No. 8 1 - 4 8 2
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1982
STATE OF MONTBATA,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
JOHN ALDIN HUBBARD,
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from: District Court of the Eighth Judiciai District,
In and for the County of Cascade
Honorable Jack Shanstrom, Judge presiding
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant:
Sandra K. Watts argued, Great Falls, Montana
For Respondent:
Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Dorothy McCarter arqued, Assistant Attorney General,
Helena, Montana
J. Fred Bourdeau, County Attorney, Great Falls, Montana
Submitted: June 2 3 , 1982
Decided: August 25, 1982
Piled:
Clerk
Mr. C h i e f J u s t i c e Frank I . H a s w e l l d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n of
the Court.
Pursuant t o a plea bargain agreement, defendant plead
guilty to the crime of n e g l i g e n t homicide. The D i s t r i c t
C o u r t s e n t e n c e d d e f e n d a n t t o c o n s e c u t i v e t e r m s of ten years
i m p r i s o n m e n t f o r n e g l i g e n t h o m i c i d e and f i v e y e a r s f o r t h e
u s e o f a weapon i n c o m m i t t i n g t h a t c r i m e .
D e f e n d a n t a p p e a l s from t h e s e n t e n c e .
This is the second time defendant's case has come
before t h i s Court. F o l l o w i n g an e a r l y morning s h o o t o u t i n a
Great Falls trailer court in which two men were killed,
defendant Hubbard and a n o t h e r were tried and c o n v i c t e d o f
mitigated deliberate homicide and burglary, respectively.
We reversed Hubbard's conviction and remanded for a new
trial. S t a t e v. Fish e t a l . (1980), - Mon t . -, 6 2 1 P.2d
1 0 7 2 , 37 S t - R e p . 2065,
On remand, t h e H o n o r a b l e J a c k D. S h a n s t r o m was sub-
s t i t u t e d a s t h e p r e s i d i n g judge. An amended i n f o r m a t i o n was
f i l e d c h a r g i n g Hubbard w i t h n e g l i g e n t h o m i c i d e . A written
plea bargain agreement was signed and filed wherein
d e f e n d a n t a g r e e d t o p l e a d g u i l t y t o t h e c r i m e of negligent
I ~ o m i c i d e and acknowledged the possibility that the statute
enhancing the penalty for use of a weapon in that crime
m i g h t be a p p l i e d t o him.
On May 1 4 , 1 9 8 1 , a h e a r i n g was h e l d w h e r e i n d e f e n d a n t
testified to his s t a t e of mind a t the t i m e of t h e crime;
expert witnesses testified that defendant was under some
duress at that time; and friends and a deputy sheriff
testified concerning events t h a t occurred on the night of
the crime. Additionally, a psychiatrist at the Montana
S t a t e P r i s o n t e s t i f i e d t h a t h i s 1979 d i a g n o s i s o f d e f e n d a n t
a s a n t i s o c i a l was i n a c c u r a t e .
The f o l l o w i n g d a y a s e n t e n c i n g h e a r i n g was h e l d which
included testimony by the district probation and parole
o f f i c e r , a c l i n i c a l p s y c h o l o g i s t , d e f e n d a n t ' s m o t h e r and t h e
defendant himself. Following t h i s h e a r i n g Judge Shanstrom
ruled that the enhancement statute applied to negligent
homicide and that none of the exceptions to the statute
applied. He s e n t e n c e d t h e d e f e n d a n t t o c o n s e c u t i v e t e r m s o f
t e n y e a r s i m p r i s o n m e n t f o r n e g l i g e n t h o m i c i d e and f i v e y e a r s
f o r t h e u s e of a weapon i n t h a t crime. Defendant appeals
from t h i s sentence raising t h e following s p e c i f i c a t i o n s of
error:
(1) Does t h e s t a t u t e e n h a n c i n g t h e p e n a l t y f o r u s e o f
a weapon in the commission of a crime apply t o negligent
homicide?
( 2 ) Was d e f e n d a n t d e n i e d due p r o c e s s by i n c l u s i o n o f
n e g l i g e n t homicide i n t h e enhancement s t a t u t e ?
( 3 ) Does t h e record show t h a t d e f e n d a n t was a c t i n g
u n d e r u n u s u a l and s u b s t a n t i a l d u r e s s p r e c l u d i n g a p p l i c a t i o n
o f t h e enhancement s t a t u t e ?
( 4 ) Was e r r o r c o m m i t t e d by the sentencing judge in
admitting testimony amounting to retrial of the original
c h a r g e o f d e l i b e r a t e h o m i c i d e and i n s e n t e n c i n g d e f e n d a n t on
an inc o m p l e t e r e a d i n g of t h e t r i a l t r a n s c r i p t ?
( 5 ) Was d e f e n d a n t p r e j u d i c e d by t h e 1 9 7 9 d i a g n o s i s o f
d e f e n d a n t a s a n t i s o c i a l which was l a t e r r e t r a c t e d ?
( 6 ) Does j u s t i c e r e q u i r e t h e f i v e - y e a r enhancement t o
be s e r v e d c o n s e c u t i v e l y r a t h e r t h a n c o n c u r r e n t l y ?
