No. 81-431
I N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE O M N A A
F OTN
1982
I N RE THE MARRIAGE O F
DOROTHEA J. SCBULTZ,
P e t i t i o n e r and A p p e l l a n t ,
- VS-
JACOB SCHULTZ,
Respondent and R e s p o n d e n t .
Appeal from: D i s t r i c t C o u r t of t h e T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
I n and. f o r t h e County o f B i g Morn, The H o n o r a b l e
Diane G . B a r z , J u d g e p r e s i d i n g .
C o u n s e l of Record:
For Appellant:
Anderson, Edwards & Molloy, B i l l i n g s , Montana
F o r Respondent :
K r o n m i l l e r a n d S e y k o r a , H a r d i n , Montana
Submitted on B r i e f s : J u n e 1 7 , 1982
Decided: A U ~ U S11,
~ 1982
Filed: BUG 11.59fjz
Mr. J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n of the
Court.
A c t i o n commenced by w i f e s e e k i n g d i s s o l u t i o n of m a r r i a g e and
a property division. P e t i t i o n e r f i l e d i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t of
the Thirteenth Judicial District in and for the County of
Yellowstone. Findings of fact and conclusions of law were
e n t e r e d A p r i l 22, 1981, f o l l o w e d by j u d g m e n t . Appeal followed
directed s p e c i f i c a l l y to t h e d i s p o s i t i o n of couple I s property.
The p a r t i e s to t h i s a c t i o n were m a r r i e d i n 1936. For the
43-year duration of t h e i r marriage they farmed and ranched at
various locations in south-central Montana. Respondent
(hereinafter Jake) has a second grade education. Appellant
( h e r e i n a f t e r D o r o t h e a ) was g r a d u a t e d from h i g h s c h o o l . Due to
t h e p a r t i e s 1 wide d i f f e r e n c e i n e d u c a t i o n s , Dorothea handled t h e
management and f i n a n c e s o f t h e o p e r a t i o n s w h i l e J a k e c o n c e n t r a t e d
on the day-to-day functions. The record shows b o t h Jake and
Dorothea were h a r d workers and attempted to make the best of
t h e i r debt-ridden business.
At t h e t i m e a p p e l l a n t f i l e d h e r p e t i t i o n f o r d i s s o l u t i o n of
m a r r i a g e , and p a r t i e s w e r e f a r m i n g and r a n c h i n g n o r t h of H a r d i n ,
Montana, on 160 acres known as the home place which they
p u r c h a s e d from D o r o t h e a l s f a t h e r . L a t e r , a n o t h e r 1 1 7 a c r e s were
purchased w i t h t h e h e l p of their son, Robert S c h u l t z , known a s
the Orser Place. The parties improved and equipped the home
p l a c e b y b o r r o w i n g s u b s t a n t i a l a m o u n t s o f money f r o m t h e FHA and
t h e PCA. I n a d d i t i o n t h e y used f u n d s which D o r o t h e a r e c e i v e d i n
a personal i n j u r y s e t t l e m e n t and f r o m money i n h e r i t e d from h e r
uncle.
The p a r t i e s a c c u m u l a t e d a h e r d o f c a t t l e on t h e r a n c h which
i n c l u d e d f o u r separate b r a n d s :
1. B a r D Lazy K , r e g i s t e r e d to D o r o t h e a S c h u l t z ;
2. Lazy D J B a r , r e g i s t e r e d to J a c o b and D o r o t h e a S c h u l t z ;
3. B a r CB, r e g i s t e r e d to P a t r i c i a Thomas;
4. S l a s h CC, r e g i s t e r e d t o R o b e r t and D o r o t h e a S c h u l t z ;
The o w n e r s h i p o f these four brands is d i s p u t e d . The B a r D
L a z y K b r a n d was f i r s t e s t a b l i s h e d i n 1950 b y Dorothea S c h u l t z .
In 1971, Dorothea transferred the brand to a j o i n t brand w i t h
J a k e upon r e q u e s t b y t h e FHA t o q u a l i f y for a loan. When t h e
l o a n was r e l e a s e d J a k e a s s i g n e d his i n t e r e s t back t o Dorothea.
The L a z y DJ Bar i s j o i n t l y owned b y D o r o t h e a and J a k e w i t h o u t
dispute. The c a t t l e b r a n d e d B a r CB were p u r c h a s e d i n 1961 by
D o r o t h e a and t h e n sold t o t h e d a u g h t e r P a t r i c i a Thomas. Since
t h e n t h e b r a n d h a s a l w a y s b e e n r e g i s t e r e d i n t h e d a u g h t e r ' s name.
When the brand Bar C cows were c a l v e d - o u t
B through the years,
some o f t h e c a l v e s were s o l d and t h e p r o c e e d s u s e d b y J a k e and
Dorothea in their operations. The c a t t l e b r a n d e d S l a s h C were
C
p u r c h a s e d b y D o r o t h e a i n 1 9 7 5 . D o r o t h e a o b t a i n e d a l o a n from t h e
L i t t l e Horn Bank t o p a y f o r t h e c a t t l e . When s h e c o u l d n ' t r e p a y
the loan, the son, Robert Schultz, repaid t h e b a n k and D o r o t h e a
g a v e him a b i l l o f s a l e f o r t h e c a t t l e . The c a t t l e were b r a n d e d
S l a s h CC and t h e b r a n d was r e g i s t e r e d i n t h e names o f R o b e r t and
Dorothea S c h u l t z .
I n t h e District C o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s of f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s of
l a w t h e c o u r t f o u n d t h e t o t a l n e t w o r t h of t h e p a r t i e s to be b e t -
ween $ 9 4 , 1 1 6 . 5 1 and $ 1 5 3 , 5 9 9 . 5 1 . The d i f f e r e n c e i n amount is due
to different appraisals of the real estate and cattle. The
D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s f i n d i n g is as f o l l o w s :
RECAP
ASSETS
Real Property $242,375.00 t o $276,060.00
L e s s s a l e o f 59% i n t e r e s t - 59,000.00 - 59,000.00
Machinery
Crops
Livestock
Brand
-Dz B r a n d 38,730.00 to 45,300.00
/CC Brand 9,450.00 to 10,900.00
- Brand
0 J 16,500.00 to 18,650.00
Check 8,729.33 to -- 8 , 7 2 9 . 3 3
Sub-Total 355,614.33 to 415,097.33
Less $59,000.00, s a l e of
59% i n t e r e s t - 59,000.00 - ,000.00
59
TOTAL ASSETS
LIABILITIES
FHA $180,030.17
L i t t l e Horn S t a t e Rank 14,722.65
Miscellaneous
TOTAL LIABILITIES
NET WORTH OF PARTIES TOGETHER
Assets $296,614.33 t o $356,097.33
TOTAL
In the j udgmen t the District Court ordered :
". . . t h a t t h e p r o p e r t y o f t h e marital
e s t a t e , b o t h r e a l and p e r s o n a l , i n c l u d i n g CB
a n d /CC b r a n d c a t t l e s h a l l be s o l d , and a f t e r
payment o f a l l i n d e b t e d n e s s h e r e i n t h e n e t
p r o c e e d s s h a l l be d i v i d e d b e t w e e n t h e p a r t i e s
e x c e p t p e t i t i o n e r is e n t i t l e d t o b e p a i d
$ 2 5 , 0 0 0 o v e r and a b o v e r e s p o n d e n t ' s s h a r e . ..
"Sale of property s e t f o r t h i n the previous
p a r a g r a p h s h a l l be accomplished by mutual
a g r e e m e n t o f t h e p a r t i e s p r e s e n t e d to t h i s
Court. I f no a g r e e m e n t is r e a c h e d , t h e c o u r t
s h a l l set t h e g u i d e l i n e s f o r t h e sale. The
c o u r t would r a t i f y a n a g r e e m e n t a l l o w i n g t h e
p e t i t i o n e r ' s t o r e t a i n t h e 'home p l a c e , ' if
t h e p a r t i e s c a n d o so, g i v i n g r e s p o n d e n t h i s
p o r t i o n o f t h e m a r i t a l e s t a t e .I'
From t h i s judgment p e t i t i o n e r a p p e a l s .
The i s s u e s p r e s e n t e d f o r r e v i e w are:
1. W h e t h e r t h e c o u r t had j u r i s d i c t i o n to i n c l u d e w i t h i n t h e
m a r i t a l e s t a t e and t o d i v i d e and o r d e r s o l d t h e c a t t l e owned by
and branded i n t h e names o f the adult children, Robert Schultz
a n d P a t r i c i a Thomas.
2. Whether the court abused its discretion and acted
c o n t r a r y t o t h e e v i d e n c e when it i n c l u d e d w i t h t h e m a r i t a l e s t a t e
the cattle with the wife's s e p a r a t e and personal brand, Bar D
Lazy K.
