State v. McKenzie

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

No. 13011
..................................................

STATE OF MONTANA

VS .
DUNCAN PEDER McKENZIE

J u s t i c e D a n i e l J. S h e a D i s s e n t

--------------_---_-----------------------.--

March 28, 1980
Mr. J u s t i c e D a n i e l J. Shea d i s s e n t i n g :

B e f o r e s e t t i n g f o r t h t h e b a s i s of m d i s s e n t , it would
y

p e r h a p s be h e l p f u l t o p l a c e t h i s c a s e i n i t s p r o c e d u r a l p r o s p e c t i v e .

T h i s C o u r t d e c i d e d t h e f i r s t McKenzie c a s e on November 1 2 , 1976.

S t a t e v . McKenzie ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 1 7 1 Mont. 278, 557 P.2d 1023. I was

n o t a member of t h i s C o u r t a t t h a t t i m e . The c a s e t h e n t r a v e l e d

t o t h e United S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t on a p e t i t i o n f o r w r i t o f

certiorari.

On J u l y 29, 1977, t h e United S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t remanded

t h e c a s e t o b e r e h e a r d i n l i g h t of P a t t e r s o n v . New York ( 1 9 7 7 ) ,

432 U.S. 1 9 7 , 97 S.Ct. 2319, 53 L.Ed.2d 281. When t h e c a s e was

a g a i n o r a l l y a r g u e d , I was a member o f t h i s C o u r t . In addition

t o a d d r e s s i n g i t s e l f t o t h e P a t t e r s o n v. New York i s s u e , t h i s

Court again i s s u e d a f u l l opinion. Other than t h e P a t t e r s o n

i s s u e , i t was f o r t h e most p a r t , s i m p l y a r e p e a t of t h e f i r s t

McKenzie d e c i s i o n .
- - S t a t e v . McKenzie ( 1 9 7 8 ) , Mont . I

581 P.2d 1205, 35 St.Rep. 759. I d i s s e n t e d t o t h a t o p i n i o n on

t h e s e a r c h and s e i z u r e q u e s t i o n and on t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y q u e s t i o n

( 5 8 1 P. 2d 1235-1277).

THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE QUESTION

I concluded t h a t t h e s e a r c h e s and s e i z u r e s i n t h i s c a s e

b l a t a n t l y v i o l a t e d d e f e n d a n t ' s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s under t h e

Montana and United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n s and t h e r e f o r e t h a t t h e

e v i d e n c e s e i z e d and t h e f r u i t s of t h e i l l e g a l l y o b t a i n e d e v i d e n c e

s h o u l d have been s u p p r e s s e d . 581 P.2d 1235-1266. Defendant was

c o n v i c t e d by t h e u s e of i l l e g a l l y s e i z e d e v i d e n c e and was t h u s

e n t i t l e d t o a new t r i a l . M views have n o t changed on t h e
y

s e a r c h and s e i z u r e q u e s t i o n ; i n d e e d , t h e y a r e even more r e s o l u t e .

T h i s i s a v e r y s t r o n g c a s e f o r s u p p r e s s i o n of e v i d e n c e . Expressed

a s m o d e r a t e l y a s p o s s i b l e , t h e s e a r c h and s e i z u r e v i o l a t i o n s

which o c c u r r e d i n t h i s c a s e a r e a p p a l l i n g .
 There is no need, however, to again set forth my dissent
in this opinion. My views expressed in the second McKenzie case
(581 P.2d 1235-1266) shall constitute my views here on the search
and seizure questions. No doubt I could write a stronger dissent,
but time constraints do not permit a rewriting. I think it
appropriate, however, to comment on one case that we have decided
since the second McKenzie case.
In Thomson v. Onstad (1979), Mont . , 594 P.2d 1137,
36 St.Rep. 910, this Court unanimously confirmed whatmy position
had always been in relation to Montana law and the requirement
that an application for a search warrant must contain probable
cause within the four corners of the document itself, without
reference to any extraneous oral statements or testimony. This
Court reconfirmed the four-corner requirement:
"However, regardless of whatever additional
information Hallett provided to the judge who
issued the warrant, the failure to put that
information in writing precludes our consideration
of whether it might have cured the insufficient
affidavit. This Court has previously construed
Article 11, Section 11 of the 1972 Montana Constitution
to require that - the facts relied upon by the
all
issuing magistrate be included in writing in the
sworn affidavit. State ex rel. Townsend v. District
Court (1975), 168 Mont. 357, 362-63, 543 P.2d 193,
196. See also, United States v. Anderson (9th Cir.
1971), 453 F.2d 174, 177 & n. 3; Petition of Gray
(1970), 155 Mont. 510, 520, 473 P.2d 532, 537. Cf.
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 473, n. 3, 96 S.Ct. at
3042, n. 3, 49 L.Ed.2d at 1075, n. 3." 594 P.2d at
1139.
From this quotation there is no doubt that this Court not
only considers this to be the law, but also that this has always
been the law in this state. These constitutional requirements
under both the United States and Montana Constitutions certainly
predated the search and seizure involved in this case. For
reasons that I am unable to comprehend, this Court has suspended
the application of this law to defendant McKenzie here. This
was one of the major points of my dissent on the search and
seizure questions, and it is why I so meticulously set forth
t h e f a c t s and c i r c u m s t a n c e s s u r r o u n d i n g t h e s e a r c h and s e i z u r e .

W e thus a r r i v e a t t h e issuance of t h e p r e s e n t opinion.

T h i s case w a s a g a i n d e c i d e d b e c a u s e t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme

C o u r t d i r e c t e d u s t o do s o . The Supreme C o u r t o r d e r e d u s t o

r e c o n s i d e r i t i n l i g h t o f Sandstrom v. S t a t e of Montana ( 1 9 7 9 ) ,

442 U.S. 510, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 6 1 L.Ed.2d 39. The s p e c i f i c o r d e r

o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t p r o v i d e d :

"WHEREAS, l a t e l y i n t h e Supreme C o u r t of t h e S t a t e
of Montana, t h e r e came b e f o r e you a c a u s e between
The S t a t e of Montana, p l a i n t i f f and r e s p o n d e n t , and
Duncan Peder McKenzie, J r . , d e f e n d a n t and a p p e l l a n t ,
No. 13011, w h e r e i n t h e judgment of t h e s a i d Supreme
C o u r t was d u l y e n t e r e d on t h e s e v e n t h day o f J u n e ,
1978, a s a p p e a r s by an i n s p e c t i o n o f t h e p e t i t i o n f o r
w r i t of c e r t i o r a r i t o t h e s a i d Supreme C o u r t and t h e
response t h e r e t o .

"AND WHEREAS, i n t h e 1978 Term, t h e s a i d c a u s e h a v i n g
been s u b m i t t e d t o t h e SUPREME COURT O THE U N I T E D
F
STATES on t h e s a i d p e t i t i o n f o r w r i t o f c e r t i o r a r i
and r e s p o n s e t h e r e t o .

"ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, it was o r d e r e d and adjudged
on J u n e 25, 1979, by t h i s Court t h a t t h e judgment o f
t h e Supreme C o u r t of Montana i n t h i s c a u s e be v a c a t e d ,
and t h a t t h i s c a u s e be remanded t o t h e Supreme C o u r t
o f t h e S t a t e of Montana f o r f u r t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n i n
l i g h t of Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. (1979).

"NOW, THEREFORE, THE CAUSE I S REMANDED t o you i n o r d e r
t h a t s u c h p r o c e e d i n g s may be had i n t h e s a i d c a u s e ,
i n c o n f o r m i t y w i t h t h e judgment of t h i s C o u r t above
s t a t e d , a s a c c o r d w i t h r i g h t and j u s t i c e , and t h e
C o n s t i t u t i o n and Laws o f t h e United S t a t e s , t h e s a i d
w r i t notwithstanding."
I n l i g h t of t h e s p e c i f i c d i r e c t i o n t o r e c o n s i d e r t h i s c a s e

i n l i g h t o f Sandstrom v . S t a t e of Montana, I do n o t know w h e t h e r

t h i s C o u r t was a g a i n r e q u i r e d t o i s s u e a f u l l o p i n i o n o r s i m p l y

t o r u l e on t h e q u e s t i o n s r a i s e d by t h e Sandstrom c a s e . Whatever

t h e c a s e may b e , t h e m a j o r i t y i s s u e d a f u l l o p i n i o n on a l l i s s u e s

r a i s e d by t h e d e f e n d a n t , and t h u s I assume t h e o p i n i o n s p e a k s from

t h e d a t e o f d e c i s i o n on a l l i s s u e s d e c i d e d . If s u c h i s t h e c a s e ,
I f a i l t o u n d e r s t a n d why t h e m a j o r i t y d i d n o t c o n s i d e r t h e s e a r c h

and s e i z u r e q u e s t i o n a g a i n and d e c i d e it i n d e f e n d a n t ' s f a v o r .

Thomson v . Onstad, s u p r a , r e q u i r e s t h i s r e s u l t .
 The majority opinion ignores any reference to Thomson
v. Onstad. Why?
The search and seizure violations committed
are
against Thomson/pale beside the violations committed in this
case. There is no doubt that this Court has not given the full
and fair consideration to McKenziets claims that his Fourth
Amendment rights were violated. Indeed, by its decision it
is clear beyond any doubt that the Court has carved out another
special McKenzie rule in the law of search and seizure. As to
McKenzie, the Fourth Amendment is dead and buried.
THE DEATH PENALTY STATUTES
In the second McKenzie case, I dissented on the question of
whether the sentencing statutes and appellate review statutes
in existence at the time of the commission of the crimes involved,
passed constitutional muster. I concluded that they did not.
Undoubtedly, by writing another dissent here on the same question,
I could better state my position. Time constraints, however, do
not permit me to do so. For this reason, my dissent in State
v. McKenzie (1978), Mont. , 581 P.2d 1235-1277, 35 St.Rep.
799A-799JJ shall constitute my dissent here on the same question.
I do have a few brief comments, however, in relation to the
majority adding the case of State v. Coleman (1979), - Mont. I

605 P.2d 1000, 36 St.Rep. 1134, in suport of its position on the
death penalty. The majority states:
"In short, we believe that the Montana statutory
scheme in existence at the time of the crimes
herein, affords defendant the procedural safeguards
necessary to protect the substantive rights to be
sentenced without arbitrariness or caprice. State
v. Coleman (1979), - Mont . - 1
I1
- P.2d I

3 6 St.Rep.

Other than citing Coleman, the statement made is precisely
the same as made in the second McKenzie case
Coleman has absolutely no application to this case. The question

in Coleman was whether the 1977 death penalty statutes could be
retroactively applied to crimes committed in 1974. The question
here is whether the general sentencing statutes and general
appellate review statutes in existence at the time of the
commission of the crimes (January 21, 1974) provided sufficient
procedural and substantive protections to satisfy the require-
ments set forth by the United States Supreme Court. Coleman
therefore, lends no support to the death penalty issues presented
in this case.
By concentrating in this dissent on the issues raised by
the Sandstrom-type instructions used in this case, I do not
mean to imply that I agree with all those portions of the
majority opinion upon which I have no specifically expressed
disagreement by writing a dissent. The simple fact is that
the entire opinion is lacking, but I do not have the time to
address all of those issues raised. Suffice to say that if
ever a case came to an appellate court as a monumental mess, this
is it.
I direct the remainder of this dissent to the issue of
whether the repeated use of the Sandstrom-type instructions in
this case are, beyond a reasonable doubt, harmless error. I
do not believe that any appellate court could, under the cir-
cumstances of the repeated use of these unconstitutional instructions,
declare that the error is harmless. For this reason, I believe
that the convictions must be reversed.
In Sandstrom v. State of Montana, supra, the United States
Supreme Court held that the presumption that one intends the
consequences of his voluntary act is unconstitutional. his
Court had not, however, passed on the issue of whether the con-
stitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. For
this reason the United States Supreme Court did not decide this
issue and remanded the case to this Court for our initial con-
sideration. In effect, that is what the United States Supreme
Court directed this Court to do in the present case.
-60-
 In granting Sandstrom a new trial after the constitutional
issue was again argued in this Court, we declared that Sandstrom
was entitled to a new trial because we could not declare beyond
a reasonable doubt that the unconstitutional presumption did
not influence to some degree the decision of the jury. State
v. Sandstrom (1979), - Mont . , 603 P.2d 244, 36 St.Rep.
2099. In Sandstrom, we also set forth what we considered the
correct test to be for the assessment of constitutional error.
I fail to see how McKenzie should not have the benefit of the
same decision--that is, granting him a new trial. The errors
comrnited in this case are overwhelming in comparison to the
one unconstitutional presumption which tainted the Sandstrom
conviction and required a reversal and new trial.

- MAJORITY APPROACH TO CONSTITUTIONAL ERROR ELIMINATES -
THE - - - - THE
NEED TO INSTRUCT - JURY ON - - - THE CASE
-- THE - - THE LAW OF - -
In Sandstrom v. State of Montana, the United States Supreme
Court declared that in determining whether constitutional error
in instructions is harmless, an appellate court must review
the instructions as reasonable jurors would view them. 442
U.S. at 514, 99 S.Ct. at 2454, 61 L.Ed.2d at 45. The focus
is clearly on the instructions rather than on the evidence.
Indeed, any other view would ignore the issue. 'In adopting the
"overwhelming evidence" test here, the majority has totally
eliminated any need to focus on the jury instructions to assess
the possible impact they had on the decision making process of
the jury.
In holding that the unconstitutional jury instructions
constitute harmless error, the majority takes essentially a
four-step approach. The fourth step is the actual application
of the "overwhelming evidence" test for assessing the impact
of constitutional error inhering in jury instructions. The

analysis defies logic.
-61-
 First, the unconstitutional instructions are analyzed
and the Court determines that a reasonable jury would conclude
the presumptions created are rebuttable rather than conclusive.
Second, the Court declares that even the rebuttable presumptions
are unconstitutional under the rationale of Mullaney v. Wilbur
(1975), 421 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508, and
therefore that a constitutional error analysis must be undertaken.
I note here, however, that this second step is not necessary.
The United States Supreme Court had already declared in Sandstrom
that similar instructions were unconstitutional regardless of
whether they created conclusive presumptions or rebuttable
presumptions. The case was sent back here for the sole purpose
of determining whether or not the constitutional error was
harmless. Third, the majority then decides that the best test
for assessing the impact of constitutional error inhering in
jury instructions is the "overwhelming evidence" test. Milton
v. Wainwright (1972), 407 U.S. 371, 92 S.Ct. 2174, 33 L.Ed.2d
1, is cited as authority for application of the "overwhelming
evidence test". And fourth, the Court then confines itself
solely to an analysis of the evidence (rather than to an analysis
of the unconstitutional instructions) and declares that the
evidence of guilt is overwhelming and therefore the verdicts
must be upheld. This approach constitutes a total abdication
of our duty, which is to assess the impact of the unconstitutional

instructions on the decision making process of the jury. It
is not our function to be the fact finder.
This approach to constitutional error obviates the need
to ever instruct the jury on the law, and therefore obviates
the need for the jury to ever follow the law. All that is
required now, it seems, is that the jury be provided only with

the appropriate verdict forms and a conviction will be sustained
if, in the minds of the majority of an appellate court, the
-62-
evidence of guilt is overwhelming. I do not believe the
United States Supreme Court could, in good conscience, let
this Court get away with this approach to the assessment of
constitutional error inhering in jury instructions.
It is not simply that this Court has adopted an entirely
unacceptable test for the assessment of constitutional error
inhering in jury instructions. Moreover, this Court, in two
recent cases, adopted and used a different standard to assess
the impact of jury instructions on the ultimate decision of
the jury. State v. Sandstrom (1979), - Mont . , 603 P.2d
244, 36 St.Rep. 2099; State v. Hamilton (1980), Mont .- I

605 P.2d 1121, 375 St-Rep. 70. No explanation whatsoever is
offered for the failure to use the same test in this case.

- ADOPTING THE 'OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE' - -TO APPLY - -
BY TEST TO THIS
CASE,- COURT HAS IGNORED - - V. SANDSTROM AND STATE V.
- THE STATE -
HAMILTON
In adopting the "overwhelming evidence" test, the majority
states:
"We find nothing in Sandstrom inconsistent with
adopting this approach to determing harmless
-
error. In Sandstrom the United States Supreme
-
Court expressly declined to reach the issue of
harmless error as an initial matter as the
Montana Supreme Court had not ruled on this issue.
-
- remand, we granted - - trial to Sandstrom
On a new
-
on grounds unrelated - - overwhelming evidence
to the
standard - assessing harmless error." (Emphasis
in
added. )
It is true that the United States Supreme Court did
no,tdirect us to follow any particular test in assessing the
impact of the unconstitutional instructions on the verdicts
of the jury. But it is equally true that we were directed
to consider the impact of the unconstitutional instruction on
a reasonable jury. How would a reasonable jury view the un-
constitutional instruction? We were not freed, as the majority
implies here, to confine our analysis to the so-called "over-
whelming evidence of guilt", which is precisely what the majority
has done.
-63-
 Nor c a n I make any s e n s e o u t o f t h e m a j o r i t y s t a t e m e n t

t h a t "on remand, w e g r a n t e d a new t r i a l t o Sandstrom on grounds

u n r e l a t e d t o t h e overwhelming e v i d e n c e s t a n d a r d i n a s s e s s i n g

harmless e r r o r . " The f a c t i s t h a t on remand w e g r a n t e d a new

t r i a l t o Sandstrom b e c a u s e , i n a n a l y z i n g t h e u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l

i n s t r u c t i o n and i t s p o s s i b l e impact on t h e j u r y , w e c o u l d n o t

d e c l a r e beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t , t h a t t h e e r r o r w a s h a r m l e s s .

