Goodnough v. State

No. 81-195
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1982

GREGORY K. GOODNOUGH and
COREY McMILLAN ,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
VS .
STATE OF MONTANA,
Defendant and Respondent.

Appeal from: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District,
In and for the County of Flathead
Honorable Robert Sykes, Judge presiding.
Counsel of Record:
For Appellants:
William A. Rossbach argued, Missoula, Montana
Hoyt and Trieweiler, Whitefish, Montana
For Respondent:
Murphy, Robinson, Heckathorn & Phillips, Kalispell,
Montana
I. James Heckathorn argued, Kalispell, Montana

Submitted: February 23, 1982
Decided:
JuL I- 1982
Filed:
Mr. J u s t i c e Gene B . Daly d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n o f t h e C o u r t .

T h i s i s an a p p e a l o f an a c t i o n i n n e g l i g e n c e a g a i n s t

t h e S t a t e o f Montana, a r i s i n g o u t o f a c a r a c c i d e n t i n w h i c h

plaintiffs' c a r was s t r u c k by a p a s s i n g v e h i c l e w h i l e making

a left turn. Plaintiffs brought this action against the

d r i v e r of t h e p a s s i n g v e h i c l e , Rodney K l u d a s h , and t h e S t a t e

of Montana. The p l a i n t i f f s sett-led with Kludash b u t pro-

ceeded t o t r i a l a g a i n s t t h e S t a t e . The j u r y r e t u r n e d a v e r -

d i c t f o r t h e S t a t - e , and a judgment b a s e d on t h i s v e r d i c t was

i s s u e d by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t o f t h e Eleventh J u d i c i a l D i s -

t r i c t , F l a t h e a d Count-y. The p l a i n t i f f s a p p e a l .

On November 9, 1 9 7 6 , a t about. 4:30 p.m., the appel-

l a n t . ~ ,t w o high school boys, w e r e d r i v i n g s o u t h on Highway

93 from W h i t e f i s h , Mont-ana, to a rural subdivision called

Happy V a l l e y . As appellant McMillan was t u r n i n g left off

the highway into the subdivision, h i s c a r was s t r u c k by a

p a s s i n g v e h i c l e d r i v e n by Rodney K l u d a s h . Both a p p e l l a n t s

incurred substant-ial i n juries. Goodnough had a b a d l y b r o k e n

femur which r e q u i r e d n e a r l y a f u l l body c a s t . . McMillan was

in a semi-comatose state f o r s e v e r a l weeks, had a crushed

pelvis, and i n c u r r e d many p r o b l e m s wit.h h i s t r a c h e a when a

t r a c h e o s t o m y was p e r f o r m e d i n t h e h o s p i t a l .

Happy V a l l e y s u b d i v i s i o n i s a b o u t s i x m i l e s sout-h o f

Whitefish. The i n t e r s e c t ion between t.he road leading t-o

Happy V a l l e y and Highway 93 i s 1 , 0 5 1 f e e t f r o m t h e c r e s t o f

a h i l l . The r o a d i s s t r a i g h t , and on t.he d a y o f t h e a c c i d e n t

i t was c l e a r and d r y . Double y e l l o w , no p a s s i n g s t r i p e s yo

u p t h e h i l l p r e c e d i n g t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n and c o n t i n u e p a s t . t h e

intersect-ion. Seven h u n d r e d feet before the intersection

t h e r e is a t r a f f i c s i g n warning of a p e d e s t r i a n c r o s s i n g .
 Tne p l a l n t i f f s c o n t e n d that the S t a t e was negligent

by using only double yellow, no passing stripes to warn

d r i v e r s of passing. They c l a i m t h e S t a t e had n o t i c e o f t h e

hazardous nature of the Happy Valley intersection and,

t h e r e f o r e , was u n d e r a d u t y t o p u t up a no p a s s i n g s i g n , a n

i n t e r s e c t i o n s i g n , o r a t u r n bay f o r l e f t - t u r n i n g cars. An

expert f o r the p l a i n t i f f s t e s t i f i e d t h a t because the State

was a w a r e of t h e h i g h number of accidents reported a t t h i s

intersection, it should have known that the yellow, no

passing stripes commanded little respect and were not

effective. The p l a i n t i f f s c l a i m t h a t the State created a

" t r a p " f o r unwary d r i v e r s .

