State v. Palmer

No. 83-313 I N THE SUPREME COURT O T I E STATE O M N A J F F O T PA 1983 STATE O F MONTAXA, P l a i n t i f f and R e s p o n d e n t , -vs- GARY L. PALMER, Defendant and A p p e l l a n t . APPEAL FROM: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Nineteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n a n d f o r t h e County o f L i n c o l n , The H o n o r a b l e R o b e r t M. H o l t e r , J u d g e p r e s i d i n g . COUNSEL O RECORD: F For Appellant: S v e r d r u 2 & S p e n c e r , L i b b y , Montana For Respondent: Eon. Mike G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , Montana W i l l i a m L. D o u g l a s , County A t t o r n e y , L i b b y , Montana S u b m i t t e d on B r i e f s : September 2 2 , 1983 Decided: December 8 , 1983 @EC c- - Filed: L, 1983 Mr. J u s t i c e L.C. Gulbrandson d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n of the Court. Defendant Gary Palmer a p p e a l s from h i s c o n v i c t i o n on charges of felony theft and felony criminal mischief following a jury trial in the District Court of the Nineteenth Judicial District, Lincoln County. For the r e a s o n s s t a t e d below, w e a f f i r m d e f e n d a n t ' s c o n v i c t i o n . On November 1 3 , 1 9 8 2 , two e m p l o y e e s o f t h e S t . R e g i s Paper Company o b s e r v e d P a l m e r and four companions, George Busse, William Glidden, Donald Souder and Bruce Bothum, c u t t i n g t r e e s on l a n d owned by S t . Regis. The e m p l o y e e s notified the county sheriff's office, which dispatched a deputy t o t h e scene. En r o u t e , t h e d e p u t y was j o i n e d by two law e n f o r c e m e n t o f f i c e r s f r o m t h e K o o t e n a i N a t i o n a l F o r e s t . A s t h e t h r e e men a p p r o a c h e d t h e scene of the tree cutting, one of t h e c u t t e r s , l a t e r i d e n t i f i e d a s G l i d d e n , r a n b e h i n d some b u s h e s . G l i d d e n d i d n o t emerge from t h e b u s h e s u n t i l t h e o f f i c e r y e l l e d f o r him t o come o u t . Glidden explained t h a t h e had g o n e b e h i n d t h e b u s h e s o n l y t o r e l i e v e h i m s e l f , but the officer c o u l d f i n d no t r a c e s o f urination i n the brush. The officers and the deputy asked Glidden and the o t h e r s f o r e v i d e n c e o f p e r m i s s i o n t o b e c u t t i n g t r e e s on t h e section. They w e r e r e f e r r e d t o t h e d e f e n d a n t , P a l m e r , who produced a s m a l l s l i p of paper indicating t h a t Palmer had a u t h o r i t y t o c u t t r e e s on s e c t i o n 3 6 , a t r a c t owned by t h e S t a t e o f Montana. The s l i p was s i g n e d by R a l p h J a m e s , who had a Christmas tree cutting permit from the State for s e c t i o n 36. However, one of t h e o f f i c e r s noted t h a t t h e area the men w e r e working was section 35, owned by St. R e g i s , which l i e s a d j a c e n t t o t h e s t a t e - o w n e d s e c t i o n . Palmer, his colleagues, and the officers left the scene and went to the sheriff I s office to discuss the problem f u r t h e r . The n e x t d a y , November 1 4 , t h e s h e r i f f I s d e p u t y and S t . Regis employees r e t u r n e d to s e c t i o n 35 to conduc t an i n v e s t i g a t i o n . One o f t h e employees determined that t h e most recent c u t t i n g had b e e n d o n e on S t . Regis l a n d , and f o u n d no e v i d e n c e o f r e c e n t c u t t i n g on s t a t e - o w n e d section 36. This conclusion was confirmed by a state f o r e s t e r o b s e r v i n g t h e a r e a a few d a y s l a t e r . P a l m e r had i n s i s t e d t h a t h e and h i s c o l l e a g u e s w e r e c u t t i n g on s e c t i o n 36. Photographs taken at the scene revealed that the p r o p e r t y l i n e s were c l e a r l y d e m a r c a t e d by p o s t e d notices, although Palmer maintained that he had not seen these n o t i c e s u n t i l t h e f o r e s t s e r v i c e o f f i c e r s a n d t h e d e p u t y had d i s c o v e r e d t h e c u t t i n g on November 1 3 . The i n v e s t i g a t i o n r e v e a l e d t h a t P a l m e r and t h e o t h e r s had b e e n c u t t i n g t h e t r e e s n e a r t h e ground, and " t o p p i n g " t h e f e l l e d t r e e s s o t h a t t h e t o p s c o u l d b e used a s C h r i s t m a s trees. St. R e g i s e m p l o y e e s and t h e s h e r i f f ' s d e p u t y w e r e a b l e t o match t h e b u t t s o f t h e t r e e s t o s t u m p s o n s e c t i o n 35. The d e p u t y r e t a i n e d some o f t h e t r e e s , b u t t s and s t u m p s a s evidence. S t . Regis r e t a i n e d t h e topped Christmas t r e e s and o t h e r b u t t s . The t r e e s were l a t e r s o l d a t w h o l e s a l e f o r a p p r o x i m a t e l y $1,600. The e m p l o y e e s a l s o t o o k e s t i m a t e s o f damages t o t h e l a n d . The e s t i m a t e s i n c l u d e d $200 t o remove the stumps; $329 f o r replacement of plant seedlings, and $1,849 f o r l o s s of t h i r t y y e a r ' s t r e e growth. Palmer and his four associates were charged with felony theft and felony criminal miscl~ief for illegally removing and damaging the trees. The four associates n e g o t i a t e d a p l e a b a r g a i n and p l e a d g u i l t y t o misdemeanor theft. Palmer p l e d n o t g u i l t y t o a l l t h e c h a r g e s a g a i n s t him. Although his c o l l e a g u e s t e s t i f i e d on h i s b e h a l f at trial, P a l m e r was c o n v i c t e d and s e n t e n c e d t o two y e a r s i n t h e Montana S t a t e P r i s o n . P a l m e r a p p e a l s from h i s c o n v i c t i o n , and r a i s e s t h r e e issues : (1) Whether the D i s t r i c t Court erred in failing to dismiss t h e c h a r g e s a g a i n s t Palmer b e c a u s e of the State's alleged suppression or destruction of material and exculpatory evidence? ( 2 ) Whether P a l m e r ' s conviction of both felony t h e f t and felony criminal mischief v i o l a t e s m u l t i p l e punishment statutes? (3) Whether the District Court erred in allowing testimony of monetary values other than "current market v a l u e " t o e s t a b l i s h proof of f e l o n y c r i m i n a l m i s c h i e f ? ISSUE ONE: P r i o r t o t r i a l , and i m m e d i a t e l y f o l l o w i n g p r e s e n t a t i o n of the state's case-in-chief, Palmer's counsel moved for d i s m i s s a l o f t h e c h a r g e s on t h e g r o u n d s t h a t t h e s t a t e h a d suppressed or destroyed material, exculpatory evidence. Palmer maintained that, because t h e S t a t e had d i s p o s e d o f a l l but four or f i v e of t h e t r e e s c u t by P a l m e r and h i s associates, h e had no e v i d e n c e w h i c h would tend t o prove t h a t t h e y had b e e n c u t t i n g t r e e s on S t a t e - o w n e d s e c t i o n 36. Suppression or destruction of material, exculpatory evidence by t h e S t a t e amounts t o a v i o l a t i o n of a d e f e n d a n t ' s due process rights and warrants dismissal of charges against him. See Brady v. Maryland ( 1 9 6 3 ) , 373 U.S. 53, 83 S.Ct. 1 1 9 4 , 1 0 L.Ed.2d 215; S t a t e v. C r a i g ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 1 6 9 Mont. 150, 545 P.2d 649. The District Court denied all motions by defense counsel to dismiss the charges. We f i n d no e r r o r in the court's actions. When the deputy and the St. Regis employees returned to the scene of cutting, they investigated both sections in dispute. They found no evidence of recent cutting on S t a t e - o w n e d s e c t i o n 36, but did find such evidence on section 35, and gathered sufficient evidence relevant to that area. Although an i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f s e c t i o n 36 i n F e b r u a r y , 1 9 8 3 , r e v e a l e d t h a t t r e e s had b e e n f e l l e d o n t h a t s e c t i o n a r o u n d November, 1 9 8 2 , t h e method o f c u t t i n g was m a r k e d l y d i f f e r e n t t h a n t h a t u s e d by P a l m e r and h i s c o l l e a g u e s o n s e c t i o n 35. Furthermore, t h e t r e e s i n q u e s t i o n were retained and l a t e r s o l d by S t . R e g i s , and n o t t h e S t a t e , a s P a l m e r h a s a r g u e d s i n c e t r i a l . Palmer's counsel filed a motion to produce all the t r e e s c u t on t h e a r e a s i n q u e s t i o n n e a r l y f i v e months a f t e r the incident arose. I n S t a t e v . C l e m e n t s ( 1 9 8 1 ) , 52 0 r . A p p . 