The s t a t u t e s a t i s s u e i n t h i s c a s e a r e s e t o u t below:
"46-18-221. Additional sentence for offenses
c o m m i t t e d w i t h a d a n g e r o u s weapon. (1) A p e r -
s o n who h a s b e e n f o u n d g u i l t y o f a n y o f f e n s e
and who, w h i l e e n g a g e d i n t h e commission o f
t h e o f f e n s e , knowingly d i s p l a y e d , b r a n d i s h e d ,
o r o t h e r w i s e used a f i r e a r m , d e s t r u c t i v e
d e v i c e , a s d e f i n e d i n 45-8-332(1), o r o t h e r
d a n g e r o u s weapon s h a l l , i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e
p u n i s h m e n t p r o v i d e d f o r t h e commission o f
s u c h o f f e n s e , be s e n t e n c e d t o a t e r m o f
imprisonment i n t h e s t a t e p r i s o n of n o t l e s s
t h a n 2 y e a r s o r more t h a n 1 0 y e a r s , e x c e p t a s
p r o v i d e d i n 46-18-222.
" ( 4 ) An a d d i t i o n a l s e n t e n c e p r e s c r i b e d by
t h i s s e c t i o n s h a l l run c o n s e c u t i v e l y t o t h e
sentence provided f o r t h e offense.
" -6 - 1 8 - 2 2 2 .
4- -
-- E x c e p t i o n s t o m a n d a t o r y minimum
s e n t e n c e s a n d r e s t r i c t i o n s on d e f e r r e d impos-
t i o n and s u s ~ e n d e de x e c u t i o n o f s e n t e n c e . A l l
m a n d a t o r y minimum s e n t e n c e s p r e s c r i b e d by t h e
l a w s of t h i s s t a t e and t h e r e s t r i c t i o n s on
d e f e r r e d i m p o s i t i o n and s u s p e n d e d e x e c u t i o n
of s e n t e n c e ... do n o t a p p l y i f :
" ( 3 ) t h e d e f e n d a n t , a t t h e t i m e o f t h e com-
m i s s i o n o f t h e o f f e n s e f o r which h e i s t o b e
s e n t e n c e d , was a c t i n g u n d e r u n u s u a l and sub-
s t a n t i a l d u r e s s , although n o t such d u r e s s a s
would c o n s t i t u t e a d e f e n s e t o t h e p r o s e c u -
t i o n ; I'
We will combine our discussion of the first and
s e c o n d i s s u e s b e c a u s e of t h e i r i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p . Appellant
contends that (1) t h e legislative history of the above
statutes demonstrates a legislative intent to include
v i o l e n t crimes ( n o t n e g l i g e n t homicide) w i t h i n t h e ambit of
the legislation, ( 2 ) t h e r e is l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t t o e x c l u d e
result-oriented crimes n o t committed i n t e n t i o n a l l y l i k e
n e g l i g e n t homicide, and ( 3 ) t h a t s i n c e s e c t i o n 46-18-221 (1)
r e q u i r e s t h a t d e f e n d a n t knowingly used a f i r e a r m , it cannot
be u s e d t o e n h a n c e a s e n t e n c e f o r n e g l i g e n t h o m i c i d e where
no specific intent is required and to do so violates
d e f e n d a n t ' s procedural due p r o c e s s r i g h t s .
In construing a s t a t u t e , t h e i n t e n t of the legisla-
ture is controlling. Section 1-2-102, MCA; Dunphy v.
Anaconda Co. ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 1 5 1 Mont. 76, 438 P.2d 668, and c a s e s
cited therein. The i n t e n t i o n o f t h e l e g i s l a t u r e m u s t f i r s t
be d e t e r m i n e d from t h e p l a i n meaning o f t h e words u s e d , and
if i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e s t a t u t e c a n be s o d e t e r m i n e d , the
courts may not go further and apply any other means of
interpretation. Dunphy v . Anaconda Co., supra, and c a s e s
cited therein. Where, a s h e r e , t h e l a n g u a g e of t h e s t a t u t e
is plain, unambiguous, direct and certain, the statute
s p e a k s f o r i t s e l f and t h e r e i s n o t h i n g l e f t f o r t h e c o u r t t o
construe. S t a t e v. Roberts (1980), - Mont. , 633 P.2d
1214, 38 St.Rep. 1551. The statute plainly says t h a t "a
p e r s o n who h a s b e e n f o u n d g u i l t y of a n y o f f e n s e " and w h i l e
engaged in t h e commission o f t h e o f f e n s e knowingly u s e s a
firearm is subject to an enhanced penalty of two to ten
years. T h e r e is s i m p l y no r e a s o n f o r t h e u s e of l e g i s l a t i v e
h i s t o r y t o c o n s t r u e a s t a t u t e where t h e l a n g u a g e is c l e a r
and unambiguous on i t s f a c e .
Nor do we s e e any c o n f l i c t between the "knowingly"
mental state required by the enhancement statute and the
"negligently" mental state as it applies to negligent
homicide. N e g l i g e n t homicide is d e f i n e d a s f o l l o w s :
"Negligent homicide. (1) C r i m i n a l h o m i c i d e
c o n s t i t u t e s n e g l i g e n t h o m i c i d e when i t i s
committed n e g l i g e n t l y . " S e c t i o n 45-5-104,
MCA.