The State emphasizes the facts surrounding the

accident itself, claiming t h a t any l i a b i l i t y of the State,

i f a n y , was cut. o f f by t h e s u p e r s e d i n g c a u s e o f t h e p a s s i n g

vehicle. The S t a t e p r e s e n t e d evidence that. the d r i v e r of

the passing vehicle, K l u d a s h , was t r a v e l i n g b e t w e e n 7 5 and

100 m i l e s per hour and that Kludash had a blood alcohol

l e v e l of .08 p e r c e n t a t t h e time of the accident. The D i s -

trict Court allowed i n t o evidence testimony t h a t Kludash' s

c a r was s e e n p a r k e d a l o n g s i d e t h e r o a d o u t s i d e o f W h i t e f i s h ,

and s e v e r a l of the car's o c c u p a n t s were o u t s i d e r e l i e v i n g

themselves.

At the t r i a l , the District Court gave t h e following

i n s t r u c t i o n on s u p e r s e d i n g , intervening cause:

"The l a w r e c o g n i z e s what i s c a l l e d a s u p e r -
seding cause. A s u p e r s e d i n g c a u s e is a n
intervening cause not reasonably f o r e s e e a b l e
t h a t c u t s o f f t h e c a u s a l c o n n e c t i o n between
t h e a l l e g e d o r i g i n a l n e g l i g e n c e and t h e
i n j u r y c o m p l a i n e d o f and t h e r e b y p r e v e n t s t h e
a l l e g e d o r i g i n a l n e g l i g e n c e from being a
proximate cause t h e r e o f . As applied t o t h i s
c a s e , t h e l a w p r o v i d e s t h a t i f you s h o u l d
f i n d t h a t t h e S t a t e o f Montana was n e g l i g e n t
 and t h e S t a t e ' s n e y l i g e n c e was a c o n t r i b u t i n g
f a c t o r t o t h e p l a i n t . i f f s l i n j u r i e s , but that.
t h e n e g l i g e n c e o f Rodney ~ l u d a s hwas a s u p e r -
seding cause, then such superseding cause
p r e v e n t s any n e g l i g e n c e of t h e S t a t e o f
Montana from b e i n g a p r o x i m a t e c a u s e o f
claimants' injuries." J u r y I n s t r u c t i o n No.
14.

After beginning deliberation, the jury evidently

became c o n f u s e d a s t o t h e meaning o f " s u p e r s e d i n g " and w r o t e

t h e t r i a l ludge t h i s note: "We d o n o t u n d e r s t a n d s u p e r s e d i n g

i n I n s t r u c t i o n No. 1 4 . " The j u d g e r e f u s e d t o g i v e t h e j u r o r s

a d i c t i o n a r y and a d v i s e d t h e j u r o r s t o e x a m i n e and c o n s i d e r

all of the other instructions along with No. 14 and, in

d o i n g s o , a p p l y t h e i r judgment t o t h e f a c t s .

After deliberation, which included a n o v e r n i g h t re-

c e s s , t h e j u r y s e n t down a v e r d i c t f o r t h e S t a t e .

'l'he appellants present basically four issues on

review:

1. Whether t h e j u r y was so c o n f u s e d by t h e i n s t r u c -

t i o n s on p r o x i m a t e c a u s e t h a t a v e r d i c t f o r a p p e 1 l a n t . s was

impossible.

2. Whether the District Court erred by admitting

evidence that occupants of the Kludash car were seen

r e l i e v i n g themselves.

3. Whether a highway patrolman was compet.ent t.o

e s t i m a t e t h e s p e e d o f t.he Kludash v e h i c l e .

4. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d in prohibiting

counsel f o r appellant-s to q u e s t ion p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r s about

their beliefs, as taxpayers, concerning their financial

i n t e r e s t . i n t h e outcome o f t.he c a s e .

Appellants' major contention of error is that the

jury was so c o n f u s e d by t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s t h a t a v e r d i c t f o r

them was made i m p o s s i b l e . S p e c i f i c a l l y , a p p e l l a n t s contend
t h a t . Instruction No. 1 4 was incomplete, i n t h a t superseding

c a u s e was n o t p r o p e r l y d e f i n e d , and c a u s e d p r e j u d i c i a l con-

fusion i n the jury.

A p p e l l a n t s contend t h a t t h e c o n f u s i o n of t h i s incom-

p l e t e d e f i n i t i o n was compounded by t h e g i v i n g of I n s t r u c t i o n

No. 1 2 which p r o v i d e s :

" A p l a i n t i f f who i s i n j u r e d a s a p r o x i m a t e
r e s u l t o f some n e g l i g e n t c o n d u c t on t h e p a r t
o f a d e f e n d a n t i s e n t i t l e d t o r e c o v e r compen-
s a t i o n f o r s u c h i n j u r y from t h a t d e f e n d a n t .

"Thus, P l a i n t i f f s a r e e n t i t l e d t o a v e r d i c t
i n t h i s c a s e i f you f i n d , i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h
my i n s t r u c t i o n s :

"1. T h a t D e f e n d a n t was n e g l i g e n t , and

"2. T h a t s u c h n e g l i g e n c e was a p r o x i m a t e
c a u s e o f i n j u r y t o t h e p l a i n t i f f s , and

"3. T h a t s u c h n e g l i g e n c e was n o t s u p e r s e d e d
by t h e n e g l i g e n c e o f o t h e r s a s d e f i n e d i n
these instructions."

A p p e l l a n t s c l a i m t h a t t h i s c o n f u s i o n could have been

a l l e v i a t e d by t h e g i v i n g o f t h e i r proposed i n s t r u c t i o n no.

" I f you f i n d t h a t t h e D e f e n d a n t S t a t e o f
Montana was n e g l i g e n t and t h a t i t s n e g l i g e n c e
was a s u b s t a n t i a l f a c t o r i n b r i n g i n g a b o u t a n
i n j u r y t o t h e P l a i n t i f f s b u t t h a t t h e immedi-
a t e c a u s e o f t h e i n j u r y was t h e n e g l i g e n t
conduct of a t h i r d person t h e Defendant is
n o t r e l i e v e d of l i a b i l i t y f o r such i n j u r y i f :

I t i . A t t h e t i m e of its conduct Defendant
r e a l i z e d o r reasonably should have r e a l i z e d
t h a t a t h i r d p e r s o n m i g h t a c t a s he d i d ;

"2. A r e a s o n a b l e p e r s o n knowing t.he s i t u a -
t i o n e x i s t i n g a t t h e t i m e of t h e conduct o f
t.he t h i r d p e r s o n would n o t h a v e r e g a r d e d i t
a s highly extraordinary t h a t t h e t h i r d person
had s o a c t e d . ' I

It i s w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d i n Montana t h a t when i n s t r u c -

tions are inconsistent or contradictory to a degree that

would confuse the average juror, reversal is required.
Brothers v. Surplus Tractor Parts Corporation (1973), 161

