No. 80-391
I N TI-IE SUPREME COURT O T I E STATE O F ?lONTANA
F
1981
I N THE MATTER O THEF
ADOPTION O F S . L. R . ,
a minor c h i l d .
Appeal f r o m : D i s t r i c t Court o f t h e Fourth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
I n a n d f o r t h e County o f R a v a l l i , The FIonorable
J o h n S. Henson, J u d g e p r e s i d i n g .
Counsel o f Record:
For Appellant:
S m i t h , Connor & Van V a l k e n b u r g , M i s s o u l a , Montana
For Respondent :
T e r r y S e h e s t e d t , M i s s o u l a , Nontana
Submitted on B r i e f s : !day 1 3 , 1 9 8 1
Decided : JAB 2 8 rubL
Filed: JAN 2 8 1982
Mr. J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e C o u r t .
T h i s i s an a p p e a l from a n o r d e r i s s u e d by t h e D i s t r i c t
C o u r t , R a v a l l i County, denying a p p e l l a n t ' s p e t i t i o n f o r t h e
a d o p t i o n o f S L R , a minor c h i l d .
A p p e l l a n t , t h e c h i l d ' s s t e p f a t h e r , r a i s e s two i s s u e s on
appeal. He a r g u e s f i r s t t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d i n
f i n d i n g t h a t t h e n a t u r a l f a t h e r , by p r o v i d i n g s e v e r a l s m a l l
a r t i c l e s of c l o t h i n g , and by p a y i n g d e b t s u n r e l a t e d t o t h e
c h i l d , had " c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e s u p p o r t " of t h e c h i l d . The
s t e p f a t h e r ' s second argument i s t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d
in f i n d i n g t h a t t h e n a t u r a l f a t h e r was " u n a b l e " t o p r o v i d e
a d d i t i o n a l support f o r t h e child.
S L R w a s b o r n o n J u n e 7 , 1976. The f a t h e r and mother of
SLR w e r e d i v o r c e d on March 31, 1978, and c u s t o d y of t h e
c h i l d was awarded t o t h e mother. The d e c r e e a l s o p r o v i d e d
t h a t t h e f a t h e r have r e a s o n a b l e r i g h t s of v i s i t a t i o n and
t h a t he pay t h e sum o f $100 p e r month f o r t h e s u p p o r t , c a r e
and maintenance o f t h e c h i l d . The s u p p o r t payments were t o
s t a r t on A p r i l 5 , 1978.
The mother m a r r i e d t h e a p p e l l a n t on November 2 , 1979.
S i n c e t h i s m a r r i a g e , t h e c h i l d h a s r e s i d e d w i t h t h e mother
and s t e p f a t h e r a t t h e i r home i n S t e v e n s v i l l e , Montana. The
f a t h e r h a s f a i l e d t o make any c h i l d s u p p o r t payments s i n c e
F e b r u a r y 9 , 1979, a l t h o u g h h e d o e s c l a i m t o have g i v e n t h e
c h i l d "a couple of blouses . . ." and o t h e r s m a l l i t e m s of
clothing. During t h i s t i m e , t h e f a t h e r h a s o n l y been s p o r a d i c a l l y
employed, h a s e a r n e d o n l y a v e r y m a r g i n a l income, h a s r e m a r r i e d ,
and h a s v o l u n t a r i l y i n c u r r e d s u b s t a n t i a l a d d i t i o n a l d e b t s .
On F e b r u a r y 2 5 , 1980, t h e s t e p f a t h e r f i l e d a p e t i t i o n
f o r t h e a d o p t i o n o f t h e c h i l d i n R a v a l l i County D i s t r i c t
Court. The mother c o n s e n t e d t o t h i s p e t i t i o n , and t h e
Montana Department o f S o c i a l and R e h a b i l i t a t i o n S e r v i c e s
waived t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n r e q u i r e d under s e c t i o n 40-8-122,
MCA. The p e t i t i o n a l l e g e d t h a t t h e c o n s e n t of t h e f a t h e r
was n o t n e c e s s a r y due t o t h e f a c t t h a t t h e f a t h e r had w i l l -
f u l l y abandoned t h e c h i l d and had n o t c o n t r i b u t e d t o h e r
s u p p o r t w h i l e a b l e t o do s o f o r one y e a r p r i o r t o t h e f i l i n g
of t h e p e t i t i o n . See s e c t i o n 40-8-111(a) (iii)and ( v ) ,
MCA .
