No. 82-23
I N THE SUPREME COURT O THE STATE O MONTANA
F F
1982
THE STATE O MONTANA, e x r e l . , COLONEL
F
JOE R. SOL, C h i e f , Montana Highway
Patrol,
P l a i n t i f f and Respondent,
-vs-
VERNON J O H N BAKKER,
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
I n and f o r t h e County o f Y e l l o w s t o n e , The Honorable
W i l l i a m 5 . S p e a r e , Judge p r e s i d i n g .
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant:
B e r g e r , S i n c l a i r and N e l s o n ; James S i n c l a i r ,
B i l l i n g s , Montana
For Respondent:
Hon. Mike G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , Helena,
Montana
Harold F. H a n s e r , County A t t o r n e y , B i l l i n g s ,
Montana
S u b m i t t e d on B r i e f s : May 20, 1982
Decided: August 11, 1982
Filed : AblG 11 4982
" D e c l a r a t i o n o f s p e e d l i m i t s -- e x c e p t i o n
to the rule. The a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l shall
d e c l a r e b y p r o c l a m a t i o n f i l e d w i t h t h e secre-
t a r y o f s t a t e a s p e e d l i m i t f o r a l l motor
v e h i c l e s o n a l l p u b l i c s t r e e t s and h i g h w a y s i n
t h e s t a t e whenever t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of such a
s p e e d l i m i t b y t h e s t a t e is r e q u i r e d b y
f e d e r a l l a w as a c o n d i t i o n to t h e s t a t e ' s con-
tinuing eligibility to receive funds
a u t h o r i z e d b y t h e F e d e r a l Aid Highway A c t o f
1 9 7 3 and a l l a c t s a m e n d a t o r y t h e r e t o o r a n y
other federal statute. The s p e e d l i m i t may
n o t be l e s s t h a n t h a t r e q u i r e d by f e d e r a l law,
and t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l s h a l l b y f u r t h e r
proclamation change t h e speed l i m i t adopted
p u r s u a n t t o t h i s s e c t i o n to c o m p l y w i t h
f e d e r a l law. Any p r o c l a m a t i o n i s s u e d p u r s u a n t
t o t h i s s e c t i o n becomes e f f e c t i v e a t m i d n i g h t
o f t h e d a y upon which i t is f i l e d w i t h t h e
s e c r e t a r y of state. A s p e e d l i m i t imposed
p u r s u a n t t o t h i s s e c t i o n is a n e x c e p t i o n to
t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s o f 61-8-303 and 61-8-312, and
speed i n e x c e s s of t h e speed l i m i t e s t a b l i s h e d
p u r s u a n t t o t h i s s e c t i o n is u n l a w f u l n o t -
w i t h s t a n d i n g a n y p r o v i s i o n o f 61-8-303 and
61-8-312. " S e c t i o n 61-8-304, MCA.
"Speed r e s t r i c t i o n s --- basic rule. (1) A
p e r s o n o p e r a t i n g or d r i v i n g a v e h i c l e of any
c h a r a c t e r on a p u b l i c highway o f t h i s s t a t e
s h a l l d r i v e i t i n a c a r e f u l and p r u d e n t
m a n n e r , and a t a r a t e o f s p e e d no g r e a t e r t h a n
i s r e a s o n a b l e and p r o p e r u n d e r t h e c o n d i t i o n s
e x i s t i n g a t t h e p o i n t of o p e r a t i o n , t a k i n g
i n t o a c c o u n t t h e amount and c h a r a c t e r o f
traffic, condition of brakes, weight of
v e h i c l e , g r a d e and w i d t h o f h i g h w a y , c o n d i t i o n
o f s u r f a c e , and f r e e d o m o f o b s t r u c t i o n to v i e w
a h e a d , and h e s h a l l d r i v e it so as n o t t o
unduly or unreasonably endanger t h e l i f e ,
l i m b , p r o p e r t y , or o t h e r r i g h t s o f a p e r s o n
e n t i t l e d t o t h e u s e of t h e s t r e e t o r highway.