Mont.. 412, 506 P.2d 1362, 1364. However, this Court has

also ruled that where the jury instructions, taken as a

whole, s t a t e t h e law a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e c a s e , a p a r t y c a n n o t

claim reversible e r r o r a s t o the giving of c e r t a i n instruc-

t ions. Kock S p r i n g s C o r p o r a t i o n v. Pierre ( 1980), - Mon t..
, 615 P.2d 2 0 6 , 211, 37 S t . K e p . 1378, 1383. A s not-ed by

our sister court. i n Idaho, when c o n s i d e r i n g j u r y instruc-

tions, i t m u s t b e remembered that often a jury is deluged

wit-h numerous i n s t r u c t i o n s , many o f w h i c h a t t e m p t t o e x p l a i n

complex q u e s t i o n s o f l a w . The c o u r t . o n r e v i e w m u s t t h e r e f o r e

balance t.he p o s s i b l e c o n £ u s i o n c r e a t e d by l a y e r upon l a y e r

o f i n s t r u c t - i o n s and t h e n e c e s s i t y o f p r o v i d i n g t h e a p p r o p r i -

ate legal theories. Messmer v. Ker ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 96 I d a h o 75, 524

B e c a u s e t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s g i v e n by t h e D i s t r l c t C o u r t

are not inconsistent or contradictory, and because they

r e f l e c t , i n s u b s t a n c e , t h e a p p l i c a b l e Montana l a w , we c a n n o t

say that the a p p e l l a n t s were prejudiced by the giving of

these instructions.

In Halsey v. Uithof ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 1 6 6 Mont. 319, 532 P.2d

686, we discussed the rules of concurrent. cause and

superseding-intervening cause and how they relate to the

d e t e r m i n a t i o n of p r o x i m a t e c a u s e :

"We a g r e e w i t h t h e p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t w h e r e o n e
has n e g l i g e n t l y caused a c o n d i t i o n of danger,
h e is n o t r e l i e v e d o f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r
damage c a u s e d t o a n o t h e r m e r e l y b e c a u s e t h e
i n j u r y a l s o involved t h e l a t e r misconduct of
someone e l s e . But, t h i s is t r u e o n l y i f both
negligent a c t s a r e i n f a c t concurring proxi-
m a t e c a u s e s o f t h e i n j u r y ; and i t i s n o t t r u e
i f t h e l a t e r n e g l i g e n c e is a n independent,
intervening s o l e cause of t h e incident.
[Citation omitted. 1
 " I n determining whether t h e negligence i n
c r e a t i n g a h a z a r d ( t h e t r u c k s t a l l e d on t h e
h i g h w a y ) was a p r o x i m a t e c a u s e o f t h e a c c i -
d e n t , t h i s t e s t i s t o be a p p l i e d : Did t h e
w r o n g f u l a c t , i n a n a t u r a l c o n t i n u o u s se-
quence of event-s, which m i g h t r e a s o n a b l y b e
expected t o follow, produce t h e i n j u r y ? If
s o , it is a c o n c u r r i n g proximate c a u s e o f t h e
i n j u r y even though t h e l a t e r n e g l i g e n t a c t o f
another ... cooperated t o cause it. On t h e
o t h e r hand, i f t h e l a t t e r ' s act of n e g l i g e n c e
i n causing t h e accident w a s of such a charac-
t e r a s not reasonably t o be e x p e c t e d t o hap-
pen i n t h e n a t u r a l sequence of events, then
such later a c t of nealiaence is t h e i n d e ~ e n -
-e n t , i n
d ----- t e r v e n i n g -c a u s e a n d t h e r e f o - t h e
- --
- r e-
s o l e proximate cause of t h e iniury. [Cita-
t . i o n s A o m i t t e d . ] " 532 P.2d at. 6901691.

Here, I n s t r u c t i o n No. 14 p r o v i d e s t h a t a superseding

cause is an "intervening cause not. r e a s o n a b l y foreseeable

that cuts off the causal connection between the alleged

o r i g i n a l n e g l i g e n c e and t h e i n j u r y c o m p l a i n e d o f and t h e r e b y

prevents the alleged original negligence from being the

proximate cause t h e r e o f ." While t h i s i s n e i t h e r t h e c l e a r -

