No. 82-186
I N THE SUPREME COURT O F THE STATE O F MONTANA
BUTTE TEACHERS' UNION LOCAL NO. 332,
AFL-CIO,
P l a i n t i f f and A p p e l l a n t ,
BOARD OF T R U S T E E S O F BUTTE SCHOOL
D I S T R I C T NO. 1 O F S I L V E R BOW COUNTY, MONTANA,
D e f e n d a n t and R e s p o n d e n t .
Appeal from: D i s t r i c t C o u r t of t h e Second J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
I n and f o r t h e C o u n t y of S i l v e r Bow
H o n o r a b l e G o r d o n B e n n e t t , Judge p r e s i d i n g .
C o u n s e l of R e c o r d :
For A p p e l l a n t :
J.Brian Tierney, B u t t e , Montana
F o r Respondent:
P o o r e , R o t h & R o b i n s o n , B u t t e , Montana
D o n a l d C. R o b i n s o n , B u t t . e , M o n t a n a
S u b m i t t e d on b r i e f s : S e p t e m b e r 2 3 , 1982
Decided: December 1 6 , 1 9 8 2
Filed: 3EC f 6 19@
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j-
L.
Clerk
M r . J u s t i c e F r a n k B. M o r r i s o n , J r . , d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n of t h e
Court.
The S e c o n d J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t C o u r t , J u d g e Gordon B e n n e t t p r e -
siding, entered judgment in favor of respondent and dismissed
appellant's declaratory judgment claim based on the parties'
c o l l e c t i v e bargaining agreement. B u t t e T e a c h e r ' s Union Local N o .
332 a p p e a l s .
On March 23, 1981, Butte Teacher's Union Local No. 332
brought a declaratory judgment claim against the Board of
T r u s t e e s of B u t t e S c h o o l D i s t r i c t No. 1 of S i l v e r Bow C o u n t y ,
alleging that retiring teachers, as p a r t o f t h e i r s e v e r a n c e pay
package under the parties' collective bargaining agreement,
s h o u l d r e c e i v e s e v e r a n c e p a y f o r unused " a d d i t i o n a l " s i c k l e a v e .
The p r o v i s i o n s on w h i c h t h e claim was p r e m i s e d s t a t e i n p e r t i n e n t
part:
" A r t i c l e 23: Severance Pay: Section 1 -
S c h o o l D i s t r i c t N o . 1 s h a 3 T pay-tld--ceac%er
upon h i s o r h e r r e t i r e m e n t or d e a t h , o n e - h a l f
o f a n y u n u s e d p o r t i o n of t h e a c c u m u l a t e d s i c k
l e a v e remaining i n h i s o r h e r account.
" A r t i c l e 32: S i c k n e s s -- d D e a t h -- n F a m---
an - i ily .
L e a v e S e- t i o n -
- -- - c 1: A t e a c h e r s h a l l be a l l o w e d
each year an annual f i f t e e n (15) days s i c k
leave with f u l l s a l a r y cumulative f o r t e n ( 1 0 )
y e a r s o r one hundred f i f t y ( 1 5 0 ) d a y s , p l u s a n
a d d i t i o n a l f i v e ( 5 ) d a y s s h a l l be a l l o w e d i n
which t h e t e a c h e r r e c e i v e s t h e d i f f e r e n c e
b e t w e e n h i s o r h e r r a t e of p a y and $18 p e r
d a y , a c c u m u l a t e d up t o t h i r t y - f i v e d a y s . . ."
The Union sought a declaration t h a t the school d i s t r i c t has a
duty t o make payment of additional sick leave to r e t i r e d and
r e t i r i n g t e a c h e r s r e t r o a c t i v e t o 1 9 7 7 , which was when t h i s C o u r t
issued i t s o p i n i o n i n S c h o o l D i s t r i c t No. 1 v. Driscoll (1977)r
1 7 5 Mont. 555, 5 6 8 P.2d 1 4 9 , whereby a s i m i l a r p r o v i s i o n in a
s e p a r a t e c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g a g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n t h e d i s t r i c t and
s c h o o l a d m i n i s t r a t o r s was c o n s t r u e d to r e q u i r e t h e d i s t r i c t to
include unused additional sick leave in the accumulated sick
leave due and owing every administrator upon retirement.
The s c h o o l d i s t r i c t a n s w e r e d , d e n y i n g " a n y l i a b i l i t y of any
kind or n a t u r e whatsoever to t h e retired and retiring teacher
members f o r payment of additional s i c k l e a v e upon r e t i r e m e n t . "
The Union f i l e d a m o t i o n f o r summary j u d g m e n t along w i t h a
s u p p o r t i n g a££ i d a v i t from its c o u n s e l a t t e s t i n g t h a t (1) s i n c e
t h e 1977-1978 school year, pursuant t o t h i s Court's decision i n
Driscoll, supra, the d i s t r i c t has paid a l l retiring principals
and a d m i n i s t r a t o r s a d d i t i o n a l s i c k l e a v e as p a r t of t h e i r r e t i r e -
ment b e n e f i t s ; ( 2 ) no r e t i r i n g o r r e t i r e d t e a c h e r members h a v e
b e e n p a i d a d d i t i o n a l s i c k l e a v e as p a r t of t h e i r s e v e r a n c e bene-
f i t s s i n c e 1977-1978; and ( 3 ) t h e s c h o o l d i s t r i c t h a s r e f u s e d to
p a y s u c h b e n e f i t s a f t e r demand w a s made p u r s u a n t t o t h e p r o v i -
s i o n s of the parties' c o l l e c t i v e bargaining agreement and the
Driscoll d e c i s i o n .
The s c h o o l d i s t r i c t o p p o s e d t h e summary j u d g m e n t m o t i o n and
filed in response an affidavit from William C. Milligan,
S u p e r i n t e n d e n t of S c h o o l D i s t r i c t No. 1. Milligan's a£ f i d a v i t
emphasized the following facts: (1) t h a t s i n c e 1964, similar
additional sick leave and severance pay provisions had been
included i n c o n t r a c t s between t h e p a r t i e s ; ( 2 ) t h a t s i n c e 1964,
n o r e t i r i n g t e a c h e r had r e c e i v e d from t h e s c h o o l d i s t r i c t a d d i -
t i o n a l s i c k l e a v e as p a r t o f t h e i r s e v e r a n c e p a y ; ( 3 ) t h a t a t no
t i m e d u r i n g i n t e r m i t t e n t n e g o t i a t i o n s b e t w e e n t h e p a r t i e s had t h e
Union p r o p o s e d t h a t t h e s e v e r a n c e p a y p r o v i s i o n be a d m i n i s t e r e d
t o i n c l u d e a d d i t i o n a l s i c k l e a v e ; and ( 4 ) t h a t t h e f a c t s of the
D r i s c o l l case w e r e d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from t h e i n s t a n t controversy
b e c a u s e D r i s c o l l , b e i n g t h e f i r s t a d m i n i s t r a t o r to r e t i r e u n d e r
t h e first c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g agreement between a d m i n i s t r a t o r s
and the school district, immediately challenged the school
d i s t r i c t ' s a p p l i c a t i o n o f a c o m p a r a b l e s e v e r a n c e pay p r o v i s i o n i n
the administratorst contract.
The D i s t r i c t C o u r t c o n c l u d e d t h e r e were no g e n u i n e i s s u e s of
m a t e r i a l f a c t b u t d e n i e d t h e U n i o n ' s p r a y e r f o r summary j u d g m e n t .
I n i t s memorandum and o r d e r t h e t r i a l j u d g e e x p l a i n e d t h a t " t h e
l o n g a c q u i e s c e n c e of t h e [ U n i o n ] i n t h e [ s c h o o l d i s t r i c t ' s ] con-
sistent and s y s t e m a t i c e x c l u s i o n of additional cumulative s i c k
l e a v e from s e v e r a n c e p a y , c o n t r a r y t o t h e e x p r e s s p r o v i s i o n of
the contract, constituted a waiver of the provision and an
agreement to amend the contract t o allow f o r s u c h e x c l u s i o n . "
Thereafter , judgment was entered for the school district.
The Union c o n t e n d s t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d i n denying its
m o t i o n f o r summary j u d g m e n t and e n t e r i n g j u d g m e n t f o r t h e s c h o o l
district. V i o l a t i o n s o f t h e p a r o l e v i d e n c e r u l e and R u l e 56 ( c ) ,
M.R.Civ.P., are a s s e r t e d .
The Union a r g u e s t h a t M i l l i g a n ' s a f f i d a v i t was i n a d m i s s i b l e
u n d e r t h e p a r o l e v i d e n c e r u l e b e c a u s e it v i o l a t e s t h e c l e a r and
unambiguous w r i t t e n c o n t r a c t terms. Under R u l e 56 ( c ), M.R.Civ. P.
supporting and opposing affidavits on a motion for summary
j u d g m e n t may o n l y s e t f o r t h f a c t s as would be a d m i s s i b l e i n e v i -
dence a t t r i a l . A d m i s s i b i l i t y m u s t be determined i n terms of
relevance and the applicable rules of evidence, including the
s u b s t a n t i v e law t h a t w r i t t e n c o n t r a c t s may n o t be v a r i e d by p a r o l
evidence. To ascertain whether extrinsic evidence can be
admitted in an action on a written contract, pleadings must
necessarily be reviewed to determine the nature of the
plaintiff I s claim for relief and the defendant's defenses
thereto. S e e s e c t i o n s 28-2-905, -1602, MCA.