During t h e h e a r i n g , t h e f a t h e r s t a t e d t h a t h e had
p r o v i d e d f o r t h e s u p p o r t o f h i s new w i f e ' s c h i l d from a
previous marriage f o r a limited t i m e . The f a t h e r f u r t h e r
a d m i t t e d t h a t he had p a i d t h e e n t r a n c e f e e f o r t h e b u l l -
r i d i n g c o m p e t i t i o n i n s e v e r a l r o d e o s d u r i n g t h e summer of
1979. These f e e s may have amounted t o a s much as $100. The
r e c o r d a l s o r e v e a l s t h a t a s u b s t a n t i a l amount of t h e f a t h e r ' s
p r e s e n t i n d e b t e d n e s s was i n c u r r e d a f t e r t h e d i s s o l u t i o n o f
h i s f i r s t marriage.
The t r i a l c o u r t , a f t e r t h e h e a r i n g , d e n i e d t h e p e t i t i o n .
I n i t s f i n d i n g s of f a c t , t h e t r i a l c o u r t found: (1) t h a t
t h e n a t u r a l f a t h e r " c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e s u p p o r t of [SLR] by
p r o v i d i n g s e v e r a l a r t i c l e s of c l o t h i n g f o r t h e c h i l d and by
assuming r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r , and making payments o n d e b t s
i n c u r r e d by t h e n a t u r a l p a r e n t s d u r i n g t h e i r m a r r i a g e " ; and
( 2 ) t h a t t h e f a t h e r ' s i n d e b t e d n e s s , new f a m i l y , and h i s
f a i l u r e t o o b t a i n s t e a d y employment have r e n d e r e d him u n a b l e
( w i t h i n t h e d e f i n i t i o n o f s e c t i o n 40-8-111 ( a ) ( v ) , MCA) t o
p r o v i d e " a d d i t i o n a l " s u p p o r t f o r SLR. This appeal followed.
S e c t i o n 40-8-111, MCA, i s c o n t r o l l i n g on t h e s e i s s u e s .
I t s e t s f o r t h a g e n e r a l r u l e and e x c e p t i o n s . The g e n e r a l
rule is that consider a p e t i t i o n f o r adoption t h e c o u r t
must f i r s t d e t e r m i n e t h a t b o t h n a t u r a l p a r e n t s ( i f l i v i n g )
consent t o t h e adoption. But t h e e x c e p t i o n s c o n t a i n e d i n
s e c t i o n 40-8-111, MCA, a r e a l s o i m p o r t a n t on t h e q u e s t i o n of
p a r e n t a l consent. One such e x c e p t i o n s t a t e s t h a t t h e c o n s e n t
of a n a t u r a l parent i s not required:
". . . i f it i s p r o v e n t o t h e s a t i s f a c t i o n of
t h e c o u r t t h a t t h e f a t h e r o r mother, i f a b l e ,
has not contributed t o t h e support of t h e c h i l d
d u r i n g a p e r i o d of 1 y e a r b e f o r e t h e f i l i n g of
t h e p e t i t i o n f o r a d o p t i o n . " S e c t i o n 40-8-111(1)
( a ) ( v ) , MCA.
