No. 80-38
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1980
STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
VS .
HAROLD W. MITCHELL, JR.,
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Lake.
Honorable John McCarvel, Judge presiding.
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant:
Datsopoulos, MacDonald and Lind, Missoula, Montana
For Respondent:
Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Richard P. Heinz, County Attorney, Polson, Montana
Submitted on briefs: December 30, 1980
Decided: APR 1 19@
Mr. J u s t i c e Gene B. D a l y d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n of t h e C o u r t .
Defendant, Harold W. Mitchell, Jr., appeals his
convictions of felony criminal mischief and solicitation
entered in the Lake County D i s t r i c t Court, the Honorable
John M. McCarvel p r e s i d i n g .
Early in the morning of October 30, 1977, the
d e f e n d a n t ' s m o b i l e home and i t s c o n t e n t s w e r e d e s t r o y e d by
fire. The p r o p e r t y was l o c a t e d i n a r u r a l s u b d i v i s i o n n e a r
St. Ignatius, Montana. The next day a juvenile, J o h n T.
Hammond, c o n t a c t e d t h e Lake C o u n t y s h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e and t o l d
them that Mitchell had recently purchased a $25,000 fire
insurance policy on the trailer home. Hammond further
s t a t e d t h a t d e f e n d a n t had removed m o s t o f t h e v a l u a b l e items
i n t h e t r a i l e r t o a n a d j a c e n t s h o p b u i l d i n g and t o a n o t h e r
t r a i l e r home owned by JoAnn Roske. Hammond a l s o s t a t e d t h a t
he helped in replacing the removed furniture with
f u r n i s h i n g s of an i n f e r i o r q u a l i t y .
On November 2 , 1 9 7 7 , Hammond informed t h e s h e r i f f ' s
office, in a tape recorded statement, t h a t h e i n f a c t had
s e t t h e f i r e a f t e r M i t c h e l l o f f e r e d him $500 and a c a r t o
burn the trailer while Mitchell was out of town for the
weekend. Hammond indicated he set the fire by placing
gasoline-soaked rags around the trailer's furnace and
l i g h t i n g them w i t h a c i g a r e t t e l i g h t e r .
On O c t o b e r 3 1 , 1 9 7 7 , d e f e n d a n t M i t c h e l l f i l e d a c l a i m
to collect on the fire insurance policy. The insurance
agent, upon r e c e i v i n g t h e c l a i m and a f t e r b e i n g a d v i s e d by
t h e county s h e r i f f that the f i r e was under investigation,
asked defendant to make a list describing the personal
property destroyed and its value. This information was
n e e d e d b e f o r e payment o f t h e c l a i m c o u l d b e r e m i t t e d . The
sheriff's office also expressed an interest in obtaining
t h i s l i s t o n c e it was r e c e i v e d by t h e a g e n t .
Defendant responded t o t h e r e q u e s t w i t h a h a n d w r i t t e n
i n v e n t o r y which was s u b m i t t e d u n s i g n e d . At the request of
the sheriff's o f f ice, the insurance agent typed the
i n v e n t o r y and a s k e d d e f e n d a n t t o s i g n i t and t h e n h a v e i t
certified. In a letter t h e a g e n t a l s o made a n i n v i t a t i o n
for the defendant to add an addendum should he wish to
include additional property. Defendant signed the typed
l i s t , c e r t i f i e d i t , and r e t u r n e d i t w i t h a d d i t i o n a l p r o p e r t y
l i s t e d i n a n addendum a s b e i n g d e s t r o y e d .
The i n s u r a n c e a g e n t f o r w a r d e d t h e s i g n e d l i s t t o t h e
county s h e r i f f . T h i s l i s t was t h e n shown t o Hammond who
i n d i c a t e d which i t e m s had b e e n moved t o Roske's trailer.
As a result of this information, a search warrant was
i s s u e d , and v a r i o u s items w e r e s e i z e d from t h e Roske t r a i l e r
t h a t c o r r e s p o n d e d w i t h items on t h e l i s t .
Mitchell was arrested on December 16, 1977, and
c h a r g e d w i t h s o l i c i t a t i o n and c r i m i n a l m i s c h i e f . The f i r s t
o f f e n s e was b a s e d on a n a l l e g a t i o n t h a t M i t c h e l l commanded,
encouraged, or facilitated t h e commission o f t h e crime of
c r i m i n a l m i s c h i e f by r e q u e s t i n g Hammond t o b u r n h i s t r a i l e r
home. The s e c o n d o f f e n s e , c r i m i n a l m i s c h i e f , was b a s e d on a
c h a r g e t h a t he k n o w i n g l y o r p u r p o s e l y d e s t r o y e d t h e t r a i l e r
w i t h t h e p u r p o s e t o d e f r a u d a n i n s u r e r by means o f f i r e s e t
by a n o t h e r whom h e had s o l i c i t e d , a i d e d and a b e t t e d .
During trial, Hammond was presented as the
prosecution's key witness. He testified to helping
d e f e n d a n t move v a r i o u s items o u t o f t h e t r a i l e r t o t h e Roske
r e s i d e n c e and r e l a t e d how h e b u r n e d t h e t r a i l e r a f t e r b e i n g
approached by Mitchell. Hammond also revealed that the
n i g h t b e f o r e t h e f i r e , w h i l e d e f e n d a n t was o u t o f town, he
had a party in defendant's trailer. Hammond stated the
p a r t y was a t t e n d e d by a b o u t t w e n t y - f i v e p e o p l e b u t t h a t no
s i g n i f i c a n t damage was d o n e t o t h e t r a i l e r . According t o a
neighbor, however, who was disturbed by the noise and
investigated, t h e t r a i l e r was i n a c o n s i d e r a b l e m e s s a s a
r e s u l t of t h e p a r t y .
Mitchell denied having induced Hammond to set the
fire. He further testified t h a t h e and Roske had r e c e n t l y
separated a f t e r living together f o r s e v e r a l y e a r s and t h a t
t h e f u r n i t u r e and o t h e r p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y moved o u t o f h i s
trailer belonged t o Roske. According t o defendant, these
w e r e n o t t h e items i n c l u d e d on t h e l i s t a s b e i n g d e s t r o y e d
in the fire.
The d e p u t y f i r e m a r s h a l 1 who investigated the fire
could not determine its cause. H e was u n a b l e t o f i n d the
presence of hydrocarbons at the scene which would have
indicated t h a t t h e f i r e had an i n c e n d i a r y o r i g i n . He did
testify, however, that the evidence was consistent with
Hammond's s t a t e m e n t t h a t h e had s e t t h e f i r e .
Following trial, defendant was convicted of both
solicitation and criminal mischief. The court sentenced
him t o e i g h t y e a r s ' i m p r i s o n m e n t w i t h s i x y e a r s s u s p e n d e d on
each count, the s e n t e n c e s t o run c o n c u r r e n t l y . Defendant
now a p p e a l s .
The f i r s t i s s u e i s w h e t h e r t h e t e s t i m o n y o f Hammond,
a s a n a c c o m p l i c e , was c o r r o b o r a t e d by s u f f i c i e n t i n d e p e n d e n t
evidence.
The s t a t u t o r y r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r c o r r o b o r a t i o n a r e s e t
f o r t h i n s e c t i o n 46-16-213, MCA:
"A c o n v i c t i o n c a n n o t b e had on t h e t e s t i m o n y
of one r e s p o n s i b l e o r l e g a l l y a c c o u n t a b l e f o r
t h e same o f f e n s e , a s d e f i n e d i n 45-2-301,
u n l e s s t h e t e s t i m o n y is c o r r o b o r a t e d b y o t h e r
e v i d e n c e which i n i t s e l f and w i t h o u t t h e a i d
of t h e testimony of t h e one r e s p o n s i b l e o r
l e g a l l y a c c o u n t a b l e f o r t h e same o f f e n s e
tends t o connect the defendant with the
commission o f t h e o f f e n s e . The c o r r o b o r a t i o n
i s n o t s u f f i c i e n t i f i t m e r e l y shows t h e com-
missison of t h e o f f e n s e o r t h e circumstances
thereof. "
Montana case law concerning corroboration is well
settled. I t p r o v i d e s t h a t t h e c o r r o b o r a t i n g e v i d e n c e may b e
supplied by the defendant or his witnesses; it may be
circumstantial evidence; it need not be sufficient to
sustain a conviction or establish a prima facie case of
guilt; and, it need o n l y t e n d t o c o n n e c t t h e d e f e n d a n t w i t h
the crime as charged. Where the claimed corroboration,
however, shows no more than an opportunity to commit a
crime, simply proves s u s p i c i o n , o r is e q u a l l y consonant with
a r e a s o n a b l e e x p l a n a t i o n p o i n t i n g t o w a r d i n n o c e n t c o n d u c t on
part of the defendant, the evidence is to be deemed
insufficient. See S t a t e v. Kemp ( 1 9 7 9 ) , Mont. ,
597 P.2d 96, 36 S t . R e p . 1215; S t a t e v. Owens ( 1 9 7 9 ) ,
Mont. , 597 P.2d 7 2 , 36 S t . R e p . 1182; S t a t e v. Coleman
(1978)t Mont. , 579 P.2d 7 3 2 , 35 S t . R e p . 560; S t a t e
v. Jones ( 1 9 3 3 ) , 95 Mont. 317, 26 P.2d 341; S t a t e v . Cobb
( 1 9 2 6 ) , 76 Mont. 8 9 , 245 P. 265.
