Converse v. Converse

No. 81-425

I N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE O M N A A
F OTN

1982

I N R THE MARRIAGE O
E F

SUSAN D. CONVERSE,

P e t i t i o n e r and Respondent,

-vs-

EVERETT C. CONVERSE,

Respondent a n d A p p e l l a n t .

Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
I n arid f o r t h e County o f Y e l l o w s t o n e , The H o n o r a b l e
Diane G. B a r z , J u d g e p r e s i d i n g .

C o u n s e l o f Record:

For Appellant:

F e l t a n d M a r t i n , B i l l i n g s , Montana

F o r Respondent:

Lynauyh, F i t z g e r a l d & S k a g g s , B i l l i n g s , Montana

Submitted on B r i e f s : March 11, 1982

Decided: May 1 3 , 1982
Mr. J u s t l c e Gene B. D a l y d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n l o n of t h e C o u r t .

This is an appeal from a judgment apportioning

marital a s s e t s i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court of t h e T h i r t e e n t h Judi-

c i a l D i s t r i c t o f t h e S t a t e o f Montana, i n and f o r t h e C o u n t y

of Yellowstone.

On A p r i l 7 , 1 9 8 0 , t h e w i f e , S u s a n D. Converse, p e t i -

tioned the District Court for a dissolution of marriage.

The p a r t i e s were u n a b l e t o a g r e e o n a p r o p e r t y d i s t r i b u t i o n

b u t d i d allow t h e c o u r t t o e n t e r a d e c r e e o f d i s s o l u t i o n o n

May 27, 1 9 8 0 . In its decree the court reserved the r i g h t t o

hear, at a later date, all other matters raised by the

pleadings, including the division of marital property. An

ev i d e n t i a r y hearing on the remaining issues commenced on

F e b r u a r y 26, 1981. On A p r i l 14, 1981, the District Court

issued its f i n d i n g s of fact, conclusions of law and o r d e r ,

apportioning the marital assets. The court awarded the

h u s b a n d a n e t amount o f $ 3 8 , 2 3 0 and t h e w i f e a n e t amount o f

$33,871. Judgment w a s e n t e r e d on A p r i l 24, 1981, and the

h u s b a n d , E v e r e t t C. Converse, now a p p e a l s .

The parties were married on May 13, 1972, in

Billings, Montana. There were no children born of the

marriage, b u t t h e husband had t w o c h i l d r e n from a p r e v i o u s

m a r r i a g e whom he h e l p e d s u p p o r t , and t h e w i f e had o n e c h i l d

from a previous marriage who resided with the parties

throughout t h e d u r a t i o n of t h e i r m a r r i a g e .

P r i o r t o t h e m a r r i a g e , t h e w i f e worked as a b a r t e n d e r

and w a i t r e s s . At the husband's request, t h e wife q u i t her

j o b a f t e r t h e y w e r e m a r r i e d and worked w i t h t h e h u s b a n d in

the construction business, kennel b u s i n e s s and as a home-

~naker. Since the divorce, the wife has returned to h e r
former occupation and makes approximately $500 p e r month.

The w i f e e n t e r e d t h e m a r r i a g e i n p o s s e s s i o n of t w o h o r s e s ,

t - a c k g e a r and a c a r . From the marriage she retained the

horses, t h e c a r , h o u s e h o l d items, k e n n e l s and a rnotor home.

The husband was a f o r e m a n i n a c o n s t r u c t . i o n company

when t-he p a r t i e s m a r r i e d . Later, h e became a p a r t n e r i n a

c o n s t r u c t i o n company and i n 1 9 7 8 , t h e p a r t - i e s s t a r t e d t h e i r

own c o n s t r u c t i o n b u s i n e s s . The h u s b a n d e n t e r e d t h e m a r r i a g e

with p e r s o n a l a f f e c t s and a f u l l a r r a y o f carpentry tools.

From t h e m a r r i a g e h e r e t a i n e d all t h e t o o l s and a s s e t s o f

t h e c o n s t . r u c t . i o n company. He has continued i n the construc-

tion business, and t.he D i s t r i c t C o u r t d e t e r m i n e d t-hat t h e

h u s b a n d h a s t h e p o t . e n t i a 1 t o e a r n somewhere bet-ween $ 2 0 , 0 0 0

and $ 3 0 , 0 0 0 p e r y e a r .

The o n l y r e a l p r o p e r t y a c q u i r e d by t h e p a r t i e s was a

twenty-acre t r a c t of unimproved p r o p e r t y , v a l u e d a t $45,000

by t h e D i s t r i c t Court. T h i s p r o p e r t y was awarded to the

husband, provided he pay the wife $22,500 or, alt-erna-

t i v e l y , t h e p r 0 p e r t . y was t o b e s o l d and t h e p r o c e e d s d i v i d e d

e q u a l l y b e t w e e n h u s b a n d and w i f e .

The i s s u e s r a i s e d by t.he h u s b a n d on a p p e a l a r e :

1. Did t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t err by a d m i t - t - i n g h e a r s a y

evidence?

2. Did t h e D i s t r i c t . Court. e r r in its valuation of

the marital assets?

3. Did t h e e v i d e n c e f a i l t o s u p p o r t t h e f i n d i n g s o f

fact, c o n c l u s i o n s of l a w and o r d e r e n t e r e d by t.he D i s t r i c t

Court?

The husband ' s cont-ention that the District Court.

e r r e d b y a d m i t t i n g h e a r s a y e v i d e n c e is n o t m e r i t o r i o u s . The
alleged hearsay evidence consisted of two instances where

the court allowed the wife to t e s t i f y as t o t h e v a l u e o f

c e r t a i n marital assets.

In the f i r s t instance, the wife testified as t o the

value of some Brittany S p a n i e l s from t h e parties' kennel.

She had based the appraisal on her own experience in

o p e r a t i n g k e n n e l s and o n a l e t t e r , e n t e r e d i n t o e v i d e n c e f o r

i l l u s t r a t i v e purposes, from a M r . G l e n n who was a p p a r e n t l y

knowledgeable about Brittany Spaniels in general and

f a m i l i a r with her dogs s p e c i f i c a l l y .

The second alleged error occurred when the wife

testified as to the value of certain house plans in the

husband's possession. She testified that the house p l a n s

w e r e wort12 a b o u t $50 e a c h a n d t h a t s h e had a r r i v e d a t that

v a l u e a £ t e r c o n v e r s i n g w i t h numerous i n d i v i d u a l s i n v o l v e d i n

the construction business.

While t h e l e t t e r is indeed h e a r s a y , i t was o n l y u s e d

for illustrative purposes and not for the truth of the

matter being asserted. Rule 8 0 1 ( c ) , Mont.K.Evid. Also,

Montana h a s a l w a y s a l l o w e d o w n e r s t o t e s t i f y a s t o t h e v a l u e

of their animals. Dutton v. Rocky Mountain Phosphates

( 1 9 6 8 ) , 1 5 1 Mont. 54, 438 P.2d 674. Further, as s t a t e d a t

31 Am. J u r . 2d E x p e r t and O p i n i o n E v i d e n c e , S 137 at 685:

". . . P u r e l y h e a r s a y e v i d e n c e as t o t h e v a l u e of a c h a t t e l

h a s been h e l d i n s u f f i c i e n t a s b a s i s f o r t e s t i m o n y p r e d i c a t e d

t h e r e o n by t h e o w n e r , b u t i n f o r m a t i o n r e c e i v e d i n p a r t f r o m

o t h e r s h a s been h e l d t o be u n o b j e c t i o n a b l e , and t h e p r i c i n g

o f s i m i l a r a r t i c l e s seems t o b e a n a p p r o v e d way o f o b t a i n i n g

knowledge. . . " Finally, as this Court held in In re

M a r r i a g e of Schwartz ( 1979 ) , - Mont . -, 602 P.2d 175,
177, 36 S t . R e p . 1980, " [ e l r r o r may n o t b e p r e d i c a t e d upon a

r u l i n g which a d m i t s o r e x c l u d e s e v i d e n c e u n l e s s it a f f e c t s a

substant-ial right. of the object-ing party." Here, the

evidence t h a t was a d m i t t - e d was h a r m l e s s e r r o r and d i d not

" s u b s t a n t i a l l y a f f e c t " t h e r i g h t s o f t h e husband.

The v a l u a t i o n o f t h e m a r i t - a 1 a s s e t s by t h e D i s t r i c t

Court. was proper. This Court held in Levandowski v.

Levandowski ( 1981) , - Mont . ,
- 630 P.2d 239, 3 8 St..Rep.

10U2, t h a t . :

"A D i s t r i c t C o u r t h a s f a r - r e a c h i n g
discretion
i n r e s o l v i n g p r o p e r t y d i v i s i o n s , and i t s
judgment w i l l n o t be a l t e r e d u n l e s s a c l e a r
a b u s e o f d i s c r e t i o n i s shown ...
The t e s t
f o r reviewing the District C o u r t ' s d i s c r e t i o n
is: Did t.he D i s t . r i c t C o u r t i n t h e e x e r c i s e
o f i t s d i s c r e t i o n act a r b i t r a r i l y wit-hout
employment o f c o n s c i e n t i o u s judgment., o r
exceed t h e bounds o f r e a s o n i n view o f a l l of
the circumstances? [Citations omitted. 1 "
630 P.2d a t 241.

See a l s o : Zell v. Zell ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 1 7 4 Mont. 216, 570 P.2d 33;

I n r e t h e M a r r i a g e o f Brown ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 1 7 9 Mont. 417, 587 P.2d

We a l s o held i n Dickerson v. Dickerson (1980), -

Mont . -, 614 P.2d 521, 37 S t . R e p . 1286, t h a t :

"The D i s t r i c t C o u r t , a s t h e t r i e r o f f a c t i n
t h i s trial without a jury, accepted the value
o f t h e r e s p o n d e n t and r e j e c t e d t h e e x p e r t ' s
valuation. This is n o t r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r . As
we e x p l a i n e d i n B i e g a l k e , I . ..
the t r i e r of
t h e f a c t s has t h e d i s c r e t i o n t o g i v e whatever
w e i g h t h e sees f i t t o t h e t e s t i m o n y o f t h e
e x p e r t from 0 t o l o o % . ' B i e g a l k e , 1 7 2 Mont.
a t 317, 564 P.2d a t 990. Unless a finding of
f a c t i s c l e a r l y e r r o n e o u s , i t c a n n o t be s e t
a s i d e by t h i s Court. See Rule 5 2 ( a ) ,
M.R.Civ.P." 614 P.2d a t 524.

The husband ' s cont-ention t-hat. t h e District Court.

erred because it chose the wife's appraisals over h i s is

c l e a r l y without merit in l i g h t of the above r u l i n g s . The

contention that t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d because it valued
t h e r e a l p r o p e r t y a t $45,U00 by a v e r a g i n g t h e two a p p r a i s a l s

is also w i t h o u t m e r i t . S e e , I n Re M a r r i a g e o f Kaasa ( 1 9 7 9 ) ,

- Mont. -, 5 9 1 P.2d 1110, 36 St.Rep. 425; In Re the

k a r r i a g e of Jensen ( 1981) , - Mont . -, 6 3 1 P.2d 700, 38

St.Rep. 1109. A review of the record reveals t.hat the

figure of $ 4 5 , 0 0 0 was n o t c h o s e n a r b i t r a r i l y and was w e l l

s u p p o r t e d by t.he e v i d e n c e .

There was sufficient evidence present-ed to support

the District. C o u r t ' s findings of fact., conclusions of law
and o r d e r . I n t h e r e c e n t d e c i s i o n o f S t ~ r a t f o r dv . S t r a t f o r d

(1981)I - Mont . -, 6 3 1 P.2d 296, 38 St..Rep. 1093, we
stated:

" F i n d i n g s o f f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s of law
provide a f o u n d a t i o n f o r t h e c o u r t ' s judg-
ment-. M a r r i a g e o f B a r r o n ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 1 7 7 Mont..
1 6 1 , 580 P.2d 936. T h i s f o u n d a t i o n need n o t
consist of a multitude of evidentiary fact-s,
but. t h e f i n d i n g s o f f a c t m u s t s e t f o r t h a
r e c o r d a t i o n o f t h e e s s e n t i a l and d e t e r m i n i n g
f a c t s upon w h i c h t h e c o u r t r e s t e d i t s c o n c l u -
s i o n s o f l a w a n d w i t h o u t w h i c h t.he j u d g m e n t
would l a c k s u p p o r t . J o n e s v. J o n e s ( 1 9 8 0 ) ,
Mont., 620 P.2d 8 5 0 , 37 S t . R e p . 1 9 7 3 . " 631
P.2d a t 298.

When a p p l y i n g t h i s s t . a n d a r d t o t h e c a s e a t . h a n d , it.

is c l e a r t h a t t h e f i n d i n g s o f fact, conclusions of law and

o r d e r were w e l l s u p p o r t - e d b y t h e e v i d e n c e .

The h u s b a n d c o n t e n d s t h a t a d i f f e r e n t s t a n d a r d i s set.

o u t i n I n re t h e Marriage o f P e t e r s o n ( 1 9 8 1 ) , - Iqon t .- I

636 P.2d 821, 38 St.Rep. 1723. In Peterson, there was

roughly a $600,000 difference in the various appraisers'

v a l u e s and w e s t a t e d :

"In addition, t h e court should s t a t e its
reasons f o r determining valuation . ..
How-
e v e r , w e w i l l uphold a p r o p e r e x e r c i s e o f
d i s c r e t - i o n by t h e t r i a l c o u r t and i f a
reasonable explanation e x i s t s f o r adopting
t h e l o w e r v a l u e , it s h o u l d be s t a t e d . " 636
P.2d a t 8 2 4 .
 I n t h i s c a s e , w h i l e t h e D i s t r i c t Court d i d not s p e c i -

f i c a l l y set. o u t a n e x p l a n a t i o n f o r s e t t i n g t h e v a l u a t i o n a t

$45,000 f o r the land, the evidence presented at. t r i a l w a s

sufficient, without explanation, to support the District

Court's figure. Both appraisers t.estif ied that the

v a l u a t . i o n t-hey were g i v i n g c o u l d v a r y up o r down somewhat

depending on v a r i o u s factors. The f a c t that the D i s t r i c t

Court chose a figure in the middle without further

explanation is e a s i l y a s c e r t a i n a b l e from t h e evidence and

was t h e r e f o r e not. e r r o n e o u s .

The wife, t.he respondent herein, alleges that. t.he

District Court erred by not equitably distributing the

p r o p e r t y . She r a i s e s t h i s i s s u e n o t a s a c r o s s - a p p e l l a n t but

instead attempts to invoke Rule 14, M.R.App.Civ.P. We

cannot. r e v i e w t h e i s s u e because r e s p o n d e n t f a i l s t o p r o p e r l y

invoke the use of Rule 14, M.R.App.Civ.P. In Johnson v.

Tindall ( 1 9 8 1 ) , - Mont. ,
- 635 P.2d 266, 38 St.Kep.

1763, we held:

"Although Rule 14 p r o v i d e s f o r review o f
m a t t e r s by cross-assignment o f e r r o r , t h i s
does not eliminate the necessity f o r cross-
a p p e a l b y a r e s p o n d e n t who s e e k s r e v i e w o f
r u l i n g s o n m a t t . e r s s e p a r a t e and d i s t - i n c t f r o m
t h o s e sought to be reviewed by t h e a p p e l l a n t .
F r a n c i s c o v . F r a n c i s c o ( 1 9 4 8 ) , 1 2 0 Mont. 468,
470, 1 9 1 P . 2 d 3 1 7 , 319. A r e s p o n d e n t who h a s
n o t c r o s s - a p p e a l e d may n o t s e e k a d e t e r m i n a -
t i o n o f t h e amount i n v o l v e d more f a v o r a b l e t o
him t h a n t , h a t made by t h e c o u r t b e l o w .
Mechanics U n i v e r s a l J o i n t Co. v. Culhane
( 1 9 3 6 ) , 299 U.S. 5 1 , 58, 57 S . C t . 8 1 , 84-85,
8 1 L.Ed. 33, 38; 5 Am.Jur.2d A p p e a l and
E r r o r , S 707." 6 3 5 P.2d a t 268.

The judgment of t.he D i s t r i c t Court is hereby

affirmed.
We concur:

Chief Justice