From t h e e x p r e s s wording of t h i s s t a t u t e , a s w e l l a s
t h e c a s e s i n t e r p r e t i n g i t , i t i s c l e a r t h a t s e c t i o n 40-8-
1 1(1.) ( a ) ( v ) , MCA, s e t s f o r t h a two-part
1 test: F i r s t , the
c o u r t must d e t e r m i n e whether t h e n o n c o n s e n t i n g p a r e n t h a s
c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e s u p p o r t of t h e c h i l d . Second, t h e c o u r t
must d e t e r m i n e whether t h e n o n c o n s e n t i n g p a r e n t had t h e
a b i l i t y t o contribute t o t h e c h i l d ' s support. Because
s t r i c t compliance w i t h s e c t i o n 40-8-111, MCA, is required
b e f o r e t h e c o u r t c a n c o n s i d e r t h e a d o p t i o n on i t s m e r i t s ,
t h e p e t i t i o n e r must be a b l e t o show t h a t t h e t e r m s o f t h e
s t a t u t e have b e e n met. I n R e Adoption of B i e r y ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 164
Mont. 353, 522 P.2d 1377. '
The t r i a l c o u r t ' s d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t t h e f a t h e r con-
t r i b u t e d t o t h e s u p p o r t of SLR i s based upon two f a c t o r s :
(1) t h e f a c t t h e f a t h e r had, d u r i n g t h e p r e c e d i n g y e a r ,
g i v e n t h e c h i l d " a c o u p l e o f b l o u s e s and a few t h i n g s l i k e
t h i s , " and ( 2 ) t h e f a c t t h a t t h e f a t h e r had made payments
toward c e r t a h d e b t s , some of which w e r e i n c u r r e d a f t e r t h e
divorce.
The n a t u r a l f a t h e r c o n t e n d s , and t h e t r i a l c o u r t r u l e d ,
t h a t t h e n o n c o n s e n t i n g f a t h e r c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e s u p p o r t of
t h e c h i l d by p r o v i d i n g s e v e r a l s m a l l a r t i c l e s of c l o t h i n g .
W e do n o t a g r e e . I n Matter of Adoption of Smigaj ( 1 9 7 5 ) ,
1 7 1 Mont. 537, 560 P.2d 1 4 1 , t h i s C o u r t , c o n s t r u i n g " s u p p o r t "
a s used i n s e c t i o n 40-8-111(1) ( a ) ( v ) , s t a t e d :
". . . we have no d i f f i c u l t y i n c o n s t r u i n g t h e
p l a i n meaning of t h e words i n t h e c o n t e x t of t h e
consent s t a t u t e s a s r e f e r r i n g t o t h e ' f i n a n c i a l
support t h a t a parent - - - a child."'
owes (Emphasis
added.) 560 P.2d a t 143.
Here, t h e f a t h e r was under a d u t y , p u r s u a n t t o t h e d i s s o l u t i o n
d e c r e e , t o p r o v i d e c h i l d s u p p o r t payments of $100 p e r month.
I t i s u n d i s p u t e d t h a t t h e f a t h e r f a i l e d t o pay any c h i l d
support f o r over a year before t h e p e t i t i o n f o r adoption w a s
filed. The " p l a i n meaning" a p p r o a c h of Smigaj r e q u i r e s t h a t
t h e f a t h e r contribute financial support t o the child. The
f a i l u r e t o p r o v i d e f i n a n c i a l s u p p o r t c a n n o t be c u r e d by
g i v i n g t h e c h i l d s e v e r a l a r t i c l e s of c l o t h i n g .