The State maintains t h a t Hammond's testimony is
s u f f i c i e n t l y c o r r o b o r a t e d by t h e f o l l o w i n g : defendant's
testimony that his trailer was not insured until shortly
before the fire; testimony of defendant and Roske that
numerous items o f p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y b e l o n g i n g t o Roske w e r e
moved from the premises to Roske's trailer; the various
items seized in Roske's trailer which corresponded with
items listed on defendant's insurance claim as destroyed in
the fire; the testimony of Gladys Orr that upon visiting
Roske's trailer shortly before the fire she viewed various
pieces of furniture and other personal property which again
corresponded with items listed by defendant as destroyed;
and, the testimony of Bud Castor and Butch Pierce that
Hammond told them prior to the actual fire that defendant
offered him cash and a car to set fire to the trailer.
In determining the sufficiency of the offered
evidence, we must first reject the State's inclusion of the
testimony by Castor and Pierce. Even though this testimony
was offered to rebut defendant's charge of subsequent
fabrication and, thus, was admissible as nonhearsay under
Rule 801(d)(l)(B), Mont.R.Evid. (see State v. Mackie (1981),
Mont . , 622 P.2d 673, 38 St.Rep. 86), its use as
corroborating evidence is improper.
The State has cited State v. Dolan (1980), Mont.
, 620 P.2d 355, 37 St.Rep. 1860, in support of using
this testimony. This case is easily distinguishable. In
Dolan the prosecution introduced evidence that the defendant
had admitted the offense to a bartender who later testified
to the conversation at trial. The court held that the
bartender's testimony was nonhearsay and substantive
evidence sufficient to corroborate the testimony of an
accomplice.
Here, however, the State is attempting to use, not a
previous statement by the defendant to corroborate an
accomplice, but a previous statement of the accomplice.
Consequently, i f we w e r e t o a l l o w t h e t e s t i m o n y t o b e u s e d
a s c o r r o b o r a t i n g e v i d e n c e , w e would i n e f f e c t be a l l o w i n g a
p r i o r s t a t e m e n t made by a n a c c o m p l i c e t o c o r r o b o r a t e h i s own
testimony. Such a r e s u l t would f r u s t r a t e t h e p u r p o s e o f t h e
s t a t u t e and w i l l n o t be p e r m i t t e d .
B e i n g u n a b l e t o make u s e o f t h e t e s t i m o n y o f C a s t o r
and Pierce, the State, in an attempt to corroborate
Hammond's testimony, is left with evidence showing the
p u r c h a s e of the i n s u r a n c e by d e f e n d a n t , the transfer of
various i t e m s from d e f e n d a n t ' s t r a i l e r t o R o s k e ' s trailer,
and items seized after the fire and viewed in Roske's
trailer shortly before t h e f i r e which c o r r e s p o n d t o items
listed on an insurance claim as being destroyed. Upon
reviewing this evidence, we find that it is sufficient
c o r r o b o r a t i o n of Hammond's t e s t i m o n y . The t o t a l sum o f t h e
e v i d e n c e d o e s more t h a n c r e a t e a mere s u s p i c i o n o f g u i l t .
I t is c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e S t a t e ' s t h e o r y o f c u l p a b i l i t y and
is supportive of a finding that the evidence tends to
connect defendant with t h e criminal a c t i v i t y a t issue.