I f w e a p p l i e d t h i s s t a n d a r d i n d e c i d i n g t h e Sandstrom c a s e on

remand, why d i d n ' t w e u s e t h e same s t a n d a r d h e r e ? I s n ' t defendant

McKenzie e n t i t l e d t o an a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e same t e s t a s w e used

i n Sandstrom? I f n o t , why n o t ?

I n d i s c u s s i n g t h e impact of t h e u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n s t r u c t i o n

and t h e t e s t f o r a s s e s s i n g t h i s i m p a c t , t h i s C o u r t s t a t e d i n

t h e Sandstrom d e c i s i o n on remand:

" I n summary, t h e i s s u e p r e s e n t e d i s whether t h e
erroneous i n s t r u c t i o n c o n s t i t u t e d harmless e r r o r
a s a g a i n s t t h e defendant. The i n s t r u c t i o n r e a d s :
'The law presumes t h a t a p e r s o n i n t e n d s t h e o r d i n a r y
consequences o f h i s v o l u n t a r y a c t s . '

" B e f o r e a f e d e r a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l e r r o r can b e h e l d
h a r m l e s s , t h e c o u r t must b e a b l e t o d e c l a r e a b e l i e f
t h a t i t w a s h a r m l e s s beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t .
Chapman v. S t a t e of C a l i f o r n i a ( 1 9 6 7 ) , 386 U.S. 1 8 ,
87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705. I n s o holding, t h e
Supreme C o u r t i n Chapman r e a f f i r m e d i t s h o l d i n g i n
Fahy v . S t a t e of C o n n e c t i c u t ( 1 9 6 3 ) , 375 U.S. 85,
86-87, 84 S.Ct. 229, 230, 1 L.Ed.2d 1 7 1 , 173:1
' [ t l h e q u e s t i o n i s whether t h e r e i s a r e a s o n a b l e
p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e complained o f might
have c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e c o n v i c t i o n .

"Under Fahy and Chapman, u n l e s s w e can f i n d h a r m l e s s
e r r o r , t h e c o n v i c t i o n must be r e v e r s e d . To con-
s t i t u t e h a r m l e s s e r r o r , w e must b e a b l e t o a s s e n t a s
a Court t h a t t h e o f f e n s i v e i n s t r u c t i o n could n o t
r e a s o n a b l y have c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e j u r y v e r d i c t . In
c o n s i d e r i n g t h e i n s t r u c t i o n , and t h e f a c t t h a t i n t e n t
was t h e main i s s u e i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t t r i a l w e
c a n n o t make t h a t a s s e r t i o n . The e r r o n e o u s i n s t r u c t i o n
g o e s t o a v i t a l e l e m e n t of t h e proof of t h e c r i m e ,
namely t h e i n t e n t of t h e d e f e n d a n t Sandstrom i n com-
m i t t i n g t h e homicide. I f t h e jury followed t h e
i n s t r u c t i o n , it would have presumed t h e i n t e n t w i t h o u t
p r o o f beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t . " (Emphasis a d d e d . )
603 P.2d a t 245, 36 St.Rep. a t 2100.
 I t i s p a t e n t l y c l e a r t h a t i n Sandstrom, t h i s C o u r t

used a d i f f e r e n t t e s t f o r measuring t h e impact o f con-

s t i t u t i o n a l e r r o r t h a n what t h e m a j o r i t y h a s used i n t h e

present case. F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e C o u r t i n Sandstrom f o c u s e d

on t h e i n s t r u c t i o n i t s e l f . Thus t h e s t a t e m e n t : "If the

j u r y f o l l o w e d t h e i n s t r u c t i o n i t c o u l d have presumed t h e

i n t e n t w i t h o u t proof beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t . " I t i s equally

c l e a r , f u r t h e r m o r e , t h a t t h e Sandstrom t e s t we a p p l i e d d o e s

n o t depend upon t h e q u a l i t y o r q u a n t i t y of t h e e v i d e n c e

s t a c k e d up a g a i n s t t h e d e f e n d a n t . R a t h e r , i t depends upon

t h e p o s s i b l e e f f e c t which t h e u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n s t r u c t i o n had

on t h e d e c i s i o n making p r o c e s s o f t h e j u r y . Any o t h e r t e s t

i s not a test f o r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l e r r o r inherent i n jury in-
structions.

Even more r e c e n t l y , i n S t a t e v. Hamilton, s u p r a , t h i s

C o u r t a p p l i e d t h e Sandstrom t e s t a l t h o u g h w e a f f i r m e d t h e

conviction. ( I n d e e d , I f e e l now t h a t I was i n e r r o r i n

s i g n i n g t h e m a j o r i t y o p i n i o n d e c l a r i n g t h e e r r o r i n Hamilton

t o be h a r m l e s s . ) I n Hamilton, w e s t a t e d :

" R e c e n t l y , t h i s C o u r t h a s made t h e f o l l o w i n g
observation: 'To c o n s t i t u t e h a r m l e s s e r r o r , w e
must b e a b l e t o a s s e n t a s a C o u r t t h a t t h e
o f f e n s i v e i n s t r u c t i o n c o u l d n o t r e a s o n a b l y have
contributed t o t h e jury v e r d i c t . ' S t a t e v. Sandstrom
(19791, Mont . , 603 P.2d 2 4 4 , a t 245, 36
St.Rep. 2099, 2100. This statement i n d i c a t e s t h a t
t h e law i n Montana a s t o h a r m l e s s e r r o r i s c l o s e r
t o t h e H a r r i n g t o n t e s t . That i s , t h e a p p e l l a t e c o u r t
d e t e r m i n e s t h e impact of t h e e r r o r upon a r e a s o n a b l e
jury. I f t h e impact of t h e i n s t r u c t i o n c o u l d n o t
have r e a s o n a b l y c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e v e r d i c t t h e n t h e
e r r o r i s harmless. That s u c h an approach i s c o r r e c t
i s emphasized by t h e United S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t .
They s a i d t h a t t h e p r o p e r a n a l y s i s o f an i n s t r u c t i o n
b e g i n s w i t h ' t h e way i n which a r e a s o n a b l e j u r o r
c o u l d have i n t e r p r e t e d t h e i n s t r u c t i o n . ' 4 4 2 U.S. a t
. 99 S . C t . a t , 61 L.Ed.2d a t 45." 605 P.2d

T h i s language a g a i n l e a v e s no d o u b t t h a t u n t i l t h e p r e s e n t

McKenzie case, t h i s C o u r t b e l i e v e d t h a t i t s d u t y i n a s s e s s i n g

c o n s t i t u t i o n a l e r r o r i n h e r i n g i n j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n s , was t o

a n a l y z e and a s s e s s t h e impact of t h e o f f e n d i n g i n s t r u c t i o n on

t h e d e c i s i o n making p r o c e s s of t h e j u r y .
 Now, however, i n less t h a n two months' t i m e , t h i s

C o u r t h a s , a t l e a s t f o r t h e p r e s e n t c a s e , c o m p l e t e l y abandoned

t h e Sandstrom and Hamilton t e s t , and r e p l a c e d it w i t h a

m e a n i n g l e s s "overwhelming e v i d e n c e " t e s t . I f w e a r e going

t o change t h e r u l e s e v e r y c o u p l e months, w e s h o u l d a t l e a s t

e x p l a i n why w e a r e d o i n g s o by c i t i n g t h e c a s e s w e a r e

abandoning o r d i s r e g a r d i n g , and e x p l a i n why t h e s e c a s e s e i t h e r

do n o t a p p l y o r why w e choose n o t t o a p p l y them. The f a i l u r e

t o f o l l o w t h e t e s t s e t f o r t h i n Sandstrom and Hamilton can o n l y

be e x p l a i n e d a s t h e c a r v i n g o u t o f a s p e c i a l and m e a n i n g l e s s

t e s t f o r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l e r r o r t o a p p l y t o d e f e n d a n t McKenzie.

AUTOMATIC REVERSIBLE ERROR - - -
CAN BE THE CONSEQUENCE - -
O F THE

FAILURE - STATE APPELLATE COURTS - FAITHFULLY ADHERE -
OF TO TO

THE RULE SET FORTH - CHAPMAN V . CALIFORNIA
--- IN -
Not l o n g a f t e r t h e United S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t d e c i d e d

Chapman v . C a l i f o r n i a , Chief J u s t i c e Traynor o f t h e C a l i f o r n i a

Supreme C o u r t w r o t e an i n f o r m a t i v e book e n t i t l e d , The R i d d l e

of Harmless E r r o r ( 1 9 6 9 ) , Ohio U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s .
7
H i s main

theme was t h a t t h e Chapman t e s t f o r measuring c o n s t i t u t i o n a l

e r r o r i s t o o s t r i n g e n t and t h a t a less e x a c t i n g s t a n d a r d c o u l d

and s h o u l d be a d o p t e d w i t h o u t j e o p a r d i z i n g t h e r i g h t s o f a

defendant. But he a l s o warned s t a t e a p p e l l a t e c o u r t s t h a t i f

t h e y d i d n o t a d h e r e t o t h e Chapman t e s t i t would be s u p p l a n t e d

with a r u l e of automatic r e v e r s a l . He stressed that the

s t a t e m e n t i n Chapman t h a t "'we c a n n o t l e a v e t o t h e S t a t e s t h e

f o r m u l a t i o n o f a u t h o r i t a t i v e l a w s , r u l e s , and r e m e d i e s d e s i g n e d

t o p r o t e c t p e o p l e from i n f r a c t i o n by t h e S t a t e s o f f e d e r a l l y

g u a r a n t e e d r i g h t s ' " was a s u r e s i g n t h a t t h e Supreme C o u r t

demands a d h e r e n c e t o t h e Chapman t e s t . With r e f e r e n c e t o

t h i s q u o t e from Chapman, h e s t a t e d :

-66-
 ". . . T h a t s t a t e m e n t i s of some i m p o r t i n t h e
l i g h t of t h e C o u r t ' s l a t t e r - d a y p r o c e d u r a l s a f e -
g u a r d s f o r c r i m i n a l d e f e n d a n t s . Unless s t r i c t l y
monitored c o u r t s n o t i n sympathy w i t h t h e s e
s a f e g u a r d s c o u l d v i t i a t e them by h o l d i n g t h e i r
v i o l a t i o n harmless. The Supreme C o u r t may have
been a p p r e h e n s i v e of a n e a s y r o u t e t o a f f i r m a n c e
d e s p i t e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l e r r o r , v i a t e s t s more l e n i e n t
t h a n t h e Chapman t e s t and more d i f f i c u l t t o m o n i t o r .
The v e r y s t r i n g e n c y of t h e Chapman t e s t i s enough t o
s u g g e s t t h a t u n l e s s it i s f a i t h f u l l y f o l l o w e d , t h e
Supreme C o u r t w i l l s u p p l a n t i t w i t h a r u l e o f a u t o -
matic reversal.

"The Chapman t e s t i t s e l f comes c l o s e t o a u t o m a t i c
reversal. A c o u r t f a i t h f u l t o t h e Chapman t e s t c o u l d
hold t h a t t h e v i o l a t i o n of a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t d i d
n o t c o n t r i b u t e t o t h e judgment, and hence was harm-
less o n l y i f i t c o u l d d e c l a r e a b e l i e f t o t h a t e f f e c t
beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t , a b e l i e f a p p r o a c h i n g
certainty.. . ." 386 U . S . 43, 4 4 .

I f what t h i s C o u r t h a s done i n t h i s c a s e i s any i n d i c a t i o n

o f t h e a t t i t u d e of most s t a t e c o u r t s toward f e d e r a l c o n s t i t u -

t i o n a l r i g h t s , I c a n t h i n k of no more c o n v i n c i n g r e a s o n f o r

t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t t o a d o p t a r u l e o f a u t o m a t i c

reversal. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , it a p p e a r s t h a t t h e Supreme C o u r t

i s i n p a r t r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h i s a t t i t u d e of s t a t e c o u r t s

b e c a u s e o f i t s own f a i l u r e t o a d o p t an u n d e v i a t i n g r u l e f o r t h e

a s s e s s m e n t of t h e e f f e c t o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l e r r o r on t h e d e c i s i o n

making p r o c e s s e s o f a j u r y . But whatever t h e t e s t may b e ,

I am c o n f i d e n t t h a t t h e United S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t w i l l n o t

a c c e p t t h e t e s t and a n a l y s i s t h e m a j o r i t y h a s used i n t h i s c a s e .

THE. "OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE" TEST AS ADOPTED AND APPLIED HERE,
--
OMITS THE ESSENTIAL I N G R E D I E N T O ASSESSING THE IMPACT - -
-F O THE
F

UNCONSTITUTIONAL INSTRUCTIONS

Out of t h e v o i d c r e a t e d by t h e a p p a r e n t f a i l u r e o r

i n a b i l i t y o f t h e United S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t t o f a s h i o n an

u n d e v i a t i n g r u l e f o r t h e a s s e s s m e n t of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l e r r o r ,

t h e m a j o r i t y h e r e h a s d e c l a r e d t h a t it i s f r e e t o a d o p t any

one o f t h r e e r u l e s t h a t a p p e a r t o have m e t t h e a p p r o v a l o f

t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t . The c h o i c e s a v a i l a b l e a r e

described a s follows:
 ". . . At least three definable approaches
appear in Uniked States Supreme Court cases:
(1) Focusing on the erroneously admitted
evidence or other constitutional error to deter-
mine whether it might have contributed to the
conviction. e.g., Fahy v. Connecticut (1963),
375 U.S. 85, 54 S.Ct. 229, 11 L.Ed.2d 171;
(2) excluding the constitutional infirmity where
overwhelming evidence supports the conviction
e.g., Milton v. Wainwright (1972), 407 U.S. 371,
92 S.Ct. 2174, 33 L.Ed.2d 1; (3) determining
whether the tainted evidence is merely cumulative
or duplicates properly admitted evidence e.g.,
Harrington v. California (1969), 395 U.S. 250, 89
S.Ct. 1726, 23 L.Ed.2d 284."
The majority cites two law review articles which apparently
support the conclusion that three distinct rules exist for
the assessment of constitutional error. Assessing the Harm-
-
lessness of Federal Constitutional Error--A Process - -
In Need

- -a Rationale, Univ. of Pennsylvania L.Rev., Dec. 1976, Vol.
of
125, No. 2; Harmless Error, - - - -
The Need for a Uniform Standard,
St. John's L.Rev., Vol. 53, Spring 1179, No. 3. The majority
neglects to mention, however, that neither article remotely
touches upon the issue of how to treat constitutional error
inhering in jury instructions. The most probable reason is
that the authors of both articles assumed, as most people would
assume, that unconstitutional jury instructions cannot be
treated in the same manner as evidence which has been invalidly
admitted at a defendant's trial.
Assuming, moreover, that Milton v. Wainwright, supra,
sets forth a separate "overwhelming evidence" test for the
assessment of constitutional error, I fail to see how it can
be applied to unconstitutional jury instructions.
In Milton v. Wainwright, the United States Supreme Court
held that an invalidly obtained confession admitted as
evidence was harmless error because three additional confessions
made by the defendant had been validly admitted as evidence.
There, a police officer posing as a fellow prisoner, was
confined in the same cell as the defendant in order to obtain
his confidence, and then illegally obtained the defendant's
confession. This confession was admitted as evidence at
defendant's trial in violation of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment
rights. But the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because
the State had validly admitted three additional confessions,
the illegally admitted confession was merely cumulative to the
three validly admitted confessions, and thus the constitutional
error was declared, beyond a reasonable doubt, to be harmless.
I do not believe that Milton v. Wainwright has any
viability in relation td an application to unconstitutional
jury instructions. But if the basic analytical approach has
any application, an appellate court would then be required to
look at all the instructions together to determine if the
impact of the unconstitutional jury instructions was somehow
nullified or neutralized by additional instructions on the
same point which properly stated the law. This approach breaks
down, however, because an appellate court would then be placed
in the untenable position of declaring that the jury, beyond
a reasonable doubt, followed the valid instructions as opposed
to the invalid instructions. I doubt that an appellate court

would have the temerity to declare that beyond a reasonable
doubt, the jury disregarded the unconstitutional instructions
and followed only the constitutional instructions in its
decision making processes.
Any test for harmless error with relation to unconsti-
tutional jury instructions must minimally involve a consideration
of whether the jury was influenced by the unconstitutional
instructions. Here, the majority has omitted this analysis
in adopting its "overwhelming evidence" test.
In stating its reasons for adopting the "overwhelming
evidence" test the majority first declares that this test
"addresses the realities of the jury trial to a greater degree
-69-
than the others - context - - McKenzie case.
in of the . ."
(Emphasis added.) What does this statement mean? Is the
Court declaring that a special test must be applied to
McKenzie that would not be applied to other cases involving
unconstitutional jury instructions? What is so special
about the McKenzie case which requires a special test for
assessing the impact of constitutional error? The opinion
sheds no light on these questions.
But in the next breath, the Court seems to be adopting
an "overwhelming evidence" test to apply to all cases involving
constitutional error. This test is preferable, the Court
declares, because "an appellate court should view the case
as a whole in assessing harmless or prejudicial error and
not confine itself to a review of only one component of the
case in artificial isolation, in this case the jury instructions."
Is the Court here adopting an undeviating rule for the
assessment of constitutional error inhering in jury instructions?
If so, why didn't the court overrule State v. Sandstrom, supra,
and State v. Hamilton, where, just a short while ago, we
used a different test for the assessment of the impact of
constitutional error? Again, the opinion sheds no light on
these question.
I agree that unconstitutional jury instructions should
not be treated as in a vacuum, that is, not assessed in terms
of the evidence and issues existing in the particular case.
Nor does the United States Supreme Court require us to so
consider them. Essentially, an appellate court has three
choices in viewing the impact of the constitutional error:
to focus exclusively on the unconstitutional instructions
(a clearly unacceptable choice); to focus exclusively on
the evidence (another clearly unacceptable choice and the
one adopted by the majority here); or to focus on the un-
constitutional instructions in relation to the issues and
-701-
evidence existing in the case. In the absence of a rule
of automatic reversal for unconstitutional jury instructions,
the only meaningful choice is the last.
AN APPELLATE COURT MUST ASSUME THAT JURORS UNDERSTAND THE
-
- AND CONSCIENTIOUSLY APPLY - - - - THE CASE
LAW - - - THE LAW TO
An appellate court can, in determining whether or not
erroneous jury instructions constitute harmless error, view
them in three ways. Traynor, The Riddle of Harmless Error
-
(19.69),the Ohio University Press, pp. 73-74. Obviously,
the impact of an erroneous instruction (or instructions)
depends upon the view taken.
Under the first view the appellate court assumes "that
a jury understands and faithfully follows the court's
instructions." (Id at 73.) This being the case, "any
substantial error in an instruction is bound to influence
the jury and therefore calls for a reversal." (Id at 73.)
This view according to Traynor, is the only respectable view
of appellate court can take if the law is to have any meaning
at all. Applied to unconstitutional error inhering in jury
instructions, this would mean that an appellate court must
assume that the jury followed the unconstitutional instructions
and thus a reversal would be required.
On the other hand, the opposite view operates on the pre-
mise "that a jury in the main is mystified by the legal abstractions
in an instruction even when the instruction is not unduly
complicated by abtruse language." (Id at 73.) Operating
on this assumption, an appellate court could then declare
that "errors [in the instructions] would have no more influence

on the jury than the instruction itself and hence would
ordinarily be harmless." (Id at 73.) Although the majority
here has not adopted this position in so many words, it is
clear that the adoption of and application of the "overwhelming
-71-
evidence" test to this case is premised on an assumption
that jury instructions are nothing more than window dressing.
underlying the court's opinion is an assumption that the
jury paid no attention to any of the trial court's instructions,
and therefore that the jury could not have paid any attention
to the unconstitutional instructions.
The middle ground position operates on the premise
that "instructions are indeed mystifying but it is impossible
to know whether or not a jury managed to comprehend them."
Id at 72. This being the case, "an appellate court is
unable to declare a belief one way or the other as to the
effect on the verdict of an error in an instruction. Hence
the error would ordinarily be deemed prejudicial rather than
harmless." Id at 73.
Traynor suggests, however, that the only honorable
choice is to assume that juries do understand and follow
the instructions.
"In the absence of definitive studies to the
contrary, we must assume that juries for the most
part understand and faithfully follow instructions.
The concept of a fair trial encompasses a decision
by a tribunal that has understood and applied the
law to all material issues in the case.. . ." Id
at 73-74.
If a jury is not required to follow the law as instructed
by the trial court it is freed to decide the case on any
basis it chooses as long as the appellate court can, on appeal,
make a determination that the verdict is supported by "over-
whelming evidence." Obviously, if a jury does not have to
follow the law, there is no need to give the law to the jury
to follow. This approach has as its bedrock, an assumption
that jury instructions are nothing more than window dressing.
But if the law is to have any meaning at all the legal system
cannot tolerate this state of affairs for it would mean no less
than jury anarchy condoned by the judiciary.
 Here, the unconstitutional jury instructions (eight
in number) played no role whatsoever in the majority
opinion finding harmless error. The majority jumped over
the unconstitutional instructions, landed on the "overwhelming
evidence" and in the same breath affirmed the convictions.
I cannot believe for one moment that the United States Supreme
Court would declare this to be an acceptable test for assessing
the impact of constitutional error.
Aside from the unconstitutionality of several jury
instructions, there is a very real problem existing in this
case with.relation to the instructions. The instructions
were long, confusing, and often contradictory. No doubt
much of the confusion was caused by the horrible form in
which the charges were filed. This situation alone, absent
the unconstitutional instructions, would be sufficient to
reverse the case and grant a new trial. My analysis of the
jury instructions, however, rests on the assumption that the
jury understood (or attempted to understand as best it could)
the jury instructions and conscientiously applied them (as
best it could) to the issues existing in this case.
THE CHARGES FILED - - -CASE
IN THIS
The charges filed in this case, together with the
jury instructions attempting to cover the charges involved,
permit only one rational conclusion--total confusion. In
the context of this case there is no way that one can plod
his way through the morass of instructions and determine the
processes by which the jury reached its guilty verdicts.
On January 1, 1974, the new substantive crimes code
went into effect in this state. The offenses charged in
this case were allegedly committed on January 21, 1974, and
therefore the crimes were charged under the new criminal code.
Perhaps the new code helps to a degree in explaining the
confusion surrounding this case.
- 7 3-
 The c h a r g e s f i l e d i n t h i s c a s e a r e v i r t u a l l y

incomprehensible. Out o f a r e l a t i v e l y s i m p l e f a c t p a t t e r n

comes s u c h a s c a t t e r gun a p p r o a c h t h a t i t would a g r e a t amount

o f t i m e f o r t h e b e s t law f i r m t o u n r a v e l . A t t h e conclusion

of t h e t r i a l , t h e t r i a l c o u r t i n s t r u c t e d t h e j u r y i n t h e

p r e c i s e wording o f t h e c h a r g e s as f i l e d . Instruction 6,
ment
~ t a t e / o f the Case. One can a p p r e c i a t e t h e c o m p l e x i t y and

i n t r i c a c y o f t h e c h a r g e s o n l y by v i e w i n g t h e c h a r g e s a s g i v e n

t o t h e jury. They r e a d a s f o l l o w s :

" T h a t Duncan P e d e r McKenzie, J r . , l a t e o f t h e
County o f P o n d e r a , on o r a b o u t t h e 2 1 s t o f J a n u a r y ,
A.D. 1974, a t t h e County o f Pondera i n t h e S t a t e
o f Montana, committed t h e crimes c h a r g e d i n t h e
f o l l o w i n g c o u n t s , a l l a t l o c a t i o n s i n Pondera
County, Montana:

"COUNT I : THAT DUNCAN PEDER McKENZIE J R . , committed
t h e c r i m e o f DELIBERATE H O M I C I D E , a f e l o n y by
p u r p o s e l y o r knowingly c a u s i n g t h e d e a t h o f L N
AA
HARDING, a human b e i n g ; i n v i o l a t i o n o f S e c t i o n 94-5-101
and S e c t i o n 94-5-102, R.C.M. 1947.

"COUNT 11: THAT DUNCAN PEDER M c K E N Z I E , J R . , committed
t h e c r i m e o f DELIBERATE H O M I C I D E , a f e l o n y , by
p u r p o s e l y o r knowingly c a u s i n g t h e d e a t h o f L N
AA
HARDING, a human b e i n g , w h i l e t h e s a i d DUNCAN PEDER
M c K E N Z I E , J R . , was engaged i n t h e commission o f , o r
i n an a t t e m p t t o c o m m i t , o r f l i g h t a f t e r committing
o r a t t e m p t i n g t o commit:

"1. SEXUAL INTERCOURSE WITHOUT CONSENT, a f e l o n y ,
by knowingly h a v i n g s e x u a l i n t e r c o u s e w i t h t h e s a i d
LANA HARDING, a f e m a l e n o t h i s s p o u s e , w i t h o u t c o n s e n t ,
t h e s a i d DUNCAN PEDER McKENZIE, J R . , b e i n g a male
person; o r

"2. A G A A E ASSAULT, a f e l o n y i n v o l v i n g t h e u s e
G R V TD
o r t h r e a t of p h y s i c a l f o r c e o r v i o l e n c e a g a i n s t t h e
s a i d LANA HARDING by p u r p o s e l y o r knowingly c a u s i n g :

"a. S e r i o u s b o d i l y i n j u r y t o t h e s a i d LANA HARDING:
or L

"b. B o d i l y i n j u r y t o t h e s a i d LANA H A R D I N G w i t h a
weapon, namely:

" (1) a r o p e by p l a c i n g s a i d r o p e around t h e neck
o f t h e s a i d LANA HARDING: o r

"(2) a heavy o b j e c t , by s t r i k i n g t h e s a i d L N
AA
HARDING upon h e r head w i t h s a i d heavy o b j e c t ; o r

" t h a t t h e s a i d DUNCAN PEDER McKENZIE, J R . , committed t h e
c r i m e of DELIBERATE H O M I C I D E , a f e l o n y a s above a l l e g e d ,
by p u r p o s e l y o r knowingly c a u s i n g t h e d e a t h o f t h e
s a i d LANA HARDING:
"1. by means o f t o r t u r e ; o r

"2. by l y i n g i n w a i t o r ambush i n v i o l a t i o n o f
S e c t i o n 94-5-101, 94-5-102, 94-5-503, and 94-5-202,
R.C.M. 1947.

"Count 3. T h a t DUNCAN PEDER M c K E N Z I E , J R . committed
t h e c r i m e o f AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING, a f e l o n y , by
knowingly o r p u r p o s e l y and w i t h o u t l a w f u l a u t h o r i t y
r e s t r a i n i n g L N HARDING by e i t h e r s e c r e t i n g o r h o l d i n g
AA
t h e s a i d LANA H A R D I N G i n a p l a c e o f i s o l a t i o n , o r by
using or threatening t o use physical f o r c e with t h e
p u r p o s e of f a c i l i t a t i n g t h e commission, o r f l i g h t t h e r e -
a f t e r , of t h e f e l o n y :

"1. SEXUAL INTERCOURSE WITHOUT CONSENT, by knowingly
h a v i n g s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h t h e s a i d LANA HARDING
a female n o t h i s spouse, without consent, t h e s a i d
DUNCAN PEDER McKENZIE, J R . , b e i n g a m a l e p e r s o n ; o r

"2. AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, by p u r p o s e l y o r knowingly
causing:

" (a) s e r i o u s b o d i l y i n j u r y t o t h e s a i d L N HARDING;
AA or

" ( b ) b o d i l y i n j u r y t o t h e s a i d LANA HARDING w i t h a
weapon, namely:

"1. a r o p e , by p l a c i n g s a i d r o p e a r o u n d t h e neck
of t h e s a i d L N HARDING: o r
AA

"2. a heavy o b j e c t , by s t r i k i n g t h e s a i d LANA
HARDING upon h e r head w i t h t h e s a i d heavy o b j e c t ;

" i n v i o l a t i o n o f S e c t i o n s 94-5-303, 94-5-503, and 94-
5-202, R.C.M. 1947, t h e s a i d LANA HARDING h a v i n g d i e d
a s a r e s u l t of s a i d c r i m i n a l conduct.

"COUNT 4 . T h a t DUNCAN PEDER M c K E N Z I E , J R . , committed
t h e c r i m e o f AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING, a f e l o n y , by
knowingly o r p u r p o s e l y and w i t h o u t l a w f u l a u t h o r i t y
r e s t r a i n i n g LANA HARDING by e i t h e r s e c r e t i n g o r h o l d i n g
t h e s a i d LANA HARDING i n a p l a c e o f i s o l a t i o n , o r by
using or threatening t o use physical force, with t h e
p u r p o s e of i n f l i c t i n g b o d i l y i n j u r y on t h e s a i d L N
AA
HARDING o r t e r r o r i z i n g t h e s a i d LANA HARDING, i n
v i o l a t i o n o f S e c t i o n 94-5-303, R.C.M. 1947, t h e s a i d
L N HARDING h a v i n g d i e d a s a r e s u l t o f s a i d c r i m i n a l
AA
conduct .
"COUNT 5. T h a t DUNCAN PEDER McKENZIE, JR. a m a l e p e r s o n
committed t h e crime o f SEXUAL INTERCOURSE WITHOUT CONSENT,
a f e l o n y , by knowingly h a v i n g s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h
LANA HARDING, a f e m a l e n o t h i s s p o u s e , w i t h o u t c o n s e n t ,
i n v i o l a t i o n o f S e c t i o n 94-5-503, R.C.M. 1947.

"COUNT 6 . T h a t DUNCAN PEDER McKENZIE, J R . , committed
t h e c r i m e o f AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, a f e l o n y , by p u r p o s e l y
o r knowingly c a u s i n g s e r i o u s b o d i l y i n j u r y t o LANA
HARDING, i n v i o l a t i o n o f s e c t i o n 9-5-202, R.C.M. 1947.

"COUNT 7. T h a t DUNCAN PEDER M c K E N Z I E , JR. committed
t h e crime o f AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, a f e l o n y , by p u r p o s e l y
o r knowingly c a u s i n g b o d i l y i n j u r y t o LANA HARDING w i t h
a weapon, namely
 " 1 . a r o p e , by p l a c i n g s a i d r o p e around t h e neck
o f t h e s a i d LANA HARDING: o r

"2. a heavy o b j e c t , by s t r i k i n g t h e s a i d LANA
HARDING upon h e r head w i t h s a i d heavy o b j e c t ;

" i n v i o l a t i o n o f S e c t i o n 94-5-202, R.C.M. 1947."

From t h i s maze o f c h a r g e s t h e t r i a l c o u r t was e x p e c t e d t o

p r o p e r l y i n s t r u c t t h e j u r y on t h e a p p l i c a b l e law. A formidable

task t o say the l e a s t . B e f o r e t h e c a s e was s u b m i t t e d t o t h e

j u r y f o r i t s d e c i s i o n t h e " c h a r g e " o f d e l i b e r a t e homicide "by

l y i n g i n w a i t o r ambush" was d i s m i s s e d . I n s t r u c t i o n 52 t o l d t h e

jury:

"The c h a r g e of D e l i b e r a t e Homicide by Lying i n W a i t
o r Ambush h a s been d i s m i s s e d by t h e C o u r t and you v
are n -
- -o t t o c o n c e r n v o u r s e l v e s w i t h t h i s c h a r ~ e n
-- -I
Count I1 o f t h e ~ n f o r m a t i o nf i l e d a g a i n s t t h e
defendant." (Emphasis a d d e d . )

The i s s u e b e f o r e t h i s Court on t h e remand from t h e U n i t e d

S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t i s whether t h e u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l Sandstrom-

t y p e p r e s u m p t i o n s c o n t a i n e d i n a t l e a s t e i g h t i n s t r u c t i o n s , had

any e f f e c t on t h e v e r d i c t s of t h e j u r y . T h a t i s , d i d t h e un-

c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r e s u m p t i o n s p l a y any p a r t i n t h e d e c i s i o n making

processes of t h e jury i n reaching i t s v e r d i c t s ? Before an

a p p e l l a t e c o u r t c a n uphold t h e c o n v i c t i o n s i t must be p r e p a r e d

t o s t a t e beyond a r e a s o n a b l e doubt t h a t t h e j u r y v e r d i c t s w e r e

n o t a f f e c t e d a t a l l by t h e u s e of t h e u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r e s u m p t i o n s .

I t i s i m p o s s i b l e t o make t h i s d e c l a r a t i o n , and f o r t h i s r e a s o n

t h e v e r d i c t s must be r e v e r s e d .

One o f t h e u n d e r l y i n g problems i n t h i s c a s e which sub-

s t a n t i a l l y d e f e a t s t h e a b i l i t y o f an a p p e l l a t e c o u r t t o c o n d u c t

meaningful r e v i e w i s t h a t i t i s i m p o s s i b l e t o d e t e r m i n e which

p a t h o r p a t h s t h e j u r y t o o k t o e a c h of t h e c o n v i c t i o n s . Here,

t h e r e w e r e m u l t i p l e c h a r g e s and t h e j u r y was p e r m i t t e d t o a d o p t

one o r more t h e o r i e s i n f i n d i n g d e f e n d a n t g u i l t y of e a c h o f

the offenses. I n a b i l i t y t o d e t e r m i n e t h e p a t h s which a j u r y t o o k

s u b s t a n t i a l l y i m p a i r s , i f it does n o t make i t i m p o s s i b l e , t h e
a b i l i t y o f a n a p p e l l a t e c o u r t t o d e c l a r e o n e way o r t h e o t h e r

whether t h e Sandstrom-type i n s t r u c t i o n s e n t e r e d i n t o t h e

d e c i s i o n making p r o c e s s o f t h e j u r y .