" N e g l i g e n t l y " is d e f i n e d a s :
" (37) 'Negligently1--a person a c t s negligent-
l y w i t h r e s p e c t t o a r e s u l t o r t o a circum-
s t a n c e d e s c r i b e d by a s t a t u t e d e f i n i n g a n
o f f e n s e when h e c o n s c i o u s l y d i s r e g a r d s a r i s k
t h a t the r e s u l t w i l l occur o r t h a t the
c i r c u m s t a n c e e x i s t s o r when h e d i s r e g a r d s a
r i s k of which h e s h o u l d be a w a r e t h a t t h e
r e s u l t w i l l occur o r t h a t t h e circumstance
exists. The r i s k m u s t be o f s u c h a n a t u r e
and d e g r e e t h a t t o d i s r e g a r d i t i n v o l v e s a
g r o s s d e v i a t i o n from t h e s t a n d a r d o f c o n d u c t
t h a t a r e a s o n a b l e p e r s o n would o b s e r v e i n t h e
actor's situation. ' G r o s s d e v i a t i o n ' means a
d e v i a t i o n t h a t is c o n s i d e r a b l y g r e a t e r t h a n
l a c k of o r d i n a r y c a r e . Relevant terms such
a s ' n e g l i g e n t ' and ' w i t h n e g l i g e n c e ' h a v e t h e
same meaning ." S e c t i o n 45-2-101 ( 3 7 ) , MCA.
"Knowingly" i s d e f i n e d a s :
" (33) 'Knowingly'--a p e r s o n a c t s knowingly
with r e s p e c t t o conduct o r t o a circumstance
d e s c r i b e d by a s t a t u t e d e f i n i n g a n o f f e n s e
when he is a w a r e o f h i s c o n d u c t o r t h a t t h e
c i r c u m s t a n c e e x i s t s , A p e r s o n a c t s knowingly
w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e r e s u l t of c o n d u c t de-
s c r i b e d by a s t a t u t e d e f i n i n g an o f f e n s e when
h e i s a w a r e t h a t i t is h i g h l y p r o b a b l e t h a t
s u c h r e s u l t w i l l be c a u s e d by h i s c o n d u c t .
When knowledge o f t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a p a r t i c u -
l a r f a c t i s a n e l e m e n t o f an o f f e n s e , s u c h
knowledge i s e s t a b l i s h e d i f a p e r s o n is a w a r e
o f a h i g h p r o b a b i l i t y o f i t s e x i s t e n c e . Equi-
v a l e n t terms such a s 'knowing' o r ' w i t h
knowledge' h a v e t h e same meaning ."
Section
45-2-101 ( 3 3 ) , MCA.
A person c a n knowingly use a f i r e a r m and still be
n e g l i g e n t by g r o s s l y d e v i a t i n g from t h e c o n d u c t o f a r e a s o n -
able person in a similar situation with regard to the
r e s u l t s of his actions. See, S t a t e v. Pierce (No. 81-343,
decided J u l y 7, 1982), - Mont, -' - P,2d -1 -
S t .Rep. There is no conflict between these two
statutes.
W do n o t f i n d a p p e l l a n t ' s d u e p r o c e s s a r g u m e n t s p e r -
e
suasive and much of what was said above applies to this
contention also. W have p r e v i o u s l y h e l d
e that the statute
does n o t offend due p r o c e s s r i g h t s . S t a t e v , Davison ( 1 9 8 0 ) ,
- Mont. -, 614 P.2d 489, 37 S t . R e p . 1135. A p p e l l a n t has
c i t e d no a u t h o r i t y d i r e c t l y i n p o i n t f o r h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
challenge. We decline to hold the enhancement statute
u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l on t h i s b a s i s .
With regard to the third issue, appellant contends
t h a t t h e f a c t s i n d i c a t e t h a t d e f e n d a n t was u n d e r u n u s u a l and
substantial duress within the meaning of section 46-18-
2 2 2 ( 3 ) , MCA, an e x c e p t i o n t o t h e e n h a n c e m e n t s t a t u t e . Appel-
lant argues that the jury v e r d i c t of mitigated deliberate
homicide (which requires "extreme mental or emotional
stress," s e c t i o n 45-5-103, MCA) bears t h i s out. Appellant
a l s o a r g u e s t h a t t h e f o l l o w i n g f a c t s i n d i c a t e d e f e n d a n t was
under the requisite amount o f duress: d e f e n d a n t had just
seen h i s friend shot, had been s h o t a t h i m s e l f , had had a
gun p o i n t e d i n h i s f a c e , and had w r e s t l e d t h e gun away f r o m
i t s owner.
The D i s t r i c t C o u r t found t h a t a l t h o u g h t h e r e was " a
c e r t a i n amount o f d u r e s s " in t h i s case, i t was n o t " u n u s u a l
or substantial," triggering s e c t i o n 46-18-222, MCA. There
was sufficient evidence in the record to support the
D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s d e t e r m i n a t i o n , and we u p h o l d i t h e r e . The
D i s t r i c t C o u r t made t h e f o l l o w i n g s t a t e m e n t s i n t h i s r e g a r d ,
addressed t o the defendant:
"By your own a d m i s s i o n you o n l y i n t e n d e d t o
' w i n g ' him. You s a i d , 'He s h o t D a l e , s o I
s h o t him.' And t h e n t h e s t a t e m e n t was made
t h a t you o n l y s h o t t o wound him. Then you
made t h e s t a t e m e n t , 'Nobody s t i c k s a gun i n
my f a c e and g e t s away w i t h i t . ' And, 'He
d e s e r v e s t o die--he d o e s n ' t d e s e r v e t o l i v e . '
'He k i l l e d my f r i e n d , s o I k i l l e d him.' I
t h i n k t h a t a l l of t h e s e s t a t e m e n t s , among
o t h e r s , i n d i c a t e an i n t e n t t o g e t e v e n by t h e
u s e of d i r e c t , p h y s i c a l f o r c e , a weapon."