W e acknowledge t h a t the evidence presented does not
e s t a b l i s h a prima f a c i e c a s e of c u l p a b i l i t y ; however, s u c h a
finding is n o t a necessary requirement for corroboration.
The e v i d e n c e c a n be c i r c u m s t a n t i a l and need o n l y ". . .
tend t o connect the defendant with the commission of the
criminal offense." S e c t i o n 46-16-213, MCA. The e v i d e n c e i n
t h i s r e g a r d i s deemed s u f f i c i e n t .
The second issue raised by defendant concerns his
contention that a conviction of both solicitation and
c r i m i n a l mischief is barred by s e c t i o n 4 6 - 1 1 - 5 0 2 ( 2 ) , MCA,
which p r o v i d e s :
"When t h e same t r a n s a c t i o n may e s t a b l i s h t h e
commission o f more t h a n o n e o f f e n s e , a p e r s o n
c h a r g e d w i t h s u c h c o n d u c t may b e p r o s e c u t e d
f o r each such o f f e n s e . H e may n o t , however,
be c o n v i c t e d o f more t h a n o n e o f f e n s e i f :
" ( 2 ) one offense c o n s i s t s o n l y of a
conspiracy or other form o f p r e p a r a t i o n to
commit t h e o t h e r ; "
Under the f a c t s of this case, we must agree with
defendant's position. Count I1 of the information, as
filed, alleged that defendant was guilty of criminal
mischief s o l e l y on t h e t h e o r y o f a c c o u n t a b i l i t y b e c a u s e h e
"solicited . . . aided and a b e t t e d " Hammond. The a c t u a l
s o l i c i t a t i o n o f Hammond, a s c h a r g e d i n Count I , was t h u s a
n e c e s s a r y -p r e p---- o r y
arat act to the offense of criminal
m i s c h i e f , and a c o n v i c t i o n on b o t h c o u n t s was i m p r o p e r .
The S t a t e c o n c e d e s t h a t a c o n v i c t i o n on b o t h c h a r g e s
was improper. It argues, however, that since defendant
f a i l e d t o o b j e c t a t t r i a l t o t h e submission of both counts
to the jury, he is precluded from r a i s i n g this i s s u e on
appeal. I n r e j e c t i n g t h i s a r g u m e n t , we need o n l y n o t e t h a t
t h e e r r o r d i d n o t o c c u r when t h e c h a r g e s w e r e p r e s e n t e d t o
t h e jury but arose only a f t e r t h e D i s t r i c t Court rendered a
f i n a l judgment o f c o n v i c t i o n on b o t h c o u n t s . See s e c t i o n s
46-11-502 and 4 6 - 1 - 2 0 1 ( 2 ) , MCA. The e r r o r a t t r i a l b e i n g
p r e d i c a t e d s o l e l y on a n a s s e r t i o n t h a t t h e f i n a l j u d g m e n t o f
c o n v i c t i o n was improperly entered, defendant's failure to
o b j e c t p r i o r t o c o n v i c t i o n d o e s n o t p r e c l u d e r e v i e w by t h i s
Court .
The f a c t t h a t t h i s i s s u e i s d e c i d e d i n f a v o r o f the
defendant does not mean, however, that defendant is now
e n t i t l e d t o a new t r i a l o r a d i s m i s s a l o f a l l c h a r g e s . As
previously stated, the trial court erred in entering
judgment of c o n v i c t i o n on b o t h counts, not in submitting
those charges t o the jury. Consequently, i f any p r e j u d i c e
t o defendant resulted from t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s error, it
a r o s e s o l e l y i n t h e s e n t e n c i n g p r o c e s s w h i c h was c o n d u c t e d
on t h e b a s i s o f a n i m p r o p e r c o n v i c t i o n o f b o t h s o l i c i t a t i o n
and criminal mischief. Prejudice to defendant in this
r e g a r d c a n b e c u r e d by r e m a n d i n g t h e c a u s e f o r r e s e n t e n c i n g .
The judgment of conviction for solicitation is
vacated and dismissed. The judgment of conviction for
c r i m i n a l m i s c h i e f i s a f f i r m e d , and t h e c a u s e i s remanded f o r
resentencing .
W e concur:
,
@~4
Chief J u s t i c e