No. 80-329
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1981
YVONNE MARTINEZ,
Charging party & Respondent,
YELLOWSTONE COUNTY WELFARE DPEARTMENT.,
Petitioner and Respondent.
Appeal from: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Yellowstone.
Honorable Charles Luedke, Judge presiding.
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant:
Anderson, Edwards and Molloy, Billings, Montana
Donald W. Molloy argued, Billings, Montana
For Respondent:
Harold F. Hanser, County attorney, argued, Billings,
Montana
C. David Gorton argued, Billings, Montana
For Amicus Curiae:
Frederick Sherwood argued, Helena, Montana
Submitted: February 18, 1981
Decided: March 27, 1981
MAR
Filed. 2 1 1981
M r . J u s t i c e Frank B. M o r r i s o n , J r . , d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e
Court.
I n 1977, a p p e l l a n t , Yvonne M a r t i n e z f i l e d a c o m p l a i n t
w i t h t h e Montana Human R i g h t s Commission (Commission),
c h a r g i n g t h e r e s p o n d e n t , Yellowstone County Welfare Department
(Department), with r a c i a l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . The c h a r g e stemmed
from t h e Department' s r e j e c t i o n of M a r t i n e z ' a p p l i c a t i o n s
f o r s e v e r a l job v a c a n c i e s . Following a n i n v e s t i g a t i o n , t h e
Commission conducted a h e a r i n g . On November 1, 1979, t h e
Commission i s s u e d f i n d i n g s of f a c t , c o n c l u s i o n s of law and
a n o r d e r d e t e r m i n i n g t h a t t h e Department had u n l a w f u l l y
discriminated a g a i n s t Martinez. The Department f i l e d a
p e t i t i o n f o r j u d i c i a l r e v i e w i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t of t h e
T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Judge C h a r l e s Luedke
presiding. O n August 1 9 , 1980, Judge Luedke e n t e r e d a n
o r d e r v a c a t i n g t h e Commission's f i n d i n g s of f a c t , c o n c l u s i o n s
of law and o r d e r and g r a n t i n g t h e D e p a r t m e n t ' s motion t o
dismiss t h e complaint. From t h i s o r d e r , M a r t i n e z a p p e a l s .
Yvonne M a r t i n e z i s a f i f t y - t w o - y e a r - o l d b l a c k woman.
She s p e a k s , r e a d s and w r i t e s p r o f i c i e n t l y i n b o t h E n g l i s h
and S p a n i s h . From F e b r u a r y 1973 t o August 1974, M a r t i n e z
was employed by t h e Department a s a n e l i g i b i l i t y t e c h n i c i a n .
During h e r employment, M a r t i n e z was recommended f o r and
r e c e i v e d permanent s t a t u s w i t h t h e Department, i n s p i t e of
problems i n v o l v i n g t a r d i n e s s , a b s e n t e e i s m and p e r s o n a l i t y
con£l i c t s .
I n August 1974, M a r t i n e z v o l u n t a r i l y r e s i g n e d from t h e
Department and moved t o C a l i f o r n i a . Upon h e r t e r m i n a t i o n ,
s h e r e c e i v e d v e r y f a v o r a b l e l e t t e r s of recommendation from
h e r immediate s u p e r v i s o r s . I n C a l i f o r n i a , M a r t i n e z o b t a i n e d
employment w i t h t h e San Diego Department of P u b l i c W e l f a r e
a s a n e l i g i b i l i t y t e c h n i c i a n advancing i n p o s i t i o n d u r i n g
h e r employment.
I n J u n e 1976, M a r t i n e z r e t u r n e d t o B i l l i n g s , Montana,
and s o u g h t employment a t t h e Department. She was a d v i s e d by
t h e Department D i r e c t o r James Greer t o a p p l y t h r o u g h t h e
Montana M e r i t System. M a r t i n e z complied by having h e r t e s t
s c o r e s o b t a i n e d i n C a l i f o r n i a t r a n s f e r r e d t o t h e Montana
M e r i t Counsel.
I n October 1976, a n e l i g i b i l i t y t e c h n i c i a n vacancy
a r o s e a t t h e Department. M a r t i n e z a p p l i e d f o r t h e vacancy.
The m e r i t system r e g i s t e r f o r Yellowstone County i n d i c a t e d
t h a t M a r t i n e z was t h e most q u a l i f i e d a p p l i c a n t . The Department
had p o s s e s s i o n of t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n b u t c h o s e t o r e j e c t
M a r t i n e z ' a p p l i c a t i o n and f i l l e d t h e p o s i t i o n w i t h a w h i t e
female. M a r t i n e z t e s t i f i e d t h a t s h e c a l l e d t h e Department
c o n c e r n i n g t h e p o s i t i o n and was t o l d by J a c k i e Hurick,
a s s i s t a n t a d m i n i s t r a t o r of t h e Department, t h a t t h e vacancy
had been f i l l e d , and t h a t t h e y w o u l d n ' t be h i r i n g any " n i g g e r s "
anyway. H u r i c k , t h e a l l e g e d d e c l a r a n t , t e s t i f i e d t h a t no
s u c h s t a t e m e n t was e v e r made. The Commission d e t e r m i n e d
t h a t t h i s s t a t e m e n t had, i n f a c t , been made and t h e Commis-
s i o n ' s p o s i t i o n was a d o p t e d by Judge Luedke i n h i s o r d e r .
I n December 1976 when a second vacancy a r o s e , M a r t i n e z '
name a p p e a r e d on t h e m e r i t system r e g i s t e r a s t h e most
q u a l i f i e d a p p l i c a n t , n o t o n l y i n Yellowstone County, b u t i n
t h e e n t i r e S t a t e of Montana. The Department had p o s s e s s i o n
o f t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n when i t r e j e c t e d M a r t i n e z ' a p p l i c a t i o n
and f i l l e d t h e p o s i t i o n w i t h a w h i t e female.
A t h i r d vacancy a r o s e i n F e b r u a r y 1977. Again M a r t i n e z '
name a p p e a r e d f i r s t on t h e m e r i t system r e g i s t e r f o r b o t h
Yellowstone County and t h e e n t i r e S t a t e of Montana. The De-
p a r t m e n t had p o s s e s s i o n of t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n when i t r e j e c t e d
M a r t i n e z ' a p p l i c a t i o n and f i l l e d t h e p o s i t i o n w i t h a w h i t e
f e m a l e c l e r i c a l worker from a n o t h e r s e c t i o n of t h e Department.
During t h e p e r i o d i n which M a r t i n e z a p p l i e d f o r job
o p e n i n g s , t h e Department used t h r e e f a c t o r s i n f i l l i n g va-
cancies. The d i r e c t o r , James Greer, looked a t t h e names of
t h e t o p t h r e e a p p l i c a n t s l i s t e d on t h e m e r i t system r e g i s t e r ,
c o n s i d e r e d i n t r a - d e p a r t m e n t a l a p p l i c a n t s , even i f t h e i r names
d i d n o t a p p e a r on t h e m e r i t r e g i s t e r , and d i s c u s s e d t h e
a p p l i c a n t s w i t h p e r s o n n e l i n t h e Department.
Greer spoke p r i m a r i l y w i t h t h r e e p e o p l e c o n c e r n i n g
Martinez: Lou Hagerman, a s u p e r v i s o r i n t h e o f f i c e d u r i n g
M a r t i n e z ' p r i o r employment a t t h e Department; C a r o l e C h a p p e l l ,
a co-worker i n t h e Department d u r i n g M a r t i n e z ' p r i o r employment;
and J a c k i e Hurick, a s s i s t a n t a d m i n i s t r a t o r of t h e Department.
I t was t h e o p i n i o n of a l l t h r e e t h a t M a r t i n e z had £re-
q u e n t l y been t a r d y , a b s e n t and had c a u s e d c o n f l i c t s w i t h i n
t h e Department. A l l t h r e e recommended t h a t M a r t i n e z n o t be
rehired. G r e e r acknowledged t h a t t h e o p i n i o n s of t h e s e
t h r e e p e o p l e , e s p e c i a l l y J a c k i e Hurick, had a g r e a t i m p a c t
on h i s d e c i s i o n t o r e j e c t M a r t i n e z ' a p p l i c a t i o n s .