est nor best language possible, it. s t a t e s essentially the

rules s e t down i n H a l s e y . In Halsey we s t a t e d , in effect,

t.hat t h e intervening cause is t h e s o l e proximate cause o f

the injury if it was not reasonably foreseeable. Other

Montana case law h a s followed this p r o p o s i t - i o n and empha-

sized the importance of foreseeabi1it.y in determining

whether an i n t e r v e n i n g cause is t h e s o l e proximate cause o f

injury. S e e S c h a f e r v. S t a t e , Dept.. o f Institutions (1979),

1 8 1 Mont. 1 0 2 , 592 P.2d 493, 36 S t .Rep. 560; and D e V e r n i e r o

v. Eby ( 1 9 7 2 ) , 1 5 9 Mont.. 1 4 6 , 496 P.2d 290.

We cannot see how p l a i n t i f f s ' proposed instruction

no. 12 would have a l l e v i a t - e d any confusion arising from

applicat-ion of t-hese complex legal rules to the facts of

t h i s case. Plaintiffs' proposed i n s t r u c t i o n no. 12 merely

p a r a p h r a s e s t h e Restatement on T o r t s , w h i l e I n s t r u c t i o n N o .
14 r e f l e c t s p r i o r Montana l a w . It did not contain a defini-

t i o n of s u p e r s e d i n g c a u s e . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t was t h e r e f o r e

n o t i n e r r o r by r e f u s i n g t h i s p r o p o s e d i n s t r u c t i o n .

B e c a u s e a p p e l l a n t s w e r e n o t p r e j u d i c e d by I n s t r u c t i o n

No. 14 and the other inst-ructions given to t.he jury, we

c a n n o t s a y t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d by g i v i n g I n s t r u c -

t i o n Nos. 1 2 and 1 4 .

I t s h o u l d be n o t e d here t h a t the appellants did not

put i n t h e i r b r i e f s a verbatim t e x t of t h e j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n s

which t h e y c l a i m e d were i n e r r o r . In t h e f u t u r e , w e r e q u e s t

that when an a p p e l l a n t r e l i e s on e r r o r a r i s i n g o u t o f the

issuance of jury i n s t r u c t i o n s , he should set f o r t h t h e t e x t

oi the instructions in the brief, as well as the trial

c o u r t ' s r u l i n g on t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s and a n y r e l a t e d instruc-

t i o n s t h e a p p e l l a n t . c l a i m s s h o u l d have been g i v e n .

The a p p e l l a n t s next. cant-end t - h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t

e r r e d by a d m i t t i n g t h e t e s t i m o n y o f a p p e l l a n t Goodnough t h a t

he had seen the Kludash car parked south of W h i t e f i s h on

Highway 93 with persons o u t s i d e t h e c a r going t o t h e bath-

roolu. Appellants claim that such testimony is without

probative value because i t is i m p o s s i b l e t o i d e n t i f y which

o c c u p a n t s were o u t s i d e o f t h e c a r and b e c a u s e t h e incident

was t o o remote from t h e s c e n e o f the accident. Appellants

also claim that the testimony was so highly inflammatory

that its probative value, if any, was outweighed by its

prejudicial effect.

The Dist-rict Court admitted Goodnough's testimony

because i t was relevant ". . . t o t h e mental condition of

the driver . . . and a l s o a s t o speed of t h e v e h i c l e . . ."
Under Rule 401, Mont .R. E v i d . , relevant. evidence is
" e v i d e n c e h a v i n g a n y t e n d e n c y t o make t h e exis-kence of any

fact that is of consequence to the determination of the

a c t i o n more o r l e s s p r o b a b l e than i t would be w i t h o u t the

evidence ." The s p e e d o f t h e K l u d a s h v e h i c l e was d e f i n i t e l y

relevant t o showing whether it w a s a superseding cause of

the appellants' injuries. T h a t t h e c a r w a s p a r k e d a number

o f m i l e s away f r o m t h e a c c l d e n t a n d t h a t i t c a u g h t up w i t h

t h e McMillan v e h i c l e i s t h e r e f o r e r e l e v a n t and p r o b a t i v e t o

an issue i n t h i s case.

