No. 83-35
I N T E SUPREME COURT O THE STATE O M TT N
H F F OJA A
1983
GENERAL MILLS, IEC. ,
P l a i n t i f f and Appellant,
-vs-
ZERBE BROTHERS, I N C . , a Pilont. C o r p . , e t ax.,
D e f e n d a n t s and R e s p o n d e n t s .
APPEAL FROM: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Seventeenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
I n and f o r t h e County o f V a l l e y ,
The H o n o r a b l e Leonard H. Langen, J u d g e p r e s i d i n g .
COUNSEL O RECORD:
F
For Appellant r
J a r d i n e , S t e p h e n s o n , B l e w e t t & Weaver; K . Dale
Schwanke, G r e a t F a l l s , Montana
For Respondents:
R o b e r t H u r l y , Glasgow, Montana
Submitted on B r i e f s : September 1 5 , 1983
Decided: November 2 3 , 1 9 8 3
Filed: NOV 2 3 1983
Plr. Justice L.C. Gulbrandson delivered the Opinion of the
Court.
This case comes on appeal from a judgment of the
Seventeenth Judicial District Court, Valley County, finding
the existence of an oral contract for the sale of 20,000
bushels of wheat and crediting the respondents with two
deliveries of wheat rejected by the appellant.
Otto (now deceased) and Paul Zerbe were brothers who
grew wheat in Lustre, Valley County, Montana, and also owned
an implement dealership known as Zerbe Brothers, Inc. On
May 29, 1973, an agent for General Mills, Inc., Fred Page,
phoned Paul Zerbe to negotiate a grain purchase by General
Mills. Both parties acknowledge that an agreement was
reached as to a price of $2.56 per bushel and a period for
delivery, but the quantity of the purchase is in dispute.
At trial, Page testified that Paul Zerbe agreed to sell
General Mills 50,000 bushels of wheat, a quantity Page wrote
on a confirmation form during the telephone conversation.
However, Paul Zerbe testified he only agreed to sell General
Mills "up to" 20,000 bushels, and that he did not have
50,000 bushels to sell. Zerbe also testified he never sold
50,000 bushels at one time or a whole crop in one
transaction and claimed he never received the confirmation
form reflecting the greater quantity. In prior sales
transactions between the parties, the Zerbes did not sign
confirmation forms or send them back to General Mills. No
specific evidence that the confirmation form was mailed or
received was presented, however, General Mills did offer
testimony that it was its usual and customary business
p r a c t i c e t o mail t h e confirmation forms t o a s e l l e r . Also,
the Zerbes received settlement checks for the wheat they
delivered.
Between J u n e 7, 1973 and J u l y 27, 1973, the Zerbes
d e l i v e r e d a t o t a l of 16,593 b u s h e l s of d a r k n o r t h e r n s p r i n g
wheat t o t h e General M i l l s g r a i n e l e v a t o r i n Great Falls,
Montana. In addition, the Zerbes tendered two a d d i t i o n a l
l o a d s of wheat t o G e n e r a l M i l l s . One l o a d was t e n d e r e d o n
July 24, 1973, and consisted of 800 bushels of wheat.
Another l o a d of 800 b u s h e l s was t e n d e r e d o n J u l y 2 8 , 1973.
B o t h l o a d s w e r e r e j e c t e d by G e n e r a l M i l l s b e c a u s e t h e y w e r e
a l l e g e d l y c o n t a m i n a t e d by i n s e c t s . However, t h e Z e r b e s s o l d
t h e same l o a d s o f w h e a t t o a n o t h e r e l e v a t o r i n G r e a t F a l l s
without discount f o r contamination. A f t e r r e j e c t i o n of the
two loads, the Zerbes discontinued deliveries under the
contract. On A p r i l 11, 1 9 7 4 , G e n e r a l M i l l s l e a r n e d t h a t t h e
Z e r b e s w e r e n o t g o i n g t o make a n y f u r t h e r d e l i v e r i e s . The
market p r i c e f o r dark n o r t h e r n s p r i n g wheat i n G r e a t F a l l s
on A p r i l 11, 1974 was $ 4 . 4 4 p e r b u s h e l .
On J u l y 1 0 , 1 9 7 5 , G e n e r a l M i l l s b r o u g h t s u i t a g a i n s t
the Zerbes alleging breach of contract and seeking
$61,802.95 i n damages. On November 4, 1982, t h e c a s e was
tried before the District Court sitting without a jury.
After hearing the evidence presented by the parties the
District Court held: (1) t h e original contract was for
20,000 bushels of wheat; (2) the defendants tendered or
d e l i v e r e d a t o t a l of 18,193 b u s h e l s t o p l a i n t i f f , a q u a n t i t y
that included the two 800 bushel loads the plaintiff
rejected on July 24, 1973 and July 28, 1973; (3) the
d e f e n d a n t s f a i l e d t o d e l i v e r 1,807 b u s h e l s under t h e terms
of the contract; and (4) the plaintiff was e n t i t l e d to a
judgment i n t h e amount o f 1,807 b u s h e l s times $ 1 . 8 5 which
was the difference between the $2.56 per bushel the
d e f e n d a n t s a g r e e d t o a c c e p t f o r t h e wheat and t h e $4.41 p e r
b u s h e l m a r k e t p r i c e o n A p r i l 11, 1 9 7 4 .
The p l a i n t i f f now a p p e a l s c l a i m i n g t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t
erred in finding that the oral contract was for 20,000
b u s h e l s r a t h e r t h a n 50,000 b u s h e l s and c r e d i t i n g d e f e n d a n t s
f o r t h e two 800 b u s h e l l o a d s t e n d e r e d o n J u l y 2 4 , 1973 and
J u l y 28, 1973. Specifically, a p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h e r e is a
presumption under Montana law that a mailing has been
received if customary o f f i c e mailing procedures have been
followed and r e s p o n d e n t s f a i l e d t o produce c r e d i b l e e v i d e n c e
t o rebut t h a t presumption. In addition, a p p e l l a n t asserts
t h e r e s p o n d e n t s s h o u l d be e s t o p p e d from c l a i m i n g t h e y o n l y
a g r e e d t o s e l l up t o 2 0 , 0 0 0 b u s h e l s o f w h e a t r a t h e r t h a n t h e
T 0 , 0 0 0 c l a i m e d by a p p e l l a n t b e c a u s e o f t h e r e s p o n d e n t s ' p a s t
p r a c t i c e of n o t s i g n i n g and r e t u r n i n g c o n f i r m a t i o n forms b u t
d e l i v e r i n g t h e q u a n t i t i e s o f w h e a t a g r e e d t o by t h e p a r t i e s .
Finally, appellant contends the District Court erred in
crediting the respondents with the two 800 bushel loads
b e c a u s e t h e e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d a t t r i a l showed t h e a p p e l l a n t
was j u s t i f i e d i n r e j e c t i n g t h e l o a d s a s c o n t a m i n a t e d .
Montana law presumes that a letter mailed in the
ordinary course of business has been received. Section
26-1-602(20)(24), MCA. I n t h i s case, w h i l e i t i s t r u e t h a t
there is no direct evidence of actual mailing of the
c o n f i r m a t i o n form, t h e presumption of receipt nevertheless
arises. C r i s s e y v . S t a t e Highway C o m m i s s i o n (1966), 147
Mont. 374, 413 P.2d 308. It is enough that there is an
o f f i c e p r a c t i c e o r custom and t h a t t h i s p r a c t i c e o r custom
was c a r r i e d o u t . Crissey, 1 4 7 Mont. a t 379. However, in
t h i s case t h e respondent denies r e c e i p t of the confirmation
order. I n Crissey, we held t h a t an addressee's positive
denial of receipt does not nullify the presumption, but
leaves the question for t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n of the jury, or
the court s i t t i n g without a jury, with such weight given t o
t h e p r e s u m p t i o n a s t h e y t h i n k i t is e n t i t l e d t o . Crissey,
1 4 7 Mont. a t 379; a l s o see J a m e s T a l c o t t , I n c . v . R e y n o l d s
(1974), 1 6 5 Mont. 404, 529 P.2d 352 and Renland v . F i r s t
N a t i o n a l Bank (1931), 90 Mont. 424, 4 P.2d 488. The
presumption is n o t conclusive and may b e controverted by
other evidence. S e c t i o n 26-1-602, MCA. Also s e e g e n e r a l l y
31A C . J . S . E v i d e n c e , S e c t i o n 1 3 6 , p . 291.