"(2) Where no s p e c i a l h a z a r d e x i s t s t h a t
r e q u i r e s lower s p e e d f o r c o m p l i a n c e w i t h sub-
s e c t i o n (1) o f t h i s s e c t i o n , t h e s p e e d o f a
v e h i c l e n o t i n e x c e s s of t h e l i m i t s s p e c i f i e d
i n t h i s s e c t i o n or e s t a b l i s h e d as a u t h o r i z e d
i n 61-8-309, 61-8-310, 61-8-311, and 61-8-313
is l a w f u l , b u t a speed i n e x c e s s of t h o s e
l i m i t s is u n l a w f u l :
"(a) 25 m i l e s p e r h o u r i n a n u r b a n d i s t r i c t ;
"(b) 35 m i l e s p e r h o u r o n a h i g h w a y u n d e r
c o n s t r u c t i o n or r e p a i r ;
"(c) 55 m i l e s p e r hour i n o t h e r l o c a t i o n s
during the nighttime, except t h a t the night-
t i m e s p e e d l i m i t o n c o m p l e t e d s e c t i o n s of
i n t e r s t a t e h i g h w a y s is 6 5 m i l e s per h o u r .
" ( 3 ) ' D a y t i m e ' means from o n e - h a l f h o u r b e f o r e
sunrise to one-half hour after sunset.
' N i g h t t i m e 1 means a t a n y o t h e r h o u r .
" ( 4 ) The s p e e d l i m i t s s e t f o r t h i n t h i s s e c t i o n
may be a l t e r e d b y t h e highway c o m m i s s i o n as
authorized in 61-8-309, 61-8-310, and
61-8-313.
"(5) The d r i v e r of a v e h i c l e s h a l l , con-
s i s t e n t with subsection ( l ) , drive a t an
a p p r o p r i a t e r e d u c e d s p e e d when a p p r o a c h i n g and
c r o s s i n g an i n t e r s e c t i o n or r a i l w a y g r a d e
c r o s s i n g , when a p r o a c h i n g and g o i n g a r o u n d a
c u r v e , when a p p r o a c h i n g a h i l l c r e s t , when
t r a v e l i n g upon a n a r r o w o r w i n d i n g roadway and
when a s p e c i a l h a z a r d e x i s t s w i t h respect t o
p e d e s t r i a n s or o t h e r t r a f f i c o r by r e a s o n o f
weather
61-8-303, MCA.
or highway c o n d i t i o n ."
Section
" S p e c i a l speed l i m i t a t i o n s on t r u c k s ,
t-r u c k t r a c t o r s . m o t o r - d r i v e n c * c l e s , a n d
- - - -
. . - - - - v
v e h i c l e s towing h o u s e t r a i l e r s . No person
s h a l l o p e r a t e any t r u c k or t r u c k t r a c t o r t h e
q r o s s w e i g h t o f which e x c e e d s 8 , 0 0 0 p o u n d s a t
a s p e e d g r e a t e r t h a n 6 5 miles per h o u r o n
t h o s e c o m p l e t e d s e c t i o n s o f i n t e r s t a t e and
f o u r - l a n e d i v i d e d h i g h w a y s and 60 miles p e r
h o u r on t h o s e completed s e c t i o n s of primary
and s e c o n d a r y highways. However, t h e t r u c k
n i g h t t i m e speed l i m i t s h a l l n o t exceed t h a t of
a u t o m o b i l e s a s s t a t e d i n 61-8-303.
" ( 2 ) N o person s h a l l o p e r a t e any motor-driven
c y c l e a t a n y t i m e m e n t i o n e d i n 61-9-201 a t a
s p e e d g r e a t e r t h a n 35 m i l e s per h o u r u n l e s s
s u c h m o t o r - d r i v e n c y c l e is e q u i p p e d w i t h a
h e a d l a m p o r l a m p s which a r e a d e q u a t e to r e v e a l
a p e r s o n o r v e h i c l e a t a d i s t a n c e of 3 0 0 f e e t
ahead.
" ( 3 ) N o p e r s o n s h a l l o p e r a t e a v e h i c l e which
is towing a h o u s e t r a i l e r a t a speed g r e a t e r
t h a n a maximum o f 50 m i l e s per h o u r
61-8-312, MCA.
Section ."