309, 628 P . 2 d 4 3 3 , u n d e r f a c t s v e r y s i m i l a r t o t h o s e a t b a r i n t h e immediate c a s e , t h e C o u r t of Appeals of Oregon h e l d t h a t a defendant could n o t a v a i l himself of the p r o t e c t i o n s afforded under Brady, supra, where a motion to disclose evidence was filed long after the evidence had been destroyed and where the state had no reason to know of defendant's claims prior to the filing of the motion. Clements involved t h e d e s t r u c t i o n o f meat a l l e g e d l y s t o l e n from a g r o c e r y s t o r e . Although t h e d e f e n d a n t i n t h a t c a s e was a w a r e o f a p o s s i b l e e x c u l p a t o r y v a l u e i n t h e meat, i . e . , t h a t h e a l l e g e d l y had n o t s t o l e n i t , b u t w a s r e t u r n i n g i t t o t h e s t o r e because i t was s u p p o s e d l y t a i n t e d , t h e s t a t e had no reason to know that the condition of the meat was m a t e r i a l t o d e f e n d a n t ' s c a s e u n t i l t h e m o t i o n was f i l e d . 52 0r.App. 3 0 9 , 6 2 8 P.2d a t 435-36. In the instant case, t h e d e f e n d a n t c o u l d h a v e moved very early in the proceedings to preserve any evidence h a v i n g some, i f a n y , c o n n e c t i o n t o s e c t i o n 36. However, t h e i n i t i a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n of t h e two s e c t i o n s g a v e n e i t h e r t h e State nor St. Regis any indication that the trees seized were connected t o s e c t i o n 36, o r t h a t any m a t e r i a l s g a t h e r e d f r o m s e c t i o n 36 would b e c r i t i c a l t o e s t a b l i s h i n g P a l m e r ' s innocence. I n d e e d , we f i n d no i n d i c a t i o n i n t h e r e c o r d t h a t there was any exculpatory evidence available to Palmer. Moreover, the allegedly exculpatory evidence w a s never in the possession of the State. The record is clear that St.Regis was i n e f f e c t i v e c o n t r o l of the remaining trees, stumps and butts found on section 35. Under these c i r c u m s t a n c e s , t h e S t a t e d i d n o t have p o s s e s s i o n o r c o n t r o l of these items for Brady purposes. Clements, supra, 52 0r.App. 3 0 9 , 6 2 8 P.2d a t 436 n . 5. ISSUE TWO: Palmer further alleges that his conviction for both felony theft and felony criminal mischief violates the provisions of t h e multiple punishment statute, Section 46-11-502, MCA, and this Court's construction of that statute. S e c t i o n 46-11-502 provides that: "When t h e same t r a n s a c t i o n may e s t a b l i s h t h e c o m m i s s i o n o f more t h a n o n e o f f e n s e , a p e r s o n c h a r g e d w i t h s u c h c o n d u c t may b e prosecuted f o r each such offense. H e may not, however, be convicted of more than one offense if: (1) one offense is included in the other; (2) one offense consists only of a conspiracy or other form of preparation to commit the other; (3) inconsistent findings of fact are required to establish the commission of the offenses; (4) the offenses differ only in that one is defined to prohibit a designated kind of conduct generally and the other to prohibit a specific instance of such conduct; or (5) the offense is defined to prohibit a continuing course of conduct and the defendant's course of conduct was interrupted, unless the law provides that the specific periods of such conduct constitute separate offenses." In a recent decision, State v. Wells (Mont. 1983), 658 P.2d 381, 40 St.Rep. 127, we had this to say about multiple punishments: "The double jeopardy prohibition contained in the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution has been applied to state proceedings since 1969. Benton v. Maryland (1969), 395 U.S. 784, 796, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 2063, 23 L.Ed.2d 707, 717. This prohibition protects a defendant from both multiple prosecutions for offenses arising out of the same transaction and from multiple punishments imposed at a single prosecution for the same offense. See North Carolina v. Pearce (1969), 