Af t e r considering the evidence and ascertaining the
witnesses' credibility, t h e D i s t r i c t Court determined t h a t
r e s p o n d e n t d i d n o t r e c e i v e t h e c o n f i r m a t i o n form r e f l e c t i n g
the 50,000 bushel q u a n t i t y and the terms of the contract
p r o v i d e d f o r d e l i v e r y o f 20,000 b u s h e l s . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t
properly weighed the presumption of receipt against
respondent's denial and the other evidence presented at
t r i a l and a r r i v e d a t i t s c o n c l u s i o n . W cannot d e v i a t e from
e
our f u n c t i o n a s an a p p e l l a t e c o u r t and r e v e r s e t h e D i s t r i c t
Court's decision. Our f u n c t i o n s d o n o t i n c l u d e a r e t r i a l o f
the case. W w i l l n o t s u b s t i t u t e our judgment f o r t h a t o f
e
the t r i a l court. W e a r e "confined t o determining whether
there is substantial credible evidence to support the
findings of fact and conclusions of law." Cameron v .
Cameron ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 1 7 9 Mont. 219, 227, 5 8 7 P.2d 939, 944; -
In
t h e M a t t e r o f t h e E s t a t e o f LaTray (1979), 1 8 3 Mont. 141,
598 P.2d 619; Olson v. Westfork Properties, Inc. (1976), 171
Mont. 154, 557 P.2d 821; Hornung v. Estate of Lagerquist
(1970), 155 Mont. 412, 473 P.2d 541. We have elaborated on
this standard numerous times and several well-settled
principles have emerged. We view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prevailing party. Cameron, supra;
Olson, supra; Hellickson v. Barrett Mobile Home Transport,
Inc. (1973), 161 Mont. 455, 507 P.2d 523. The evidence may
be inherently weak and still be deemed "substantial."
Campeau v. Lewis (1965), 144 Mont. 543, 547, 398 P.2d 960,
962. Moreover, Rule 52(a) M.R.Civ.P. provides, in part,
that "[£]indings of fact shall not be set aside unless
clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility
of the witnesses." The record before us does not evince a
clear error in the District Court's decision to find the
parties contract was for 20,000 bushels rather than 50,000
bushels. Likewise, appellant has failed to point out any
clear error in the District Court's decision that the
respondents be credited with the two 800 bushel loads they
tendered to appellant on July 24, 1973 and July 28, 1973.
Appellant also asserts that respondents should be
estopped from denying the contract was for 50,000 bushels
because in prior transactions between the parties the
respondents never signed or returned confirmation forms.
The essential elements of estoppel are the following: (1)l
there must be conduct, acts, language or silence amounting
to a representation or concealment of facts; (2) facts must
be known to party estopped at the time of his conduct; (3)
truth concerning the facts must be unknown to the other
party; ( 4 ) t h e c o n d u c t m u s t be d o n e w i t h t h e i n t e n t i o n t h a t
i t b e a c t e d upon b y t h e o t h e r p a r t y o r u n d e r c i r c u m s t a n c e s
s o t h a t it is b o t h n a t u r a l and p r o b a b l e t h a t it w i l l be s o
a c t e d upon; ( 5 ) t h e c o n d u c t m u s t i n f a c t h a v e a c t e d upon i t
to his detriment. I n r e t h e Matter o f Shaw (Mont. 1980),
615 P . 2 d 910, 37 St.Rep. 1480; Kenco v . C a n t r e l l (1977)r
1 7 4 Mont. 130, 5 6 8 P.2d 1225; Smith v. K r u t a r (1969), 153
Mont. 325, 457 P.2d 459. The f a c t s of this case d o n o t
warrant an a p p l i c a t i o n of the d o c t r i n e of estoppel. The
record does not contain evidence of any conduct of the
respondent that would be considered a representation or
c o n c e a l m e n t t h a t t h e p a r t i e s c o n t r a c t was f o r 5 0 , 0 0 0 b u s h e l s
rather than 20,000 bushels. Also, the District Court
determined the evidence showed the parties agreed to a
20,000 b u s h e l q u a n t i t y on t h i s p a r t i c u l a r occasion so the
50,000 q u a n t i t y claimed by a p p e l l a n t c a n n o t be c o n s i d e r e d a
" f a c t " w i t h i n t h e knowledge of t h e r e s p o n d e n t s . E s t o p p e l is
not favored and will be sustained only upon appellant's
showing o f c l e a r and c o n v i n c i n g e v i d e n c e . T r i b b l e v. Reely
( 1 9 7 6 ) , 1 7 1 Mont. 2 0 1 , 557 P.2d 813.
In sum, we find no reversible error and therefore
affirm.
W concur:
e
V44A$&&fJgJ
Chief J u s t i c e
A
Jqd ices