No. 85-273
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1985
WILLIWi J. GRIFFIN and BRENDA G.
GRIFFIN,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
KENNETH E. SCOTT and BARBARA 2.
SCOTT,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Twentieth Judicial District,
Tn and for the County of Sanders,
The Honorable C. B. McNeil, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Tipp, Hnven, Skjelset & Frizzell; Raymond P. Tipp,
Missoula, Montana
For Respondent :
Baxter, Fletcher & Hanson; Robert L. Fletcher,
Thompson Falls, Montana
Submitted on briefs: Aug. 15, 1985
Decided: November 6, 1985
Filed : , .1 ,
, ' .. '1985
Mr. J u s t i c e L. C. Gulbrandson d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion o f the
Court.
Kenneth and Barbara Scott, appellants, appeal the
d e n i a l o f a m o t i o n t o s e t a s i d e a d e f a u l t judgment e n t e r e d i n
the District Court of the Twentieth Judicial District,
S a n d e r s County. We affirm.
William and Earbara Griffin, respondents, filed a
complaint on November 28, 1984, claiming a prescriptive
easement over an existing roadway across appellants1
adjoining property. The complaint and summons were
p e r s o n a l l y s e r v e d o n a p p e l l a n t s on December 5 , 1 9 8 4 , a t t h e i r
home in Wyoming. On about December 14, 1984 appellants
mailed these and o t h e r d o c u m e n t s t o t h e i r c o u n s e l , Raymond
T i p p , i n M i s s o u l a , Montana. H e l e f t f o r a two-week vacation
o n December 2 0 , 1 9 8 4 , u n a w a r e t h a t t h e summons and c o m p l a i n t
a r r i v e d a t h i s o f f i c e t h a t day. Tipp returned t o h i s o f f i c e
on January 4, 1985, but did not review the information
a p p e l l a n t s had s e n t b e c a u s e o f t h e amount o f m a i l and o t h e r
work which had accumulated. He did not discover that a
d e f a u l t judgment h a d b e e n e n t e r e d o n J a n u a r y l l . , 1985, u n t i l
h e saw a c r e d i t b u r e a u r e p o r t on F e b r u a r y 1 2 , 1 9 8 5 . At that
time he reviewed the information from his clients and
contacted respondents1 attorney t o request a s t i p u l a t i o n t h a t
t h e judgment b e s e t a s i d e . H e then asked t h e D i s t r i c t Court,
on F e b r u a r y 2 1 , 1 9 8 5 , t o s e t a s i d e t h e judgment o n t h e b a s i s
of mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect pursuant to
R u l e 6 0 ( b ) , l4.R.Civ.P.
Respondents opposed t h i s motion c i t i n g appel.lants' l a c k
of diligence in addition t o counsells f a i l u r e t o read his
incoming m a i l . A p p e l l a n t s had n o t r e s p o n d e d t o a l e t t e r from
r e s p o n d e n t s m a i l e d A u g u s t 2 , 1984 w h i c h o u t l i n e d t h e p r o b l e m s
between the parties in detail and u r g e d them t o c o n t a c t an
attorney. They also declined to respond to a follow-up
l e t t e r t h r e e weeks l a t e r a d v i s i n g them t h a t r e s p o n d e n t s w o u l d
proceed formally t o determine t h e e x t e n t o f t h e i r easement.
Even after they received the complaint and summons,
appellants apparently did nothing to monitor t h e s t a t u s o f
the suit.
R e s p o n d e n t s f i l e d t h e i r m o t i o n f o r d e f a u l t j u d g m e n t on
January 8, 1985. The judgment, entered January 11, 1 9 8 5 ,
awarded respondents an easement over an existing roadway
along the edge of appellants1 property and permanently
enjoined appellants from obstructing the easement. The
D i s t r i c t Court held a h e a r i n g on a p p e l l a n t s 1 m o t i o n t o set
a s i d e t h e d e f a u l t judgment on March 2 6 , 1 9 8 5 and d e n i e d t h e
m o t i o n on A p r i l 1 2 , 1 9 8 5 .
A p p e l l a n t s r a i s e two i s s u e s on a p p e a l :
(I) Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court erred by n o t setting
aside the default judgment on the basis of mistake,
inadvertence or excusable n e g l e c t .
(2) W h e t h e r t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t had a u t h o r i t y t o e n t e r
a default judgment in a q u i e t t i t l e a c t i o n w i t h o u t a prima
f a c i e showing o f a r i g h t t o easement by competent e v i d e n c e .
The standard of review where a district court has
d e n i e d a motion t o set a s i d e t h e d e f a u l t " i s t h a t no g r e a t
abuse of discretion need be shown to warrant reversal."
Lords v. Newman (Mont. 1 9 8 4 ) , 688 P.2d 290, 294, 4 1 St.Rep.
1793, 1797. Another s t a t e m e n t o f t h i s s t a n d a r d "is t h a t o n l y
' s l i g h t abuse1 i s s u f f i c i e n t t o r e v e r s e an o r d e r r e f u s i n g t o
set aside a default." (Citations omitted.) Lords, 688 P.2d
a t 293.
The t e s t t o d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r t h e n e g l e c t i s e x c u s a b l e
and s u f f i c i e n t t o s e t a s i d e a d e f a u l t i s :
... whether t h e reasons given f o r t h e
n e g l e c t a r e such t h a t r e a s o n a b l e minds
might differ in their conclusions
concerning excusable n e g l e c t . I f so,
doubt should be resolved i n f a v o r o f a
t r i a l on t h e m e r i t s .
