In Re the Marriage of Herron

No. 14743
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1980

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF
PAUL W. HERRON,
Petitioner and Respondent,

SHARON M. HERRON,
Respondent and Appellant.

Appeal from: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District,
In and For the County of Flathead.
Honorable Robert C. Sykes, Judge presiding.
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant:
Murphy, Robicson, Heckathorn and Phillips, Kalispell,
Montana
For Respondent:

Hash, Jellison, O'Brien and Bartlett, Kalispell,
Montana

Submitted on briefs: November 11, 1979
Decided: MAR 1c 198C
Mr. J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion o f
t h e Court.

T h i s i s a n a p p e a l by Sharon M. Herron on t h e d i s t r i -

b u t i o n of p r o p e r t y i n t h i s m a t t e r . H e r former husband,

r e s p o n d e n t D r . P a u l Herron, b r o u g h t a n a c t i o n f o r d i s s o l u -

t i o n , c u s t o d y , and a d i v i s i o n o f t h e c o u p l e ' s p r o p e r t y i n

t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t of t h e E l e v e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , i n and

f o r t h e County o f F l a t h e a d . By agreement of t h e p a r t i e s ,

and w i t h t h e a p p r o v a l of t h e c o u r t , t h e w i f e r e t a i n e d c u s t o d y

of t h e f o u r minor c h i l d r e n . Upon t r i a l , t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ,
s i t t i n g without a jury, d i s s o l v e d t h e marriage and, s u b j e c t

t o c e r t a i n minor e x c e p t i o n s , d i v i d e d t h e p r o p e r t y e q u a l l y

between t h e p a r t i e s . The c o u r t r e t a i n e d j u r i s d i c t i o n i n

t h e matter f o r t h e s o l e p u r p o s e of e f f e c t u a t i n g t h e "even

division." The c o u r t a l s o o r d e r e d c h i l d s u p p o r t i n t h e

amount o f $300 p e r month p e r c h i l d and maintenance payments

of $400 p e r month f o r 48 months.
A t t h e t i m e o f t h e m a r r i a g e on J u l y 2 1 , 1962, D r .

Herron w a s a b o a r d - c e r t i f i e d t h o r a c i c and v a s c u l a r s u r g e o n

p r a c t i c i n g i n S e a t t l e , Washington. Mrs. Herron w a s a

r e g i s t e r e d n u r s e employed a s a s u r g i c a l n u r s e i n S e a t t l e .

T h i s w a s D r . H e r r o n ' s second m a r r i a g e and t h e f i r s t m a r r i a g e

f o r M r s . Herron. Dr. Herron had a f a m i l y by h i s p r e v i o u s
marriage. The t e s t i m o n y i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h r o u g h t h e e a r l y
y e a r s o f t h i s m a r r i a g e D r . Herron s u p p o r t e d a n o t h e r f a m i l y ,

b u t d o e s n o t i n d i c a t e t h e amount of s u p p o r t o r f o r what
p e r i o d of time.
The p a r t i e s l i v e d i n S e a t t l e where D r . Herron p r a c t i c e d

u n t i l 1967 when t h e f a m i l y moved t o C o n n e c t i c u t where he d i d
r e s e a r c h f o r t h e S t e r l i n g Drug Company f o r 18 months. he

f a m i l y t h e n moved t o N e w York where D r . Herron c o n t i n u e d t o
do r e s e a r c h .
 In 1972 the family moved to Kalispell, Montana, where
Dr. Herron joined the surgical practice of a Dr. Lipinski.
In recent years, Dr. Herron's net income from his medical
practice has been in excess of $45,000 per year.
As previously noted, Mrs. Herron was working as a
registered nurse in Seattle when she married Dr. Herron. She
continued to work as an R.N. until November 1963, when she
quit work because of a physical disability. From that time
until August 1965, she maintained four foster children in
the household. There are four children of this marriage:
~eid,born August 27, 1965; Mark, born March 9, 1966;
Shelbey, born September 4, 1967; and, Jamey, born September
25, 1970. Jamey, the youngest, has a learning disability
that requires special care and special education.
At the time of the dissolution of this marriage, the
parties owned the following assets:
(1) The Ranch - This consists of some 80 acres and a
home with a swimming pool, located in the Flathead Valley
between Columbia Falls and Kalispell.
(2) The Lake Place - This consists of approximately 3-
1/3 acres with 135 feet of Flathead Lake front near Big
Fork, Montana.
(3) The Paul Herron Medical Practice and Ownership in

