No. 14852
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1979
LARRY A. MICHAELSON and SYLVIA
MICHAELSON, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
VS .
CALLIS WARDELL,
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from: District Court of the First Judicial District,
Honorable Gordon R. Bennett, Judge presiding.
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant:
Small, Hatch and Doubeck, Helena, Montana
For Respondents:
Robert T. Cummins, Helena, Montana
Jackson and Kelley, Helena, Montana
Submitted on briefs: November 14, 1979
Decided: .jJ/,;1 9
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Filed: i s : -
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Mr. Justice Gene B. Daly delivered the Opinion of the Court.
his appeal is from a summary judgment in favor of the
respondents who alleged they were entitled to a permanent
easement over appellant's land by operation of law. ~oth
parties filed motions for summary judgment. Pursuant to
these motions, the District Court granted respondents an
implied easement by reservation.
Appellant filed a motion with the District Court to
alter and amend a portion of its order. No action was taken
on this motion, and appellant brought this appeal.
Prior to 1969 appellant, as a principal stockholder of
Cal-Mart Corp., was the owner of the land now owned by
respondents. Also, prior to 1969, appellant built the house
presently inhabited by respondents, and built and improved
the access road presently in issue. This road traverses
several hundred feet of appellant's property, enters respon-
dents' property and becomes respondents' driveway. The road
was built by appellant to serve the house on the property
and also to serve part of appellant's fields.
In 1969 appellant conveyed the property presently owned
by respondents to James and Grace Fournier. The conveyances
were made by warranty deed and contained no easements. The
roadway across appellant's property was used by the ~ourniers
to reach their property. Appellant also used this road to
drive through the Fourniers' property to get to his fields.
The Fourniers conveyed the property to Mr. and Mrs.
Greenfield. In 1972 the Greenfields conveyed the property
to the respondents. This deed did not contain an express
easement.
Although a p p e l l a n t had n e v e r g i v e n t h e r e s p o n d e n t s
s p e c i f i c w r i t t e n o r o r a l permission t o use t h e access road,
r e s p o n d e n t s used i t c o n t i n u o u s l y , w i t h a p p e l l a n t ' s knowledge
and c o o p e r a t i o n from t h e t i m e t h e y p u r c h a s e d t h e p r o p e r t y .
The a c c e s s r o a d was and s t i l l i s t h e o n l y r e g u l a r l y used
means o f a c c e s s t o r e s p o n d e n t s ' house.
Respondents used t h e r o a d u n t i l March 1978. A t that
t i m e a p p e l l a n t removed a c a t t l e g u a r d a t t h e b e g i n n i n g of t h e
a c c e s s r o a d on a p p e l l a n t ' s p r o p e r t y and blocked t h e r o a d
with a concrete culvert. T h i s was t h e f i r s t t i m e a p p e l l a n t
had e v e r i n t e r f e r e d w i t h r e s p o n d e n t s ' o r t h e i r p r e d e c e s s o r s '
u s e of t h e a c c e s s r o a d . A p p e l l a n t ' s a c t i o n prompted r e s p o n d e n t s
t o bring t h i s s u i t .
The D i s t r i c t C o u r t found t h a t r e s p o n d e n t s d i d n o t have
a n easement by p r e s c r i p t i o n b e c a u s e t h e u s e was p e r m i s s i v e .
The D i s t r i c t C o u r t d i d f i n d , however, t h a t r e s p o n d e n t s have
a n i m p l i e d easement by r e s e r v a t i o n p u r s u a n t t o s e c t i o n 70-
20-308, MCA. I t i s t h i s c o n c l u s i o n o f law t h a t forms t h e
o n l y i s s u e f o r r e v i e w by t h i s C o u r t .
A p p e l l a n t c o n t e n d s t h e u s e of t h e roadway by r e s p o n d e n t s
and t h e i r p r e d e c e s s o r s w a s e n t i r e l y w i t h a p p e l l a n t ' s c o n s e n t
and p e r m i s s i o n and w a s i n t h e n a t u r e of a l i c e n s e , t h e r e f o r e ,
no easement of any k i n d would a r i s e w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e u s e
of t h e r o a d . W e disagree.
The D i s t r i c t C o u r t c o r r e c t l y found t h a t , w h i l e r e s p o n d e n t s
do n o t have a p r e s c r i p t i v e easement, t h e y have an i m p l i e d
easement by r e s e r v a t i o n o v e r t h i s r o a d .
The c o n t r o l l i n g s t a t u t e i s s e c t i o n 70-20-308, MCA. It
reads:
"Easements t o p a s s w i t h p r o p e r t y . A t r a n s f e r o f
real p r o p e r t y p a s s e s a l l easements a t t a c h e d
t h e r e t o and c r e a t e s i n f a v o r t h e r e o f a n e a s e m e n t
t o -e o t h e r r e a l property o f -e p e r s o n whose
- us - th
e s t a t e i s t r a n s f e r r e d - -e same manner - -o
i n th - and t
as su
t h e s a m e e x t e n t - -c h p r o p e r t y was o b v i o u s l y
--
a n d p e r m a n e n t l y u s e d & t h e p e r s o n whose e s t a t e
- t r a n s f e r r e d - - b e n e f i t t h e r e o f - -e
is for the a t th
t i m e when t h e t r a n s f e r was a g r e e d - -o-com-
--- upon r
pleted. " (Emphasis a d d e d . )
T h i s s t a t u t e , i n p a r t , r e c i t e s t h e common l a w p r i n c i p l e
t h a t a n e a s e m e n t i s r e s e r v e d when t h e d o m i n a n t t e n e m e n t i s
conveyed and a s e r v i e n t t e n e m e n t i s r e t a i n e d . Spaeth v.
E m m e t t ( 1 9 6 3 ) , 142 Mont. 231, 383 P.2d 812, 816.
T h i s s t a t u t e , however, e x t e n d s t h e common law and
c r e a t e s a n e a s e m e n t , n o n e x i s t e n t p r i o r t o t h e conveyance, i n
c a s e s where t h e p r o p e r t y i n q u e s t i o n was " o b v i o u s l y and
p e r m a n e n t l y " u s e d by t h e g r a n t o r f o r t h e b e n e f i t o f w h a t
becomes t h e dominant e s t a t e . McPherson v . Monegan ( 1 9 4 7 ) ,
120 Mont. 454, 187 P.2d 542, 545.
I n McPherson w e u p h e l d a n i m p l i e d e a s e m e n t o f a r o a d
u n d e r s e c t i o n 70-20-308, MCA ( t h e n , 86865, Rev. Codes 1 9 3 5 ) ,
on f a c t s n o t d i s s i m i l a r t o t h o s e p r e s e n t e d h e r e . "The
f a c t s i n t h i s c a s e d i s c l o s e a n implied g r a n t of easement
which p a s s e d w i t h t h e p r o p e r t y u n d e r o u r s t a t u t e (sec. 6865)
and which a r o s e o u t o f t h e f a c t t h a t M r s . Samson s o l d l a n d
bounded i n p a r t by a r o a d which had t h e r e t o f o r e been c o n t i n -
u o u s l y u s e d by s a i d g r a n t o r a s a means o f access t o s a i d
land . . ." 1 8 7 P.2d a t 545.
The f a c t s i n t h i s case, a s found by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ,
r e v e a l such a n implied g r a n t o f easement. Appellant w a s t h e
owner i n common o f h i s p r e s e n t p r o p e r t y and r e s p o n d e n t s '
present property. Before s e l l i n g any of h i s p r o p e r t y ,
a p p e l l a n t b u i l t t h e access r o a d t o s e r v e t h e r e s i d e n c e now
owned by r e s p o n d e n t s . T h a t r o a d w a s c o n t i n u o u s l y u s e d by
respondents and their predecessors to serve the residence.
The road was and still is the only means of access used by
respondents and their predecessors. When appellant conveyed
the property to the first grantees, the Fourniers, he created
under the above statute a permanent easement for use of the
roadway as an access to respondents' residence. The roadway
is being used for the same benefit to respondents as it was
to the original owner.
The requirements of the statute were met, McPherson v.
Monegan, supra; Spaeth v. Emmett, supra; Godfrey v. Pilon
(1974), 165 Mont. 439, 529 P.2d 1372; and, there were no
genuine issues as to any material fact. The District Court
acted properly in ruling the respondents have an implied
easement by reservation in the road crossing appellant's
property and in granting respondents' motion for summary
judgment.
The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.
/
L.
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Justice
We concur:
3*&k4
Chief Justice