S i m i l a r l y , t h e noncustodial parent cannot s a t i s f y h i s
o b l i g a t i o n t o p r o v i d e f i n a n c i a l s u p p o r t by i n c u r r i n g o r
p a y i n g d e b t s which a r e u n r e l a t e d t o t h e c h i l d . The e x p r e s s
t e r m s of t h e s t a t u t e r e f e r t o " s u p p o r t t h a t a p a r e n t - - a
owes
child." Smigaj, s u p r a . H e r e , t h e d e b t s p a i d by t h e f a t h e r
w e r e n o t r e l a t e d t o t h e s u p p o r t of t h e c h i l d , and much o f
t h e d e b t had been i n c u r r e d a f t e r t h e d i s s o l u t i o n o f h i s
f i r s t marriage. The r e c o r d c l e a r l y shows t h a t t h e f a t h e r
made no f i n a n c i a l c o n t r i b u t i o n t o t h e s u p p o r t of t h e c h i l d
f o r over a year. T h i s r e q u i r e s u s t o v a c a t e t h e f i n d i n g of
t h e t r i a l c o u r t t h a t t h e g i f t of c l o t h i n g and payment of
d e b t s by t h e f a t h e r c o n s t i t u t e d " s u p p o r t " a s t h a t t e r m i s
used i n s e c t i o n 40-8-111, MCA.
I n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e , t h e f a t h e r had no v a l i d r e a s o n f o r
f a i l i n g t o make even one c h i l d s u p p o r t payment d u r i n g t h e
e n t i r e year preceding t h e f i l i n g of t h e p e t i t i o n . H e suffered
no p h y s i c a l o r m e n t a l impairment d u r i n g t h a t t i m e , and h e
was p o s s e s s e d of s k i l l s t h a t would have made him employable
( c a r p e n t r y , l a b o r e r , o p e r a t i n g heavy e q u i p m e n t ) . The f a t h e r
v o l u n t a r i l y chose a l i f e s t y l e i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h h i s p a r e n t a l
support obligations. T h a t he had a r i g h t t o c h o s e such a
lifestyle is conceded. That he had a legal right to prevent
the adoption of his child, however, is not consistent with
his voluntary failure to contribute to the child's support.
In the words of the California court:
"A statute should not be interpreted in favor of
a father who seeks the benefit of parental rights
but shuns the burden of parental obligations."
In Re Burton's Adoption (1956), 147 Cal.App.2d
125, 305 P.2d 185, 191.
It was the burden of the stepfather to show that the
father was able to but failed to provide support for the
child during the one-year period immediately preceding the
filing of the petition. In Re Adoption of Challeen (1976),
172 Mont. 362, 563 P.2d 1120. In Challeen, the Court found
that the petitioner had failed to meet this burden. In that
case, the natural father had one of his eyes surgically
removed, had been confined in the state prison, and had
attended college during the time that he was alleged to have
been "able" to contribute to the support of the child.
Similarly, in the recent case of In Re Adoption of T.G.K.
& J.P.K. ,
(1981), - Mont. - 630 P.2d 740, 38 St.Rep.
1030, it was shown that the father had been incarcerated in
the state prison and therefore was thus not able to contribute
to the child's support. In the present case, the father had
no such excuse. Indeed, his own testimony reveals that,
during the entire period, he was fully capable of obtaining
fulltime employment but refused to do so. His voluntary
assumption of the debts of his new wife and his support of
her child for a limited period belie his claim of inability
to support his own child. The record here shows that petitioner
has met his burden of proof as to the father's "ability."
The findings of the District Court as to the issues of
the father's contribution to the support of the child and his
a b i l i t y t o s o c o n t r i b u t e are v a c a t e d . The c a s e i s remanded
t o t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t f o r f u r t h e r p r o c e e d i n g s on t h e p e t i t i o n
f o r adoption.
,N4
Justice d
W e Concur:
Chief ~ u s t i c e
/us tices
Mr. J u s t i c e D a n i e l J. Shea d i s s e n t i n g :
I dissent.
R e g a r d l e s s o f what name i s g i v e n t o t h e s t a t u t e
,
i n v o l v e d ( s e c t i o n 40-8-111 (1) MCA) , t h e undeniable f a c t
i s t h a t w e are i n t e r p r e t i n g a s t a t u t e which h a s an
irrevocable sanction: a n a t u r a l p a r e n t can f o r e v e r l o s e
h i s parental rights. Because, however, t h e s t a t u t e i s ,
i n e s s e n c e , a p e n a l s t a t u t e , i t must be s t r i c t l y c o n s t r u e d
a g a i n s t t h e p e t i t i o n e r and i n f a v o r o f t h e n a t u r a l f a t h e r .
That i s t r u e of a l l c i v i l s t a t u t e s penal i n nature. Missoula
High School L e g a l Defense Assoc. v. S u p t . o f P u b l i c I n s t r u c t i o n
(Deckniber 2 2 , 1 9 8 1 ) , - Moot. -1 - P.2d r 38
St.Rep. 2164; and S t a t e v. S t a t e Highway P a t r o l ( 1 9 5 8 ) , 133
Mont. 162, 321 P.2d 612. Few c i v i l s t a t u t e s impose a more
s e v e r e s a n c t i o n than one f o r e v e r terminating p a r e n t a l r i g h t s .
The l a n g u a g e " h a s n o t c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e s u p p o r t of
t h e c h i l d d u r i n g a p e r i o d o f one y e a r b e f o r e t h e f i l i n g of
t h e p e t i t i o n f o r a d o p t i o n , " i s ambiguous, and t h a t i s p r e c i s e l y
why t h i s C o u r t h a s been c a l l e d upon t o i n t e r p r e t t h e p h r a s e
"has n o t contributed t o t h e support of t h e c h i l d . . ." The
l e g i s l a t u r e c h o s e n o t t o s p e c i f y o r d e i g n what i t c o n s i d e r s
t o be a " c o n t r i b u t i o n t o t h e s u p p o r t of t h e c h i l d . . ."
Because w e a r e d e a l i n g w i t h a p e n a l s t a t u t e , t h i s C o u r t s h o u l d
n o t p r o v i d e an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n by a d e f i n i t i o n f a v o r i n g
t h e termination of p a r e n t a l r i g h t s . Rather, t h i s Court
s h o u l d s t r i c t l y c o n s t r u e t h i s s t a t u t e t o mean t h a t any k i n d
o f s u p p o r t o f t h e c h i l d w i t h i n t h e one y e a r p e r i o d w i l l
e f f e c t i v e l y p r e v e n t a d e t e r m i n a t i o n of whether i t would b e
i n t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t s o f t h e c h i l d t o be adopted.
The c a s e o f I n R e Adoption o f Smigaj ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 1 7 1 Mont.
537, 560 P. 2d 1 4 1 , d i d c o n s t r u e s e c t i o n 40-8-111 (1)( a ) ( v ) ,
MCA, t o mean " f i n a n c i a l s u p p o r t t h a t a p a r e n t owes a c h i l d . "
But t h e C o u r t f a i l e d t o acknowledge t h a t i t was i n t e r p r e t i n g
a p e n a l s t a t u t e t h a t must be s t r i c t l y c o n s t r u e d a g a i n s t t h e
penalty--the p e n a l t y of f o r e v e r l o s i n g o n e ' s c h i l d . There-
f o r e , Smigaj w a s i n c o r r e c t l y d e c i d e d . H e r e t h e majority has
i g n o r e d t h e f a c t t h a t s e c t i o n 40-8-111(1), i s , i n essence,
a p e n a l t y s t a t u t e a p p l i e d t o a p e r s o n who h a s r e f u s e d t o
c o n s e n t t o t h e a d o p t i o n of h i s c h i l d .
I f t h e l e g i s l a t u r e has n o t e x p l i c i t l y set f o r t h t h e
b a s i s on which t h e p e n a l t y i s t o b e i n v o k e d , t h i s C o u r t
should f i l l i n t h e blanks f o r t h e l e g i s l a t u r e . Our d u t y
i s t o s t r i c t l y c o n s t r u e t h e s t a t u t e a g a i n s t i n v o c a t i o n of
t h e penalty. To do t h a t w e must l i b e r a l l y c o n s t r u e t h e terms
" c o n t r i b u t e d " and " s u p p o r t " i n f a v o r o f t h e n a t u r a l p a r e n t .