Following a c o n t e s t e d h e a r i n g i n t h i s m a t t e r , t h e
Commission d e t e r m i n e d t h a t a p p e l l a n t , M a r t i n e z , had been
u n l a w f u l l y d i s c r i m i n a t e d a g a i n s t by t h e r e s p o n d e n t , Department.
I n making t h i s d e t e r m i n a t i o n , t h e Commission r e l i e d upon and
a p p l i e d t h e p r i n c i p l e s g o v e r n i n g employment d i s c r i m i n a t i o n
c a s e s , a s s e t f o r t h i n McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green
( 1 9 7 3 ) , 4 1 1 U.S. 792, 9 3 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668. The
D i s t r i c t C o u r t acknowledged t h e Commission's r e l i a n c e upon
t h e s e p r i n c i p l e s b u t r e v e r s e d t h e a g e n c y ' s d e t e r m i n a t i o n due
t o what t h e c o u r t c o n s i d e r e d a ". . . failure to require
t h a t t h e proof e s t a b l i s h t h e e x i s t e n c e of t h e e s s e n t i a l
e l e m e n t s of t h e c h a r g e of p r o h i b i t e d r a c i a l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n
. . ." According t o t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t " [ d l i s c r i m i n a t i o n
a g a i n s t c o m p l a i n a n t b e c a u s e of h e r membership i n t h e b l a c k
r a c e r e q u i r e s f i r s t , proof t h a t s h e i s b l a c k and, second,
t h a t r e s p o n d e n t knew s h e w a s b l a c k a n d , t h i r d , t h a t s h e was
d e n i e d employment b e c a u s e s h e was b l a c k . " After reviewing
t h e e v i d e n c e , t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t d e t e r m i n e d t h a t no proof
e x i s t e d which e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t James G r e e r , d i r e c t o r of t h e
Department, knew M a r t i n e z was b l a c k when he made h i s d e c i s i o n s
t o r e j e c t her applications.
The i s s u e s p r e s e n t e d on a p p e a l a r e a s f o l l o w s :
1. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d i n r e q u i r i n g proof
of s c i e n t e r on t h e p a r t of James G r e e r ?
2. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t exceeded i t s s t a t u t o r y
a u t h o r i t y of r e v i e w under s e c t i o n 2-4-704, MA
C?
3. Whether t h e Commission e r r e d i n r e d u c i n g a p p e l l a n t ' s
award of backpay by u s e of i n f o r m a t i o n of i n t e r i m wages n o t
p r e s e n t e d a t t h e Commission h e a r i n g ?
A p p e l l a n t c o n t e n d s t h a t i t was e r r o r t o r e q u i r e proof
of G r e e r ' s s t a t e of mind. A p p e l l a n t a r g u e s such a r e q u i r e -
ment e x c e e d s t h e prima f a c i e showing s t a n d a r d e s t a b l i s h e d i n
McDonnell Douglas v . Green, s u p r a .
T h i s i s a c a s e of f i r s t i m p r e s s i o n i n Montana. The
c a s e a r o s e under t h e p r o v i s i o n s of T i t l e 4 9 , Human R i g h t s
A c t , MCA, s p e c i f i c a l l y s e c t i o n 49-2-303, MCA, which p r o v i d e s
i n pertinent part:
" (1) I t i s a n u n l a w f u l d i s c r i m i n a t o r y p r a c t i c e
for:
" ( a ) an employer t o r e f u s e employment t o a p e r s o n
... b e c a u s e of h i s r a c e , c r e e d , r e l i g i o n , m a r i t a l
status, color, o r national origin . . ."
The p r o v i s i o n s of T i t l e 49, Montana Human R i g h t s A c t ,
a r e c l o s e l y modeled a f t e r T i t l e V I I of t h e F e d e r a l C i v i l
R i g h t s Act of 1964, 4 2 U.S.C. 52000$ e t seq., and t o a
l e s s e r d e g r e e a f t e r t h e Age D i s c r i m i n a t i o n i n Employment
A c t , 29 U.S.C. 5621, e t s e q . A c o n s i d e r a b l e body of law h a s
developed under t h e s e f e d e r a l empl.oyment d i s c r i m i n a t i o n
acts. Due t o t h e p a r a l l e l s t r u c t u r e of t h e f e d e r a l laws and
t h e Montana Human R i g h t s A c t , t h i s C o u r t h a s examined t h e r a t i o n -
a l e of f e d e r a l c a s e law.