3. Whether the court abused its d i s c r e t i o n in failing to
g i v e t h e w i f e t h e r i g h t to p u r c h a s e t h e home r a n c h b e f o r e sub-
j e c t i n g it t o f o r c e d l i t i g a t i o n .
Appellant argues the District Court e r r e d by i n c l u d i n g the
b r a n d s S l a s h CC and B a r CB, r e g i s t e r e d i n t h e c h i l d r e n ' s names,
i n t o t h e m a r i t a l e s t a t e . T h e r e is no d i s p u t e t h a t t h e b r a n d , Bar
CB i s r e g i s t e r e d i n t h e name o f t h e d a u g h t e r , P a t r i c i a Thomas, o r
t h a t the brand, S l a s h CC i s r e g i s t e r e d i n t h e names of t h e son,
R o b e r t S c h u l t z and D o r o t h e a S c h u l t z .
A p p e l l a n t c i t e s s e c t i o n 1-1-101, MCA:
"A p e r s o n , f i r m or c o r p o r a t i o n i n whose name a
m a r k or b r a n d i s r e c o r d e d i s e n t i t l e d to t h e
e x c l u s i v e u s e o f t h e mark o r b r a n d o n t h e s p e -
c i e s o f a n i m a l and i n t h e p o s i t i o n d e s i g n a t e d
i n t h e r e c o r d . A copy of t h e record c e r t i f i e d
b y t h e d e p a r t m e n t is prima f a c i e e v i d e n c e of
t h i s r i g h t , - - c e r t i f i c a t e - -s o p r i m a
and t h e is al
f a c i e e v i d e n c e -t - p e r s o n , - m o-cor-
t h a the fir - r
p e r a t i o n e n t i t l e d - -e-h e mark o r b r a n d i s
to us t - -
t h e e r - -l a n i m a l s o n w h i c h i t a p p e a r s
of al
i n -e p o s i t i o n -d -n- h e s p e c i e s o f a n i m a l
- th an o t -
stated in - c e r t i f i c a t e .I1
the (Emphasis
supplied .
)
This s e c t i o n was o r i g i n a l l y e n a c t e d as S e c t i o n 5, Ch. 144
Laws of Montana ( 1 9 2 1 ) , c o d i f i e d as S e c t i o n 3 3 0 5 , R.C.M. 1921.
The l a n g u a g e h a s r e m a i n e d unchanged s i n c e i t s e n a c t m e n t . In the
case o f S t a t e v. Keays ( 1 9 3 4 ) r 97 Mont. 404, 34 P.2d 855, this
C o u r t c i t e d t h e s e c t i o n and s t a t e d : "Defendant argues t h a t the
c e r t i f i c a t e s mentioned i n t h e a b o v e s e c t i o n were t h e b e s t e v i -
d e n c e o f o w n e r s h i p , and t h a t i t was e r r o r to a d m i t t h e o r a l t e s t i -
mony of Rafesty upon this question. It is true that the
c e r t i f i c a t e s s p e c i f i e d by t h e s t a t u t e s would h a v e b e e n t h e b e s t
evidence. The a d m i s s i o n of t h e o r a l t e s t i m o n y i n t h e p l a c e of
such c e r t i f i c a t e s did constitute at least a technical error."
T h i s b e i n g a c r i m i n a l case, t h e C o u r t found o t h e r g r o u n d s upon
which w e could r e v e r s e . However, the rule t h a t the c e r t i f i c a t e
is the best evidence of ownership has never been overruled.
T h a t d o e s n o t mean t h a t t h e p r e s u m p t i o n of o w n e r s h i p c a n n o t
be r e b u t t e d . I n B o h a r t v. Songer e t a l . ( 1 9 4 0 ) , 1 1 0 Mont. 405,
1 0 1 P.2d 64, we stated: " [ n ] ow t h e r e c o r d e d b r a n d e s t a b l i s h e s
p r i m a facie proof of ownership on which such brand a p p e a r s . Of
c o u r s e , t h e p r i m a f a c i e e v i d e n c e o f o w n e r s h i p c a n be o v e r c o m e by
s a t i s f a c t o r y evidence of transfer or relinquishment of a par-
t i c u l a r animal." I n t h e p r e s e n t case t h e r e was no e v i d e n c e of
t r a n s f e r o r relinquishment of the disputed brands. The b r a n d s
have always been i n t h e c h i l d r e n ' s names and t h u s t h e c h i l d r e n
are presumed t h e owners.