the Kalispell Medical Arts Building.
(4) The Sharon Herron Home - This is the home occupied
by Mrs. Herron and the four children.
(5) The George Robbin Estate - Mrs. Herron's father,
George Robbin, willed his property to Dr. and Mrs. Herron.
Dr. Herron acquired an interest in the real and personal

property of a gross value of approximately $143,000 and ~ r s .
Herron acquired an equal amount, but in addition, life
insurance in the amount of $19,841.39 and other joint assets
in the amount of $4,234.84, or a gross estate of $167,242.46,
which was subject to costs and taxes.
(6) Miscellaneous Property - Both parties have miscel-
laneous personal property which has been divided between
them. The division of the miscellaneous property is not
contested on appeal.
The Herrons acquired many of the above-listed assets as
a result of gifts from Mrs. Herron's father. The Herrons
purchased a home while living in Seattle. Mrs. Herron sold
several life insurance policies held in her name to provide
a partial downpayment on the home. Her father gave the
couple the money necessary for the remainder of the down
payment. When the Herrons moved to Connecticut, they sold
the Seattle home and used the proceeds of the sale for a
downpayment on a home in Connecticut. The couple repeated
the process when they moved to New York. The Herrons used
the proceeds from the sale of their New York home to make a
downpayment on the Flathead Lake property when they moved to
Kalispell. Thus, the acquisistion of the lake property is
traceable to a gift from Mr. Robbin.
When the couple moved to Kalispell, Mr. Robbin bought a
house for the family. He paid $46,000 for the home. The
Herrons subsequently sold the house for $46,000 and used the
money from the sale as a downpayment on their ranch property.
Mr. Robbin also gave the Herrons approximately $59,000 to
build an addition onto the house located on the ranch.
Therefore, approximately $105,000 of the equity the Herrons

have accumulated in the ranch came from gifts from Mr.
Robbin.
 I n addition, Mr. Robbin g a v e D r . H e r r o n $7,500 which

was u s e d by D r . H e r r o n t o buy i n t o t h e o f f i c e b u i l d i n g and

p a r t n e r s h i p owned by D r . L i p i n s k i when D r . H e r r o n s e t u p

practice i n Kalispell. The c o u p l e a l s o r e c e i v e d a s u b s t a n -

t i a l s m o f money from M r . R o b b i n ' s e s t a t e .
u The s a l e o f t h e

home owned by M r . Robbin p r o v i d e d t h e f u n d s f o r t h e down-

payment o n t h e home M r s . Herron p r e s e n t l y occupies. The

r e m a i n d e r o f t h e e s t a t e r e p r e s e n t s a m a j o r i t y of t h e c o u p l e ' s

liquid assets.

The i s s u e b e f o r e t h e C o u r t i s w h e t h e r a b a s i c a l l y 50/50

d i v i s i o n o f m a r i t a l p r o p e r t y between D r . and M r s . Herron i s

e q u i t a b l e under t h e circumstances r e l a t i n g t o t h e a c q u i s i -

t i o n o f t h e p r o p e r t y by t h e p a r t i e s .

W e c l e a r l y and a c c u r a t e l y set o u t t h e s t a n d a r d f o r

reviewing property d i v i s i o n s i n d i s s o l u t i o n proceedings i n

I n R e t h e M a r r i a g e o f Brown ( 1 9 7 8 ) , Mont . , 587

P.2d 361, 35 S t . R e p . 1733. I n Brown w e s a i d :

"The a p p o r t i o n m e n t made by t h e D i s t r i c t
C o u r t w i l l n o t b e d i s t u r b e d on r e v i e w
u n l e s s t h e r e h a s been a c l e a r abuse of
d i s c r e t i o n a s m a n i f e s t e d by a s u b s t a n -
t i a l l y i n e q u i t a b l e d i v i s i o n of t h e mari-
t a l assets resulting i n substantial
i n j u s t i c e . " Brown, 587 P.2d a t 364, 35
S t . R e p . a t 1736.

S e e a l s o I n Re t h e M a r r i a g e o f Aanenson ( 1 9 7 9 ) , Mont .
, 598 P.2d 1 1 2 0 , 1 1 2 3 , 36 St.Rep. 1 5 2 5 , 1528; I n R e t h e

M a r r i a g e o f Kaasa ( 1 9 7 9 ) , - Mont . - 5 9 1 P.2d 1 1 1 0 ,

1 1 1 3 , 36 S t - R e p . 425, 428; I n R e t h e M a r r i a g e o f K r a m e r

(1978) r - Mont. , 580 P.2d 439, 442, 35 St.Rep. 700,
704. I n r e v i e w i n g t h e p r o p e r t y d i v i s i o n o r d e r e d by t h e

D i s t r i c t C o u r t i n t h i s case, w e f i n d t h e l o w e r c o u r t a b u s e d

its discretion.
 The b a s i s f o r t h e e r r o r i n t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f t h e

H e r r o n s ' p r o p e r t y i s t h e f a i l u r e of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t t o

f o l l o w t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f s e c t i o n 40-4-202, MCA. S e c t i o n 40-

4-202(1) d i r e c t s t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t t o a p p o r t i o n m a r i t a l

assets ". . . b e l o n g i n g t o e i t h e r o r b o t h , however and

whenever a c q u i r e d and whether t h e t i t l e t h e r e t o i s i n t h e

name o f t h e husband o r w i f e o r b o t h . " That language c l e a r l y

i n d i c a t e s t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t s h o u l d c o n s i d e r a l l t h e Herron

p r o p e r t y , i n c l u d i n g t h a t r e c e i v e d by g i f t o r b e q u e s t from

George Robbin, i n d i v i d i n g t h e m a r i t a l e s t a t e . See a l s o

Brown, 587 P.2d a t 365, 35 St.Rep. a t 1737; I n re t h e Mar-

r i a g e of Vivian (1978), - Mont. , 583 P.2d 1072, 1074,

35 St.Rep. 1359, 1362; Morse v . Morse ( 1 9 7 7 ) , - Mont. ,
571 P.2d 1147, 1149, 34 St.Rep. 1334, 1337. The D i s t r i c t

Court here included a l l t h e g i f t property i n t h e m a r i t a l

assets, t h u s complying w i t h t h i s r e q u i r e m e n t o f s e c t i o n 40-

,
4-202 (1) MCA.

The s t a t u t e g o e s on t o s t a t e :

". . . I n d i s p o s i n g of p r o p e r t y a c q u i r e d
p r i o r t o t h e m a r r i a g e ; p r o p e r t y a c q u i r e d by
g i f t , bequest, devise, o r descent; property
a c q u i r e d i n exchange f o r p r o p e r t y a c q u i r e d
b e f o r e t h e m a r r i a g e o r i n exchange f o r
p r o p e r t y a c q u i r e d by g i f t , b e q u e s t , d e v i s e ,
o r descent; t h e increased value of property
a c q u i r e d p r i o r t o m a r r i a g e ; and p r o p e r t y
a c q u i r e d by a spouse a f t e r a d e c r e e of
l e g a l separation, the court s h a l l consider
t h o s e c o n t r i b u t i o n s of t h e o t h e r s p o u s e t o
t h e marriage, including:

" ( a ) t h e nonmonetary c o n t r i b u t i o n of
a homemaker;

" ( b ) t h e e x t e n t t o which such c o n t r i b u -
t i o n s have f a c i l i t a t e d t h e m a i n t e n a n c e
o f t h i s p r o p e r t y ; and

" ( c ) whether o r n o t t h e p r o p e r t y d i s -

postion serves a s an a l t e r n a t i v e t o
maintenance a r r a n g e m e n t s . " S e c t i o n 40-
,
4-202 (1) MCA.
 This p a r t of t h e p r o p e r t y d i s t r i b u t i o n s t a t u t e e s t a b -

l i s h e s t h e c r i t e r i a f o r determining an e q u i t a b l e d i v i s i o n of

p r o p e r t y b r o u g h t t o t h e m a r r i a g e , a c q u i r e d by g i f t o r be-

q u e s t d u r i n g t h e m a r r i a g e and a c q u i r e d a f t e r a d e c r e e o f

l e g a l s e p a r a t i o n . The s t a t u t e r e q u i r e s t h e c o u r t t o c o n s i d e r

t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n s of t h e non-acquiring s p o u s e t o t h e mar-

r i a g e i n d i v i d i n g t h e s e t y p e s of p r o p e r t y . I n re t h e Mar-

r i a g e of Herring (1979), Mont. r 602 P.2d 1 0 0 6 , 1 0 0 7 ,

36 S t . R e p . 2052, 2054. I n determining t h e exact d i s t r i b u -

t i o n o f t h i s t y p e o f m a r i t a l a s s e t , no s e t f o r m u l a c a n be

e s t a b l i s h e d a s t o how t h e assets s h o u l d b e e q u i t a b l y d i s -

tributed. Each c a s e h a s t o b e d e c i d e d o n i t s own m e r i t s . In

re t h e Marriage of Metcalf ( 1 9 7 9 ) , - Mont. -, 598 P.2d
1140, 1143, 36 St.Rep. 1 5 5 9 , 1563; V i v i a n , 583 P.2d a t 1 0 7 4 ,

35 St.Rep. a t 1362; Morse, 571 P.2d a t 1 1 4 7 , 1150, 34

St.Rep. a t 1338.

I t i s i n t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of t h i s a s p e c t of t h e d i s -

p o s i t i o n s t a t u t e t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t f a i l e d t o comply

w i t h s e c t i o n 40-4-202(1), MCA. I n l i g h t of t h i s section,

the property distribution order i s so inequitable a s t o

r e p r e s e n t an abuse of d i s c r e t i o n .

The i n e q u i t y o f t h e 50/50 p r o p e r t y d i v i s i o n becomes

a p p a r e n t a f t e r c o n s i d e r i n g t h e s o u r c e o f t h e m a r i t a l assets

of t h e p a r t i e s . Almost a l l o f t h e p r o p e r t y a c c u m u l a t e d by

t h e H e r r o n s c a n b e t r a c e d t o g i f t s o r b e q u e s t s from George

Robbin.

The c o u p l e p u r c h a s e d t h e r a n c h p r o p e r t y f o r $65,000,

added a p p r o x i m a t e l y $59,000 w o r t h o f improvements t o t h e

r a n c h h o u s e , and i n s t a l l e d a p o o l on t h e p r o p e r t y a t a c o s t

o f $15,000. T o t a l e x p e n d i t u r e s f o r t h e r a n c h and improve-

m e n t s t h u s e q u a l a p p r o x i m a t e l y $140,000. Mr. ~ o b b i n ave
g
t h e Herrons o v e r $100,000 o f t h e $140,000 t h e y s p e n t on t h e

Property. The F l a t h e a d Lake p r o p e r t y was p u r c h a s e d w i t h
money from t h e s a l e o f homes f o r which M r . Robbin o r i g i n a l l y

gave t h e H e r r o n s a p a r t of t h e downpayment. Mr. Robbin gave

Dr. Herron t h e money he needed t o buy i n t o h i s m e d i c a l

practice i n Kalispell. Mrs. Herron bought t h e home s h e and

t h e c h i l d r e n now r e s i d e i n w i t h t h e p r o c e e d s from t h e s a l e

o f t h e R o b b i n ' s f a m i l y home, which t h e c o u p l e i n h e r i t e d from

George Robbin. The o t h e r main m a r i t a l a s s e t , t h e George

Robbin E s t a t e , o r i g i n a t e d from a d e v i s e from M r s . Herron's

father.

George Robbin t h u s g i f t e d o r bequeathed o v e r a q u a r t e r

o f a m i l l i o n d o l l a r s t o t h e Herrons d u r i n g t h e c o u r s e o f

t h e i r marriage. The p r o p e r t y was g i v e n t o t h e Herrons

jointly, but Mr. Robbin c e r t a i n l y d i d s o t o p r o v i d e f o r h i s

o n l y d a u g h t e r . The p r o p e r t y s h o u l d be c o n s i d e r e d a s p r i n -

cipally g i f t s to M r s . Herron.