Under f e d e r a l c a s e law, u n l a w f u l employment d i s c r i m i n -
a t i o n claims a r e separated i n t o t h r e e d i s t i n c t categories:
(1) d i s p a r a t e t r e a t m e n t , where a p r o t e c t e d c l a s s member
a l l e g e s unequal c o n s i d e r a t i o n , b u t where t h e r e a r e f a c i a l l y
n e u t r a l h i r i n g p r a c t i c e s (McDonnell Douglas) ; ( 2 ) d i s p a r a t e
t r e a t m e n t t o a whole c l a s s where a n employer r e g u l a r l y and
p u r p o s e f u l l y t r e a t s a p r o t e c t e d c l a s s less f a v o r a b l y i n t h e
employment p r o c e s s ( I n t e r n a t i o n a l Brotherhood of T e a m s t e r s
v . U n i t e d S t a t e s ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 431 U.S. 324, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 52
L.Ed. 2d 396) ; and ( 3 ) d i s p a r a t e i m p a c t , where an e m p l o y e r ' s
practice i s facially neutral, but i n actuality affects a
p r o t e c t e d c l a s s more h a r s h l y t h a n o t h e r c l a s s e s . (Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 4 2 2 U.S. 405, 95 S.Ct. 2362, 45
A complaining p a r t y i s o f t e n u n a b l e t o d e v e l o p d i r e c t
e v i d e n c e of d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . A s was n o t e d i n Loeb v . Textron,
1014.
Inc., (1st C i r . 1 9 7 9 ) , 600 F. 2d 1003, / ". . . 71.) d i r e c t e v i -
dence of d i s c r i m i n a t i o n i s l i k e l y t o be u n a v a i l a b l e , and ( 2 )
t h e employer h a s t h e b e s t a c c e s s t o t h e r e a s o n s t h a t prompted
him t o f i r e , r e j e c t , d i s c i p l i n e o r r e f u s e t o promote t h e
complainant. . ." To e a s e t h i s d i f f i c u l t y t h e United
S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t i n McDonnell Douqla-s e n u n c i a t e d t h e
e l e m e n t s of f a c t u a l proof which make a prima f a c i e c a s e of
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n f o r t h e p l a i n t i f f where t h e a l l e g a t i o n i s
d i s p a r a t e treatment.
Once a complaining p a r t y e s t a b l i s h e s a prima f a c i e c a s e ,
a n i n f e r e n c e of d i s c r i m i n a t i o n a r i s e s by o p e r a t i o n of law i r -
r e s p e c t i v e of whether d i r e c t e v i d e n c e of d i s c r i m i n a t i o n
exists. Furnco C o n s t r u c t i o n Corp. v . Waters ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 438
U.S. 567, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 57 L.Ed.2d 957. The e l e m e n t s
c o n s t i t u t i n g a prima f a c i e c a s e under e a c h t h e o r y of discrim:
i n a t i o n may d i f f e r . I n the case a t b a r , Martinez' complaint
stemmed from unequal t r e a t m e n t where t h e r e w e r e f a c i a l l y
neutral hiring practices. Thus, t h i s C o u r t must f o c u s on
t h e e l e m e n t s c o n s t i t u t i n g a prima f a c i e c a s e under t h e
d i s p a r a t e treatment discrimination theory.
To make o u t a prima f a c i e c a s e of d i s p a r a t e t r e a t m e n t ,
a complaining p a r t y must show:
". . . ( i ) t h a t he b e l o n g s t o a r a c i a l m i n o r i t y ;
( i i ) t h a t he a p p l i e d and was q u a l i f i e d f o r a job
f o r which t h e employer was s e e k i n g a p p l i c a n t s ;
(iii) t h a t , d e s p i t e h i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n s , he was r e -
j e c t e d ; and ( i v ) t h a t , a f t e r h i s r e j e c t i o n , t h e
p o s i t i o n remained open and t h e employer c o n t i n u e d
t o s e e k a p p l i c a n t s from p e r s o n s of c o m p l a i n a n t ' s
qualifications." McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
s u p r a , 4 1 1 U.S. a t 802.
