , w e f i n d t h a t
a more r e a s o n a b l e award of c o s t s and a t t o r n e y f e e s i s p r o p e r ,
and w e d i r e c t t h e c o u r t t o h o l d a h e a r i n g r e g a r d i n g t h e
d e t e r m i n a t i o n of c o s t s and r e a s o n a b l e a t t o r n e y f e e s .
Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court is
affirmed in part. The court is directed to hold a hearing
and award a reasonable figure with respect to costs and
attorney fees.
We concur:
& Justices