Under Rule 403, Mont . K . E v i d . , relevant e v i d e n c e may

be e x c l u d e d if its probative value i s o u t w e i g h e d by u n f a i r

prejudice o r confusion of the issues. The a p p e l l a n t s c i t e

S t a t e v. Bischert ( 1 9 5 7 ) , 1 3 1 Mont. 152, 308 P.2d 969, to

support their argument that Goodnough's testimony was so

i n f l a m m a t o r y t h a t it s h o u l d h a v e b e e n e x c l u d e d . In Bischert ,
thls Court discussed the prejudicial nature of gruesome

photographs of a five-month-old baby who had starved to

death. B i s c h e r t is n o t a p p l i c a b l e h e r e .

The t e s t i m o n y o f Goodnough i s n o t p r e j u d i c i a l t o t h e

appellants; it i s no r e f l e c t i o n o n them o r t h e i r actions.

While it may be considered somewhat prejudicial toward

K l u d a s h and t h e o c c u p a n t s o f h i s c a r , w e a r e n o t c o n c e r n e d

with them here. The prejudicial nature of Goodnoughls

testimony, i f any, i s t h e r e f o r e outweighed by ~ t probative
s

value .
'The appellants1 third issue 1s whether Highway

P a t r o l m a n J a c o b s e n was c o m p e t e n t t o t e s t i f y a s t o t h e s p e e d

of the Kludash vehicle. A p p e l l a n t s acknowledge that this

Court recognizes the competency of a highway p a t r o l m a n to

y l v e h i s c a l c u l a t i o n s o f t h e speed o f a v e h i c l e b a s e d o n t h e
v e h i c l e ' s s k i d marks. A p p e l l a n t s c l a i m , however, t h a t e s t i -

mating speed i n a complicat-ed c o l l i s i o n r e q u i r e s t r a i n i n g i n

p h y s i c s and mechanics which highway p a t r o l m e n d o n o t h a v e .

See, D e a v e r v. Hickox ( 1 9 6 7 ) , 8 1 Ill.App.2d 79, 224 N.E.2d

4611.

T h i s Court h a s long held t h e st-andard t h a t t h e d e t e r -

mination of t h e q u a l i f i c a t i o n of a s k i l l e d o r e x p e r t w i t n e s s

is a m a t t e r l a r g e l y w i t h i n t h e d i s c r e t i o n o f t h e t r i a l judge

and, i n t h e a b s e n c e o f a showing o f abuse, ordinarily w i l l

not be disturbed. Graham v. Rolandson (1967), 1 5 0 Mont.

270, 435 P.2d 263; Workman v. McIntyre Construction Co.

( 1 9 8 0 )I Mont. 617 P . 2 d 1 2 8 1 , 37 St..Rep. 1637; f o r
more e x t e n s i v e d i s c u s s i o n see 29 ALR3d 248. More i m p o r t - a n t -

l y , i n a v e r y s i m i l a r c a s e i n v o l v i n g t h e same t y p e o f c o l l i -

sion, w e s p e c i f i c a l l y a l l o w e d e x p e r t . t-estimony o f a h i g h w a y

p a t - r o l m a n c o n c e r n i n g t h e c a u s e o f t h e a c c i d e n t . and v e h i c u l a r

speed. See, Rude v . Neal ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 1 6 5 Mont. 520, 530 P.2d

428.