The Supreme C o u r t i n McDonnell Douglas n o t e d t h a t due
t o t h e v a r y i n g f a c t u a l s i t u a t i o n s a r i s i n g under T i t l e V I I
discrimination claims, t h e s e four elements w e r e n o t n e c e s s a r i l y
applicable t o every d i s p a r a t e treatment claim. Thus, c o u r t s
have h e l d t h a t t h e f o u r t h e l e m e n t i n McDonnell Douglas was
s a t i s f i e d by a showing t h a t t h e job v a c a n c i e s were f i l l e d
w i t h w h i t e employees, Crawford v. Western E l e c . Company, I n c .
(5th C i r . 1 9 8 0 ) , 614 F.2d 1300. Once a prima f a c i e c a s e i s
e s t a b l i s h e d , an i n f e r e n c e a r i s e s which i s s u f f i c i e n t t o
s u s t a i n t h e complaining p a r t y ' s burden of p r o o f .
Where evidence exists establishing a prima facie case,
the trier of fact must proceed to the next step in evaluating
evidence. This entails determining whether the employer
countered the complaining party's prima facie case with
probative evidence establishing ". . . some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection."
411 U.S. at 802.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, supra,/ If no such evidence
exists, the complaining party must prevail-.
If evidence exists which, on its face, shows a legiti-
mate nondiscriminatory reason for the employer's conduct,
the trier of fact must resolve the conflict and determine
whether complainant has satisfied the burden of proof. In
resolving this conflict, the trier of fact may be aided by
affirmative evidence of pretext. McDonnell Douglas. The
trier of fact may also be assisted by the strength of the
inference arising from the complaining party's prima facie
case or by its assessment of the credibility of the witnesses
at trial. Maine Human Rights Commission v. City of Auburn
(1979)r Me. , 408 A.2d 1253.
In the case at bar, the Commission followed the evidentiary
standards enunciated in McDonnell Douglas. The Commission
determined that Martinez had established a prima facie case
of racial discrimination and that the Department had articu-
lated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for rejecting
Martinez. The Commission then found that the evidence, as a
whole, established unlawful discrimination because the Depart-
ment's reason for rejecting Martinez was merely a pretext
for a discriminatory purpose. In making this finding the
Commission considered that Martinez had previously been
promoted to permanent status despite her tardiness, absences
and personality conflicts.
The District Court, in requiring Martinez to prove that
James Greer knew she was black when he rejected her applica-
tion, erred as a matter of law. The McDonnell Douglas
elements, constituting a prima facie case, do not require a
showing of scienter on the part of the employer. Requiring
proof of such knowledge would effectively destroy the prima
facie case rule and the inference of discrimination created
by law.
The District Court held that no proof existed showing
Greer's adverse decision regarding Martinez to be affected
by the racially biased remark of Jackie Hurick. Section 49-
2-101(8), MCA, which defines "employer" is silent on whether
that term embraces "agents" or those upon whom the employer
relies. Since Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §2000e(b) defines employer
to include "agents", the federal cases are inapplicable.
The holding by the District Court is contrary to the
rationale expressed in Board of Trustees of Billings, Etc.
v. State ex rel. Board of Personnel Appeals (1979), Mont.
, 604 P.2d 770, 36 St.Rep. 2289. In that case we held
that it was an unlawful act of discrimination for a school
board to rely upon a tainted evaluation of a school teacher
in reaching a decision not to rehire. Chief Justice Haswell,
writing for a unanimous court, made it abundantly clear that
it was the taint of the evaluation that created the unlawful
discrimination. The school board trustees ". . . relied
upon this evaluation, thereby committing the prohibited act
of discrimination. - - - insulate themselves by
They may not
claiming - -of knowledge.
lack If we were not to adopt such a
policy a school board could violate a public employee's
rights with impunity in almost every instance . . ."
(Emphasis supplied.) 604 P.2d at 775.
I n t h e c a s e a t b a r , James G r e e r , d i r e c t o r of t h e Depart-
ment, r e l i e d upon a n e v a l u a t i o n of M a r t i n e z by J a c k i e H u r i c k ,
a s s i s t a n t a d m i n i s t r a t o r of t h e Department. This evaluation
was t a i n t e d . W h o l d t h a t G r e e r ' s p e r s o n a l knowledge was
e
n o t m a t e r i a l , and t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d i n f i n d i n g
s u c h p e r s o n a l knowledge t o be a n e c e s s a r y e l e m e n t of p l a i n t i f f ' s
proof.
I n reaching i t s determination t o reverse, the D i s t r i c t
C o u r t reviewed t h e e n t i r e r e c o r d , and i n e f f e c t , r e d e t e r m i n e d
t h e c r e d i b i l i t y of t h e w i t n e s s e s and t h e w e i g h t g i v e n t o
e v i d e n c e by t h e Commission. The s c o p e of r e v i e w of a D i s t r i c t
C o u r t r e g a r d i n g agency d e t e r m i n a t i o n s i s governed by s e c t i o n
2-4-704, MCA, which p r o v i d e s i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t :
" ( 2 ) The c o u r t may n o t s u b s t i t u t e i t s judgment f o r
t h a t of t h e agency a s t o t h e w e i g h t of t h e e v i d e n c e
on q u e s t i o n s of f a c t ... The c o u r t may r e v e r s e
o r modify t h e d e c i s i o n i f s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s of t h e
a p p e l l a n t have been p r e j u d i c e d b e c a u s e t h e admini-
s t r a t i v e f i n d i n g s , i n f e r e n c e s , c o n c l u s i o n s , o r de-
cisions are:
" ( e ) c l e a r l y e r r o n e o u s i n view of t h e r e l i a b l e ,
p r o b a t i v e , and s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e on t h e whole
record; "
The e f f e c t of t h i s p r o v i s i o n i s t o l i m i t a r e v i e w i n g D i s t r i c t
C o u r t t o a d e t e r m i n a t i o n of whether o r n o t s u b s t a n t i a l
e v i d e n c e e x i s t s t o s u p p o r t t h e agency d e c i s i o n .
T h i s C o u r t spoke t o t h a t i s s u e i n S t a n d a r d Chemical Man-
u f a c t u r i n g Company v . Employment S e c u r i t y D i v i s i o n ( 1 9 8 0 ) .
613 108
Mont. , 605 P.2d 610,/37 St.Rep. 1 0 5 , / s t a t i n g t h a t :
. . . I n q u e s t i o n s of t h i s k i n d , where t h e agency i s en-
t r u s t e d and c h a r g e d w i t h a d m i n i s t e r i n g t h e s t a t u t e
and making n e c e s s a r y , i n i t i a l f a c t u a l d e t e r m i n a t i 6 n s .
i t i s well s e t t l e d t h a t a reviewing c o u r t ' s f u n c t i o n
i s l i m i t e d . Where f a c t u a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n s a r e war-
r a n t e d by t h e r e c o r d and have a r e a s o n a b l e b a s i s i n
law, t h e y a r e t o be a c c e p t e d . It i s not the court's
f u n c t i o n t o s u b s t i t u t e i t s own i n f e r e n c e s of f a c t
f o r t h o s e of a n a d m i n i s t r a t i v e t r i b u n a l o r agency,
where f a c t s a r e s u p p o r t e d by e v i d e n c e i n t h e r e c o r d . "
I n the case a t b a r , c o n f l i c t i n g evidence e x i s t e d regarding
M a r t i n e z ' prima f a c i e c a s e and t h e D e p a r t m e n t ' s c l a i m e d
n o n d i s c r i m i n a t o r y r e a s o n f o r n o t r e h i r i n g M a r t i n e z . These
c o n f l i c t s w e r e d e c i d e d i n f a v o r of M a r t i n e z by t h e Commission.
For t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t t o review and r e d e c i d e t h e s e c o n f l i c t s
exceeds i t s s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y . A s was n o t e d i n S t a n d a r d
Chem., 605 P.2d a t 614:
"Where t h e i s s u e [ i n c o n t r o v e r s y ] i s s o c l o s e and
t h e r e i s s u f f i c i e n t c r e d i b l e e v i d e n c e on t h e re-
c o r d which would a l l o w r e a c h i n g o p p o s i t e conclu-
s i o n s , w e t h i n k t h a t a f i n d i n g which o v e r t u r n s
another a s being ' c l e a r l y erroneous' i s an abuse
of d i s c r e t i o n . Where t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s review-
ing function i s limited, a s i n t h i s case, the
f i n d i n g s of a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a g e n c i e s and t r i b u n a l s
must be s u s t a i n e d where t h e r e i s s u f f i c i e n t
c r e d i b l e evidence i n the record."
For t h e f o r e g o i n g r e a s o n s , t h e judgment of t h e D i s t r i c t
C o u r t must be r e v e r s e d .
W e must now t u r n t o t h e i s s u e of o f f s e t t i n g i n t e r i m
wages. Although no e v i d e n c e was p r e s e n t e d a t t h e c o n t e s t e d
h e a r i n g i n t h i s m a t t e r r e g a r d i n g i n t e r i m wages e a r n e d by
M a r t i n e z , t h e Commission reduced h e r backpay award based on
information contained elsewhere i n i t s record. The Commission
d i d n o t s p e c i f y t h e s o u r c e of t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n i n i t s f i n d i n g s
of f a c t b u t merely d e t e r m i n e d t h a t M a r t i n e z had e a r n e d
$5,229.50 d u r i n g t h e d u r a t i o n of t h i s m a t t e r .
S e c t i o n , 2-4-612, MCA, sets f o r t h r u l e s r e g a r d i n g
p r o c e d u r e f o r Commission h e a r i n g s . I t provides i n p e r t i n e n t
part, that:
" (1) O p p o r t u n i t y s h a l l be a f f o r d e d a l l p a r t i e s t o
respond and p r e s e n t e v i d e n c e and argument on a l l
i s s u e s involved.
" (5) A party s h a l l have t h e r i g h t t o c o n d u c t c r o s s -
e x a m i n a t i o n s r e q u i r e d f o r a f u l l and t r u e d i s c l o s u r e
of f a c t s . . .
" ( 6 ) N o t i c e may be t a k e n of j u d i c i a l l y c o g n i z a b l e
facts ... P a r t i e s s h a l l be n o t i f i e d e i t h e r b e f o r e
o r d u r i n g t h e h e a r i n g o r by r e f e r e n c e i n p r e l i m i n a r y
r e p o r t s o r o t h e r w i s e of t h e m a t e r i a l n o t i c e d , i n -
c l u d i n g any s t a f f memoranda o r d a t a . They s h a l l b e
afforded an opportunity t o c o n t e s t the m a t e r i a l so
noticed. "
I n t h e c a s e a t b a r , t h e i n f o r m a t i o n used by t h e Commission
t o r e d u c e M a r t i n e z ' backpay award was n o t n o t i c e d t o t h e
p a r t i e s i n v o l v e d t h u s p r e c l u d i n g t h e a p p e l l a n t from c o n t e s t i n g
t h e reduction.
F u r t h e r m o r e , s e c t i o n 2-4-623, MCA, governing t h e f i n a l
o r d e r handed down by t h e Commission i n c o n t e s t e d c a s e s , p r o -
vides that:
"(1) ... A f i n a l d e c i s i o n s h a l l i n c l u d e f i n d i n g s of
f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s of law, s e p a r a t e l y s t a t e d . ..
" ( 2 ) F i n d i n g s of f a c t s h a l l be based e x c l u s i v e l y on
t h e e v i d e n c e and on m a t t e r s o f f i c i a l l y n o t i c e d . "
S i n c e t h e m a t t e r of i n t e r i m wages w a s n o t s u b s t a n t i a t e d
by e v i d e n c e a t t h e h e a r i n g nor o f f i c i a l l y n o t i c e d t o t h e
p a r t i e s i n v o l v e d , i t was e r r o r f o r t h e Commission t o r e d u c e
t h e backpay award of Yvonne M a r t i n e z . Therefore, t h i s
m a t t e r must be remanded f o r p r o p e r d e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e
o f f s e t , i f any.
The D i s t r i c t C o u r t o r d e r i s r e v e r s e d . The o r d e r of t h e
Commission i s r e i n s t a t e d e x c e p t t h a t p o r t i o n o f f s e t t i n g
i n t e r i m wages. The c a s e i s remanded t o t h e Commission w i t h
d i r e c t i o n s t o h o l d a h e a r i n g f o r t h e p u r p o s e of d e t e r m i n i n g
what, i f any, i n t e r i m wages s h o u l d be o f f s e t from t h e award
granted.
./'/
/) Justices I/