The d e f e n d a n t a l s o had t h e p r e s e n c e o f mind t o tem-
p o r a r i l y i n c a p a c i t a t e t h e owner o f t h e gun by k i c k i n g him i n
the groin. F i n a l l y , d e f e n d a n t s h o t and k i l l e d a man r u n n i n g
away from him who p o s e d no i m m e d i a t e t h r e a t t o him. These
facts do not indicate unusual or substantial duress but
r a t h e r a r e v e n g e f u l a t t i t u d e on d e f e n d a n t ' s p a r t , s e e k i n g t o
make t h e k i l l e r " p a y " f o r s h o o t i n g h i s f r i e n d . T h e r e was no
abuse of discretion by the District Court in so ruling,
State v. Metz ( 1 9 7 9 ) , - Mont. ,
- 604 P.2d 102, 36
S t .Rep. 2261.
Next, appellant argues that the sentencing judge
e r r e d by a d m i t t i n g t e s t i m o n y which amounted t o a r e t r i a l on
t h e d e l i b e r a t e h o m i c i d e c h a r g e and by f a i l i n g to read the
entire t r i a l transcript. W w i l l address the l a t t e r p a r t of
e
t h i s contention f i r s t . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t j u d g e s o f this
s t a t e a r e b u r d e n e d w i t h h e a v y c a s e l o a d s a s i t is. W are
e
l o a t h e t o hold t h a t t h e f a i l u r e of a D i s t r i c t Court judge t o
r e a d e v e r y word o f a t r i a l t r a n s c r i p t m a n d a t e s a r e v e r s a l ,
Nor do we f i n d a n y e r r o r i n t h e a d m i s s i o n o f testi-
mony by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t . Such a h e a r i n g a s was h e l d h e r e
is required by section 46-18-223, MCA, which provides in
part:
" H e a r i n g t o d e t e r m i n e - p p l i c a t i o n o f -x c e p -
a-- e-
tions. (1) When t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f a n excep-
t i o n p r o v i d e d f o r i n 46-18-222 i s an i s s u e ,
the court s h a l l g r a n t the defendant a hearing
p r i o r t o t h e i m p o s i t i o n of s e n t e n c e t o d e t e r -
mine t h e a p p l i c a b i l i t y of t h e e x c e p t i o n ."
To d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r t h e d e f e n d a n t was o p e r a t i n g u n d e r sub-
s t a n t i a l o r unusual d u r e s s , t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t must neces-
s a r i l y c o n s i d e r t h e f a c t s l e a d i n g up t o t h e f a t a l s h o o t i n g s .
T h i s is e s p e c i a l l y t r u e h e r e s i n c e t h e t r i a l j u d g e was n o t
t h e s e n t e n c i n g judge.
Appellant's £if t h i s s u e i n v o l v e s whether t h e defen-
d a n t was p r e j u d i c e d w i t h r e s p e c t t o a w r o n g f u l d i a g n o s i s by
Montana S t a t e P r i s o n o f f i c i a l s on the presentence report.
This point is r a i s e d b e c a u s e t h e p s y c h i a t r i s t who p r e p a r e d
the presentence report in 1979 (wherein he diagnosed the
defendant as being antisocial) testified at the May 14,
1 9 8 1 h e a r i n g t h a t h i s d i a g n o s i s was i n a c c u r a t e . Appellant
claims error because the District Court considered this
report in sentencing the defendant. Appellant r e f e r s us t o
t h e f o l l o w i n g l a n g u a g e i n t h e c o u r t ' s o r d e r o f May 27, 1 9 8 1 :
"The C o u r t , h a v i n g h e a r d and c o n s i d e r e d o r a l
arguments t o g e t h e r with a l l of t h e testimony
and e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d a t t h e s e n t e n c i n g
hearing, the various presentence reports, the
d i a g n o s t i c e v a l u a t i o n from t h e Montana state
P r i s o n a n 5 t h e t r a n s c r i p t s , and b e i n g f u l l y
advised . . ." (Emphasis added.)
Appellant has cited no authority for this novel
a s s e r t i o n , and we r e j e c t i t . The s e n t e n c i n g j u d g e h e a r d t h e
psychiatrist t e s t i f y regarding h i s mistaken d i a g n o s i s , and
there is no indication that he did not abide by this
testimony. T1-ke mere r e f e r e n c e t o t h e r e p o r t i n t h e c o u r t ' s
o r d e r is n o t a s u f f i c i e n t g r o u n d f o r r e v e r s a l .
Appellant's final contention alleges error for the
District Court's sentence requiring the additional five
years to run consecutively, rather than concurrently.
Although t h e p r e s e n t s t a t u t e r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e s e n t e n c e run
consecutively (section 46-18-221(4), MCA, supra), at the
t i m e t h i s d e f e n d a n t was s e n t e n c e d t h e c o u r t had d i s c r e t i o n
to require the enhanced sentence to run concurrently.