Of n e c e s s i t y , an a n a l y s i s of t h e p o s s i b l e impact o f t h e un-

c o n s t i t u t i o n a l Sandstrom-type i n s t r u c t i o n s on t h e j u r y v e r d i c t s ,

must be based on s p e c u l a t i o n . Indeed, s i n c e t h e t r i a l c o u r t

f a i l e d t o p r o v i d e a b a s i s by which i t can be d e t e r m i n e d how

t h e j u r y r e a c h e d i t s v e r d i c t , it i s , i n m judgment,
y sufficient

t o r e v e r s e t h e c a s e on t h i s b a s i s a l o n e . The b e n e f i t o f any

r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t a s t o how t h e j u r y r e a c h e d i t s v e r d i c t s s h o u l d

be g i v e n t o t h e d e f e n d a n t , and t h u s it must be assumed t h a t t h e

j u r y v e r d i c t s w e r e impacted by t h e u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n s .

According t o t h e enumerated c h a r g e s , t h e r e w e r e seven

s e p a r a t e counts: Count 1, D e l i b e r a t e Homicide; Count 2 , D e l i -

b e r a t e Homicide; Count 3 , Aggravated Kidnapping; Count 4 ,

Aggravated Kidnapping; Count 5 , S e x u a l I n t e r c o u r s e Without Consent;

Count 6 , Aggravated A s s a u l t ; and Count 7 , Aggravated A s s a u l t .

But t h e c h a r g e s a r e even more c o m p l i c a t e d t h a n t h i s , f o r w i t h i n

e a c h broad c h a r g e of d e l i b e r a t e homicide, a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g ,

and a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t , a r e s e v e r a l a l t e r n a t i v e methods by which

t h e d e f e n d a n t i s c h a r g e d w i t h having committed t h e crimes. A l l

t o l d , d e f e n d a n t i s c h a r g e d w i t h committing t h e c r i m e s i n v o l v e d

i n a t l e a s t s e v e n t e e n a l t e r n a t i v e ways.

The e v i l s i n h e r e n t i n r e v i e w under t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s a r e

compounded by t h e f a c t t h a t d e f e n d a n t was c h a r g e d w i t h (and

may have been c o n v i c t e d ) of t h e c r i m e o f d e l i b e r a t e homicide

-
"by means - t o r t u r e w - - a n o n e x i s t e n t c r i m e i n t h i s s t a t e .
of

F u r t h e r m o r e , i n b o t h of t h e a g g r a v a t i n g k i d n a p p i n g c o u n t s t h e

a d d i t i o n a l a l l e g a t i o n was thrown i n t h a t d e f e n d a n t c a u s e d t h e

death of t h e victim. The d e a t h o f t h e v i c t i m i s n o t , however,

an e l e m e n t o f t h e o f f e n s e o f a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g . It is,

r a t h e r , an a g g r a v a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e which, - - - - t h e
i f found by

c o u r t , may r e s u l t i n t h e i m p o s i t i o n of t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y a b s e n t

m i t i g a t i n g circumstances.
- 77 -
-- INSTRUCTIONS
THE JURY
~ h e
unconstitutional Sandstrom-type presumptions permeate
the instructions given to the jury in this case. Instruction
31 sets the general tone by covering in great detail the use
of presumptions as a tool in satisfying the proof in relation
to the mental element involved with the particular crime. Further-
more, almost every count charged has corresponding instructions
whereby Sandstrom-type presumptions are set forth.
In Count 1, Deliberate Homicide, the jury was told by
Instruction 33 that the mental element involved could be proved
by use of these Sandstrom-type presumptions. Count 2, Deliberate
Homicide, involves essentially the invocation of the felony-
murder rule, charging that defendant committed the homicide while
committing, attempting to commit, or in withdrawing from the
felonies of sexual intercourse without consent or aggravated
assault. By Instruction 37, the jury was told that the element
involved in sexual intercourse without consent could be proved
by use of the Sandstrom-type presumptions. By Instruction 38,
the jury was told that the mental element involved in aggravated
assault could be proved by use of the Sandstrom-type presumptions.
A more detailed analysis will follow in another section of this
dissent.
In Count 3, Aggravated idn nap ping, Instructions 37 and 38,
supra, also have a direct bearing on this charge. Defendant
was charged with aggravated kidnapping while attempting to commit,
committing, or withdrawing from bhe felonies of sexual inter-
course without consent or aggravated assault. Thus Instruction
37, mental element in relation to sexual intercourse without
consent, and instruction 38, mental element in relation to
aggravated assault, must also be applied in the context of this
charge of aggravated kidnapping. Again, the Sandstrom-type
presumptions are involved. A more detailed analysis will follow

in another section of this dissent.
-73-
 The only count which possibly was not impacted by the
unconstitutional Sandstrom-type instructions is Count 4,
Aggravated Kidnapping. It appears that a jury could have fought
its way through the maze of instructions and not used any of the
Sandstrom-type presumptions to determine defendant's guilt under
this count. But because of the deficient jury verdict forms,
an appellate court does not know if the jury found defendant
guilty of Count 4. Thus an appellate court would have to
speculate that the jury did in fact convict defendant on Count
4 before it could undertake an analysis of the effect of the
unconstitutional Sandstrom-type presumptions on the ultimate
determination of guilt. A more detailed analysis will follow
in another section of this dissent.
Count 5 charges sexual intercouse without consent, and
Instruction 37 directs the jury to use the Sandstrom-type
presumptions to find proof of the mental element involved.
Counts 6 and 7 charge aggravated assault in alternative ways,
and Instruction 38 applies to both counts and directs the jury
to use the Sandstrom-type presumptions as proof of the mental
element involved.
VERDICT FORM INSTRUCTIONS AND VERDICT FORMS

In seeking to explain the maze of charges to the jury,
the trial court attempted to put them in some kind of per-
spective by explaining in Instruction 6, Statement of the Case,
the number of counts, and the number of potential convictions:
"Although defendant is charged with two counts in
each of the offenses of Deliberate Homicide,
Aggravated Kidnapping and Aggravated Assault, only
one offense of Deliberate Homicide and one offense
of Aggravated Kidnapping and one offense of Aggravated
Kidnapping and one offense of Aggravated Assault are
involved in this case. Leave was granted - State
the
of Montana to charge - -
in this manner, and to also
charqe the offense of Sexual Intercourse Without Consent,
- o;der - - - problems of proof that arise when
in to meet the
an offense or offenses - - committed in different
- can be
--
ways, or bydifferent means, - - different purposes.
or for
 "The d e f e n d a n t - - c o n v i c t e d o r a c q u i t t e d
can be
on - - r a l l of s a i d o f f e n s e s -y o u may f i n d
- any o - - - as ---
t h e a l l e g a t i o n s - e a c h - - c o u n t s proved
i n -- of s a i d
- -t proved, b u t i n no e v e n t may be s e n t e n c e d
o r no
f o r more t h a n one o f f e n s e o f D e l i b e r a t e Homicide
and more t h a n one o f f e n s e o f Aggravated Kidnapping
and more t h a n one o f f e n s e o f A s s r a v a t e d A s s a u l t
even though you may f i n d b o t h of t h e c o u n t s w i t h
which he i s c h a r g e d t o have been proved beyond a
reasonable doubt." Instruction 6. ( ~ m p h a s i sa d d e d . )

By t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n i t i s c l e a r t h a t t h e j u r y w a s f r e e t o

f i n d d e f e n d a n t g u i l t y of b o t h c o u n t s of d e l i b e r a t e homicide

(Counts 1 and 2 ) . F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e j u r y was f r e e t o f i n d

d e f e n d a n t g u i l t y on b o t h c o u n t s o f a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g (Counts

3 and 4 ) . The j u r y was f r e e t o f i n d d e f e n d a n t g u i l t y on b o t h

c o u n t s o f a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t (Counts 6 and 7 ) . The c o u r t s t a t e d :

"The d e f e n d a n t c a n be c o n v i c t e d o r a c q u i t t e d on - o r a - f
any - l l o

said offenses. . ." Instruction 6. (Emphasis a d d e d . )

But even I n s t r u c t i o n 6 i s m i s l e a d i n g a s t o t h e number o f

c h a r g e s , f o r t h e d e f e n d a n t was c h a r g e d w i t h many a l t e r n a t i v e ways.

Count 1 c h a r g e s o n l y one method of h a v i n g committed d e l i b e r a t e

homicide. But Count 2 a l l e g e s t h a t t h e d e l i b e r a t e homicide was

committed i n a t l e a s t f i v e a l t e r n a t i v e ways. One o f t h e a l l e g a t i o n s

w i t h i n Count 2 i s t h a t t h e homicide was committed und-er c i r -

cumstances which would c a l l f o r t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e f e l o n y -
(0
murder r u l e p r o v i d e d f o r i n s e c t i o n 94-5-102(b),
n R.C.M. 1947.

The f e l o n i e s a l l e g e d l y committed w e r e s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h o u t

consent o r aggravated a s s a u l t .

The d e l i b e r a t e homicide c h a r g e s c o n t a i n e d i n Count 2 are

f u r t h e r c o m p l i c a t e d by t h e a l l e g a t i o n t h a t t h e homicide was

committed "by means o f t o r t u r e " o r "by l y i n g i n w a i t o r ambush."

I n d e e d , n e i t h e r d e a t h c a u s e d "by means o f t o r t u r e " , o r d e a t h

c a u s e d as a r e s u l t of " l y i n g i n w a i t o r ambush", i s an e l e m e n t of

t h e crime o f d e l i b e r a t e homicide. Rakher, e a c h o f t h e s e e l e m e n t s

i s an a g g r a v a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e under s e c t i o n 94-5-105, R.C.M.

1947, whereby t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y may b e imposed upon a f i n d i n g of
-813-
t h e e x i s t e n c e of t h a t c i r c u m s t a n c e , u n l e s s t h e s e n t e n c i n g

c o u r t f i n d s m i t i g a t i n g circumstances. Notwithstanding t h i s

r a t h e r fundamental f a c t , t h e S t a t e c h a r g e d d e f e n d a n t w i t h a

s u b s t a n t i v e o f f e n s e of d e l i b e r a t e homicide "by means of t o r t u r e "
- -
and "by l y i n g i n w a i t o r ambush" and b o t h w e r e t r e a t e d t h e r e a f t e r

a s separate substantive offenses.

Although t h e c h a r g e of d e l i b e r a t e homicide "by l y i n g i n

w a i t o r ambush" was d i s m i s s e d b e f o r e it r e a c h e d t h e j u r y , the

c h a r g e o f d e l i b e r a t e homicide "by means o f t o r t u r e " w a s con-

s i s t e n t l y t r e a t e d a s a separate substantive offense. The j u r y

was i n s t r u c t e d t h a t i t was a s e p a r a t e s u b s t a n t i v e o f f e n s e , and

a p p e a r s t h a t t h e j u r y found d e f e n d a n t g u i l t y o f s u c h c h a r g e .

Of a l l t h e a l t e r n a t i v e s a v a i l a b l e t o t h e j u r y , there is

no way o f d e t e r m i n i n g . w h i c h one o r more o f t h e a l t e r n a t i v e

methods t h e j u r y u s e d i n c o n v i c t i n g d e f e n d a n t of d e l i b e r a t e

homicide and of a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g . Indeed, t h e t r i a l c o u r t

s p e c i f i c a l l y i n s t r u c t e d t h e jury t h a t t h e v e r d i c t s it reached

d i d n o t have t o r e v e a l t h e p a t h o r p a t h s i t c h o s e i n r e a c h i n g

the verdicts.

With r e l a t i o n t o t h e s e p a r a t e c o u n t s o f d e l i b e r a t e homicide,

t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o l d t h e jury:

". . . even though you may f i n d more t h a n one o r
more o f s a i d c h a r g e s t o have been proved beyond
a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t , a s o n l y one d e a t h i s a l l e g e d ,
o n l y one G u i l t y o f D e l i b e r a t e Homicide v e r d i c t
form i s r e q u i r e d . . ." I n s t r u c t i o n 5 4 , p a r t 11--
V e r d i c t Forms--Deliberate Homicide.

And, o f c o u r s e , t h e v e r d i c t form r e t u r n e d and s i g n e d by t h e j u r y ,

i s equally a s nonrevealing a s t o t h e p a t h o r paths taken t o
reach i t s verdict:

"A. W e , t h e j u r y i n t h e above e n t i t l e d c a u s e f i n d
t h e d e f e n d a n t g u i l t y of t h e o f f e n s e o f D e l i b e r a t e
Homicide a s c h a r g e d .

"B. W e f u r t h e r f i n d t h a t t h e D e l i b e r a t e Homicide
was [ues n e t ] by Means o f T o r t u r e .

" ( S t r i k e o u t t h e b r a c k e t e d word o r words which do
not apply.) "
 The same is true of the aggravated kidnapping charges.
It cannot be determined which alternative or alternatives were
used in reaching its verdict. The trial court instructed the
jury :
"Since only one Aggravated Kidnapping is alleged,
though in different ways and for different purposes,
you are to consider all of the charges of Aggravated
Kidnapping made against the defendant and even though
you may find more than - - all of the charges of
- - - - - - - - one or
Aggravated Kidnapping to have been proved beyond a
reasonable doubt - - furnished with only one
you are ---
verdict form upon which to return a verdict of Guilty
of Aggravated Kidnapping.

"If you adopt the Guilty of Aggravated Kidnapping form
you will be required to find on that form whether
Lana Harding did or did not die as a result of the
Aggravated Kidnapping." Instruction 5 4 , part 111--
Verdict Forms--Aggravated Kidnapping. (Emphasis added.)
The guilty of aggravated kidnapping verdict form which
the jury adopted and signed, reads as follows:
"A. We, the jury, in the above-entitled cause,
find the defendant Guilty of the offense of Aggravated
Kidnapping as charged.
"B. We further find that Lana Harding (did) (d*d n e t )
die as a result of said Aggravated Kidnapping.
"(Strike out bracketed word or words that do not apply)."
Thus, the trial court's own instructions, combined with
the verdict forms he provided to the jury, present a situation
on appeal where the appellate court has no way of determining
the theory or theories used by the jury in finding defendant
guilty of deliberate homicide and in finding him guilty of
aggravated kidnapping. It is impossible'to say, under these
circumstances, that the Sandstrom-type presumptions did not
figure in the decision making processes of the jury. For this
reason alone, an appellate court should declare that under these
circumstances constitutional error will be presumed to have
affected the decisions of the jury. Accordingly, the convictions
should be reversed.
 The jury could have, furthermore, failed to unanimously
agreed to any single theory or set of theories in arriving
at its decision. If this is the case defendant was deprived
of his constitutional right to a unanimous jury verdict. Mon-
tana Constitution, Art. 11, 826; section 95-1901, R.C.M. 1947.
$3.
As stated in United States v. Gipson (1977), 553 F.2d 457:
A
"The unanimity rule thus requires jurors to be
in substantial agreement as to just what a
defendant did as a step preliminary to deter-
mining whether the defendant is guilty of the
crime charged. Requiring the vote of twelve
jurors to convict a defendant does little to
insure that his right to a unanimous jury verdict
is protected unless this prerequisite of jury
concensus as to the defendant's course of action
is also required." 553 F.2d at 4-5+-%9.
457 -459
In reversing a defendant% conviction because the
court was not able to ascertain the basis of the jury
verdict, the court in Gipson, further stated:
"During argument, the government admitted,
and the record shows that the prosecution
presented evidence tending to show that
Gipson performed each of these six acts
prohibited by 18 U.S.C. 82313. The pos-
sibility that the jury may have returned
a guilty verdict in the face of a substantial
rift among the jurors over the facts in the
case, is, therefore, a real one. Because it is
impossible to determine whether all of the jurors
agreed that the defendant committed acts falling
within one of the two conceptual groupings, we
cannot say that the district court's instruction
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under
Chapman v. California, 1967, 386 U.S. 18, 87
S. Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 7 - M . " 553 F.2d 459.
705
Here, defendant was charged alternatively under two
broad theories: (1) Deliberate homicide with the element
required of "knowingly or purposely"; (2) Deliberate homicide
under the felony murder rule where the state does not have to
prove the mental element of "knowingly or purposely." Con-
ceivably the jury could have avoided the Sandstrom-type pre-
sumptions by taking the felony-murder route to its verdict. But

since there is no way of knowing that the jury did take this
route, the rule of Chapman v. California, cited in Gipson, above,
requires that the deliberate homicide conviction be reversed.
Furthermore, because one cannot state beyond a reasonable doubt
that the jury followed a constitutional path in reaching the
aggravated-kidnappingverdict, it too, must be reversed.
 Analysis of the impact of the unconstitutional Sandstrom-
type instructions should not have to proceed beyond this
point. Where the path or paths the jury took to its verdict
cannot be determined beyond a reasonable doubt, any analysis
of the path or paths it could have taken, is pure speculation.
Nonetheless, because the majority has omitted entirely any
analysis of the unconstitutional instructions in relation to
their possible use by the jury in reaching its verdicts, I will
do so. First, I will discuss the deliberate homicide conviction,
and second the aggravated kidnapping conviction.
DELIBERATE HOMICIDE--IMPACT - - SANDSTROM-TYPE INSTRUCTIONS
OF THE

- - DELIBERATE HOMICIDE CONVICTION
ON THE
As I previously stated, at some point before the case
reached the jury for its deliberations, the charge of deliberate
homicide "by lying in wait or ambush" was dismissed (see Instru-
ction 52, supra). However, the so-called charge of deliberate
- -
homicide "by means of torture" remained for the jury's decision.
I must digress at this point to a vitally important and
fundamental fact. Defendant was charged with deliberate homicide
"by means of torture", the jury was instructed that it was a
separate offense, and instructions were given defining this so
called offense. Furthermore, there is a reasonable likelihood
that the jury may have convicted him of this offense. If this
is so, defendant has been sentenced to death for a crime which
does not exist in the statutes of this state.
The statute defining deliberate homicide at the time of
the alleged crimes in this case, is section 94-5-102, R.C.M.
1947. The entire statute reads as follows:
"94-5-102. Deliberate homicide.
" (1) Except as provided in section 94-5-103 (1)(a),
criminal homicide constitutes deliberate homicide if:
"(a) it is committed purposely or knowingly; or
"(b) it is committed while the offender is engaged
in or is an accomplice in the commission of, or an
attempt to commit, or flight after committing or
attempting to commit robbery, sexual intercourse without
consent, arson, burglary, kidnapping, felonious escape
or any other felony which involves the use or threat
of physical force or violence against any individual.
 " ( 2 ) A p e r s o n c o n v i c t e d of t h e o f f e n s e o f
d e l i b e r a t e homicide s h a l l be p u n i s h e d by d e a t h
as p r o v i d e d i n s e c t i o n 94-5-105, o r by imprisonment
i n t h e s t a t e p r i s o n f o r any t e r m n o t t o exceed one
hundred (100) y e a r s . "

There i s no o t h e r s t a t u t e which c r e a t e s o r d e f i n e s d e l i b e r a t e

homicide. I t i s r e a d i l y a p p a r e n t t h a t d e l i b e r a t e homicide "by

means o f t o r t u r e " i s n o t a s u b s t a n t i v e c r i m e . I t i s , however,

one o f t h e s t a t u t o r y l i s t o f c i r c u m s t a n c e s which, i f found by

t h e c o u r t a f t e r a c o n v i c t i o n of d e l i b e r a t e homicide, may j u s t i f y

t h e i m p o s i t i o n o f t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y , a b s e n t m i t i g a t i n g circum-

stances. S e c t i o n 94-5-105, r e f e r r e d t o i n s e c t i o n 94-5-102(2)

above, p r o v i d e s a s f o l l o w s :

"94-5-105. S e n t e n c e o f Death f o r D e l i b e r a t e Homicide.

" (1) When a d e f e n d a n t i s c o n v i c t e d of t h e o f f e n s e o f
d e l i b e r a t e homicide t h e c o u r t s h a l l impose a s e n t e n c e
of death i n t h e following circumstances, unless t h e r e
a r e m i t i g a t i n g circumstances:

" ( a ) The d e l i b e r a t e homicide was committed by a
p e r s o n s e r v i n g a s e n t e n c e o f imprisonment i n t h e s t a t e
prison; o r

" ( b ) The d e f e n d a n t was p r e v i o u s l y c o n v i c t e d o f
a n o t h e r d e l i b e r a t e homicide; o r

" ( c ) The v i c t i m of t h e d e l i b e r a t e homicide was a
peace o f f i c e r k i l l e d while performing h i s duty o r

-
" ( d ) The d e l i b e r a t e homicide was committed by means
of t o r t u r e ; o r
- 7

" ( e ) The d e l i b e r a t e homicide was committed - -a
by
p e r s o n l y i n g - - i t o r ambush; o r
i n wa-

" ( f ) The d e l i b e r a t e homicide was committed a s a
p a r t of a scheme o r o p e r a t i o n which, i f completed,
would r e s u l t i n t h e d e a t h o f more t h a n one p e r s o n . "
(Emphasis added. )

I t i s abundantly c l e a r t h a t t h e prosecutor mistakenly

c h a r g e d d e f e n d a n t w i t h d e l i b e r a t e homicide "by means o f t o r t u r e "

o r "by l y i n g i n w a i t o r ambush" when t h e r e was no s t a t u t o r y

b a s i s t o c h a r g e him w i t h s u c h a s a s u b s t a n t i v e c r i m e . Nonethe-

l e s s , t h e r e i s a r e a s o n a b l e chance t h a t t h e j u r y may have
convicted defendant of t h i s so-called offense.

I n t h e v e r d i c t form i n s t r u c t i o n s ( I n s t r u c t i o n 54, P a r t

11, V e r d i c t Forms--Deliberate Homicide) t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o l d

t h e jury:
-85-
 " I f you a d o p t t h e G u i l t y of D e l i b e r a t e Homicide
v e r d i c t form you a r e asked t o f i n d on t h a t form
whether t h e D e l i b e r a t e Homicide was o r was n o t by
Means o f T o r t u r e - -i- i s t h e most s e r i o u s o f
as th s --
t h e r e m a i n i n s c h a r s e s o f D e l i b e r a t e Homicide made
-
a g a i n s t t h e defendant.

" A f t e r you have r e a c h e d a v e r d i c t on t h e c h a r g e s
of D e l i b e r a t e Homicide, whether G u i l t y o r Not
G u i l t y , you are s t i l l r e q u i r e d t o r e t u r n a v e r d i c t
on t h e c h a r g e s o f a g g r a v a t e d Kidnapping. Have y o u r
foreman d a t e and s i g n t h e v e r d i c t form upon which
you a g r e e on t h e c h a r g e s of D e l i b e r a t e Homicide and
t a k e up t h e Charges of Aggravated Kidnapping."
I n s t r u c t i o n 11, V e r d i c t Forms--Deliberate Homicide.
(Emphasis added. )

The v e r d i c t form r e q u i r e d t h e j u r y t o u s e a two-step p r o c e s s

i n i t s decision. F i r s t , t h e j u r y w a s t o d e t e r m i n e whether o r

n o t d e f e n d a n t w a s g u i l t y of t h e o f f e n s e o f d e l i b e r a t e homicide

( w i t h o u t r e f e r e n c e t o any t h e o r i e s o r t h e o r i e s used i n a r r i v i n g

a t t h i s decision). ( P a r t A , j u r y v e r d i c t form, s u p r a . ) Second,

t h e j u r y was t h e n t o d e t e r m i n e whether t h e homicide w a s committed

"by means o f t o r t u r e " ( P a r t B, j u r y v e r d i c t form, s u p r a ) .

I t a p p e a r s t h a t t h e v e r d i c t form c o n t r a d i c t s I n s t r u c t i o n

54, p a r t 11. I n s t r u c t i o n 54, P a r t 11, t o l d t h e j u r y t o f i r s t

d e t e r m i n e i f d e f e n d a n t was g u i l t y o f t h e s u b s t a n t i v e o f f e n s e

o f d e l i b e r a t e homicide "by means of t o r t u r e " . On t h e o t h e r hand,

t h e v e r d i c t form s i m p l y r e q u i r e s t h e j u r y t o f i r s t f i n d d e f e n d a n t

g u i l t y o f d e l i b e r a t e homicide, and c o n t a i n s no r e f e r e n c e t o t h e

t h e o r y o r t h e o r i e s by which t h e j u r y c o u l d r e a c h t h i s r e s u l t .

Second, upon a d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t d e f e n d a n t w a s g u i l t y o f

d e l i b e r a t e homicide t h e j u r y was t h e n t o d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r t h e

o f f e n s e was committed "by means o f t o r t u r e . " Furthermore, it

a p p e a r s t h a t I n s t r u c t i o n 5 4 , P a r t 11, above c o n t r a d i c t s I n s t r u c -

t i o n 6 , supra. I n any e v e n t , one can s a f e l y s a y t h a t t h e s e

i n s t r u c t i o n s g i v e no c l e a r i n d i c a t i o n a s t o t h e p a t h o r p a t h s

t h e jury took i n reaching i t s v e r d i c t .

Count 1 of d e l i b e r a t e homicide, a l l e g e d t h a t d e f e n d a n t

"knowingly o r p u r p o s e l y " c a u s e d t h e d e a t h of Lana Harding. This
 ()
1
a l l e g a t i o n was made on t h e b a s i s of s e c t i o n 94-5-10
5( a ) . On

t h e o t h e r hand, p a r t of t h e a l l e g a t i o n s under Count 2 , d e l i -

b e r a t e homicide, were p r e d i c a t e d upon t h e felony-murder r u l e

p r o v i d e d f o r i n s e c t i o n 94-5-102(b). This subsection of

Count 2 a l l e g e d a t l e a s t two ways i n which t h e d e f e n d a n t

committed a f e l o n y murder: e i t h e r sexual intercourse without

-
consent, o r aggravated a s s a u l t . The f e l o n y o f a g g r a v a t e d

a s s a u l t was f u r t h e r d i v i d e d i n t o a l t e r n a t i v e methods o f com-

mission.

I n s t r u c t i o n 22 p r o v i d e d t h e b a s i c d e f i n i t i o n s of d e l i b e r a t e

homicide a s c h a r g e d i n Count 1 and a s c h a r g e d i n a p o r t i o n of

Count 2 . T h i s i n s t r u c t i o n i s a v e r b a t i m s t a t e m e n t of s e c t i o n

94-5-102(a) and ( b ) . This i n s t r u c t i o n i s l e g a l l y s u f f i c i e n t .

But a r e a l w r i n k l e i s thrown i n t o a p o r t i o n of t h e Count 2

c h a r g e s b e c a u s e t h e a d d i t i o n a l c h a r g e i s made t h a t t h e d e l i -

b e r a t e homicide was committed "by means o f t o r t u r e . " In filing

t h e c h a r g e s and by t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s , t h i s d e l i b e r a t e homicide

"by means o f t o r t u r e " was t r e a t e d a s a s e p a r a t e s u b s t a n t i v e

offense.

I n s t r u c t i o n 23 a t t e m p t s t o d e f i n e t h e p u r p o r t e d s e p a r a t e

o f f e n s e o f d e l i b e r a t e homicide "by means of t o r t u r e . " It

provides :

" D e l i b e r a t e Homicide by Means o f T o r t u r e i n s o f a r
a s we a r e concerned w i t h t h e d e f i n i t i o n t h e r e o f
i n t h i s case is:

"Whoever p u r p o s e l y a s s a u l t s a n o t h e r p h y s i c a l l y
f o r t h e p u r p o s e of i n f l i c t i n g c r u e l s u f f e r i n g upon
t h e person s o a s s a u l t e d f o r t h e p a r t i c u l a r purpose
of e n a b l i n g t h e a s s a i l a n t t o e i t h e r :

"(a) e x t o r t a n y t h i n g from s u c h a p e r s o n ;

" ( b ) o r t o persuade such person a g a i n s t h i s o r
her w i l l , o r

" ( c ) t o s a t i s f y some o t h e r untoward p r o p e n s i t y
of t h e a s s a i l a n t ,
-87-
 "and i n s o d o i n g t h e a s s a i l a n t c a u s e s t h e d e a t h
o f t h e p e r s o n h e a s s a u l t s , i n t h e law i s g u i l t y
of t h e o f f e n s e o f D e l i b e r a t e Homicide by Means
of T o r t u r e , whether o r n o t i t w a s t h e p u r p o s e o r
i n t e n t i o n of t h e a s s a i l a n t t o c a u s e s u c h d e a t h .

"'Untoward p r o p e n s i t y ' means any p e r v e r s e , wrong,
bad o r c o r r u p t i n c l i n a t i o n o r t e n d e n c y . " Instruction
2 3 - - D e l i b e r a t e Homicide By Means o f T o r t u r e D e f i n e d . )

There i s a b s o l u t e l y no s t a t u t o r y b a s i s f o r t h e l a n g u a g e

used i n I n s t r u c t i o n 23 a t t e m p t i n g t o d e f i n e t h e c r i m e o f

d e l i b e r a t e homicide "by means of t o r t u r e . " I do n o t know where

t h e t r i a l c o u r t found t h e s e d e f i n i t i o n s . I n s t r u c t i o n 3 4 , Methods

- Proof A p p l i c a b l e - D e l i b e r a t e Homicide by Means o f T o r t u r e ,
of to ---
n o t o n l y r e p e a t s most o f t h e language c o n t a i n e d i n I n s t r u c t i o n

2 3 , above, b u t a l s o a t t e m p t s t o set f o r t h t h e methods by which

t h e e l e m e n t o f t h i s o f f e n s e can b e proved. The t r i a l c o u r t

s p e c i f i c a l l y t o l d t h e j u r y t h a t s i n c e a p a r t i c u l a r p u r p o s e had

t o be p r o v e d , p r e s u m p t i o n s c o u l d n o t be used t o p r o v e t h e m e n t a l

element involved. The l a s t p a r a g r a p h o f t h e i n s t r u c t i o n p r o v i d e s :

"And i f you f i n d one o r more of s a i d p a r t i c u l a r
p u r p o s e s t o have been proved beyond a r e a s o n a b l e
d o u b t and t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t k i l l e d h e r w h i l e
p u r p o s e l y s o i n f l i c t i n g c r u e l s u f f e r i n g upon h e r ,
h e h a s committed t h e o f f e n s e of D e l i b e r a t e Homicide
by means o f T o r t u r e , whether - -s- r- - n o t h i s
i t w a o was -
purpose - i n t e n t i o n - -l l h e r . "
or to ki - (Emphasis added.)

I w i l l have more t o s a y c o n c e r n i n g t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n b u t

p r e s e n t l y it i s s u f f i c i e n t t o s t a t e t h a t any a n a l y s i s o f t h e

impact o f t h e Sandstrom-type i n s t r u c t i o n s must s t a r t o u t w i t h

t h e r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t t h e r e i s no c r i m e i n t h i s s t a t e e n t i t l e d

d e l i b e r a t e homicide "by means o f t o r t u r e . " One c a n n o t t e l l

whether o r n o t t h e j u r y a c t u a l l y c o n v i c t e d d e f e n d a n t o f t h i s

crime. But even i f t h e r e i s a r e a s o n a b l e c h a n c e , t h e c o n v i c t i o n
must be r e v e r s e d f o r t h i s r e a s o n a l o n e , t h e Sandstrom-type

i n s t r u c t i o n s notwithstanding. Minimum s t a n d a r d s of due p r o c e s s

of l a w c a n n o t t o l e r a t e a r e a s o n a b l e chance t h a t d e f e n d a n t may

have been c o n v i c t e d of and s e n t e n c e d t o d e a t h f o r a c r i m e t h a t

does not e x i s t .
 For purposes of a Sandstrom analysis however, I will
operate on the assumption that whether or not there is a sub-
stantive crime of deliberate homicide "by means of torture",
is not an issue.
I start this analysis with what I believe is a required
premise: unless an appellate court can declare beyond a reason-
able doubt that the jury took a constitutional path to its
deliberate homicide verdict (thereby avoiding application of
the unconstitutional Sandstrom-type instructions), the conviction
must be reversed. I see no other respectable way to approach
the problem of constitutional error inhering in jury instructions.
Instruction 31 set the stage for all the Sandstrom-type
presumptions which were to follow. It went into great detail
as to how the mental element is proven in a criminal case. Part
2 of Instruction 31 specifically sets forth the Sandstrom type
instructions and tells the jury how it is to use them:
"2. Proof by Presumption - -
of Law. (Deductions
which the law expressly directs you to make from
particular facts):

" [TIhe law presumes, that is, the law expressly
directs the jury to reason: That an unlawful act
was done with an unlawful intent and also that a
person is presumed to intend the ordinary consequences
of his voluntary act.

"Further, unless you are otherwise instructed with
regard to a particular presumption, all presumptions
are rebuttable; that is, they may be controverted
and overcome by other evidence."
The trial court then zeros in on the particular offenses
charged. Instruction 33, entitled Method --
of Proof Applicable

- - Offense of Deliberate Homicide, sets forth two of the
to the -
Sandstrom-type presumptions. The first presumption declares
that:
".
. .the law presumes that an unlawful act was
done with an unlawful intent; that is, the law
expressly directs you to reason from such unlawful
act that the defendant acted with unlawful intent
or purpose."
Thus, by t h i s p r e s u m p t i o n , i f t h e j u r y found t h a t d e f e n d a n t

e i t h e r a s s a u l t e d t h e v i c t i m o r i n j u r e d t h e v i c t i m , i t was

d i r e c t e d t o f i n d t h a t d e f e n d a n t had an u n l a w f u l i n t e n t . The

t r i a l c o u r t a l s o t o l d t h e j u r y t h a t t h i s was a r e b u t t a b l e

presumption.

I n s t r u c t i o n 33 t a k e s a n o t h e r s t e p and sets f o r t h a n o t h e r

u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l presumption t h a t would f a l l w i t h i n t h e

p r o s c r i p t i o n of Sandstrom v. S t a t e o f Montana:

". . . i f you f i n d . . . t h a t t h e defendant, . . .
v o l u n t a r i l y and u n l a w f u l l y a s s a u l t e d o r i n j u r e d
Lana Harding, and i f you f u r t h e r f i n d beyond a
r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t t h a t t h e d e a t h would r e s u l t as t h e
o r d i n a r y consequence o f such an a s s a u l t o r i n j u r y ,
t h e l a w presumes t h a t , and e x p r e s s l y d i r e c t s you
t o reason therefrom t h a t t h e defendant intended t o
c a u s e s a i d d e a t h r e g a r d l e s s of whether o r n o t h e
a c t u a l l y had such an i n t e n t o r p u r p o s e . "

The t r i a l c o u r t f u r t h e r i n s t r u c t e d t h e j u r y t h a t t h i s a l s o i s

a r e b u t t a b l e presumption.

These f a t a l Sandstrom-type i n s t r u c t i o n s w e r e a g a i n d r i l l e d

home t o t h e j u r y by I n s t r u c t i o n 38, Methods - Proof A p p l i c a b l e
of

- - O f f e n s e of Aggravated A s s a u l t .
t o the - The t r i a l c o u r t t o l d t h e

j ury :

" S i n c e t h e o f f e n s e o f a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t may be
committed e i t h e r knowingly o r p u r p o s e l y , t h e
o f f e n s e may be proved by showing t h e a c t was know-
i n g l y done, and t h e l e g a presumption t h a t : 'An
u n l a w f u l a c t w a s done w i t h a n u n l a w f u l i n t e n t , and
t h e l e g a l p r e s u m p t i o n t h a t a p e r s o n i s presumed t o
i n t e n d t h e o r d i n a r y consequences o f h i s v o l u n t a r y
a c t , ' can b e used t o prove t h e m e n t a l s t a t e o f
knowingly. "

" T h e r e f o r e , i f you r e a s o n from f a c t s proved i n t h e
evidence ... t h a t t h e defendant ... unlawfully
c a u s e d Lana Harding b o d i l y i n j u r y e i t h e r w i t h o r
w i t h o u t a weapon, t h e l a w e x p r e s s l y d i r e c t s you t o
reason therefrom t h a t he a c t e d w i t h unlawful i n t e n t
t h a t i s p u r p o s e l y ; and i f you f u r t h e r r e a s o n from f a c t s
beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t t h a t t h e harm i n f l i c t e d
by him was such a s o r d i n a r i l y r e s u l t s from an a c t s u c h
a s d e f e n d a n t ' s t h e l a w e x p r e s s l y d i r e c t s you t o r e a s o n
t h a t he i n t e n d e d t h e consequences o f h i s a c t . "
I n s t r u c t i o n 38.

The t r i a l c o u r t a l s o t o l d t h e j u r y t h a t t h e s e p r e s u m p t i o n s a r e

rebuttable. ( I n s t r u c t i o n 38 becomes i m p o r t a n t when c o n s t r u e d

a l o n g w i t h I n s t r u c t i o n 3 4 , which a n a l y s i s w i l l be s e t f o r t h

later i n this dissent.)
 ~ n s t r u c t i o n34 c o n t a i n s t h e methods o f proof f o r t h e

n o n s t a t u t o r y o f f e n s e of d e l i b e r a t e homicide "by means o f

torture." The j u r y i s s p e c i f i c a l l y t o l d t h a t t h e p a r t i c u l a r

p u r p o s e o r p u r p o s e s which must be proved under t h i s c h a r g e ,

c a n n o t be proved by p r e s u m p t i o n s , b u t o n l y i n f e r e n c e s can be

used. The t r i a l c o u r t t e l l s t h e j u r y t h a t t h e s p e c i f i c

purpose t o i n f l i c t " c r u e l s u f f e r i n g " (also a nonstatutory

t e r m ) , can be found by t h e u s e of i n f e r e n c e s o n l y . The t r i a l

c o u r t a l s o d e f i n e s t h e term " c r u e l s u f f e r i n g " ( a g a i n a non-

statutory definition). I t a p p e a r s t h a t t h e e s s e n c e of t h i s

i n s t r u c t i o n i s the d i r e c t i o n t o t h e jury t h a t defendant i s

g u i l t y o f d e l i b e r a t e homicide "by means o f t o r t u r e " i f t h e

j u r y f i n d s t h a t h e "had p u r p o s e l y a s s a u l t e d " Lana Harding and

i n f l i c t e d "--r u e l s u f f e r i n g " - t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t had t h e
c and

p a r t i c u l a r p u r p o s e t o i n f l i c t " c r u e l s u f f e r i n g " by h i s a s s a u l t .

(Emphasis added. )

These i n s t r u c t i o n s a r e e x c e e d i n g l y c o n f u s i n g , m i s l e a d i n g

and i n c o n s i s t e n t . N o n t h e l e s s , I must assume t h a t t h e j u r y under-

s t o o d I n s t r u c t i o n s 31, 33, 34, and 3 8 , o r a t l e a s t d i d i t s b e s t

t o follow t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s . The q u e s t i o n t h e n a r i s e s : By

which p r o c e s s d i d t h e j u r y r e a c h i t s v e r d i c t t h a t d e f e n d a n t was

g u i l t y o f d e l i b e r a t e homicide? I t appears t h a t t h e j i n y could

have t a k e n s e v e r a l p a t h s , and t h a t o n l y o n e of t h e p a t h s m i g h t

n o t have been a f f e c t e d by t h e u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l Sandstl-om-type

presv.mptions. Unless an a p p e l l a t e c o u r t c a n d e t e r x i n e beyond a

r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t which p a t h t h e j u r y c h o s ~ ;i t i s i n no p o s i t i o n

t o d e c l a r e t h a t a j u r y c h o s e t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p a t h and i g n o r e d

the unconstitutional

I n s t r u c t i o n s a s t o t h e u s e of j u r y v e r d i c t forms g i v e some

c l u e with r e l a t i o n t o t h e s t e p s taken i n reaching t h e verdict,.

b u t n o t t o t h e p a t h o r p a t h s which t h e j u r y f o l l o w e d . Instruction ,

no. 5 4 , V e r d i c t --
Forms and I n s t r u c t i o n s A s - T h e i r U s e , s t a t e d
- to

i n the introduction:
-91-
 "In order to return a verdict, all twelve jurors
must agree to the decision, including the
additional findings - - asked - -
you are to make on the
Guilty of Deliberate Homicide verdict form and on
the Guilty of Aggravated Kidnapping verdict form."
(Emphasis added. )
This can be interpreted as requiring that the jury first deter-
mine whether or not defendant is guilty of deliberate homicide
and then to determine if the homicide was committed "by means
of torture." Instruction 54, Part 11, Verdict Forms--Deliberate
Homicide provides additional support for this two-step process.
Instruction 54, Part 11, provides in relevant part:
". . . as only one death is alleged, only one
Guilty of Deliberate Homicide verdict form is
required.

"If you adopt the Guilty of Deliberate Homicide
verdict form you are asked to find on that form
whether the Deliberate Homicide was or was not by
Means of Torture as this is the most serious of the
remaining charges of Deliberate Homicide made against
the defendant.''
Again, a two step process is clearly indicated by this instru-
ction.
When combining the two step process set forth in the verdict
form with these instructions, a reasonable conclusion is that
the jury first reached its decision that defendant was guilty
of deliberate homicide and then found in the second step that
the deliberate homicide was committed "by means of torture."
It remains a mystery, of course, which path or paths the jury
took in finding defendant guilty of deliberate homicide. There
are, however, several more obvious possibilities. If one assumes
that the jury followed this two step process in reaching its
verdict, the probabilities are clearly in favor of the con-
clusion that the jury's verdict was tainted by use of the
Sandstrom-type instructions.
Count 1 charged defendant with "knowingly or purposely"
causing the victim's death. Instruction 31 told the jury that
a voluntary act could be proved by the use of Sandstrom-type
presumptions. Instruction 33, Part 11, specifically told
the jury that the mental state required for proof of deliberate
homicide could be proved by use of Sandstrom-type presumptions.
Thus, if the jury did find defendant guilty of Count 1, an
appellate court must assume that the jury reached this verdict
by use of the unconstitutional presumptions contained within
Instructions 31 and 33.
Several possibilities arise if the jury found defendant
guilty of any of the alternative charges contained in Count 2.
One of the alternative allegations in Count 1 is that defendant
is guilty of deliberate homicide by reason of the application
of the felony-murder rule. The State alleged that defendant
had attempted, had committed, or was withdrawing from the com-
mission of sexual intercourse without consent, a felony, or
aggravated assault, a felony. If the jury followed a strict
application of the felony-murder rule and thus found defendant
guilty of deliberate homicide, it is possible that its verdict
was not tainted by the unconstitutional Sandstrom-type in-
structions.
The felony-murder rule is set forth in Instruction 22,
part (b) (a verbatim recitation of the statute), and in ~nstruction
33, Part 111. Under Instruction 33, Part 111, "knowingly or
purposely) is not an element of the offense. Technically, the
jury was therefore not required to consult or use either
Instruction 31 or 33 in reaching a verdict that defendant is
guilty under the felony-murder rule. But an appellate court
cannot determine whether the jury took this path to its verdict.
Surely no appellate court could declare beyond a reasonable doubt
that the jury took only the felony-murder route just described
as its only path to its verdict.
Furthermore, if the jury took the felony-murder rule path
to its verdict (thereby avoiding the use of the unconstitutional
presumptions contained in Instruction 33) there is still a
-93-
strong chance that it used the unconstitutional instructions
contained in Instructions 37 and 38. Assuming the jury deter-
mined that defendant was guilty of deliberate homicide by
committing, attempting to commit, or withdrawing from the
commission of the felony of sexual intercouse without consent,
the jury would have been required to use Instruction 37, Methods

- Proof Applicable - Sexual Intercourse Without Consent.
of to
Instruction 37, part 11, specifically declares that proof that
----
the act was "knowingly" committed "can be made by presumption."
The Sandstrom-type presumption was set forth as the applicable
presumption. Thus a felony-murder verdict in relation to
sexual intercourse without consent would still not assure that
the verdict was untainted by the unconstitutional presumptions.
The same analysis can be made in relation to a felony-
murder conviction under the theory that defendant killed the
victim while committing, attempting to commit, or withdrawing
from the commission of aggravated assault. Instruction 38,
-
Part 11, Methods of Proof Applicable - - Offense of-Aggravated
to the -

Assault, specifically declares that proof that an assault was
committed "knowingly or purposely" can be made by the presumptions
either that "an unlawful act was done with an unlawful intent",
or "the legal presumption that a person is presumed to intend
the ordinary consequences of his voluntary act." Accordingly,

a felony murder verdict in relation to aggravated assault would
be tainted by the reasonable possibility that the jury used the
unconstitutional presumptions contained in Instruction 38.
Another possibility is that the jury reached its verdict
through the path cut in relation to the charge of deliberate
homicide "by means of torture." Aside from the fact that such
offense does not exist in this state, the State did charge that
this offense was committed (Count 2, last paragraph), and the
trial court defined the offense for the jury (Instruction 23)
-94-
and set forth the method of proof required for this offense
(Instruction 34, supra). Whether the jury took this path,
is, of course, another mystery. Assuming that it did however,
it could have followed an unconstitutional path or a consti-
tutional path.
Instruction 34 permitted the jury to find defendant guilty
of the offense of deliberate homicide "by means of torture" if
it found the following elements: (1) That defendant had
"purposely assaulted Lana Harding and inflicted cruel suffering"
and
- (2) that defendant had one of the particular purposes to
inflict "cruel suffering." The phrase "purposely assaulted" is
important in relation to how the jury may have reached its
decision.
If the jury first found that defendant "purposely assaulted"
Lana Harding, and then found that the particular purpose of
the assault was to inflict "cruel suffering" it followed an
unconstitutional path. A "purposeful assault" is defined by
Instruction 38, Method - -
of Proof Applicable To - Offense of
- The -

Aggravated Assault. Part I1 of Instruction 38 specifically
directs that the mental element of "purposely or knowingly"
is established by the use of the Sandstrom-type presumptions.
The trial court specifically told the jury that:
"Since the offense of aggravated assault may be
committed either knowingly or purposely, the
offense may be proved by showing the act was
knowingly done, and the legal presumptions that:
'An unlawful act was done with an unlawful intent,
and the legal presumption that a person is
presumed to intend the ordinary consequences of
his voluntary act,' can be used to prove the mental
state of knowingly.
"Therefore, if you reason from facts proved in the
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
. . . unlawfully caused Lana Harding bodily injury
either with or without a weapon, - - expressly
the law
directs you- reason therefrom - -he acted with
- to that
unlawful intent - -is purposely; and if you further
that
reason from facts proved beyond a reasonable doubt
that the harm inflicted by him was such as ordinarily
results from acts such as defendant's, - -
the law
- to --
expressly directs you- reason that he intended the
- his act." (Emphasis added.)
consequences of - -
The instruction further provided that these are rebuttable
presumptions.
It is clear therefore, that Instruction 38 permits the
element of "purposely or knowingly" to be proved by the use
of the Sandstrom-type presumptions. Thus, if the jury used
either one of these presumptions in determining the first step
that defendant committed a "purposeful assault", the verdict
cannot stand. Any finding that defendant had the particular
purpose to inflict "cruel suffering" would be tainted by the
initial determination that defendant had committed a "purposeful
assault" by the use of the Sandstrom-type presumptions.
It is possible, on the other hand, to construe the special

jury finding that the deliberate homicide was committed "by
means of torture", as embracing the general purpose of the
defendant to assault the victim. If the jury followed this
path, it need not have used the unconstitutional presumptions
contained in Instruction 38, supra. It is, however, quite
unlikely that the jury followed this path to its verdict.
Initially, it must be emphasized again that it remains
a mystery as to the path or paths chosen by the jury in
reaching its verdict. But neither do the instructions telling
the jury how to proceed, or the verdict form itself, support
a conclusion that the jury found defendant guilty of deliberate
homicide "by means of torture" in one fell swoop. Rather,
Instruction 54, Part 11, tells the jury to first determine
if defendant is guilty of deliberate homicide and if it is so
to then determine if the deliberate homicide was committed "by
means of torture." The two step process in the verdict form
itself indicates, moreover, that the jury followed this process
directed by the instruction.
There are, of course, many additional possibilities that
the jury found defendant guilty of more than one count or that
it found him guilty of having committed the deliberate homicide
-96-
in several alternative ways. The trial court specifically
instructed the jury that this was permissible. Instruction
6, supra; Instruction 54, part 11, supra. Unfortunately, the
trial court did not see fit to provide the appropriate verdict
forms for the jury's use.
Because of the deficient record, only the jury knows
which path or paths it followed in reaching the guilty verdict.
An appellate court can only speculate as to what the jury did
or did not do. It is impossible to determine therefore, that
the Sandstrom-type presumptions which were sprinkled so liberally
throughout the instructions used in this case, did not have an
impact on the decision making process of the jury. Certainly
no self-respecting appellate court can declare beyond a reason-
able doubt that the Sandstrom-type instructions had no impact
on the decision of the jury. As a matter of fact, because of
the prevalence of these unconstitutional instructions, the
probabilities are clearly in favor of a determination that the
jury did use these presumptions as part of its decision making
process.
I cannot in good conscience declare that beyond a reasonable
doubt the Sandstrom-type presumptions had no effect on the jury's
verdict. Indeed, the probabilities are that they did. But I
must emphasize again, that separate basis exists to reverse the
deliberate homicide conviction aside from the Sandstrom issue.
There is a reasonable chance that the jury convicted defendant
of the so-called offense of deliberate homicide "by means of
torture." Such statutory offense does not exist in this state.
If the jury did in fact convict him of this nonoffense it is
a
a frightening prospect indeed thatldefendant has been sentenced
to death for a crime which does not exist. Due process of law
requires for this reason alone that this conviction be reversed.
THE KIDNAPPING STATUTES AND CHARGES FILED I N THIS CASE
---
The k i d n a p p i n g s t a t u t e s i n v o l v e d i n t h i s c a s e t o o k

e f f e c t on J a n u a r y 1, 1976. The c r i m e s w e r e a l l e g e d l y committed

on J a n u a r y 21, 1974. The k i d n a p p i n g s t a t u t e s a r e c o n t a i n e d

i n s e c t i o n s 94-5-201 t h r o u g h 94-5-305, R.C.M. 1947. Three

of t h e s e s t a t u t e s a r e p e r t i n e n t t o t h i s case: s e c t i o n 94-5-302,

c r e a t i n g and d e f i n i n g t h e crime o f k i d n a p p i n g ; s e c t i o n 94-5-303,

c r e a t i n g and d e f i n i n g t h e crime o f a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g ; and

s e c t i o n 94-5-304, which p r o v i d e s t h a t t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y s h a l l

be imposed i f t h e v i c t i m i s dead a s a r e s u l t of a n a g g r a v a t e d

k i d n a p p i n g , and p r o v i d e d t h e r e a r e no m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s .

The S t a t e c h a r g e d d e f e n d a n t w i t h two c o u n t s o f a g g r a v a t i n g

k i d n a p p i n g (Counts 3 and 4 ) . S e c t i o n 94-5-303, reads a s follows:

" ( 1 ) A p e r s o n commits t h e o f f e n s e o f a q g r a v a t e d
k i d n a p p i n g i f h e knowingly o r p u r p o s e l y - a n d
without lawful a u t h o r i t y r e s t r a i n s another person
by e i t h e r s e c r e t i n g o r h o l d i n g him i n a p l a c e o f
i s o l a t i o n , o r by u s i n g o r t h r e a t e n i n g t o u s e p h y s i c a l
f o r c e , w i t h any of t h e f o l l o w i n g p u r p o s e s :

" ( a ) t o h o l d f o r ransom o r reward, o r a s a s h i e l d
o r hostage; o r

" ( b ) t o f a c i l i t a t e commission o f - f e l o n y o r
- any -
flishtthereafter; or

" ( c ) t o i n f l i c t bodily i n j u r y - - - t e r r o r i z e
on o r t o
t h e victim - another; o r
of

" ( d ) t o i n t e r f e r e w i t h t h e performance of any
governmental o r p o l i t i c a l f u n c t i o n ; o r

" ( e ) t o h o l d a n o t h e r i n a c o n d i t i o n of i n v o l u n t a r y
servitude." (Emphasis a d d e d . )

The p e n a l t y i s p r o v i d e d f o r i n s u b s e c t i o n ( 2 ) , which p r o v i d e s :

" ( 2 ) A p e r s o n c o n v i c t e d o f t h e o f f e n s e of a g g r a v a t e d
k i d n a p p i n g s h a l l be p u n i s h e d by d e a t h a s p r o v i d e d
i n s e c t i o n 94-5-304, o r be i m p r i s o n e d i n t h e s t a t e
p r i s o n f o r any t e r m n o t t o exceed one hundred (100)
y e a r s u n l e s s he has v o l u n t a r i l y r e l e a s e d t h e v i c t i m ,
a l i v e , i n a s a f e p l a c e , and n o t s u f f e r i n g from s e r i o u s
b o d i l y i n j u r y , i n which e v e n t h e s h a l l be i m p r i s o n e d
i n t h e s t a t e p r i s o n f o r any t e r m n o t t o exceed t e n
(10) years."

S e c t i o n 94-5-304, r e f e r r e d t o i n s e c t i o n 94-5-303(2)

above, s e t s f o r t h t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s under which t h e d e a t h

p e n a l t y may be imposed:
 "A c o u r t s h a l l impose t h e s e n t e n c e of d e a t h
f o l l o w i n g c o n v i c t i o n of a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g
i f it that the i s dead
- - f i n d s -- v i c t i m - - as t h e r e s u l t
o f t h e c r i m i n a l conduct u n l e s s t h e r e a r e m i t i q a t i n q- -
circumstances." (Emphasis a d d e d . )

Count 3 of t h e a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g c h a r g e s , s u p r a ,

i n v o k e s s e c t i o n 94-5-303(b)
0 and a l l e g e s s e v e r a l a l t e r n a t i v e
n
ways by which t h e o f f e n s e was committed. First, the State

a l l e g e s t h a t d e f e n d a n t had t h e p a r t i c u l a r p u r p o s e t o commit

o r f l e e from t h e commission of t h e f e l o n y o f s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e

without consent. Second, t h e S t a t e a l l e g e s t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t

had t h e p a r t i c u l a r p u r p o s e t o commit o r f l e e from t h e commission

of t h e felony of aggravated a s s a u l t . The a l l e g a t i o n s w i t h

r e s p e c t t o aggravated a s s a u l t a r e f u r t h e r divided i n t o a l t e r n a t i v e

a l l e g a t i o n s r e l a t i n g t o t h e p a r t i c u l a r purpose. By Count 3 ,

2 ( a ) , s u p r a , t h e S t a t e a l l e g e s t h a t t h e k i d n a p p i n g w a s committed

f o r t h e purpose of causing " s e r i o u s b o d i l y i n j u r y " t o t h e victim.

"?
(See s e c t i o n 94-5-202A a ) , R.C.M. 1947.) By Count 3 , 2 ( b ) , t h e

S t a t e a l l e g e s t h a t t h e k i d n a p p i n g was committed f o r t h e p u r p o s e

o f c a u s i n g " b o d i l y i n j u r y " ( a s opposed t o s e r i o u s b o d i l y i n j u r y ,

above) " w i t h a weapon". (See s e c t i o n 94-5-202(b), R.C.M. 1947.)

F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e " w i t h a weapon" a l l e g a t i o n i s d i v i d e d i n t o an

a l l e g a t i o n t h a t t h e weapon used w a s " a r o p e " o r " a heavy

weapon. "
Count 3 a d d s , i n t h e l a s t a l l e g a t i o n , t h a t t h e v i c t i m d i e d

a s a r e s u l t of t h e k i d n a p p i n g . The v i c t i m ' s d e a t h , however,

i s n o t a n e l e m e n t of t h e c r i m e o f a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g .

Count 4 o f t h e a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g c h a r g e s , s u p r a , i n v o k e s
>!C
s e c t i o n 94-5-30$(c), and a l l e g e s t h a t d e f e n d a n t , i n k i d n a p p i n g

t h e v i c t i m , had " t h e p u r p o s e o f i n f l i c t i n g b o d i l y i n j u r y " on

t h e victim, o r "threatening o r t e r r o r i z i n g t h e victim. Count

4 a l s o adds, i n t h e l a s t a l l e g a t i o n , t h a t t h e victim d i e d a s

a r e s u l t of t h e kidnapping. Again, however, t h e v i c t i m f s deatl!

i s n o t an e l e m e n t of t h e crime o f a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g .
 The S t a t e a l l e g e d t h a t t h e v i c t i m d i e d a s a r e s u l t o f

t h e k i d n a p p i n g b e c a u s e i t wanted t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y t o be

imposed s h o u l d t h e d e f e n d a n t be c o n v i c t e d . But u n d e r s e c t i o n
94-5-304, supra, it i s t h e function of t h e c o u r t , n o t t h e jury,

t o make t h a t f i n d i n g i n t h e e v e n t of a c o n v i c t i o n .

AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING--IMPACT - - SANDSTROM-TYPE INSTRUCTIONS
O THE
F

I t would o f c o u r s e be p r o p e r t o g i v e d e f e n d a n t n o t i c e

t h a t t h e S t a t e would s e e k t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y i n t h e e v e n t o f a

c o n v i c t i o n , b u t t h e i s s u e s h o u l d n e v e r have been s u b m i t t e d t o

t h e jury. The p l a i n meaning of s e c t i o n 94-5-305, is t h a t t h e

c o u r t must make t h i s d e t e r m i n a t i o n of whether t h e v i c t i m i s

dead a s a r e s u l t o f t h e k i d n a p p i n g .

The j u r y had t h e c h o i c e of a t l e a s t e i g h t s e p a r a t e p a t h s

it c o u l d have t a k e n t o t h e v e r d i c t , a s t h e d e f e n d a n t w a s
eight
c h a r g e d i n a t l e a s y a l t e r n a t i v e ways. The t r i a l c o u r t ' s

i n s t r u c t i o n s a l s o p e r m i t t e d t h e j u r y t o t a k e two o r more p a t h s

t o its verdict. An a n a l y s i s of Count 3 r e v e a l s t h a t t h e j u r y

had s i x s e p a r a t e c h o i c e s ; an a n a l y s i s o f Count 4 r e v e a l s t h a t

t h e j u r y had two s e p a r a t e c h o i c e s . However, t h e a p p l i c a b l e

i n s t r u c t i o n s p r o v i d e no c l u e s a s t o t h e c h o i c e o r c h o i c e s

t h e j u r y may have chosen. And t h e v e r d i c t form upon which t h e

jury returned i t s v e r d i c t , reveals absolutely nothing a s t o

which p a t h o r p a t h s it c h o s e i n r e a c h i n g i t s v e r d i c t .

The t r i a l c o u r t t o l d t h e j u r y t h a t i t c o u l d c o n v i c t t h e

d e f e n d a n t on o n e o r a l l of t h e s e p a r a t e c h a r g e s ( I n s t r u c t i o n 6 ,

S t a t e m e n t o f -e Case, s u p r a ) .
- th - But even i f t h e j u r y c h o s e

more t h a n one p a t h i n r e a c h i n g i t s v e r d i c t , t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o l d

t h e j u r y t o r e t u r n o n l y one v e r d i c t form ( I n s t r u c t i o n 54, P a r t

111, V e r d i c t Forms--Aggravated Kidnapping, s u p r a ) . And t h e

v e r d i c t i t s e l f i s a simple d e c l a r a t i o n t h a t t h e jury f i n d s t h e

defendant g u i l t y of aggravated kidnapping:

-100-
 "A. We, the jury, in the above-entitled cause,
find the defendant Guilty of the offense of
Aggravated Kidnapping as Charged.
"B. We further find that Lana Harding (did)
(did A&) die as a result of said Aggravated
Kidnapping) .
"(Strike out bracketed word or words that do
not apply. ) "
Assuming that the jury chose only one path by which
it reached its verdict, because of the multiple charges and
alternative ways alleged, it had at least eight choices.
Furthermore, if the jury chose more than one path to reach
its verdict, and the instructions of the trial court explicitly
allowed this approach, the possible combination of choices is
multiplied many times over. Needless to say, it is impossible
to determine which path or paths the jury chose. Before an
appellate court can affirm the conviction here, it must be able
to declare beyond a reasonable doubt which path or paths the
jury chose and that the path or paths chosen were not impacted
by the use of the unconstitutional Sandstrom-type jury instructions.
An appellate court cannot in good conscience, make that de-
claration, and therefore the only choice is to reverse the
conviction.
It should be sufficient to stop the analysis at this
point and simply declare that the multiple choices available
to the jury without any indication of what its choice or
choices were, makes review impossible. Nonetheless, I will
set forth some of the more obvious paths the jury could have
taken, assuming, of course, that the jury followed or attempted
to follow the applicable instructions.
The charges of aggravated kidnapping are set forth in
Counts 3 and 4 of the Information, supra. There are quite a
number of jury instructions which have a bearing on these charges.
-101-
 I n s t r u c t i o n 25 d e f i n e s b o t h t h e c r i m e of k i d n a p p i n g

and t h e crime of a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g . The t r i a l c o u r t

t o l d t h e j u r y t h a t t h e c r i m e of k i d n a p p i n g r e q u i r e s t h a t

t h e a c t i n v o l v e d by done "knowingly - p u r p o s e l y and w i t h o u t
or

lawful authority. . ." This d e f i n i t i o n i s a verbatim r e c i t a -

t i o n o f s e c t i o n 54-5-302(1). I n defining t h e c r i m e of

aggravated kidnapping t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o l d t h e jury t h a t t h e

a c t must b e done "knowingly - p u r p o s e l y , and f u r t h e r , t h a t
or

i t be done t o a c c o m p l i s h one of t h e p a r t i c u l a r p u r p o s e s c h a r g e d ,

namely :

"(a) t o f a c i l i t a t e t h e commission of a f e l o n y ,
or

" (b) t o i n f l i c t b o d i l y i n j u r y on t h e v i c t i m ,
or

"(c) t o t e r r o r i z e t h e victim."

T h i s i n s t r u c t i o n i s , f o r t h e most p a r t , a v e r b a t i m r e c i : k a t i o n o f
the
/aggravated k i d n a p p i n g s t a t u t e , s e c t i o n 94-5-302(2), R.C.M.

I n s t r u c t i o n 29, e n t i t l e d Requirement o f - V o l u n t a r y Act
-a

--
With a Mental S t a t e , i s a t h r e e page i n s t r u c t i o n s e t t i n g f o r t h

t h e v a r i o u s m e n t a l s t a t e s which must be proved f o r e a c h o f

t h e charges f i l e d a g a i n s t t h e defendant. In relation t o the

o f f e n s e of k i d n a p p i n g , P a r t I V of t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n t e l l s t h e

jury t h a t :

". . . the voluntary - ( t h e s e c r e t i n g o r holding
act
of a v i c t i m i n a p l a c e of i s o l a t i o n w i t h o u t l a w f u l
a u t h o r i t y , o r t h e h o l d i n g o f s a i d p e r s o n by p h y s i c a l
f o r c e o r t h r e a t s t h e r e o f ) be done e i t h e r knowingly
- purposely."
or (Emphasis a d d e d . )

I n r e l a t i o n t o t h e o f f e n s e of aggravated kidnapping, P a r t V

of t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n t e l l s t h e j u r y t h a t :

". . . the voluntary a c t (the secreting o r
holding the victim without lawful authority i n
a place of i s o l a t i o n , o r t h e holding of s a i d
p e r s o n by p h y s i c a l f o r c e o r t h r e a t s t h e r e o f ) ,
- done e i t h e r p u r p o s e l y o r knowingly - -
be - and i n
a d d i t i o n t h e r e t o t h a t i t be done f o r one of t h e
following p a r t i c u l a r purposes: either
 "(a) to facilitate the commission of any felony
(in this case sexual intercourse without consent
of the victim, or an aggravated assault upon the
victim), or
" (b) to inflict bodily injury on the victim, or
"(c) to terrorize the victim." (Emphasis added.)
Instruction 29, Part VI, provides that for the offense
of sexual intercourse without consent, "that the voluntary

- (sexual intercourse without consent) be done knowingly."
act
(Emphasis added.) Instruction 29, Part VII, provides that
for the offense of aggravated assault:
". .
. the voluntary act (the infliction of serious
bodily injury either with or without a weapon, or
the infliction of bodily injury with a weapon) be
done either knowingly or purposely." (~mphasis-
added.
With these statements as to mental state out of the
way, the trial court then gave a long series of instructions
as to the methods of proof which can be used to prove the
mental element involved for each crime. The unconstitutional
Sandstrom-type presumptions permeate this series of instructions.
Instruction 31, entitled Mental State--Methods - Proof,
of
set the stage by explaining the kinds of evidence: Direct
Evidence; Indirect Evidence; Presumptions; and Inferences. Part
I1 of Instruction 31, entitled Proof by Indirect or Circumstantial
- -
Evidence, subheading (2), is entitled Proof by Presumption of
-
Law. There, the trial court sets forth the unconstitutional

Sandstrom-type instructions. In essence the trial court told
the jury that it is presumed that the defendant intended the
consequences of his "voluntary act", and that it is presumed
that an unlawful act was done with unlawful intent. (Note:
I have previously set out these presumptions in the discussion
relating to the deliberate homicide conviction, supra.)
 In each of the instructions containing the uncon-
stitutional presumptions the jury was told that the presumptions
were rebuttable. But the jury was not told that it could
accept or reject the presumptions as it saw fit. The clear
meaning of the instructions taken together is that the jury
must use these presumptions to find the mental element and that
it was within the power of the defendant alone to rebut these
presumptions. Instruction 31 stated:
"2. Proof bv Presum~tionof law. (Deductions
which the l ; expres;ly directs - - -
a to be made
from particular facts):

'I.. . in addition thereto the law Dresumes,
that is, - - expressly directs - - - to
the law the jury
reason: That an unlawful act was done with an
unlawful intend and also that a person is presumed
to intend the ordinary consequences of his voluntary
act." (Emphasis added.)
From these general instructions as to methods of proof
the trial court then provided a long series of instructions
describing for the jury the use of the presumptions in relation
to each of the offenses charged. In this respect the words or
phrases "voluntary act", "unlawful act", and "purposely or
knowingly", or "intent", take on a real importance because
the trial court told the jury to find the requisite mental
element by the use of the unconstitutional Sandstrom-type
instructions. These presumptions were hammered home to the
jury again and again.
The State charged in one of the deliberate homicide counts
and in the aggravated kidnapping counts that the defendant had
a particular purpose in mind by committing the act. With
respect to this particular purpose, the trial court in Instruction
32, told the jury that such particular purpose could never be
presumed:
"in offenses which require proof of a particular
-
purpose the particular purpose required may never
be proved by means of -
- - legal presumptions, --
but must
be proved by means - inferences only. In this
- - of
 c a s e t h e o f f e n s e s o f : D e l i b e r a t e Homicide
by Means o f T o r t u r e , and Aggravated Kidnapping
a l l r e q u i r e proof t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t committed
t h e p a r t i c u l a r a c t charged f o r a p a r t i c u l a r
p u r p o s e , i n a d d i t i o n ---- a t he committed
t o proof t h
--t e i t h e r knowingly - p u r p o s e l y . "
said ac or
(Emphasis a d d e d . )

-
I n s t r u c t i o n 36, e n t i t l e d Method of Proof--Aggravated

Kidnapping, p r o v i d e s a s f o l l o w s :

"The o f f e n s e of Aggravated Kidnapping, i n a d d i t i o n
- the
t o - proof r e q u i r e d t o p r o v e - o f f e n s e o f
the
k i d n a p p i n g , r e q u i r e s that t h e k i d n a p p i n g wascom-
m i t t e d f o r a p a r t i c u l a r purpose.

" I n t h i s c a s e Count 4 r e q u i r e s p r o o f t h a t t h e
kidnapping w a s f o r a p a r t i c u l a r purpose e i t h e r t o
i n f l i c t b o d i l y i n j u r y on Lana Harding, o r t o
t e r r o r i z e h e r and Count 3 r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e k i d -
napping have been f o r t h e p a r t i c u l a r p u r p o s e o f
f a c i l i t a t i n g t h e commission o f a f e l o n y : e i t h e r
sexual intercourse without her consent, o r t o
commit a n Aggravated A s s a u l t on h e r .

" T h e r e f o r e , - - -i n d beyond a r e a s o n a b l e doubt
i f you f
t h a t the defendant,.
-- . . d i d k i d n a p Lana Harding,
b e f o r e he c a n be found g u i l t y o f t h e o f f e n s e o f
a a a r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n s a s charqed i n t h e I n f o r m a t i o n ,
-- f u r t h e r - f i n d beyond
must a reasonable doubt t h a t
he a c t e d w h i l e h a v i n g - l e a s t o n e- - e p a r t i c u l a r
at - of t h
purposes charged.

" S i n c e a p a r t i c u l a r purpose may n e v e r be presumed i n
l a w , t h e m e n t a l s t a t e of e i t h e r knowingly o r p u r p o s e l y
s e c r e t i n g o r h o l d i n g f o r a p a r t i c u l a r p u r p o s e must
be proved by i n f e r e n c e o n l y w i t h o u t t h e u s e o f any
presumptions.

" T h i s means t h a t i f you f i n d beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t ,
t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t d i d k i d n a p Lana Harding, you are
p e r m i t t e d t o deduce o r r e a s o n from any and a l l f a c t s
and c i r c u m s t a n c e s proved i n c o n n e c t i o n t h e r e w i t h t h a t
h e d i d s o w i t h one o r more of t h e p a r t i c u l a r p u r p o s e s
charged i n Counts 3 and 4 , and t o f i n d beyond a
r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t t h a t h e committed t h e o f f e n s e as
charged." (Emphasis a d d e d . )

Although it may b e o t h e r w i s e d e f i c i e n t , I n s t r u c t i o n 36,

standing alone, i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . I t c o n t a i n s no Sandstrom-

type presumptions. I f an a p p e l l a t e c o u r t c o u l d d e t e r m i n e

beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t t h a t t h e j u r y used I n s t r u c t i o n 36 as

i t s s o l e g u i d e i n f i n d i n g t h e e l e m e n t s of t h e o f f e n s e , i t
would t h e n have t o t a k e a l o n g , h a r d l o o k a s t o w h e t h e r t h e

r e m a i n i n g Sandstrom-type i n s t r u c t i o n s would o r would n o t have

t a i n t e d the jury v e r d i c t . I f i t knew t h e p a t h chosen by t h e
jury, an a p p e l l a t e c o u r t c o u l d d e c l a r e t h a t t h e j u r y ' s

f i n d i n g of a p a r t i c u l a r p u r p o s e , i n o r d e r t o c o n v i c t

d e f e n d a n t of a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g , embraced by n e c e s s i t y

t h e g e n e r a l i n t e n t o r general purpose t o kidnap. The

conscious o b j e c t t o restrain t h e v i c t i m (required f o r t h e

c r i m e of k i d n a p p i n g ) c o u l d a r i s e by n e c e s s i t y from a f i n d i n g

of a p a r t i c u l a r p u r p o s e t o e i t h e r commit a f o r c i b l e f e l o n y

o r t o t e r r o r i z e t h e victim. See s e c t i o n 94-5-303, supra.

T h i s would be a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p a t h , f o r t h e s p e c i f i c f i n d i n g

o f a p a r t i c u l a r p u r p o s e would i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e j u r y found

t h i s p a r t i c u l a r p u r p o s e o n l y by t h e u s e o f p e r m i s s i v e i n -

f e r e n c e s a s d i r e c t e d by I n s t r u c t i o n 36.

The most o b v i o u s d e f e c t i n t h i s a n a l y s i s i s t h a t no s e l f -

r e s p e c t i n g a p p e l l a t e c o u r t c o u l d e v e r d e c l a r e beyond a

reasonable doubt t h a t t h e jury took t h i s path t o i t s v e r d i c t .

There a r e , moreover, s t r o n g r e a s o n s t o b e l i e v e t h a t t h e

Sandstrom-type p r e s u m p t i o n s had an e f f e c t on t h e d e c i s i o n

making p r o c e s s of t h e j u r y .

No one knows o f c o u r s e , which one o r more p a r t i c u l a r

p u r p o s e s t h e j u r y may have found under t h e c h a r g e s . For

example, under Count 3 d i d t h e j u r y f i n d t h a t d e f e n d a n t had

t h e " p a r t i c u l a r p u r p o s e e i t h e r t o i n f l i c t b o d i l y i n j u r y on

Lana Harding, o r t o t e r r o r i z e h e r ? " O r d i d it f i n d b o t h s u c h

purposes? Under Count 4 d i d t h e j u r y f i n d t h a t d e f e n d a n t had

t h e p a r t i c u l a r p u r p o s e " t o f a c i l i t a t e t h e commission o f a

felony: e i t h e r s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h Lana ~ a r d i n g i t h o u t
w

h e r c o n s e n t , o r t o commit Aggravated A s s a u l t upon h e r ? " Or

d i d it f i n d both? O r d i d t h e j u r y f i n d one o r more o f t h e

p a r t i c u l a r p u r p o s e s under Count 3 and one o r more of t h e

p u r p o s e s under Count 4? O r d i d it f i n d a l l of t h e p a r t i c u l a r

p u r p o s e s under Count 3 and Count 4? No a p p e l l a t e c o u r t would

be s o i r r e s p o n s i b l e t o d e c l a r e beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t which

t h e o r y o r t h e o r i e s t h e j u r y used i n r e a c h i n g i t s v e r d i c t .

-106-
 I t a p p e a r s from I n s t r u c t i o n 36, on t h e o t h e r hand,

t h a t t h e j u r y was t o l d t o make a two s t e p a n a l y s i s i n d e t e r -

mining whether d e f e n d a n t w a s g u i l t y of a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g .

First, t h e j u r y was t o d e t e r m i n e i f d e f e n d a n t committed t h e

o f f e n s e o f k i d n a p p i n g ( a s opposed t o a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g ) .

Second, i f t h e j u r y found h e d i d commit t h e o f f e n s e o f k i d -

napping, i t was t h e n t o d e t e r m i n e i f i t c o n s t i t u t e d a g g r a v a t e d

kidnapping. Thus t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o l d t h e j u r y by I n s t r u c t i o n

36, supra:

"The o f f e n s e o f Aggravated Kidnapping, i n a d d i t i o n
t o t h e proof r e q u i r e d t o p r o v e t h e o f f e n s e o f
k i d n a p p i n g , r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e k i d n a p p i n g w a s com-
m i t t e d f o r a p a r t i c u l a r purpose.

" T h e r e f o r e , - - -i n d beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t
i f you f
t h a t the defendant,. . . --d k i d n a p Lana Harding,
di
b e f o r e he c a n be found g u i l t y o f t h e o f f e n s e o f
aggravated kidnapping a s charged i n t h e Information,
you must f u r t h e r f i n d beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t
--
t h a t h e a c t e d w h i l e h a v i n g a t l e a s t one of t h e
p a r t i c u l a r purposes charged." (Emphasis a d d e d . )

T h i s two s t e p p r o c e s s f o r t h e j u r y ' s f i n d i n g s i s f u r t h e r

s u g g e s t e d by I n s t r u c t i o n 29, P a r t V , and by I n s t r u c t i o n 32,

s u p r a , which r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e p a r t i c u l a r p u r p o s e be proved

"in a d d i t i o n - proof t h a t he committed s a i d a c t e i t h e r know-
- to

i n g l y o r purposely." (Emphasis a d d e d . )

I n s t r u c t i o n s 25, 29 ( P a r t I V , and 35, a r e p e r t i n e n t t o

t h e o f f e n s e of k i d n a p p i n g (as opposed t o t h e o f f e n s e o f

aggravated kidnapping). I n s t r u c t i o n 25 sets f o r t h t h e

s t a t u t o r y d e f i n i t i o n o f k i d n a p p i n g ( s e c t i o n 94-5-302, supra)

and s p e c i f i c a l l y s t a t e s t h a t t h e m e n t a l a c t r e q u i r e d f o r i t s

commission i s " p u r p o s e l y o r knowingly." I n s t r u c t i o n 29, P a r t

IV, provides t h a t :

". . . t h e voluntary - ( t h e secreting o r holding
act
of t h e v i c t i m i n a place of i s o l a t i o n without
lawful a u t h o r i t y , o r t h e holding of s a i d person
by p h y s i c a l f o r c e o r t h r e a t s t h e r e o f ) - -
be done
-
e i t h e r knowingly o r p u r p o s e l y . " (Emphasis a d d e d . )
 Instruction 35, Part 11, - - by Presumption sets out
Proof
the Sandstrom-type presumptions:
". . . if you find that the defendant,. . .
without lawful authority, restrained Lana
Harding, either by secreting her in a place
of isolation, or by usinq physical force to hold
- - -
her, the law presumes - -he acted therein with
that
an unlawful intent, purpose or knowledge, a n d
expressly directs - - - reason." (~mphasis
you to so
added. )
If the jury took a two step process to its verdict,
and it appears that it was directed to do so, there can be
no question that the jury may well have used the unconstitutional
presumptions contained within Instruction 35 in reaching its
decision that defendant committed the offense of kidnapping.
Thus, the finding of intent (herein classified as "purposely
or knowingly") to kidnap could well have been affected by the
unconstitutional presumption. Certainly no court could declare
beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury's finding as to
"purposely or knowingly" was not affected by the unconstitutional
presumption whereby the jury was specifically directed to
"presume that he acted therein with an unlawful intent, purpose,
or knowledge. . ."
Thus, if the jury first found the offense of kidnapping
before proceeding to the next question of whether defendant
had committed the offense of aggravated kidnapping, its finding
of a particular purpose for aggravated kidnapping would be
tainted by its reliance on the unconstitutional presumption
in its first finding. Clearly, the verdict would then be
built in part upon the use of an unconstitutional presumption.
It is perhaps more reasonable to view the instructions
in a fashion that permits the general purpose to commit
kidnapping to be embraced by the more specific particular
purpose finding which is necessary for a conviction of
aggravated kidnapping. If the question were not a con-

stitutional one perhaps an appellate court could reach this
conclusion. But our duty here is confined to a determination
-108-
beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t , a s t o whether o r n o t t h e j u r y

c h o s e a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p a t h and i g n o r e d t h e u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l

paths t o reach i t s v e r d i c t . There i s abundant r e a s o n a b l e

doubt i n t h i s c a s e t o b e l i e v e t h a t t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l e r r o r

i n h e r i n g i n t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s , was n o t h a r m l e s s .

I t i s , moreover, n o t l i k e l y t h a t t h e j u r y , i n reaching

i t s d e c i s i o n a s t o a p a r t i c u l a r p u r p o s e , would n o t have r u n

i n t o t h e Sandstrom-type p r e s u m p t i o n s . I f one assumes t h a t

t h e j u r y found t h e p a r t i c u l a r p u r p o s e a s a l l e g e d under Count

4 , t o e i t h e r commit s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h o u t c o n s e n t o r

a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t , o r b o t h , a s p a r t of i t s d e c i s i o n making

p r o c e s s t h e j u r y c o u l d w e l l have used t h e Sandstrom-type

p r e s u m p t i o n s c o n t a i n e d i n I n s t r u c t i o n s 37 ( s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e

w i t h o u t c o n s e n t ) and 38 ( a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t ) .

By I n s t r u c t i o n 37, t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o l d t h e j u r y t h a t

t h e Sandstrom-type p r e s u m p t i o n s c o u l d be used t o p r o v e t h e

v o l u n t a r y a c t o f "knowingly" i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e o f f e n s e o f

sexual intercourse without consent. By I n s t r u c t i o n 38, t h e

t r i a l c o u r t t o l d t h e j u r y t h a t t h e Sandstrom-type p r e s u m p t i o n s

c o u l d be used t o p r o v e t h e v o l u n t a r y a c t of "knowingly o r

purposely" i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e o f f e n s e of aggravated a s s a u l t .

Thus, t h e j u r y c o u l d have used t h e s e p r e s u m p t i o n s t o c o n c l u d e

t h a t d e f e n d a n t was g u i l t y of s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h o u t c o n s e n t ,

o r aggravated a s s a u l t , o r both. With t h i s d e c i s i o n made it

would n o t be a t a l l d i f f i c u l t t o c o n c l u d e t h a t d e f e n d a n t

kidnapped t h e v i c t i m f o r t h e p a r t i c u l a r p u r p o s e of a c c o m p l i s h i n g

these offenses. A t l e a s t , one c a n n o t i n good c o n s c i e n c e

d e c l a r e beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t t h a t t h e s e Sandstrom-type

i n s t r u c t i o n s had no i n f l u e n c e w h a t e v e r on t h e d e c i s i o n

making p r o c e s s e s of t h e j u r y .
SUMMARY AND POSTSCRIPT
-
I concluded in my dissent in McKenzie - that we had
I1
denied defendant's constitutional rights at both ends of
the procedural spectrum. First, we did not begin to fairly
consider defendant's assertions that his rights had been
violated under the Fourth Amendment and under Art. 11, S11
of the Montana Constitution. Second, this Court did not fairly
apply and fairly analyze the existing laws in relation to
the death penalty. My views on these two questions are even
more resolute. Now we can add to this our failure to fairly
consider whether the barrage of unconstitutional Sandstrom-
type instructions was prejudicial error. Our analysis and
conclusion that the instructions were harmless can never be
accepted by the United States Supreme Court as an appropriate
standard. And now we can add to this the strong and frighten-
ing possibility that defendant may have been convicted of an
offense and sentenced to death for a crime that does not
exist in the laws of this state--deliberate homicide by means
of torture. Never have I seen a case more replete with con-
stitutional error.
I end this dissent with a postscript. In McKenzie - and
I
McKenzie - we held that defendant's procedural rights in
11,
relation to the death penalty are adequately protected by
his right to take his case before the Sentence Review Board
after we had reviewed his case on direct appeal. I dissented
to this view because the sentence review statutes (sections
95-2501 through 95-2504, R.C.M. 1947; 581 P.2d 1235 through
1266), clearly show on their face that they do not apply to
review of a death penalty. Moreover, assuming that they do,
they are defective because the defendant does not have a right
to appeal to this Court from any decision made by the Sentence
Review Board, a panel of district judges. Indeed, after
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 d e f e n d a n t took h i s c a s e t o t h e S e n t e n c e Review Board, he

p e t i t i o n e d t h i s C o u r t t o r e v i e w t h e B o a r d ' s d e c i s i o n , and

w e declined. I d i s s e n t e d b e c a u s e any s y s t e m o f meaningful

r e v i e w must p r o v i d e t h a t t h e s t a t e ' s h i g h e s t c o u r t w i l l review

the f i n a l death penalty decision. See o r d e r e n t e r e d i n S t a t e

v. McKenzie, Cause No. 13011, d a t e d February 20, 1979.

The m a j o r i t y view i n McKenzie - and McKenzie - and i n
I 11,

Cause no. 13011, s u p r a , rests, o f c o u r s e , on an assumption

t h a t t h e s e n t e n c e r e v i e w s t a t u t e s i n d e e d do a p p l y t o r e v i e w

a death sentence. But l o and b e h o l d , s t r a n g e a s it may seem,

i t i s now t h e view o f t h e Montana Supreme C o u r t t h a t s e n t e n c e

r e v i e w s t a t u t e s do n o t a p p l y t o a s e n t e n c e of d e a t h and

t h e r e f o r e t h a t t h e S e n t e n c e Review Board c a n n o t r e v i e w a d e a t h

sentence. T h i s i s , o f c o u r s e , a 180 d e g r e e s h i f t from McKenzie

- and McKenzie - and from S t a t e v . McKenzie, Cause No. 13011.
I 11,

T h i s d e c i s i o n was r e c e n t l y made i n t h e Coleman o r d e r : State

of Montana e x r e l . Dewey Eugene Coleman v. S e n t e n c e Review

D i v i s i o n of t h e Supreme C o u r t o f Montana, No. 80-89, dated

March 2 1 , 1980.

I n t h e Coleman c a s e , t h i s C o u r t d e n i e d an a p p l i c a t i o n o f

a n o t h e r d e a t h p e n a l t y d e f e n d a n t f o r a w r i t of s u p e r v i s o r y

c o n t r o l , and p r o p e r l y s o . Defendant i s under s e n t e n c e of

d e a t h b u t a l s o h e h a s been s e n t e n c e d t o imprisonment by con-

v i c t i o n on a s e p a r a t e c o u n t . Defendant p e t i t i o n e d t h i s

Court t o s t a y proceedings i n D i s t r i c t Court f o r an execution

d a t e f o r t h e r e a s o n t h a t d e f e n d a n t f i r s t had t h e r i g h t t o go

' t o t h e S e n t e n c e Review Board t o have it r e v i e w a nonideakh

penalty sentence. W e declined, holding t h a t should h i s death

p e n a l t y s e n t e n c e be o v e r t u r n e d i n t h e F e d e r a l C o u r t s y s t e m , he

c o u l d t h e n a p p l y t o t h e S e n t e n c e Review Board t o r e v i e w h i s

na-death penalty sentence. What i s i m p o r t a n t however, i s what

w e s a i d i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e s e n t e n c e r e v i e w

s t a t u t e s t o a death sentence:
-111-
 "The review application by relator was denied
by the Sentence Review Division on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction. It pointed out that
review - sentences - available - -to persons
of is only
sentenced - -a term of - - - - - - in the
to - - one year or more
state prison, section 46-18-903, MCA, and that
it had-no jurisdiction to review death sentences.
It also pointed to section 46-18-307, MCA, which
provides for automatic review of death sentences
by the Montana Supreme Court.
"We hold that the denial of review by the Sentence
Review Division was correct. With respect to
the death sentence, the only statutory agency with
power to review is this Court. We have fulfilled
our duties in that connection. It would --
not only
- extra-statutory - - anomalywere we to hold
be but an ----
-- conclusions - - Court on review bv
that the of this review of
death sentences were subiect to later --
the Sentence Review ~ivisionof -
- this Court."
(Emphasis added) .
Needless to say, a judicial system having fundamental
fairness as one of its underpinnings, cannot long tolerate
this kind of inconsistency--particularly where death itself
is the underlying issue.
I leave it for others more perceptive and scholarly than
myself to determine the status of constitutional law in this
state in the wake of McKenzie - and McKenzie - and now
I 11,
McKenzie 111. Perhaps, however, an appropriate title for an
article or book on the subject would be: The McKenzie Rules:
Not - General Application--Apply Sparingly.
- For