In the i n s t a n t matter, t h i s Court cannot review the lower
c o u r t ' s i m p l i c i t r u l i n g on t h e U n i o n ' s o b j e c t i o n to t h e a d m i s s i o n
o f p a r o l e v i d e n c e b e c a u s e t h e s t a t e o f t h e p l e a d i n g s a t t h e time
of t h e s u b m i s s i o n o f t h e a f f i d a v i t was s u c h t h a t t h e q u e s t i o n of
waiver was not properly i n issue.
R u l e 8 ( c ) , M.R.Civ.P., r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e d e f e n s e o f w a i v e r be
af f irmatively plead. Here, waiver was neither plead in the
school district's answer or raised by a subsequent motion or
cross-motion for summary judgment. Cf. Suckow Borax Mines
Consol., Inc. v. Borax C o n s o l . , Ltd., (9th Cir. 1 9 5 0 ) , 1 8 5 F.2d
196, 205, c e r t . d e n . 340 U.S. 9 4 3 , 9 5 L.Ed. 680, 7 1 S.Ct. 506,
cited i n Rambur v . D i e h l Lumber C o . Inc. ( 1 9 6 4 ) , 1 4 4 Mont. 84,
9 0 , 394 P.2d 745, 749. A l l e g a t i o n s o f w a i v e r were i n t h e f i r s t
instance presented to the D i s t r i c t C o u r t v i a a memorandum and
s u p p o r t i n g a f f i d a v i t i n o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e U n i o n ' s m o t i o n f o r sum-
m a r y j udgment .
Additionally" a t no t i m e d i d t h e Union join i n the waiver
issue. B e f o r e t h e d i s t r i c t and a p p e l l a t e c o u r t s , t h e Union h a s
m a i n t a i n e d i t s o b j e c t i o n t o t h e s c h o o l d i s t r i c t ' s a l l e g a t i o n s of
w a i v e r as b e i n g v i o l a t i v e o f t h e p a r 0 1 e v i d e n c e r u l e . Therefore,
i t c a n n o t be s a i d t h a t a n i s s u e n o t r a i s e d b y t h e p l e a d i n g s w a s
t r i e d by t h e e x p r e s s o r implied c o n s e n t of the p a r t i e s , as R u l e
1 5 ( b ) , M.R.Civ.P. would p e r m i t . Cf. R e i l l y v . Maw ( 1 9 6 5 ) , 1 4 6
Mont. 1 4 5 , 4 0 5 P.2d 4 4 0 , w h e r e i n i m p l i e d c o n s e n t was f o u n d o n t h e
b a s i s t h a t e v i d e n c e e x t r i n s i c t o t h e claim p l e a d , was a d m i t t e d -- t
a
t- l- w i t h o u t - - t i o n .
.
.
r i a-.
.
o b j -c -
.-
e Without an i s s u e r e g a r d i n g w a i v e r , a
large portion of Milligan's af f i d a v i t is inadmissible simply
because i t is i r r e l e v a n t to t h e q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r t h e s c h o o l
district has a duty to pay unused sick leave to retired and
retiring t e a c h e r s under the terms o f the c o l l e c t i v e bargaining
a g r e e m e n t and t h e D r i s c o-- o p i n i o n .
ll
G i v e n t h e d i s p o s i t i o n of t h e f i r s t i s s u e , w e need n o t a d d r e s s
t h e s e c o n d a r g u m e n t on a p p e a l .
T h i s C o u r t h e r e b y v a c a t e s t h e j u d g m e n t below and r e m a n d s t h e
case w i t h instructions to the court to r e c o n s i d e r the Union's
summary judgment motion i n t h e c o n t e x t of the issues properly
before the court. Amendment o f t h e s c h o o l d i s t r i c t ' s a n s w e r to
i n c l u d e a f f i r m a t i v e d e f e n s e s i n a v o i d a n c e of t h e c o n t r a c t is n o t
p r e c l u d e d by t h i s o p i n i o n .
W concur:
e
Mr. Justice John C. Sheehy, specially concurring:
I concur in the opinion, but disagree that an amend-
ment to the pleadings to include waiver is permissible in
this case. Waiver is a voluntary and knowing relinquish-
ment of a right. I do not see how waiver, if waiver
occurred, by the Union could be binding upon the individual
teacher-members of the Union on their severance. While the
Union is the agent of the teachers in the bargaining which
results in the contract, it can hardly be the agent of its
members for the purpose of waiver when the school board
violates the terms of the contract.