However, t h i s g o e s t o t h e e q u i t y o f t h e s e n t e n c e r a t h e r t h a n
i t s l e g a l i t y and s h o u l d be d i r e c t e d t o t h e S e n t e n c e Review
Board and n o t t h i s C o u r t , S t a t e v . Metz, supra. Appellant
should take up these concerns with the appropriate
authority.
Affirmed.
T~u*e.ditwme
Chief J u s t i c e
We concur:
Mr. J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly d i s s e n t i n g :
I am n o t e a s i l y moved t o dissent but, "Qui f o r t i t e r
emungit, elicit sanguinem" -- "He who wrings the nose
s t r o n g l y b r i n g s blood." P r o v e r b s XXX, 33. M nose h a s been
y
s t r o n g l y wrung. I am n o t unmindful of t h e c l o s e and c o n s t a n t
i n t e r a c t i o n between " f a c t s " and "law." However, any j u d i c i a l
d e c e p t i o n t h a t e x i s t s i s more l i k e l y t o a p p l y t o t h e f a c t s
r a t h e r t h a n t h e law.
I have l a b o r e d w i t h t h e f a c t s of t h i s c a s e s i n c e 1978
when I r e c e i v e d t h e a s s i g n m e n t t o examine a D i s t r i c t C o u r t
d e n i a l of b a i l t o d e f e n d a n t Hubbard. M e x a m i n a t i o n produced
y
a normal young man, employed, e t c . , no p r e v i o u s r e c o r d . In
s h o r t , n o t h i n g i n t h e p e r s o n a l r e c o r d would m i l i t a t e a g a i n s t
a reasonable b a i l . T h i s C o u r t a g r e e d , and we s e t b a i l .
T h e r e a f t e r , i n 1980, I was a s s i g n e d S t a t e v. F i s h and
Hubbard on a p p e a l a £ t e r t r i a l . S t a t e v. F i s h and Hubbard
( 1 9 8 o ) t - Mont . , 621 P.2d 1072, 37 St.Kep. 2065.
The a u t h o r i t i e s a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t l e v e l took a n
unusually stronq stand against these defendants which was
not s u p p o r t e d by the t r i a l record. I authored an opinion
w i t h a unanimous C o u r t and, among o t h e r t h i n g s , s e t the
f a c t s s t r a i g h t b a s e d on t h e t r i a l t r a n s c r i p t . A person g e t s
a f e e l i n g r e a d i n g a t r i a l t r a n s c r i p t , where t h e r e i s i n s u f -
ficient evidence to sustain a conviction, that perhaps
t h i n g s a r e done t h a t a r e n o t c o m p a t i b l e w i t h due p r o c e s s o r
f a i r play. T h i s moved t h e C o u r t i n i t s r e v e r s a l t o q u i e t l y
admonish t h e l o c a l o f f i c i a l s , " d o n ' t do i t a g a i n . "
The h a n d l i n g of t h i s matter in t h e D i s t r i c t Court
c r e a t e d a s o r d i d mess w i t h t h e a p p e a r a n c e of an e f f o r t t o
restoration of the status quo that existed prior t o our
r e v e r s a l on a p p e a l . So, t h e s e n t e n c e p r o c e d u r e t h a t r e s u l t e d
f r o m a b r o k e n p l e a b a r g a i n and t h e u n u s u a l s e n t e n c e h a s b e e n
appealed again t o t h i s Court.
The facts in the majority opinion t h a t presume to
have examined t h i s m a t t e r a r e o u t r a g e o u s l y i n a c c u r a t e . They
a r e s l a n t e d and l i m i t e d i n s u c h a manner a s t o p r o d u c e a n
a p p e a r a n c e o f e x t r e m e c r i m i n a l i t y and p u r p o s e f u l g u i l t upon
t h e defendant. T h i s is a l l i n d i r e c t d e f i a n c e of t h e f a c t s
a s t h e y w e r e f o u n d t o be f r o m t h e t r a n s c r i p t r e c o r d o f t h e
trial!
I w i l l q u o t e a s m a l l p o r t i o n of the appeal decision
f o u n d r e p o r t e d 6 2 1 P.2d a t 1 0 7 8 . T h i s was p a r t of t h e d i s -
c u s s i o n on t h e a c c o u n t a b i l i t y c h a r g e s w h i c h w e r e r e v e r s e d :
" I n f u r t h e r s u p p o r t of t h e a c c o u n t a b i l i t y
t h e o r y , t h e S t a t e d r a w s on t h e time F i s h ,
Hubbard and Lodge w e r e t o g e t h e r e a r l i e r i n
t h e e v e n i n g and on i s o l a t e d r e m a r k s o v e r h e a r d
from them, a l l e g e d l y of a n e x c e e d i n g l y v i o -
l e n t n a t u r e and t h a t a l l t h r e e w e r e a g a i n
p r e s e n t a t M i l l e r ' s t r a i l e r when Lodge ap-
proached t h e t r a i l e r door. Yet, t h e record
is b a r e of any e v i d e n c e of any p r e p a r a t i o n by
any of t h e t h r e e t o c a r r y o u t t h e s e a l l e g e d
t h r e a t s ; no o n e was a r m e d , n o t e v e n w i t h a
s t i c k o r rock. The r e c o r d i s more c o m p a t i b l e
w i t h a n i n t e n t by F i s h t o e n g a g e i n a f i s t
f i g h t - - t o which h e a d m i t s . The S t a t e a d m i t s
i n t h e r e c o r d t h a t no weapons w e r e f o u n d when
t h e v e h i c l e s were s e a r c h e d . M i l l e r was t h e
o n l y p e r s o n armed. W a c k n o w l e d g e t h a t t h e r e
e
w a s a n uncommon a m o u n t o f a c t i v i t y t h a t
e v e n i n g t h a t made i t s way i n t o t h e r e c o r d ,
b u t we a r e c o m p e l l e d t o r e j e c t t h e c o n c l u s i o n
r e a c h e d f r o m t h i s by t h e S t a t e . " (Emphasis
added. )
The j u r y a l s o r e j e c t e d t h e t h e o r y o f f e r e d by t h e S t a t e .
The e n t i r e s e c o n d i s s u e i n t h e a p p e a l c a s e had t o d o
w i t h H u b b a r d ' s s t a t e of m i n d , y e t t h e t r i a l judge on s e n -
t e n c e h e l d a new h e a r i n g and r e c e i v e d e v i d e n c e WE HELD ON
THE APPEAL WAS NOT RELEVANT.
The p r o b l e m t h a t J u d g e S h a n s t r o m h a s i s t h a t h e i s
t r y i n g t o g i v e t h e d e f e n d a n t t h e maximum i n t e r m s of sen-
tence on a minimum record and refused to consult or be
g u i d e d by our a p p e a l o p i n i o n which I i n s i s t i s t h e law of
the case.
The f a c t s s i m p l y s t a t e d a r e t h a t d e f e n d a n t H u b b a r d ' s
judgment may have been f a u l t y i n i t i a l l y by p e r m i t t i n g h i s
sister t o persuade him to join the group, " t o make sure
there is a fair fight." T h i s e v e n t u a l l y l e d him t o t h e
t r a i l e r p a r k and t h e p r o b l e m s found t h e r e . N e v e r t h e l e s s , he
was by t h e t r i a l r e c o r d a " b y s t a n d e r . " A s the t r i a l record
i n d ~ c a t e s , none of t h e young p e o p l e were armed, not even
with a s t i c k . M i l l e r s h o t t h r o u g h t h e door and wounded a l l
t h r e e persons s t a n d i n g there--one fatally. All retreated
except the dead person. Miller came out and fired two
r o u n d s i n H u b b a r d ' s d i r e c t i o n , a p p e a r e d a t t h e s i d e of h i s
car in the dark, put a gun in his face, and profanely
threatened t o k i l l Hubbard. Hubbard w r e s t e d t h e gun from
M i l l e r and t h e r e s t is h i s t o r y .
The p o i n t of all this is, in the judge's opinion,
t h a t Hubbard a t t h i s p o i n t was n o t under u n u s u a l o r s u b s t a n -
t i a l duress. This is contrary to our findings on the
o r i g i n a l appeal.
I would l i k e t o move away from t h e f a c t s and i n t o t h e
law a p p l i e d a g a i n s t t h e d e f e n d a n t by t h e lower c o u r t , that
r e s u l t e d i n a n i n c r e a s e of p e n a l t y t o f i f t e e n y e a r s .
The D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n t o a p p l y t h e enhance-
ment s t a t u t e , s e c t i o n 46-18-221, PICA, and add an e x t r a f i v e
y e a r s t o d e f e n d a n t ' s s e n t e n c e f o r n e g l i g e n t homicide s h o u l d
be reversled on t h r e e g r o u n d s . First, b e c a u s e t h e enhance-
ment s t a t u t e c o n t a i n s a s p e c i f i c i n t e n t , "knowingly," it i s
a c o n t r a d i c t i o n i n terms t o a p p l y it t o a s i t u a t i o n where
admittedly defendant acted only "negligently." To s a y t h a t
a p e r s o n may a c t " k n o w i n g l y " and " n e g l i g e n t l y " a t t h e same
t i m e and d u r i n g t h e same a c t c r e a t e s a v a g u e , c o n f u s i n g a n d
a r b i t r a r y s t a n d a r d of c o n d u c t . S e c o n d l y , and more i m p o r t a n t
t o due process, the District Court disrupted t h e p l e a bar-
gaining process by a c t i v e l y p a r t i c i p a t i n g in the negotia-
tions. S u c h a c t i o n s by a t r i a l c o u r t h a v e b e e n condemned i n
numerous cases. S e e , Annot., 1 0 ALR4th 6 8 9 , e t s e q . L a s t l y ,
even i f t h e enhancement s t a t u t e i s a p p l i e d t o t h i s case, t h e
evidence does not support the D i s t r i c t Court's conclusion
that d e f e n d a n t was not acting under sufficient duress to
meet t h e s t a t u t o r y e x c e p t i o n s of t h e enhancement statute.
S e e , s e c t i o n 46-18-222, MCA.
The controlling language here is contained in the
enhancement s t a t u t e which p r o v i d e s i n p a r t t h a t a p e r s o n is
s u b j e c t t o i t s a p p l i c a t i o n i f he ". . . k n o w i n g l y displayed,
brandished, o r o t h e r w i s e used a f i r e a r m . . ."
T h i s C o u r t h a s h e l d t h a t when t h e l e g i s l a t u r e e n a c t e d
the new criminal code in 1973, it substituted t h e words
" p u r p o s e l y " and " k n o w i n g l y " f o r t h e w o r d s " f e l o n i o u s l y " a n d
"intentionally." S t a t e v. K l e i n ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 1 6 9 Mont. 3 5 0 , 547
P.2d 75. By d e f i n i t i o n , t h e n , s t a t u t e s c o n t a i n i n g t h e word
"knowingly" c o n t a i n a s p e c i f i c i n t e n t . A l s o by d e f i n i t i o n ,
acting "knowingly" is not acting accidently. State v.
S e i t z i n g e r ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 1 8 0 Mont. 1 3 6 , 589 P.2d 655.
In contrast, "negligently," by d e f i n i t i o n , r e f e r s t o
the commission of an act without regard to the actor's
i n t e n t o r knowledge. S e e d e f i n i t i o n i n s e c t i o n 4 5 - 2 - 1 0 1 ( 3 7 ) ,
MCA.
N e v e r t h e l e s s , a t t h e s e n t e n c i n g h e a r i n g t h e i n t e n t of
defendant was repeatedly brought into evidence over the
o b j e c t i o n of d e f e n s e c o u n s e l . The S t a t e w i t h t h e e n c o u r a g e -
ment of t h e District Court i n e f f e c t r e t r i e d defendant f o r
d e l i b e r a t e homicide. S e e comment, s u p r a .
The D i s t r i c t C o u r t r a t i o n a l i z e d t h e u s e o f s u c h e v i -
d e n c e by t r y i n g t o d i s t i n g u i s h t h e knowing u s e o f t h e f i r e -
arm f r o m t h e crime c o m m i t t e d . T h i s c a n n o t be d o n e s i m p l y
because it s u b j e c t s the defendant t o proof of a specific
i n t e n t w h e r e a d m i t t e d l y no s p e c i f i c i n t e n t i s p r e s e n t . In
essence, n e g l i g e n t homicide has been redefined as a n a c t
committed "knowingly," d e p r i v i n g d e f e n d a n t of h i s r i g h t t o
equal protection and due process and creating a vague
statute.
A s t h e W a s h i n g t o n Supreme C o u r t s t a t e d :
". . . S t a t u t e s which d e f i n e c r i m e s must b e
s t r i c t l y construed according t o the p l a i n
meaning of t h e i r words t o a s s u r e t h a t c i t i -
z e n s h a v e a d e q u a t e n o t i c e o f t h e terms o f t h e
l a w , as r e q u i r e d by d u e p r o c e s s . 'Men o f
common i n t e l l i g e n c e c a n n o t b e r e q u i r e d t o
g u e s s a t t h e meaning of t h e enactment.'
W i n t e r s v . N e w York, 333 U . S . 5 0 7 , 515, 68
S.Ct. 665, 670, 92 L.Ed.2d 840 ( 1 9 4 7 ) ;
S e a t t l e v . P u l l m a n , 82 Wash.2d 7 9 4 , 7 9 7 , 514
P.2d 1 0 5 9 ( 1 9 7 3 ) . The word ' k n o w l e d g e ' h a s
a n o r d i n a r y and a c c e p t e d m e a n i n g . A s t a t u t o r y
r e d e f i n i t i o n o f k n o w l e d g e t o mean n e g l i g e n t
i g n o r a n c e would c o m p l e t e l y c o n t r a d i c t t h e
a c c e p t e d meaning. . ." S t a t e v. S h i p p ( 1 9 8 0 ) ,
93 Wash.2d 5 1 0 , 610 P.2d 1 3 2 2 , 1 3 2 6 .
Moreover, t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t i n t e r p r e t e d t h e enhance-
m e n t s t a t u t e i n s u c h a way t h a t a p e n a l t y is imposed f o r
a c t s and a n i n t e n t d i f f e r e n t f r o m t h o s e i n t h e u n d e r l y i n g
offense. In effect, the District Court has created a
separate offense out of the enhancement statute, i.e.,
knowingly using a f i r e a r m o r o t h e r d e s t r u c t i v e d e v i c e . The
d e f e n d a n t was t h e n t r i e d f o r t h i s o f f e n s e a t t h e s e n t e n c i n g
hearing .
W e s t a t e d i n S t a t e v. Davison ( 1 9 8 0 ) , - Mont . - I
614 P.2d 489, 37 S t . R e p . 1135, t h a t t h e enhancement s t a t u t e
neither c r e a t e s nor p e n a l i z e s a d e f e n d a n t w i t h a separate
o f f e n s e . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e e n h a n c e -
ment s t a t u t e , h e r e , is n o t r e c o n c i l a b l e w i t h t h e h o l d i n g i n
Davison. I f t h e e n h a n c e m e n t s t a t u t e is t o b e u s e d , as i t s
name suggests, to "enhancen the underlying offense, it
c a n n o t i m p o s e a n e l e m e n t of i n t e n t s e p a r a t e f r o m t h e u n d e r -
lying offense.
As w e l l as misinterpreting t h e enhancement s t a t u t e ,
t h e D i s t r i c t Court o b s t r u c t e d t h e purpose of t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s
p l e a b a r g a i n by i m p o s i n g a f i v e - y e a r s e n t e n c e on t o p o f t h e
ten-year s e n t e n c e f o r which d e f e n d a n t o r i g i n a l l y b a r g a i n e d .