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2076, 23 L.Ed.2d 656,664-665. Where, as here, defendant was tried at a single prosecution for all of the statutory crimes in question, the issue is one of multiple punishments. State v. Close (1981), . Mont , 623 P.2d 940, 949, 38 St.Rep. 177, 188. "The analysis that this Court has consistently applied in determining whether one offense is included within another offense is the test set forth in Blockburger v. United States (1932), 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 182, 76 L.Ed. 306, 309. In Blockburger, the Court ruled: 'The applicable rule is that where the same act or transaction constitutes a v i o l a t i o n o f two d i s t i n c t s t a t u t o r y p r o v i s i o n s , t h e t e s t t o be a p p l i e d t o d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r t h e r e a r e two o f f e n s e s o r o n l y o n e , is whether e a c h p r o v i s i o n r e q u i r e s proof of a f a c t which t h e o t h e r does not.' 284 U.S. a t 3 0 4 , 52 S . C t . a t 1 8 2 , 76 L.Ed. a t 309. "The B l o c k b u r g e r t e s t is codified in s e c t i o n 46-11-502, MCA. "This Court has adopted t h e approach whereby t h e a n a l y s i s i s a p p l i e d t o t h e s t a t u t e s i n question rather than t o t h e f a c t s of t h e i n d i v i d u a l c a s e . S t a t e v. Ritchson (1981), Mont. , 630 P.2d 2 3 4 , 2 3 7 , 3 8 S t . R e p . 1 0 1 5 , 1 0 1 8 . In determining whether m u l t i p l e punishments s h o u l d be allowed f o r o f f e n s e s a r i s i n g out of the same transaction, the d i s p o s i t i v e q u e s t i o n t h e n becomes w h e t h e r the l e g i s l a t u r e intended t o provide f o r multiple punishments. S t a t e v. Close ( 1 9 8 1 ) , s u p r a , 623 P.2d a t 949, 38 St.Rep. a t 188. ' B l o c k b u r g e r ' s a n a l y s i s must s t a n d o r f a l l on t h e working of t h e s t a t u t e s a l o n e , n o t on t h e i n d i c t m e n t . ' C l o s e , 623 P.2d a t 9 5 0 , 38 S t . R e p . a t 189. S e e a l s o , S t a t e v . Buckman ( 1 9 8 1 ) , Mont. , 630 P.2d 7 4 3 , 7 4 5 , 38 St.Rep. 1 0 0 r 1 0 0 9 ; S t a t e v. Coleman 11979). Mont. , 605 P.2d 1 0 0 0 . 1008-i009,3 St.Rep. ii34, 1138-1140~; S t a t e v . P e r r y ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 1 8 0 Mont. 3 6 4 , 368. 590 P.2d 1 1 2 9 . 1 1 3 1 : S t a t e v . D a v i s & c i o s e ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 1 7 6 ~ o n t ' . 1 9 6 , 1 9 9 , 577 P.2d 3 7 5 , 377; S t a t e v. R a d i , s u p r a , 1 7 6 Mont. a t 4 6 2 , 578 P.2d a t 1 1 7 6 . " Adhering to these standards, we find no error in c o n v i c t i n g P a l m e r on b o t h f e l o n y t h e f t a n d f e l o n y c r i m i n a l mischief. Theft in the context of this c a s e c o n s i s t s of p u r p o s e l y o r knowingly t a k i n g t h e p r o p e r t y of another with the purpose to deprive. Section 45-6-301(1)(a), MCA. Criminal mischief i n t h e context of t h i s c a s e c o n s i s t s of purposely or knowingly damaging o r d e s t r o y i n g t h e p r o p e r t y of another without his consent. Section 45-6-101(1)(a), MCA. Clearly, the two statutes are similar only in the requirements concerning mental state, and proof of a r e q u i s i t e m e n t a l s t a t e is a f e a t u r e of any c r i m i n a l s t a t u t e . Palmer, however, insists that the act of "taking" or " d e p r i v i n g " i n v o l v e d i n t h e f t i s synonomous w i t h t h e a c t o f " d e s t r o y i n g " o r "damaging" i n v o l v e d i n c r i m i n a l m i s c h i e f . Common s e n s e d i c t a t e s t h a t t h e o f f e n s e s o f t h e f t and criminal mischief are neither coextensive nor wholly includible within each o t h e r . There a r e many situations where the acts of a wrongdoer involve both theft and c r i m i n a l m i s c h i e f , and t h e i n s t a n t c a s e i s b u t o n e e x a m p l e . Palmer deprived St. Regis of its property, by taking p o r t i o n s of t r e e s t o use o r s e l l a s Christmas t r e e s . Palmer damaged St. Regis property, as t h e r e was evidence of diminished value to the land because of the destruction. The c o n v i c t i o n on c h