R e s p o n d e n t now claims he h a s a n " i n t e r e s t 1 ' i n t h e d i s p u t e d
b r a n d s b e c a u s e he fed and w a t e r e d t h e c a t t l e and t o o k care of
them on h i s l a n d . H e cites no a u t h o r i t y which s u b s t a n t i a t e s t h i s
claim of ownership. Respondent acknowledged that the children
were the registered owners of the brands and never contested
their ownership u n t i l the d i s s o l u t i o n proceeding. The record
s h o w s t h e p a r e n t s s o l d c a l v e s from t h e d a u g h t e r ' s b r a n d , Bar CB,
a n d t h e p r o c e e d s were u s e d i n t h e o p e r a t i o n of the ranch. The
record does not show that the daughter was repaid for these
calves. R e s p o n d e n t c a n n o t a r g u e he w a t e r e d , f e d and p a s t u r e d t h e
children's cattle without compensation as i t seems t h e p a r e n t s
use of the proceeds from the daughter's calf sales provided
e q u i t a b l e payment. W e f i n d no merit i n r e s p o n d e n t ' s contentions.
A p p e l l a n t n e x t a r g u e s t h e District Court abused its discre-
t i o n when it i n c l u d e d the wife's p e r s o n a l brand of cattle with
the marital estate. The standard for reviewing the property
d i v i s i o n i n a d i s s o l u t i o n decreed by a D i s t r i c t C o u r t is w e l l
s e t t l e d i n M o n t a n a . The a p p o r t i o n m e n t made b y t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t
will n o t be d i s t u r b e d on r e v i e w u n l e s s t h e r e h a s been a c l e a r
a b u s e o f d i s c r e t i o n as m a n i f e s t e d b y a s u b s t a n t i a l l y i n e q u i t a b l e
division of the marital assets resulting in substantial
injustice. I n R e M a r r i a g e o f Brown ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 1 7 9 Mont. 417, 587
P.2d 3 6 1 , 3 6 4 ; I n R e M a r r i a g e o f B l a i r ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 1 7 8 Mont. 2 2 0 , 583
P.2d 4 0 3 , 405; V i v i a n v. V i v i a n ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 1 7 8 Mont. 3 4 1 , 5 8 3 P.2d
1072, 1074. The d u t y o f t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t is to c o n s i d e r t h e
statutory c r i t e r i a and e q u i t a b l y a p p o r t i o n t h e marital assets.
Each case m u s t b e l o o k e d a t i n d i v i d u a l l y w i t h a n e y e to i t s uni-
que circumstances. I n Re Marriage of J a c o b s o n ( 1 9 7 9 ) , Mont . -
- - , 600 P.2d 1183, 1186, 35 S t . R e p . 1773, 1776; Aanenson v.
Aanenson ( 1 9 7 9 ) , -- Mont. , 5 9 8 P.2d 1 1 2 0 , 36 S t . R e p . 1525,
S e c t i o n 40-4-202, MCA s t a t e s :
" I n a p r o c e e d i n g f o r d i s s o l u t i o n of a m a r r i a g e
. . . the court , . . shall . . . finally
e q u i t a b l y a - -p o r t i o n b e t w e e n t h e p a r t i e s t h e
p
p r o p e r t y - and a s s e t s b e l o n g i n g - e i t h e r o r
to
both, however - whenever
and acquired and
w h e t h e r t i t l e t h e r e t o - i n - - - - the
is t h e name o f
husband or wife or both. In making
a p p o r t i o n m e n t , t h e court s h a l l consider the
d u r a t i o n o f t h e m a r r i a g e and [ o t h e r f a c t o r s ]
. . . The c o u r t s h a l l a l s o c o n s i d e r t h e
c o n t r i b u t i o n or d i s s i p a t i o n of v a l u e of t h e
r e s p e c t i v e estates - - c o n t r i b u t i o n - -
and t h e of a
s p o u s e a s a homemaker o r - -e f a m i l y u n i t . "
to th
( Emphasis added. )
T h i s s e c t i o n makes i t c l e a r t h a t t h e s o u r c e of and t i t l e to
marital p r o p e r t y i s i r r e l e v a n t as t o t h e d i v i s i o n o f s u c h pro-
perty upon d i s s o l u t i o n o f marriage. I n Re Marriage of Brown,
supra. The s t a t u t e s p e c i f i c a l l y s t a t e s t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t m u s t
e q u i t a b l y a p p o r t i o n t h e a s s e t s no matter i n whose name l i e s t i t l e
or f o r what s o u r c e a c q u i r e d . The s e c t i o n is n o t a m b i g u o u s . When
we a p p l y s e c t i o n 40-4-202, MCA, the r e l e v a n t case law to the
D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s r u l i n g w e f i n d no a b u s e of d i s c r e t i o n b u t r a t h e r
a c o r r e c t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e l a w .
A p p e l l a n t a r g u e s s e c t i o n 40-2-201, MCA, s u p p o r t s the wife I s
claim o f ownership t o h e r brand of cattle, t h e B a r D Lazy K .
T h i s s e c t i o n s t a t e s , " N e i t h e r husband n o r wife h a s any i n t e r e s t
in the property of the other, except as m e n t i o n e d in section
40-2-102, b u t n e i t h e r c a n be e x c l u d e d from t h e o t h e r ' s d w e l l i n g
u n l e s s e n j o i n e d by a c o u r t . " S e c t i o n 40-2-201, MCA, does not
apply in a proceeding for disposition of property.
A p p e l l a n t claims t h a t r e s p o n d e n t had no i n t e r e s t i n h e r p e r -
s o n a l b r a n d o f c a t t l e and s o e x p r e s s e d i n a b i l l o f s a l e o f which
purported to relinquish his interest in virtually all of the
m a r i t a l estate. S e c t i o n 40-4-202, MCA, calls f o r an equitable
division of the marital estate by the court, regardless of
however o r whenever a c q u i r e d o r i n whose name the property is
held. I n Re Marriage of Houtchens ( 1 9 7 9 ) , ---- Mon t . ---- I
592 P.2d 1 5 8 , 1 6 0 , 36 S t . R e p . 501, 503. Whether or n o t a par-
ticular brand of c a t t l e was r e g i s t e r d in the wife's name, or
w h e t h e r t h e r e was a q u e s t i o n a b l e b i l l o f s a l e which p a s s e d a l l of
t h e h u s b a n d ' s p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y t o t h e w i f e h a s no b e a r i n g o n t h e
d i v i s i o n of p r o p e r t y mandate of s e c t i o n 40-4-202, MCA. Aside
from t h e i n c l u s i o n of t h e c h i l d r e n ' s c a t t l e i n t h e marital e s t a t e
w e f i n d no a b u s e o f d i s c r e t i o n by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t i n i t s pro-
perty division.
Finally, appellant argues the District Court abused its
d i s c r e t i o n by f a i l i n g t o g i v e h e r t h e r i g h t to p u r c h a s e t h e home
r a n c h b e f o r e s u b j e c t i n g it to f o r c e d l i t i g a t i o n . Paragraph 5 of
the District Court 's j udgmen t reads as follows :
"5. S a l e of p r o p e r t y s e t f o r t h i n the pre-
v i o u s p a r a g r a p h s h a l l be a c c o m p l i s h e d b y
m u t u a l agreement of t h e p a r t i e s p r e s e n t e d to
t h i s court. I f no a g r e e m e n t is r e a c h e d , t h e
c o u r t s h a l l set t h e g u i d e l i n e s f o r the sale.
The c o u r t would r a t i f y a n a g r e e m e n t a l l o w i n g
P e t i t i o n e r t o r e t a i n t h e 'home p l a n t i f p a r -
t i e s can do s o , g i v i n g respondent h i s p o r t i o n
o f t h e marital e s t a t e . "
I t d o e s n o t a p p e a r t h a t f o r c e d s a l e o f t h e r a n c h was t h e o n l y
a l t e r n a t i v e as t h e a p p e l l a n t c l a i m s . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t c l e a r l y
allowed the parties room to n e g o t i a t e a buy-out on their own
terms. It seems t h e parties would have an i n t e r e s t i n nego-
t i a t i n g t h e i r own terms a s t h e y a r e i n a b e t t e r p o s i t i o n to know
w h a t t h e y c a n a f f o r d and w h a t t h e y f e e l t h e i r i n t e r e s t is w o r t h .
T h e i r i n c e n t i v e s h o u l d be t o a v o i d a f o r c e d sale which m i g h t n o t
be as fruitful as a s a l e from o n e p a r t y to t h e o t h e r . Here
f o r c e d s a l e was n o t o r d e r e d u n l e s s t h e p a r t i e s c o u l d n o t r e a c h a n
agreement. We find no error in the District Court's ruling.
For the above r e a s o n s , w e remand the case to t h e D i s t r i c t
C o u r t t o m o d i f y t h e p r o p e r t y d i v i s i o n by e x c l u d i n g t h e c h i l d r e n ' s
c a t t l e from t h e m a r i t a l e s t a t e .
W e concur:
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Justices /