S u c h a c t i o n by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t is i n contravention to
s t a n d a r d s s e t by t h e A m e r i c a n Bar A s s o c i a t i o n S t a n d a r d s f o r
C r i m i n a l J u s t i c e which l i m i t s t h e t r i a l judge t o t h e r o l e o f
an i m p a s s i v e moderator. ABA S t a n d a r d s f o r C r i m i n a l J u s t i c e
14-3.3 ( 2 d ea. 1980). When a p l e a is influenced by the
a c t i o n s o f a j u d g e i t c a n n o t be s a i d t o b e v o l u n t a r y . State
v. C r o s s ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 270 S.C. 44, 240 S.E.2d 514. Plea negotia-
tions s h o u l d be between adversaries, and the trial judge
should not participate for either side since it is his
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o determine unbiasedly t h e voluntariness of
the plea.
Here, the District Court broke the plea bargain
agreement i n its b a s t a r d i z a t i o n of t h e enhancement s t a t u t e .
Defendant o r i g i n a l l y bargained up t o t h e t e n - y e a r maximum
s e n t e n c e f o r n e g l i g e n t homicide. Only t h r o u g h a c t i v e p a r t i -
c i p a t i o n by the District Court w a s t h i s maximum sentence
i n c r e a s e d by f i v e y e a r s .
Even if the enhancement statute could be said to
a p p l y t o t h i s c a s e and i f t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s p a r t i c i p a t i o n
in the plea n e g o t i a t i o n s could be considered proper, the
District Court nevertheless abused its discretion by
c o n c l u d i n g t h a t d e f e n d a n t d i d n o t come under t h e s t a t u t o r y
exceptions to the enhancement s t a t u t e . The r e c o r d s i m p l y
d o e s n o t s u p p o r t t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a-------------------
t d e f e n d a n t was n o t
a c t i n g under u n u s u a l and s u b s t a n t i a l d u r e s s . S e e , S t a t e v.
F i s h and Hubbard, s u p r a .
A s r e l a t e d i n t h e f a c t s acknowledged by t h i s C o u r t on
appeal, t h e owner of the r i f l e , Miller, s h o t two t i m e s a t
d e f e n d a n t moments b e f o r e d e f e n d a n t h i m s e l f came i n t o p o s s e s -
s i o n of the r i f l e . M i l l e r had shoved t h e r i f l e i n d e f e n -
dant's face, t h r e a t e n i n g t o blow h i s head o f f . Defendant
w r e s t e d t h e r i f l e away from M i l l e r . D e f e n d a n t t h e n walked
o v e r t o h i s f r i e n d who had j u s t been f a t a l l y s t r u c k i n t h e
neck w i t h s h r a p n e l from M i l l e r ' s p r i o r s h o t s . M i l l e r began
t o r u n away and d e f e n d a n t s h o t a t h i m t o p r e v e n t h i s e s c a p e .
Clearly, this e v i d e n c e of the s i t u a t i o n preponderates
a g a i n s t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s c o n c l u s i o n t h a t d e f e n d a n t was
n o t under s u b s t a n t i a l d u r e s s a t t h e t i m e of the shooting.
The D i s t r i c t C o u r t , therefore, abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n . The
statutory exception found in section 46-18-222(3), MCA,
s h o u l d a p p l y , and t h e e x t r a f i v e - y e a r s e n t e n c e s h o u l d be s e t
aside.
I have made some b r o a d s t a t e m e n t s and am m i n d f u l of
m own f r a i l t i e s .
y However, i t h a s been m p u r p o s e t o d e a l
y
with the f a c t s i n an i m p e r s o n a l and o b j e c t i v e manner. I
have p e r h a p s been t o o c r i t i c a l of t h e lower c o u r t p e r s o n n e l .
I would like it understood that I do not speak in terms of
conscious partiality or prejudgment, as no judge worthy of
his office would knowingly permit any cloud of prejudice to
darken his understanding or influence his decision.
Justice fl
I
Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea dissents and will file a written
dissent later.
Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea dissenting:
I join in the dissent of Justice Daly. It is refreshing
on occasion to see an opinion no longer bathed in judicial
language, but instead addressing the fundamental issues
underlying the surface issues.
We don't know precisely why the trial court gave the
sentence to defendant. In State v. Stumpf (1980),
Mont . -, 609 P.2d 298, we held that "a trial court's right
to exercise its discretion does not mean that a trial court
should not disclose the reasons underlying a discretionary
act. Absenti-reasons,the appellate court can only guess as
to why the trial court made a particular decision." Here,
the broad statement of the trial court that it relied on the
sentencing report, without disclaiming that report's inaccuracy,
places an appellate court in the impossible situation of not
knowing whether the trial court relied on erroneous parts of
the report. A sentence in that situation should not be upheld.
In United States v. Latimer (Ohio 1969), 415 F.2d 1288,
the Court held that error in a presentence investigation report,
if relied on, is a ground for remanding for resentencing. The
case was remanded for resentencing because the record -
did
not disclose whether the trial court had relied on erroneous
or improper information. An eloquent argument in favor of
a requirement that judges give reasons for their sentences,
has been made in United States v. Bazzano (1977), 521 F.2d
1122, 1132.
Fundamental fairness requires that the reasons for a
sentence be set out with precision. The defendant has a
right to assurance that a judge was not relying on erroneous
information. The record here is demonstrably lacking in that
"
assurance.
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$ *
% 8 :
" ?'
r:
; & .@"r
'
,
'1
1.1. '