Given t h e f a c t t h a t most of t h e m a r i t a l a s s e t s w e r e

accumulated v i a g i f t s from M r s . Herron's f a t h e r , D r . Herron's

c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o t h e m a r r i a g e from o t h e r s o u r c e s would have

t o s u b s t a n t i a l l y outweigh M r s . H e r r o n ' s t o r e n d e r e q u i t a b l e

a 50/50 d i v i s i o n of t h e c o u p l e ' s a s s e t s . T h a t s i m p l y i s n o t

t h e case here. For t h e f i r s t y e a r o f t h e m a r r i a g e , b o t h t h e

p a r t i e s worked. Mrs. Herron t h e n assumed t h e d u t i e s of

c a r i n g f o r t h e c o u p l e ' s home. She a l s o c a r e d f o r f o s t e r

c h i l d r e n b r o u g h t i n t o t h e home and l a t e r f o r t h e c o u p l e ' s

four natural children. Dr. Herron s u p p o r t e d t h e f a m i l y
f i n a n c i a l l y w i t h income from h i s m e d i c a l p r a c t i c e . The

m a r r i a g e had a l l t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of a c o u p l e working

t o g e t h e r and c o n t r i b u t i n g e q u a l l y toward t h e a c c u m u l a t i o n

and maintenance o f t h e m a r i t a l assets. M r s . Herron main-
t a i n e d t h e f a m i l y home and c a r e d f o r t h e c o u p l e ' s c h i l d r e n ,

e n a b l i n g D r . Herron t o p r a c t i c e h i s p r o f e s s i o n . Dr. Herron

p r a c t i c e d m e d i c i n e , p r o v i d i n g t h e income t o s u p p o r t M r s .

Herron and t h e c h i l d r e n . There i s no e v i d e n c e t h a t D r .

Herron c o n t r i b u t e d more t o t h e m a r r i a g e t h a n M r s . Herron.

I n f a c t , t h e e v i d e n c e i s t o t h e c o n t r a r y , a s D r . Herron

t e s t i f i e d t h a t p a r t o f h i s income went t o pay alimony and

c h i l d s u p p o r t f o r h i s f o r m e r w i f e and t h e c h i l d r e n o f h i s

f i r s t marriage.

W e have c o n s i d e r e d s i m i l a r s i t u a t i o n s i n s e v e r a l r e c e n t

cases. I n I n re t h e M a r r i a g e of Balsam ( 1 9 7 9 ) , - Mont .
,
- 589 P.2d 652, 36 St.Rep. 79, M r . Balsam's p a r e n t s gave

him some s h a r e s i n t h e f a m i l y b u s i n e s s v a l u e d i n e x c e s s o f

$50,000. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t c o n s i d e r e d t h e s t o c k a p a r t o f

t h e m a r i t a l a s s e t s , b u t awarded M r s . Balsam no i n t e r e s t i n

t h e s t o c k s on d i s s o l u t i o n of t h e marriage. The D i s t r i c t

C o u r t r e a s o n e d t h a t s i n c e t h e s t o c k s had n o t a p p r e c i a t e d

d u r i n g t h e m a r r i a g e , none o f t h e i r v a l u e c o u l d be a p r o d u c t

o f c o n t r i b u t i o n from t h e m a r i t a l e f f o r t . Balsam, 589 P.2d

a t 654, 36 St.Rep. a t 83. W e a f f i r m e d t h e d e c i s i o n and

r a t i o n a l e of t h e lower c o u r t .

I n Brown, s u p r a , M r . Brown i n h e r i t e d a r a n c h from h i s

father. H e and M r s . Brown worked t h e r a n c h t o g e t h e r f o r

14 y e a r s . The r a n c h was v a l u e d between $350,000 and $450,000

a t t h e t i m e o f d i s s o l u t i o n o f t h e Browns' m a r r i a g e . The

D i s t r i c t C o u r t awarded M r s . Brown $25,000, o r between 5 and
7 p e r c e n t o f t h e t o t a l v a l u e of t h e r a n c h , a s h e r e q u i t a b l e

s h a r e of t h e property. T h i s C o u r t found t h a t M r s . Brown

acquired a vested i n t e r e s t i n the ranch property regardless
o f i t s s o u r c e by v i r t u e o f h e r 1 4 y e a r s a s a m o t h e r , house-

w i f e and p a r t t i m e r a n c h hand. Brown, 587 P.2d a t 365, 35
St.Rep. at 1737. We held that awarding her such a small
amount of the total valuation of the ranch represented an
inequitable division of the marital asset. Brown, 587 P.2d
at 365, 35 St-Rep. at 1737-1738.
In Metcalf, supra, Mr. Metcalf had received an inheri-
tance five years prior to dissolution of the marriage. The
Metcalfs' earnings at the time they received the inheritance
were such that they spent the money for the normal expenses
of the marriage. We found it impossible for the District
Court to trace the inheritance under these circumstances.
Metcalf, 598 P.2d at 1143, 36 St.Rep. at 1563. We held that
a District Court faced with this predicament could not be
required to "I. . .become an appraiser, an accountant, a
computer, and an all-around genius .. . ' " and enter spe-
cific findings regarding an inheritance expended in this
fashion. Metcalf, 598 P.2d at 1143, 36 St.Rep. at 1563
(citing Downs v. Downs (1979), - Mont. , 592 P.2d 938,
939, 36 St.Rep. 577, 579).
These cases set out some broad guidelines for an
equitable division on dissolution of property acquired via
gift or bequest to one party to the marriage.
The gift must be traceable before the District Court
will be required to make specific findings regarding the
property. Metcalf, supra. If none of the value of the
property is a product of contribution from the marital
effort, the District Court can justifiably find that the
non-acquiring spouse has no interest in the property.
Balsam, supra. If, on the other hand, both parties to the
marriage contribute to the maintenance and thus the appre-
ciated value of the gift property, it is inequitable to
award the non-acquiring spouse only a fraction of the value
of the asset on dissolution. Brown, supra.
 The f a c t s h e r e do n o t f a l l s q u a r e l y under any of t h e

previously decided cases. Unlike Metcalf, t h e g i f t property

is definitely traceable. W e a r e not presented with t h e

Balsam s i t u a t i o n o f no c o n t r i b u t i o n t o t h e maintenance of

t h e a s s e t and no a p p r e c i a t i o n of t h e p r o p e r t y d u r i n g t h e

marriage. W e do have a s e t of f a c t s i n v o l v i n g e q u a l c o n t r i -

b u t i o n t o t h e maintenance o f t h e g i f t a s s e t s and a p p r e c i -

a t i o n of t h e a s s e t s a s i n Brown. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t h e r e ,

however, h a s n o t awarded s u b s t a n t i a l l y a l l t h e g i f t p r o p e r t y

t o t h e a c q u i r i n g spouse.

The s i t u a t i o n l i e s somewhere between t h e r e s u l t s

r e a c h e d i n Balsam and Brown. The f a c t s do n o t w a r r a n t t h e

t o t a l d e n i a l of any i n t e r e s t i n t h e g i f t e d m a r i t a l a s s e t s by

t h e non-acquiring s p o u s e j u s t i f i e d i n Balsam. Both p a r t i e s

h e r e c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e maintenance o f t h e a s s e t s , and t h e

a s s e t s have a p p r e c i a t e d . By t h e same t o k e n , j u s t a s i n

Brown, t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t would n o t be j u s t i f i e d i n awarding

t h e n o n - a c q u i r i n g s p o u s e o n l y a s m a l l f r a c t i o n of t h e t o t a l

v a l u e o f t h e g i f t p r o p e r t y b e c a u s e of t h e j o i n t c o n t r i b u t i o n

t o m a i n t a i n i n g t h e p r o p e r t y and t h e a p p r e c i a t i o n of t h e

property. Both p a r t i e s h e r e s h o u l d s h a r e e q u a l l y i n t h e

p o r t i o n o f t h e v a l u e of t h e g i f t p r o p e r t y a t t r i b u t a b l e t o

c o n t r i b u t i o n from t h e m a r r i a g e and a p p r e c i a t i o n d u r i n g t h e

marriage. The Herrons s h o u l d n o t , however, s h a r e e q u a l l y i n

t h e t o t a l v a l u e of t h e p r o p e r t y s i n c e t h e m a r i t a l a s s e t s

came t o t h e m a r r i a g e p r i n c i p a l l y a s g i f t s f o r M r s . err on's
benefit.

W e t h e r e f o r e remand t h e c a s e t o D i s t r i c t C o u r t f o r

retrial.
On remand, we d i r e c t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t t o c o r r e c t two

a d d i t i o n a l e r r o r s i n i t s h a n d l i n g of t h i s c a s e . W have
e
r e p e a t e d l y s t a t e d t h e t r i a l c o u r t must d e t e r m i n e t h e n e t

w o r t h o f t h e p a r t i e s a t t h e t i m e o f t h e d i v o r c e t o have a

proper d i s t r i b u t i o n of t h e m a r i t a l a s s e t s . H e r r i n g , 602

P.2d a t 1 0 0 7 , 36 St.Rep. a t 2054; Brown, 587 P.2d a t 365, 35

St.Rep. a t 1738; V i v i a n , 583 P.2d a t 1074, 35 St.Rep. at

1361; Kramer, 580 P.2d a t 443, 35 St.Rep. a t 704. The

n a t u r e o f some o f t h e p r o p e r t y i n v o l v e d h e r e i l l u s t r a t e s t h e

r e a s o n a n e t w o r t h d e t e r m i n a t i o n i s n e c e s s a r y b e f o r e an

e q u i t a b l e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f p r o p e r t y c a n b e made. For ex-

ample, D r . H e r r o n i n t r o d u c e d a n e x h i b i t and g a v e t e s t i m o n y

a t t r i a l v a l u i n g h i s m e d i c a l p r a c t i c e a t $7,500. To v a l u e

a t $7,500 a n i n t e r e s t i n a m e d i c a l p r a c t i c e t h a t i n c l u d e s

p a r t ownership i n a c l i n i c b u i l d i n g , goodwill, accounts

r e c e i v a b l e t o t a l i n g o v e r $50,000, and a c a p a c i t y f o r g e n e r -

a t i n g o v e r $45,000 p e r y e a r i n income i s , o f c o u r s e , r i d i c u -

lous. L i k e w i s e , t o award M r s . H e r r o n 50 p e r c e n t o f $7,500

a s h e r e q u i t a b l e s h a r e of t h e medical p r a c t i c e , even a b s e n t

t h e f a c t t h a t h e r f a t h e r gave D r . Herron t h e money t o buy

i n t o the practice, i s patently inequitable.

T h e r e must b e a j u d i c i a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e t r u e

worth of a s s e t s l i k e D r . Herron's medical p r a c t i c e b e f o r e an

e q u i t a b l e d i v i s i o n o f t h e m a r i t a l a s s e t s c a n b e made.

D e s p i t e o u r r e p e a t e d s t a t e m e n t s o f t h e n e c e s s i t y o f de-

termining n e t worth b e f o r e d i v i d i n g m a r i t a l p r o p e r t y , t h e

District C o u r t f a i l e d t o do s o here. W e advise the court t o

d o s o on remand. I n considering t h e family a s s e t s under t h e

f a c t s o f t h i s c a s e , t h e c o u r t on remand s h o u l d t a k e i n t o

c o n s i d e r a t i o n how t h e j o i n t e s t a t e o f t h e c o u p l e w a s a c -
q u i r e d and make a n e q u i t a b l e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f t h e same. The

50/50 r u l e i s n o t a b s o l u t e when i t b r i n g s a b o u t a n i n e q u i -

table distribution.
 The second error by the District Court involves the
maintenance award made in this case. Maintenance can only
be awarded to parties lacking sufficient property to provide
for their needs and unable to support themselves through
appropriate employment. Section 40-4-203(1), MCA. The
court cannot determine if the parties possess sufficient
property to support themselves until the marital assets have
been valued and divided. Therefore, the District Court
should not award final maintenance payments until the
marital assets have been valued and equitably apportioned.
Vivian, 583 P.2d at 1075, 35 St.Rep. at 1362; In re the
Marriage of Johnsrud (1977), - Mont. , 572 P.2d 902,
907, 34 St.Rep. 1417, 1423-1424. Here the marital assets
have been neither valued nor equitably apportioned. The
maintenance award should therefore be reviewed on remand.
In reviewing the maintenance award, we recommend that
the District Court carefully consider the advisability of
placing any time restrictions on the duration of the main-
tenance to Mrs. Herron. Section 40-4-203(2), MCA, sets out
the considerations relevant to the amount and duration of a
maintenance award. That sub'section states:
"The maintenance order shall be in such amounts
and for such periods of time as the court deems
just, without regard to marital misconduct, and
after considering all relevant facts including:
"(a) the financial resources of the party seek-
ing maintenance, including marital property ap-
portioned to him, and his ability to meet his
needs independently, including the extent to
which a provision for support of a child living
with the party includes a sum for that party as
custodian;
" (b) 'the time necessary to acquire sufficient
education or training to enable the party seek-
ing maintenance to find appropriate employment;

"(c) the standard of living established during
the marriage;
 "(dl the duration of the marriage;
" (e) the age and the physical and emotional
condition of the spouse seeking maintenance;
and
" (f) the ability of the spouse from whom
maintenance is sought to meet his needs while
meeting those of the spouse seeking main-
tenance. "
Considering these factors, Mrs. Herron is now 45 years
old. She left the job market over 15 years ago in part
because a physical disability made it difficult for her to
work as a nurse. Her recent efforts to obtain and hold a job
have met with minimum success at best. Mrs. Herron main-
tains a home for four children, the youngest of whom has a
learning disability and may require Mrs. Herron's care for
quite some time. Dr. Herron, on the other hand, is a prac-
ticing surgeon in the prime of his professional career. His
employment allows him to earn in excess of $45,000 annually.
This level of income would allow him to pay the support and
maintenance ordered by the District Court and still retain
approximately $25,000 annually for his own expenses. Addi-

tionally, the couple established a relatively high standard
of living during their 16 years of marriage.
The court should also consider whether the property
awarded to the parties is income consuming or income pro-
ducing in determining the amount and duration of maintenance
payments. Johnsrud, 572 P.2d at 905, 34 St.Rep. at 1421;
Brawman v. Brawrnan (1962), 199 Cal.App.2d 876, 19 Cal.Rptr.
106, 110. Brawman illustrates the rationale for considering
the nature as well as the amount of distributed property in
determining adequate maintenance. The California court
points out that the practical effect of a property division
awarding income consuming property to one spouse and income
producing property to the other leaves one spouse in pos-
session of property the spouse is unable to maintain while
placing the other party in control of assets that generate a
comfortable living. Brawman, 19 Cal.Rptr. at 110. The
Brawman court found this situation inequitable and held that
maintenance should be employed as a remedy. 19 Cal.Rptr. at
111.
Here we find the property awarded to Mrs. Herron,
although possibly substantial in quantity, is income con-
suming in nature. The primary income producing marital
asset, the medical practice and attendant goodwill, will be
awarded to Dr. Herron. The danger exists of creating a
situation in which Mrs. Herron would be "property poor",
i.e. in possession of a large quantity of property but
unable to generate the income to maintain the property. In
contrast, the marital assets received by Dr. Herron should
allow him to continue making a handsome salary. We agree
with the Brawman court that maintenance payments to Mrs.
Herron should be employed to compensate for the inequities
inherent in this situation.
The considerations set forth in section 40-4-203(2),
MCA, and the nature of the Herron marital assets to be
distributed militate against limiting the duration of main-
tenance payments to Mrs. Herron. On remand we advise the

District Court to reconsider its decision to do so.
For the above reasons, we remand the case for retrial

on the issues of property disposition and maintenance.
We concur:

Justices
Mr. Justice John C. Sheehy concurring in part and dissenting
in part:

I must respectfully dissent from the majority in concluding

that the gifts from the wife's father to the couple must be
counted as the wife's contribution in dividing the marital
estate. The record shows that the gifts were made irrevocably
to the couple. That being so, ownership of one-half of the
gifts was vested in the husband at the time of the gifts. It
may be in the light of after-events that the father would not
have made those gifts to the husband had the father known
what was in the future, but we cannot cure that with our
hindsight. This Court is in no better position to reverse the
ownership of the gifts than the father's executor would be.
We might wish it otherwise, but that is the law.

Justice