U n i t e d S t a t e s P-ubber Co. v. Community Gas & O i l Co. (1961),
139 Mont. 36, 39, 359 P.2d 375, 376. In United S t a t e s
Rubber, the attorney's neglect consisted of his failure t o
r e a d h i s m a i l f o r two o r t h r e e weeks " b e c a u s e of b e i n g b u s y ,
the holiday season, and t h e mistaken assumption t h a t t h e
l e t t e r concerned a d i f f e r e n t m a t t e r . " ( ~ m p hs i s
a in
original.) 139 Mont. a t 39. FJe h e l d that the attorney's
a c t i o n s w e r e i n e x c u s a b l e n e g l e c t and t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t
had not abused its discretion in denying a motion to set
aside the default judgment. In the case at bar the
attorney's actions a r e surprisingly similar t o those a t issue
i n U n i t e d S t a t e Rubber. The a t t o r n e y h e r e , i n h i s a f f i d a v i t ,
c i t e d t h e a c c u m u l a t i o n o f m a i l and work i n h i s o f f i c e and h i s
absence over t h e Christmas holiday a s t h e reason f o r f a i l i n g
t o r e a d h i s c l i e n t s ' l e t t e r f o r a b o u t f i v e weeks. During t h e
h e a r i n g on t h e m o t i o n t o s e t a s i d e t h e d e f a u l t j u d g m e n t , he
s t a t e d t h a t h e had n o t g i v e n t h e documents prompt a t t e n t i o n
because, in his past dealings with appellants, problems
g e n e r a l l y w e n t on f o r months and m o n t h s . Although t h i s i s
not an assumption that t h e documents c o n c e r n e d a different
matter, t h e a t t o r n e y d i d m i s t a k e n l y assume t h e d o c u m e n t s d i d
not concern a matter requiring prompt attention. Another
difference is that in U n i t e d S t a t e s Rubber the l e t t e r was
from an opposj-ng attorney. However, these factual
d i f f e r e n c e s a r e n o t s u f f i c i e n t t o d i s t i n g u i s h t h e two c a s e s .
W e note also t h a t there a r e several other attorneys i n Tipp's
office, according t o s i g n a t u r e s i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court f i l e ,
who could have reviewed the mail and discovered the
complaint. As in United S t a t e s Rubber, this attorney's
f a i l u r e t o r e a d h i s m a i l f o r f i v e weeks b e c a u s e o f work w h i c h
had accumulated in his absence over a holiday is not
excusable neglect.
The n e g l e c t o f an a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l l y may b e a t t r i b u t e d
t o t h e c l i e n t e x c e p t where t h e a t t o r n e y ' s a c t i o n c o n s t i t u t e s
" a c t u a l misconduct," L o r d s , 688 P.2d a t 295, and t h e c l i e n t s
are "blameless." Lords, 688 P.2d at 296. I n Lords, the
a t t o r n e y made a genera1 appearance in court on behalf of
c l i e n t s who had n o t b e e n s e r v e d w i t h p r o c e s s and who had n o t
a u t h o r i z e d him t o a c t . H e then disappeared from s i g h t . The
clients attempted to contact him and proceeded "with
diligence t o r e c t i f y the court's action." L o r d s , 688 P.2d a t
296. Here the attorney's action does not approach the
misconduct o f t h e a t t o r n e y i n Lords. F u r t h e r , knowing t h a t
an a p p e a r a n c e was due the day after Christmas, appellants
w a i t e d u n t i l a t l e a s t December 1 4 t o m a i l t h e p a p e r s t o t h e i r
attorney and apparently did nothing t o check on the suit.
N o t h i n g i n t h e r e c o r d shows t h e y l e t t h e i r a t t o r n e y know t h e
matter would require prompt attention. Under these
circumstances, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in refusing to set a s i d e the default judgment.
In the second issue, appellants refer to plaintiffs'
action as a quiet title action under S 70-28-101 et.seq.,
MCA. They c o n t e n d t h a t § 70-28-108, MCA r e q u i r i n g p l a i n t i f f s
" p r o d u c e e v i d e n c e s u f f i c i e n t t o prima f a c i e e n t i t l e [ t h e m ] t o
r e l i e f " b e f o r e t h e y a r e e n t i t l e d t o a d e f a u l t d e c r e e was n o t
satisfied. They c l a i m t h e p l a i n t i f f s p r o d u c e d no e v i d e n c e t o
show t h e y w e r e e n t i t l e d t o r e l i e f , t h u s t h e d e f a u l t judgment
should be set aside. This action did not adjudicate
ownership o f r e a l p r o p e r t y , o r even a d j u d i c a t e t h e ownership
o f t h e easement. The j u d g m e n t a d d r e s s e s o n l y t h e u s e o f t h e
r o a d w a y b e t w e e n t h e i n d i v i d u a l s named a s p a r t i e s . A s s u c h it
is not a quiet title action to which § 70-28-108, MA
C
applies. W e t h e r e f o r e h o l d t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t had a u t h o r i t y
t o e n t e r t h e d e f a u l t judgment.
/
The o r d e r o f t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t i s a f f i r m e @ /
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pp,2
Justice,
4 1
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W e concur: