No. 83-313
I N THE SUPREME COURT O T I E STATE O M N A J
F F O T PA
1983
STATE O F MONTAXA,
P l a i n t i f f and R e s p o n d e n t ,
-vs-
GARY L. PALMER,
Defendant and A p p e l l a n t .
APPEAL FROM: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Nineteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
I n a n d f o r t h e County o f L i n c o l n ,
The H o n o r a b l e R o b e r t M. H o l t e r , J u d g e p r e s i d i n g .
COUNSEL O RECORD:
F
For Appellant:
S v e r d r u 2 & S p e n c e r , L i b b y , Montana
For Respondent:
Eon. Mike G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , Montana
W i l l i a m L. D o u g l a s , County A t t o r n e y , L i b b y , Montana
S u b m i t t e d on B r i e f s : September 2 2 , 1983
Decided: December 8 , 1983
@EC c- -
Filed: L, 1983
Mr. J u s t i c e L.C. Gulbrandson d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n of the
Court.
Defendant Gary Palmer a p p e a l s from h i s c o n v i c t i o n on
charges of felony theft and felony criminal mischief
following a jury trial in the District Court of the
Nineteenth Judicial District, Lincoln County. For the
r e a s o n s s t a t e d below, w e a f f i r m d e f e n d a n t ' s c o n v i c t i o n .
On November 1 3 , 1 9 8 2 , two e m p l o y e e s o f t h e S t . R e g i s
Paper Company o b s e r v e d P a l m e r and four companions, George
Busse, William Glidden, Donald Souder and Bruce Bothum,
c u t t i n g t r e e s on l a n d owned by S t . Regis. The e m p l o y e e s
notified the county sheriff's office, which dispatched a
deputy t o t h e scene. En r o u t e , t h e d e p u t y was j o i n e d by two
law e n f o r c e m e n t o f f i c e r s f r o m t h e K o o t e n a i N a t i o n a l F o r e s t .
A s t h e t h r e e men a p p r o a c h e d t h e scene of the tree cutting,
one of t h e c u t t e r s , l a t e r i d e n t i f i e d a s G l i d d e n , r a n b e h i n d
some b u s h e s . G l i d d e n d i d n o t emerge from t h e b u s h e s u n t i l
t h e o f f i c e r y e l l e d f o r him t o come o u t . Glidden explained
t h a t h e had g o n e b e h i n d t h e b u s h e s o n l y t o r e l i e v e h i m s e l f ,
but the officer c o u l d f i n d no t r a c e s o f urination i n the
brush.
The officers and the deputy asked Glidden and the
o t h e r s f o r e v i d e n c e o f p e r m i s s i o n t o b e c u t t i n g t r e e s on t h e
section. They w e r e r e f e r r e d t o t h e d e f e n d a n t , P a l m e r , who
produced a s m a l l s l i p of paper indicating t h a t Palmer had
a u t h o r i t y t o c u t t r e e s on s e c t i o n 3 6 , a t r a c t owned by t h e
S t a t e o f Montana. The s l i p was s i g n e d by R a l p h J a m e s , who
had a Christmas tree cutting permit from the State for
s e c t i o n 36. However, one of t h e o f f i c e r s noted t h a t t h e
area the men w e r e working was section 35, owned by St.
R e g i s , which l i e s a d j a c e n t t o t h e s t a t e - o w n e d s e c t i o n .
Palmer, his colleagues, and the officers left the
scene and went to the sheriff I s office to discuss the
problem f u r t h e r . The n e x t d a y , November 1 4 , t h e s h e r i f f I s
d e p u t y and S t . Regis employees r e t u r n e d to s e c t i o n 35 to
conduc t an i n v e s t i g a t i o n . One o f t h e employees determined
that t h e most recent c u t t i n g had b e e n d o n e on S t . Regis
l a n d , and f o u n d no e v i d e n c e o f r e c e n t c u t t i n g on s t a t e - o w n e d
section 36. This conclusion was confirmed by a state
f o r e s t e r o b s e r v i n g t h e a r e a a few d a y s l a t e r . P a l m e r had
i n s i s t e d t h a t h e and h i s c o l l e a g u e s w e r e c u t t i n g on s e c t i o n
36. Photographs taken at the scene revealed that the
p r o p e r t y l i n e s were c l e a r l y d e m a r c a t e d by p o s t e d notices,
although Palmer maintained that he had not seen these
n o t i c e s u n t i l t h e f o r e s t s e r v i c e o f f i c e r s a n d t h e d e p u t y had
d i s c o v e r e d t h e c u t t i n g on November 1 3 .
The i n v e s t i g a t i o n r e v e a l e d t h a t P a l m e r and t h e o t h e r s
had b e e n c u t t i n g t h e t r e e s n e a r t h e ground, and " t o p p i n g "
t h e f e l l e d t r e e s s o t h a t t h e t o p s c o u l d b e used a s C h r i s t m a s
trees. St. R e g i s e m p l o y e e s and t h e s h e r i f f ' s d e p u t y w e r e
a b l e t o match t h e b u t t s o f t h e t r e e s t o s t u m p s o n s e c t i o n
35. The d e p u t y r e t a i n e d some o f t h e t r e e s , b u t t s and s t u m p s
a s evidence. S t . Regis r e t a i n e d t h e topped Christmas t r e e s
and o t h e r b u t t s . The t r e e s were l a t e r s o l d a t w h o l e s a l e f o r
a p p r o x i m a t e l y $1,600. The e m p l o y e e s a l s o t o o k e s t i m a t e s o f
damages t o t h e l a n d . The e s t i m a t e s i n c l u d e d $200 t o remove
the stumps; $329 f o r replacement of plant seedlings, and
$1,849 f o r l o s s of t h i r t y y e a r ' s t r e e growth.
Palmer and his four associates were charged with
felony theft and felony criminal miscl~ief for illegally
removing and damaging the trees. The four associates
n e g o t i a t e d a p l e a b a r g a i n and p l e a d g u i l t y t o misdemeanor
theft. Palmer p l e d n o t g u i l t y t o a l l t h e c h a r g e s a g a i n s t
him. Although his c o l l e a g u e s t e s t i f i e d on h i s b e h a l f at
trial, P a l m e r was c o n v i c t e d and s e n t e n c e d t o two y e a r s i n
t h e Montana S t a t e P r i s o n .
P a l m e r a p p e a l s from h i s c o n v i c t i o n , and r a i s e s t h r e e
issues :
(1) Whether the D i s t r i c t Court erred in failing to
dismiss t h e c h a r g e s a g a i n s t Palmer b e c a u s e of the State's
alleged suppression or destruction of material and
exculpatory evidence?
( 2 ) Whether P a l m e r ' s conviction of both felony t h e f t
and felony criminal mischief v i o l a t e s m u l t i p l e punishment
statutes?
(3) Whether the District Court erred in allowing
testimony of monetary values other than "current market
v a l u e " t o e s t a b l i s h proof of f e l o n y c r i m i n a l m i s c h i e f ?
ISSUE ONE:
P r i o r t o t r i a l , and i m m e d i a t e l y f o l l o w i n g p r e s e n t a t i o n
of the state's case-in-chief, Palmer's counsel moved for
d i s m i s s a l o f t h e c h a r g e s on t h e g r o u n d s t h a t t h e s t a t e h a d
suppressed or destroyed material, exculpatory evidence.
Palmer maintained that, because t h e S t a t e had d i s p o s e d o f
a l l but four or f i v e of t h e t r e e s c u t by P a l m e r and h i s
associates, h e had no e v i d e n c e w h i c h would tend t o prove
t h a t t h e y had b e e n c u t t i n g t r e e s on S t a t e - o w n e d s e c t i o n 36.
Suppression or destruction of material, exculpatory evidence
by t h e S t a t e amounts t o a v i o l a t i o n of a d e f e n d a n t ' s due
process rights and warrants dismissal of charges against
him. See Brady v. Maryland ( 1 9 6 3 ) , 373 U.S. 53, 83 S.Ct.
1 1 9 4 , 1 0 L.Ed.2d 215; S t a t e v. C r a i g ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 1 6 9 Mont. 150,
545 P.2d 649.
The District Court denied all motions by defense
counsel to dismiss the charges. We f i n d no e r r o r in the
court's actions. When the deputy and the St. Regis
employees returned to the scene of cutting, they
investigated both sections in dispute. They found no
evidence of recent cutting on S t a t e - o w n e d s e c t i o n 36, but
did find such evidence on section 35, and gathered
sufficient evidence relevant to that area. Although an
i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f s e c t i o n 36 i n F e b r u a r y , 1 9 8 3 , r e v e a l e d t h a t
t r e e s had b e e n f e l l e d o n t h a t s e c t i o n a r o u n d November, 1 9 8 2 ,
t h e method o f c u t t i n g was m a r k e d l y d i f f e r e n t t h a n t h a t u s e d
by P a l m e r and h i s c o l l e a g u e s o n s e c t i o n 35. Furthermore,
t h e t r e e s i n q u e s t i o n were retained and l a t e r s o l d by S t .