The defendant argues that S e c t i o n 61-8-312, MCA, h a s been
preempted by t h e p r o v i s i o n s of S e c t i o n 61-8-304, MCA. In the
instant case, a c t i o n began when the S t a t e of Montana c h a r g e d
defendant as a h a b i t u a l traffic of f e n d e r . Defendant contends
t h a t with the enactment of S e c t i o n 61-8-304, MCA, by t h e 1974
legislature, and with its subsequent amendment by the 1979
l e g i s l a t u r e , S e c t i o n 6 6 , C h a p t e r 421, t h a t under t h e e s t a b l i s h e d
r u l e s of s t a t u t o r y construction our l e g i s l a t u r e c l e a r l y intended
that Section 61-8-304, MCA, is the controlling statute and
preempts Section 61-8-312, MCA, as to speeding offenses.
Montana D e p a r t m e n t o f Revenue v. American S m e l t i n g and R e f i n i n g
( 1 9 7 7 ) f 1 7 3 Mont. 3 1 6 , 5 6 7 P.2d 901, 9 0 6 ; Matter of Senate B i l l
No. 23, C h a p t e r 491, Montana S e s s i o n L a w s of 1973 ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 168
Mont. 1 0 2 , 540 P.2d 975; Hammill v . Young ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 1 6 8 Mont. 81,
M r . J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n of the
Court.
T h i s is a n a p p e a l from a n O r d e r o f t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t of t h e
Thirteenth Judicial District, County o f Ye11owstone1 ad j u d g i n g
Bakker to be a habitual t r a f f i c offender and d i r e c t i n g him to
surrender his drivers license to the Montana Highway Patrol.
The c o m p l a i n t was f i l e d s e e k i n g to d e c l a r e d e f e n d a n t a h a b i -
tual t r a f f i c offender. T h e r e a f t e r t h e o r d e r to show c a u s e was
issued by the District Court requiring him to appear on
August 12, 1981. D e f e n d a n t s e c u r e d c o u n s e l and a p p e a r e d b e f o r e
the Honorable W i l l i a m J. Speare, sitting without a jury, who
d e t e r m i n e d t h a t d e f e n d a n t was a h a b i t u a l t r a f f i c o f f e n d e r under
t h e p r o v i s i o n s of our code.
Bakker is a twenty-nine year old truck driver employed by
Wymont B e v e r a g e s . H i s s o l e means o f s u p p o r t is t h a t o f d r i v i n g
trucks. H i s driving record, a s i n t r o d u c e d a t t h e h e a r i n g showed
an accumulation of a s t a t u s of thirty (30) habitual offender
points. The t h i r t y ( 3 0 ) p o i n t s r e p r e s e n t a n a c c u m u l a t i o n o f t e n
( 10) speeding violations under the provisions of Section
61-8-312, MCA. These v i o l a t i o n s o c c u r r e d between J a n u a r y 15,
1 9 7 9 , and A p r i l 2 0 , 1 9 8 1 . During t h a t p e r i o d t h e r e c o r d indi-
cated that the Montana Highway Patrol had corresponded with
the d e f e n d a n t warning him o f the acccumulation of points and
c o u n s e l i n g him a b o u t f u t u r e v i o l a t i o n s and t h e p o s s i b l e l o s s of
h i s license.
Following post-trial motions f o r a new t r i a l and to amend
f i n d i n g s o f f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s o f l a w , and d e n i a l of same, t h e
defendant f i l e d h i s n o t i c e of appeal. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t e n t e r e d
a n o r d e r , p u r s u a n t to a s t i p u l a t i o n between t h e p a r t i e s , staying
j u d g m e n t p e n d i n g a d e c i s i o n by t h i s C o u r t .
The sole i s s u e b e f o r e t h i s C o u r t is w h e t h e r S e c t i o n 61-8-312,
MCA, h a s b e e n p r e e m p t e d b y p r o v i s i o n s o f S e c t i o n 61-8-304, MCA.
T h r e e s e c t i o n s o f o u r code a r e b e f o r e u s i n c o n s i d e r i n g t h e
issue presented.
540 P.2d 971.
We find no argument with the cases cited and have long
a d h e r e d to t h e p o s i t i o n t h a t i n c o n s t r u i n g a s t a t u t e t h e i n t e n -
t i o n of t h e l e g i s l a t u r e m u s t be f o l l o w e d , i f possible. Section
1-2-102, MCA. However, the i n t e n t i o n of l e g i s l a t u r e must f i r s t
be determined f r o m t h e p l a i n meaning o f t h e words u s e d , and if
t h e meaning of t h e s t a t u t e c a n be d e t e r m i n e d , c o u r t s may n o t go
f u r t h e r and a p p l y a n y o t h e r means o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . S t a t e ex re1
Z a n d e r v. District Court ( 1 9 7 9 ) , -- Mon t . --, 5 9 1 P.2d 956,
36 St.Rep. 489; Haker v. S o u t h w e s t e r n Ry C o . (1978), 1 7 6 Mont.
364, 5 7 8 P.2d 724. In t h i s case the i n t e n t of the legislature
can be ascertained from the plain meaning as written.
S e c t i o n 61-8-304, MCA, m a k e s c l e a r t h a t it is a n e x c e p t i o n to
S e c t i o n s 61-8-303, MCA, and 61-8-312, MCA, which e s t a b l i s h the
s p e e d l i m i t a t 5 5 m i l e s per h o u r . The b a s i c r u l e s t a t u t e S e c t i o n
61-8-303, MCA, provides in subsection (2)(c) that a nighttime
s p e e d i n e x c e s s o f 65 miles per h o u r o n t h e i n t e r s t a t e h i g h w a y is
unlawful. The d e f e n d a n t was c i t e d u n d e r S e c t i o n 61-8-312, MCA,
which p r o v i d e s that the speed l i m i t f o r t r u c k s is 65 miles p e r
h o u r o n i n t e r s t a t e and four-lane d i v i d e d highways, and 6 0 m i l e s
p e r hour on o t h e r highways. I n a d d i t i o n , it restricts t h e n i g h t -
time speed limit for trucks as the same for automobiles, as
s t a t e d i n S e c t i o n 61-8-303, MCA.
Here the clear meaning of the statute can be determined
according to t h e plain-meaning rule. As set f o r t h i n Sections
61-8-303, MCA, and 61-8-312, MCA, i t is o b v i o u s t h a t t h e s e sec-
t i o n s s e t t h e s p e e d l i m i t s a t 60 m i l e s p e r h o u r and 6 5 miles p e r
hour, and t h a t S e c t i o n 61-8-304, MCA, s p e c i f i c a l l y provides t h a t
notwithstanding those l i m i t s , a s p e e d a b o v e 5 5 miles per h o u r i s
unlawful as p u r s u a n t to that statute. Therefore, as in this
c a s e , a t r u c k e x c e e d i n g t h e 50 m i l e per h o u r s p e e d l i m i t o n a
completed s e c t i o n of the interstate, but not exceeding the 65
mile per hour speed limit, would be charged under Section
61-8-304, MCA. However, i n t h e e v e n t t h a t t h e t r u c k e x c e e d e d t h e
rate of 6 5 miles per hour on such a s t r e t c h of highway, the
driver would be charged under S e c t i o n 61-8-312, MCA. Rating
these two speed limit statutes it is clear that Section
61-8-304, MCA, e n s u r e s t h a t it is u n d e r s t o o d t h a t s p e e d s between
5 5 and 6 5 m i l e s p e r h o u r a r e a l s o u n l a w f u l . T h i s i s made c l e a r
b y t h e l a s t s e n t e n c e of S e c t i o n 61-8-304, MCA, which indicates
that the legislature intended that Section 61-8-312, MCA,
remained i n e f f e c t .
In further clarification of our interpretation as given
above, we look to other rules of statutory construction for
guidance. That next step i n the p r o c e s s of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is
looked to t h e purpose of t h e s t a t u t e f o r g u i d a n c e i n i t s meaning.
S e e S t a t e v. Weese (1982), Mont . ---- , 616 P.2d 371,
37 S t . R p t r . 1620 a t 1622.
The p u r p o s e o f S e c t i o n 61-8-304, MCA, was s i m p l y to p u t a l a w
o n t h e b o o k s t h a t would e n s u r e t h e c o n t i n u e d r e c e i p t of federal
highway funds, yet, impose no real penalty or hardship on
violators. T h i s is e v i d e n c e d by t h e m i n i m a l $5 ( f i v e ) f i n e , and
t h e f a c t t h a t no p o i n t s a r e a c c e s s e d f o r v i o l a t i o n . See Chapter
60, Laws o f Montana (1974). T h a t act p r o v i d e s t h a t t h e speed
l i m i t established by t h e attorney general s h a l l t e r m i n a t e whe-
never such speed limit is no longer required by federal law.
Section 31 Chapter 601 Laws of Montana (1974).
The p u r p o s e o f t h a t p o r t i o n o f t h e s t a t u t e , o r t h a t which is
now S e c t i o n 61-8-304, MCA, was n o t to r e v i s e t h e s t a t u t o r y scheme
relating to speed limits in general. This i s made c l e a r by
reading of S e c t i o n 61-8-305(2) , MCA, and S e c t i o n 61-8-306(5),
MCA. Those sections b a s i c a l l y provide t h a t the local l a w may
e s t a b l i s h lower s p e e d l i m i t s t h a n t h a t d e c l a r e d b y t h e a t t o r n e y
general. In addition, t o make t h e i n t e n t o f t h e act p e r f e c t l y
clear, Section 7 , Chapter 60, Laws of Montana (1974), now
c o d i f i e d as S e c t i o n 61-8-307, MCA, provides:
" T h i s a c t i n no way a f f e c t s t r a f f i c c o n t r o l
s t a t u t e s and v i o l a t i o n s o f e x i s t i n g s t a t u t e s
shall be prosecuted solely as provided
therein ."
O b v i o u s l y , t h e c l e a r i n t e n t o f t h e l e g i s l a t u r e was to e n a c t a
new l a w when it passed C h a p t e r 60. But, the laws were f o r a
i
l i m i t e d p u r p o s e , and t h a t p u r p o s e was a c h i e v e d by s e t t i n g f u r t h e r
exceptions to e x i s t i n g traffic laws and without rewriting the
e n t i r e t r a f f i c r e g u l a t i o n body of l a w .
Finally, we note that the appellant argues that Section
61-8-304, MCA, "preempts" other sections, and in so doing,
provides f o r "implied repeal" argument. It has been t h e long-
e s t a b l i s h e d r u l e t h a t r e p e a l s by i m p l i c a t i o n a r e n o t f a v o r i t e s .
R e p e a l s by i m p l i c a t i o n are n o t f a v o r e d and c o u r t s w i l l make e v e r y
e f f o r t to r e c o n c i l e t h e s t a t u t e s i n q u e s t i o n s t o avoid r e p e a l s .
Kuchan v . H a r v e y ( 1 9 7 8 ) , ----- Mont . ---- , 5 8 5 P.2d 1298, 35
St.Rep. 1547. See also Lee v. State of Montana (1981)
----- Mon t . ---- , 6 3 5 P.2d 1 2 8 2 , 38 S t . R e p . 1729. Mead, Samuel
and Co., Inc. v. Dyar (1980), 127 A r i z . 565, 622 P.2d 512.
Based on t h e above r u l e s of s t a t u t o r y c o n s t r u c t i o n , we f i n d
it c l e a r that the Montana s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e d i d not intend to
rewrite the traffic regulations, and that S e c t i o n 61-8-304 is
s i m p l y an e x c e p t i o n to t h e o t h e r s t a t u t e s . Here t h e l e g i s l a t u r e
o n l y p a s s e d t h e s e c t i o n i n o r d e r t o e n s u r e a c o n t i n u e d r e c e i p t of
f e d e r a l highway f u n d s . S e c t i o n 61-8-304, MCA, as f a r as S e c t i o n s
61-8-303, MCA, and 61-8-312, MCA, a r e c o n c e r n e d , a p p l i e s o n l y to
s p e e d l i m i t s b e t w e e n 5 5 miles p e r h o u r and e i t h e r 6 0 o r 6 5 m i l e s
per hour depending upon the type of highway o f f e n s e incurred
thereon.
The j u d g m e n t o f t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t is a f f i r m e d .
We concur: