No. 81-418
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1982
ROBERT SMITH,
Petitioner,
STURM, RUGER AND COMPANY, INC.
a Connecticut Corporation and
WILLIAM B. RUGER, individually,
Respondents.
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING:
Counsel of Record:
For Petitioner:
Smith and Harper, Helena, Montana
Charles A. SMith, 111, argued, Helena, Montana
For Respondents:
Poore, Roth, Robischon and Robinson, Butte, Montana
Robert Poore argued, Butte, Montana
Wildman, Harrold, Allen & Dixon, Chicago, Illinois
Submitted: January 11, 1982
Decided: April 15, 1982
Filed:
APR 15 1 9 1
Clerk
Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea delivered the Opinion of the
Court.
The United States District Court, Montana District,
Great Falls Division, has certified a question for this
Court to decide concerning the running of the statute of
limitations against a minor.
The certification presents the following issue: whether
a minor injured by an allegedly defective product when he
was 15 years and 2 months old (2 years and 10 months before
attaining majority) has a period of 1 year or 3 years after
attaining majority in which to bring a cause of action
against the manufacturer?
On March 6, 1975, Robert Smith (petitioner) was injured
by an accidental discharge from an allegedly defective
revolver designed and manufactured by the respondent, Sturm,
Ruger & Co. At the time of his injury, Robert Smith was 15
years and 2 months of age, or about 2 years and 10 months
under the age of majority. He filed suit against Sturm,
Ruger & Co. on April 17, 1980, 2 years and 3 and 1/2 months
after attaining majority.
The applicable statute of limitations is section 27-2-
2 0 4 ( 1 ) , MCA, which provides for a 3 year period within which
to bring the action. Because Smith was a minor at the time
this cause of action accrued, all parties agree that section
27-2-401(1) controls. Section 27-2-401(1), MCA, provides:
"27-2-401. When person entitled to bring
action is under a disability. ( 1
) If a person
entitledto bring an action mentioned in part
,
2, except 27-2-211 (3) is, at the time the cause
of action accrues, either a minor, seriously mentally
ill, or imprisoned on a crzminal charge or under a
sentence for a term less than for life, the time of
such disability is not a part of the time limited
for commencing the action. However, the time so
limited cannot be extended more than 5 years by any
such disability except minority or, in any case, more
than 1 year after the disability ceases." (Emphasis
added. )
Smith contends that section 27-2-401, tolls the normal
three year period of limitations until the minor attains
majority. Sturm, Ruger & Co. argues that the last sentence
of section 27-2-401(1) creates an absolute one year period
of limitations after majority.
This Court has already determined that section 27-2-
401(1) operates to toll the applicable statute of limitations
until the plaintiff is no longer disabled. The second
sentence of the section does not come into play until the
person is under the disability for the full statutory period
of limitation. State ex rel. Hi-Ball Contr., Inc. v.
District Court (1969), 154 Mont. 99, 460 P.2d 751. In -
Hi-
Ball, we rejected the interpretation of section 27-2-401(1)
urged by Sturm, Ruger & Co. We stated:
"This is not the way we interpret this statute.
This section provides that the statute of limita-
tions is tolled by a period of insanity on the
part of the plaintiff. According to the general
view of the word 'toll' it means to stop the
running of the statute of limitations. Igoe v.
Slaton Block Company, 329 S.W.2d 39 (Mo. 1959).
Thus the statute was 'tolled' from April 11,
1962 until August 1, 1962, when it then began to
run. Nothing has been shown to indicate that the
exception clause comes into play in this case.
Rather the exception clause ----
does not come into
play until - person has - under the disability
the - been
- three460 P . 2the period - limitations." (Emphasis
for
added.)
years,
d X 754.
of
While section 27-2-401(1) is hardly a model of good
draftsmanship, we nonetheless believe that the intent of the
statute was to preserve rights of action that accrue during
a disability, such as minority. The law favors a right of
action over a right of limitation, and a statute which tolls
a statute of limitation will be liberally construed in order
to accomplish that purpose. In Re '- Estate
(1941), 45 N.M. 406, 115 P.2d 627.
W e t h e r e f o r e f i n d t h a t t h e s t a t u t e a l l o w s t h e pe-
t i t i o n e r t h e f u l l s t a t u t o r y p e r i o d ( 3 y e a r s ) i n which t o
f i l e h i s action a f t e r attaining majority.
W e Concur:
Justices
Mr. Chief concurring:
Chief ~ u s t i c e --
-.
Mr. Justice Frank B. Morrison, Jr., specially concurring:
I concur in the result. However, I would overrule
State ex rel. Hi-Ball Contr., Inc. cited in the majority
opinion. In my opinion, the statute of limitations applicable
to a minor extends one year after that minor reaches majority
qualified by the fact that the normal statute of limitations
cannot be shortened. In other words, a minor is entitled to
the regular statute of limitations which is applicable, but
if that period of time has expired the minor is entitled to
one year after reaching majority within which to file the
action.
However, the plaintiff in this case was entitled to
rely upon our previous decision in Hi-Ball. Under these
circumstances, I would permit the plaintiff's action to go
forward.
We join in the foregoing special concurrence.