a r g e s o f t h e f t and c r i m i n a l m i s c h i e f was legally permissible. ISSUE THREE: Palmer contends that the e v i d e n c e of v a l u e used to charge and convict him of felony criminal mischief was inadmissible. In the absence of any acceptable values, Palmer m a i n t a i n s t h a t h i s c o n v i c t i o n on t h a t c h a r g e c a n n o t stand. The g i s t o f P a l m e r ' s d e f e n s e i s t h a t p r o o f o f " v a l u e , " f o r t h e p u r p o s e of e s t a b l i s h i n g commission of a f e l o n y , is controlled by Section 45-2-101(69)(a), MCA, which states t h a t v a l u e "means t h e m a r k e t v a l u e a t t h e t i m e and p l a c e o f t h e c r i m e o r , i f s u c h c a n n o t be s a t i s f a c t o r i l y a s c e r t a i n e d , the cost of the replacement of the property within a reasonable t i m e a f t e r t h e crime." The e v i d e n c e o f "value" produced a t t r i a l t o e s t a b l i s h t h e a c t of felony criminal mischief consisted of c o s t s of stump removal, replanting, and l o s t future t r e e growth. While the costs associated with these items are not within the scope of "value" as defined i n Section 45-2-101(69)(a), we find that they a r e still admissible to establish proof of felony criminal mischief. Most c r i m i n a l s t a t u t e s , i n c l u d i n g t h e f t , d r a w t h e l i n e b e t w e e n a f e l o n y and a misdemeanor b a s e d upon t h e " v a l u e " o f the property involved. It is to these statutes that the definition contained in Section 45-2-101(69)(a) applies. The distinction between felony and misdemeanor criminal mischief, however, is not measured by the "value" of property damaged or destroyed. On the contrary, the d i f f e r e n c e is c o n t r o l l e d by t h e amount o f "pecuniary l o s s " t o t h e owner o f t h e p r o p e r t y . See S e c t i o n 45-6-101(3). The term "value," a s defined by Section 45-2-101(69)(a), does not appear i n t h e criminal mischief s t a t u t e . Palmer p o i n t s t o c e r t a i n C o m p i l e r ' s Comments t o t h e s t a t u t e w h i c h u s e t h e word " v a l u e " i n t h e c o n t e x t o f c r i m i n a l m i s c h i e f , but these comments, apparantly drafted by the Montana Criminal Law I n f o r m a t i o n and R e s e a r c h C e n t e r a t t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f Montana Law S c h o o l , a r e n o t p a r t o f t h e s t a t u t e and t h u s d o n o t h a v e the f o r c e of law. Moreover, they are c l e a r l y misleading w i t h r e s p e c t t o c l a s s i f y i n g c a t e g o r i e s of c r i m i n a l m i s c h i e f . Section 45-1-102(2) requires provisions of the c r i m i n a l code " t o be c o n s t r u e d a c c o r d i n g t o t h e f a i r import of their terms with a view to effect [the object of the code] . . . and to promote justice." Simply defined, " p e c u n i a r y l o s s " means " [ a ] l o s s o f money, o r s o m e t h i n g by which money o r something of money v a l u e may b e a c q u i r e d . " Black's Law D i c t i o n a r y 1018 ( 5 t h ed. 1979). Evidence of damages from loss of future tree growth, as well as the out-of-pocket expense of removing stumps and replanting, is includible within the concept of pecuniary loss. Obviously, the statute was carefully drafted to avoid reference to "value," because property damaged or destroyed by criminal mischief may not, in some instances, have a market value or replacement cost. The trial court properly allowed the State's evidence to show the monetary losses arising from defendant's damage to St. Regis property. This evidence clearly established more than $150 of pecuniary loss---enough to charge and convict Palmer of felony criminal mischief. Even if we accept as true one of Palmer's subarguments, i.e., that there was insufficient evidence to establish any attempt by St. Regis to remove stumps and reseed the harvested portions of section 35, the evidence of money damages from lost future tree growth clearly exceeds the $150 minimum necessary to impose a felony conviction. Accordingly, the conviction of the defendant Palmer is affirmed. We concur: >ha- Chief Justice $1 $%iMdk