Here, Highway Patrolman Jacobsen testified that he

had b e e n a h i g h w a y p a t r o l m a n f o r t w e l v e y e a r s , had i n v e s t i -

gated about 1,500 accidents, and had t~raining in accident

investigation, including how to estimate speed from the

length of skid marks and damage to automobiles. As we

r e c o g n i z e d i n W o l l a s t o n v. Burlington Northern, Inc. ( 1980) ,
- Mont.. 612 P.2d 1277, 37 S t . R e p . 1015, a s long a s

the cross-examiner is g i v e n a d e q u a t e o p p o r t u n i t y t o e l i c i t

any assumptions o r f a c t s underlying an e x p e r t ' s o p i n i o n , t h e

w e i g h t to be g i v e n t h e e x p e r t ' s t e s t i m o n y is f o r t h e j u r y t o

det-ermine. A s not.ed by t.he D i s t r i c t C o u r t , t h e q u e s t i o n is

not one of a d m i s s i b i l i t y of t h e pat.rolmanls test-imony, b u t
t h e welcjht ~t 1s g l v e n . The D i s t r l c t C o u r t , therefore, dld

not e r r by a l l o w i n g t h e hlghway p a t r o l m a n t o t e s t i f y a s t o

t h e speed of t h e Kludash v e h i c l e .

Finally, a p p e l l a n t s contend that the District Court

e r r e d i n not allowing counsel f o r t h e a p p e l l a n t s to q u e s t i o n

prospective jurors about their beliefs, as t a x p a y e r s , con-

c e r n i n g t h e financial o u t c o m e o f t h e c a s e . In Borkoski v.

Yost ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 1 8 2 Mont. 28, 594 P.2d 688, 36 St.Rep. 809, w e

h e l d t h a t t h e £ a l l u r e t o p e r m i t v o i r d i r e on i s s u e s r e l a t i n g

t o damages is h a r m l e s s e r r o r where t h e j u r y finds against

the plaintiff on the issue of liability. We did not,

however, r u l e t h a t i t was n o t e r r o r .

I n K e l t h v . L i b e r t y C o u n t y Hosp. & N u r s . Home ( 1 9 7 9 ) ,

Mont . , 598 P.2d 203, 36 St.Kep. 1378, the jury

d e c i d e d a g a i n s t t h e p l a i n t i f f o n t h e i s s u e o f l i a b i l i t y , and

the plaintiff c o n t e n d e d on a p p e a l t h a t s h e s h o u l d h a v e b e e n

g r a n t e d a c h a n g e o f v e n u e b e c a u s e m o s t o f t h e members o f t h e

lury panel were county taxpayers who had a pecuniary

interest in the outcome of the action against the county

hospital. We held that plaintiff's motion for change of

v e n u e was u n t i m e l y b u t s t a t e d t h a t t h i s C o u r t h a s p r e v i o u s l y

held that taxpayer status is n o t a ground for juror dis-

qualification. It appears that the trial courts are

~ n t e r p r e t i n g our holdings a s messages that we think voir

dlre on this subject should not be permitted. To the

c o n t r a r y , we t h i n k t h e t r i a l c o u r t s s h o u l d p e r m i t t h i s t y p e

of v o i r d i r e i f e i t h e r p a r t y requests it.

A l t h o u g h t h e s i t u a t i o n may n o t o f t e n o c c u r , we c a n n o t

overlook the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t prospective jurors, because of

their i n t e r e s t s as t a x p a y e r s , might not want t o reach the
 issue of ddrnayes and therefore might decide against the

plaintiff on t-he i s s u e o f liability. W e c a n s e e no harm i n

p e r m i t t i n g v o i r d i r e on t h e i s s u e o f d a m a g e s , and p e r m i s s i o n

by t h e t r i a l c o u r t s w i l l d i s p o s e o f t h e r e c u r r i n g p r o b l e m o f

whether the failure to permit t.he voir dire is harmless

error.

Here, since the jury ret-urned a verdict for the

defendant and did not reach the q u e s t i o n of damages, the

error must be considered harmless and not grounds for

reversal. S e e , B o r k o s k i , s u p r a ; R u l e 6 1 , M. R. C i v . P .

Having found no prejudicial error, the judgment of

t h e D l s t r i c t Court is a £ f irmed. '
-2

,'
I

w concur :
e d

District. Judge, s i t t i n g i n
p l a c e o f M r . J u s t i c e F r a n k B.
M o r r i s o n , Jr .