R e g i s , and n o t t h e S t a t e , a s P a l m e r h a s a r g u e d s i n c e t r i a l .
Palmer's counsel filed a motion to produce all the
t r e e s c u t on t h e a r e a s i n q u e s t i o n n e a r l y f i v e months a f t e r
the incident arose. I n S t a t e v . C l e m e n t s ( 1 9 8 1 ) , 52 0 r . A p p .
309, 628 P . 2 d 4 3 3 , u n d e r f a c t s v e r y s i m i l a r t o t h o s e a t b a r
i n t h e immediate c a s e , t h e C o u r t of Appeals of Oregon h e l d
t h a t a defendant could n o t a v a i l himself of the p r o t e c t i o n s
afforded under Brady, supra, where a motion to disclose
evidence was filed long after the evidence had been
destroyed and where the state had no reason to know of
defendant's claims prior to the filing of the motion.
Clements involved t h e d e s t r u c t i o n o f meat a l l e g e d l y s t o l e n
from a g r o c e r y s t o r e . Although t h e d e f e n d a n t i n t h a t c a s e
was a w a r e o f a p o s s i b l e e x c u l p a t o r y v a l u e i n t h e meat, i . e . ,
t h a t h e a l l e g e d l y had n o t s t o l e n i t , b u t w a s r e t u r n i n g i t t o
t h e s t o r e because i t was s u p p o s e d l y t a i n t e d , t h e s t a t e had
no reason to know that the condition of the meat was
m a t e r i a l t o d e f e n d a n t ' s c a s e u n t i l t h e m o t i o n was f i l e d . 52
0r.App. 3 0 9 , 6 2 8 P.2d a t 435-36.
In the instant case, t h e d e f e n d a n t c o u l d h a v e moved
very early in the proceedings to preserve any evidence
h a v i n g some, i f a n y , c o n n e c t i o n t o s e c t i o n 36. However, t h e
i n i t i a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n of t h e two s e c t i o n s g a v e n e i t h e r t h e
State nor St. Regis any indication that the trees seized
were connected t o s e c t i o n 36, o r t h a t any m a t e r i a l s g a t h e r e d
f r o m s e c t i o n 36 would b e c r i t i c a l t o e s t a b l i s h i n g P a l m e r ' s
innocence. I n d e e d , we f i n d no i n d i c a t i o n i n t h e r e c o r d t h a t
there was any exculpatory evidence available to Palmer.
Moreover, the allegedly exculpatory evidence w a s never in
the possession of the State. The record is clear that
St.Regis was i n e f f e c t i v e c o n t r o l of the remaining trees,
stumps and butts found on section 35. Under these
c i r c u m s t a n c e s , t h e S t a t e d i d n o t have p o s s e s s i o n o r c o n t r o l
of these items for Brady purposes. Clements, supra, 52
0r.App. 3 0 9 , 6 2 8 P.2d a t 436 n . 5.
ISSUE TWO:
Palmer further alleges that his conviction for both
felony theft and felony criminal mischief violates the
provisions of t h e multiple punishment statute, Section
46-11-502, MCA, and this Court's construction of that
statute.
S e c t i o n 46-11-502 provides that:
"When t h e same t r a n s a c t i o n may e s t a b l i s h
t h e c o m m i s s i o n o f more t h a n o n e o f f e n s e ,
a p e r s o n c h a r g e d w i t h s u c h c o n d u c t may b e
prosecuted f o r each such offense. H e may
not, however, be convicted of more than
one offense if:
(1) one offense is included in the
other;
(2) one offense consists only of a
conspiracy or other form of preparation
to commit the other;
(3) inconsistent findings of fact are
required to establish the commission of
the offenses;
(4) the offenses differ only in that
one is defined to prohibit a designated
kind of conduct generally and the other
to prohibit a specific instance of such
conduct; or
(5) the offense is defined to prohibit
a continuing course of conduct and the
defendant's course of conduct was
interrupted, unless the law provides that
the specific periods of such conduct
constitute separate offenses."
In a recent decision, State v. Wells (Mont. 1983), 658
P.2d 381, 40 St.Rep. 127, we had this to say about multiple
punishments:
"The double jeopardy prohibition
contained in the Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution has been
applied to state proceedings since 1969.
Benton v. Maryland (1969), 395 U.S. 784,
796, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 2063, 23 L.Ed.2d 707,
717. This prohibition protects a
defendant from both multiple prosecutions
for offenses arising out of the same
transaction and from multiple punishments
imposed at a single prosecution for the
same offense. See North Carolina v.
Pearce (1969), 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89
S.Ct. 2072, 2076, 23 L.Ed.2d 656,664-665.
Where, as here, defendant was tried at a
single prosecution for all of the
statutory crimes in question, the issue
is one of multiple punishments. State v.
Close (1981), .
Mont , 623 P.2d
940, 949, 38 St.Rep. 177, 188.
"The analysis that this Court has
consistently applied in determining
whether one offense is included within
another offense is the test set forth in
Blockburger v. United States (1932), 284
U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 182, 76
L.Ed. 306, 309. In Blockburger, the
Court ruled:
'The applicable rule is that where the
same act or transaction constitutes a
v i o l a t i o n o f two d i s t i n c t s t a t u t o r y
p r o v i s i o n s , t h e t e s t t o be a p p l i e d t o
d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r t h e r e a r e two o f f e n s e s
o r o n l y o n e , is whether e a c h p r o v i s i o n
r e q u i r e s proof of a f a c t which t h e o t h e r
does not.' 284 U.S. a t 3 0 4 , 52 S . C t . a t
1 8 2 , 76 L.Ed. a t 309.
"The B l o c k b u r g e r t e s t is codified in
s e c t i o n 46-11-502, MCA.
"This Court has adopted t h e approach
whereby t h e a n a l y s i s i s a p p l i e d t o t h e
s t a t u t e s i n question rather than t o t h e
f a c t s of t h e i n d i v i d u a l c a s e . S t a t e v.
Ritchson (1981), Mont. , 630
P.2d 2 3 4 , 2 3 7 , 3 8 S t . R e p . 1 0 1 5 , 1 0 1 8 . In
determining whether m u l t i p l e punishments
s h o u l d be allowed f o r o f f e n s e s a r i s i n g
out of the same transaction, the
d i s p o s i t i v e q u e s t i o n t h e n becomes w h e t h e r
the l e g i s l a t u r e intended t o provide f o r
multiple punishments. S t a t e v. Close
( 1 9 8 1 ) , s u p r a , 623 P.2d a t 949, 38
St.Rep. a t 188. ' B l o c k b u r g e r ' s a n a l y s i s
must s t a n d o r f a l l on t h e working of t h e
s t a t u t e s a l o n e , n o t on t h e i n d i c t m e n t . '
C l o s e , 623 P.2d a t 9 5 0 , 38 S t . R e p . a t
189. S e e a l s o , S t a t e v . Buckman ( 1 9 8 1 ) ,
Mont. , 630 P.2d 7 4 3 , 7 4 5 , 38
St.Rep. 1 0 0 r 1 0 0 9 ; S t a t e v. Coleman
11979). Mont. , 605 P.2d 1 0 0 0 .
1008-i009,3 St.Rep. ii34, 1138-1140~;
S t a t e v . P e r r y ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 1 8 0 Mont. 3 6 4 ,
368. 590 P.2d 1 1 2 9 . 1 1 3 1 : S t a t e v . D a v i s
& c i o s e ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 1 7 6 ~ o n t ' . 1 9 6 , 1 9 9 , 577
P.2d 3 7 5 , 377; S t a t e v. R a d i , s u p r a , 1 7 6
Mont. a t 4 6 2 , 578 P.2d a t 1 1 7 6 . "
Adhering to these standards, we find no error in
c o n v i c t i n g P a l m e r on b o t h f e l o n y t h e f t a n d f e l o n y c r i m i n a l
mischief. Theft in the context of this c a s e c o n s i s t s of
p u r p o s e l y o r knowingly t a k i n g t h e p r o p e r t y of another with
the purpose to deprive. Section 45-6-301(1)(a), MCA.
Criminal mischief i n t h e context of t h i s c a s e c o n s i s t s of
purposely or knowingly damaging o r d e s t r o y i n g t h e p r o p e r t y
of another without his consent. Section 45-6-101(1)(a),
MCA. Clearly, the two statutes are similar only in the
requirements concerning mental state, and proof of a
r e q u i s i t e m e n t a l s t a t e is a f e a t u r e of any c r i m i n a l s t a t u t e .
Palmer, however, insists that the act of "taking" or
" d e p r i v i n g " i n v o l v e d i n t h e f t i s synonomous w i t h t h e a c t o f
" d e s t r o y i n g " o r "damaging" i n v o l v e d i n c r i m i n a l m i s c h i e f .
Common s e n s e d i c t a t e s t h a t t h e o f f e n s e s o f t h e f t and
criminal mischief are neither coextensive nor wholly
includible within each o t h e r . There a r e many situations
where the acts of a wrongdoer involve both theft and
c r i m i n a l m i s c h i e f , and t h e i n s t a n t c a s e i s b u t o n e e x a m p l e .
Palmer deprived St. Regis of its property, by taking
p o r t i o n s of t r e e s t o use o r s e l l a s Christmas t r e e s . Palmer
damaged St. Regis property, as t h e r e was evidence of
diminished value to the land because of the destruction.
The c o n v i c t i o n on c h a r g e s o f t h e f t and c r i m i n a l m i s c h i e f was
legally permissible.
ISSUE THREE:
Palmer contends that the e v i d e n c e of v a l u e used to
charge and convict him of felony criminal mischief was
inadmissible. In the absence of any acceptable values,
Palmer m a i n t a i n s t h a t h i s c o n v i c t i o n on t h a t c h a r g e c a n n o t
stand.
The g i s t o f P a l m e r ' s d e f e n s e i s t h a t p r o o f o f " v a l u e , "
f o r t h e p u r p o s e of e s t a b l i s h i n g commission of a f e l o n y , is
controlled by Section 45-2-101(69)(a), MCA, which states
t h a t v a l u e "means t h e m a r k e t v a l u e a t t h e t i m e and p l a c e o f
t h e c r i m e o r , i f s u c h c a n n o t be s a t i s f a c t o r i l y a s c e r t a i n e d ,
the cost of the replacement of the property within a
reasonable t i m e a f t e r t h e crime." The e v i d e n c e o f "value"
produced a t t r i a l t o e s t a b l i s h t h e a c t of felony criminal
mischief consisted of c o s t s of stump removal, replanting,
and l o s t future t r e e growth. While the costs associated
with these items are not within the scope of "value" as
defined i n Section 45-2-101(69)(a), we find that they a r e
still admissible to establish proof of felony criminal
mischief.
Most c r i m i n a l s t a t u t e s , i n c l u d i n g t h e f t , d r a w t h e l i n e
b e t w e e n a f e l o n y and a misdemeanor b a s e d upon t h e " v a l u e " o f
the property involved. It is to these statutes that the
definition contained in Section 45-2-101(69)(a) applies.
The distinction between felony and misdemeanor criminal
mischief, however, is not measured by the "value" of
property damaged or destroyed. On the contrary, the
d i f f e r e n c e is c o n t r o l l e d by t h e amount o f "pecuniary l o s s "
t o t h e owner o f t h e p r o p e r t y . See S e c t i o n 45-6-101(3). The
term "value," a s defined by Section 45-2-101(69)(a), does
not appear i n t h e criminal mischief s t a t u t e . Palmer p o i n t s
t o c e r t a i n C o m p i l e r ' s Comments t o t h e s t a t u t e w h i c h u s e t h e
word " v a l u e " i n t h e c o n t e x t o f c r i m i n a l m i s c h i e f , but these
comments, apparantly drafted by the Montana Criminal Law
I n f o r m a t i o n and R e s e a r c h C e n t e r a t t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f Montana
Law S c h o o l , a r e n o t p a r t o f t h e s t a t u t e and t h u s d o n o t h a v e
the f o r c e of law. Moreover, they are c l e a r l y misleading
w i t h r e s p e c t t o c l a s s i f y i n g c a t e g o r i e s of c r i m i n a l m i s c h i e f .
Section 45-1-102(2) requires provisions of the
c r i m i n a l code " t o be c o n s t r u e d a c c o r d i n g t o t h e f a i r import
of their terms with a view to effect [the object of the
code] . . . and to promote justice." Simply defined,
" p e c u n i a r y l o s s " means " [ a ] l o s s o f money, o r s o m e t h i n g by
which money o r something of money v a l u e may b e a c q u i r e d . "
Black's Law D i c t i o n a r y 1018 ( 5 t h ed. 1979). Evidence of
damages from loss of future tree growth, as well as the
out-of-pocket expense of removing stumps and replanting, is
includible within the concept of pecuniary loss. Obviously,
the statute was carefully drafted to avoid reference to
"value," because property damaged or destroyed by criminal
mischief may not, in some instances, have a market value or
replacement cost. The trial court properly allowed the
State's evidence to show the monetary losses arising from
defendant's damage to St. Regis property. This evidence
clearly established more than $150 of pecuniary
loss---enough to charge and convict Palmer of felony
criminal mischief. Even if we accept as true one of
Palmer's subarguments, i.e., that there was insufficient
evidence to establish any attempt by St. Regis to remove
stumps and reseed the harvested portions of section 35, the
evidence of money damages from lost future tree growth
clearly exceeds the $150 minimum necessary to impose a
felony conviction.
Accordingly, the conviction of the defendant Palmer is
affirmed.
We concur:
>ha-
Chief Justice
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