Snell v. Snell

                                              No.    82-394

                    I N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF 310NTA?IA

                                                     1983




I i J RE TIJE MARRIAGE OF

W.   CARTER S N E L L ,

                    P e t i t i o n e r and R e s p o n d e n t ,

       -VS-

HARRIETTE A.       SNELL,

                    R e s p o n d e n t and A p p e l l a n t .




APPEAL FROM:        D i s t r i c t C o u r t of t h e S i x t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
                    I n and f o r t h e C o u n t y o f R o s e b u d ,
                    T h e I I o n o r a b l e A l f r e d B. C o a t e , Judge p r e s i d i n g .


COUNSEL OF RECORD:

         For Appellant:

                    11.   D.   Buelow,      M i l e s C i t y , Montana

         F o r Respondent :

                    B r o w n and H u s s , M i l e s C i t y , Montana




                                              S u b m i t t e d on B r i e f s :    June 2 , 1 9 5 3

                                                                    Decided:       A u g u s t 18, 1 9 8 3



Filed:




                                                                      .
                                                                      -
                                              clerk-
Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea delivered the Opinion of the
Court.


     Harriette A. Snell appeals from that part of a marital
dissolution decree    of   the Rosebud County District Court
dividing property and denying her request for maintenance.
She argues that the trial court abused its discretion in not
including in the marital estate certain gifts of ranch stock
to her husband from his parents.     She argues that the trial
court   abused   its discretion in distributing the marital
estate.    Approximately 67 percent of the value was awarded to
the husband and 33 percent was awarded to the wife.   Finally,
she argues that the court abused       its discretion in not
ordering the husband to pay her maintenance.        We affirm.
     The parties were married in 1945, and the marriage was
dissolved in 1982.     They moved to Montana in 1948 and the
husband was employed as a ranch hand from 1948 to 1951.     In
March 1951, the husband formed a partnership with his brother
and his father, and purchased a 9,500 acre ranch near Jordan,
Montana.    The husband's father made the down payment on the
ranch and the balance of the purchase price was borrowed.
The husband and wife lived and worked on the partnership
ranch until 1957 when they purchased a house in Miles City
and the wife moved      there with their two children.     The
husband stayed on the ranch and the wife never moved back.
The children attended school in Miles City.      The husband's
pa-rents gifted the down payment for the house and the balance
of the purchase price was paid for from the husband's ranch
earnings.
     The wife has been almost continuously employed since
leaving the ranch.     She worked at Montgomery Ward in Miles
City from 1958 through 1963; she worked at the Miles City
Star    from     1964 through      1978; and     she has worked   as an
assistant and receptionist in a doctor's office from 1978 to
the present time.          Her take-home pay was $530 per month at
the time of the hea-ring.
       The wife testified that after the children finished
school in 1967, her husband would not allow her to return to
the ranch.        The husband testified that she chose not to
return to the ranch, and the trial court so found.                 Until
October 1981, the husband provided the wife with $325 per
month for upkeep of the house in Miles City.
       The wife had been in Miles City for three years when the
Snell family ranch was incorporated in 1960.               The ranch was
incorporated as a family corporation and the trial court
found the owners at the time of the trial to be petitioner's
mother,     M.    Gladys    Snell,     petitioner,   and    petitioner's
brother, James Snell.            Respondent relinquished her interest
in the ranch real property by quitclaim deed dated January
23, 1960.
       The husband received 118 shares at the time the ranch
was    incorporated,       and    during   the    19701s, he    received
additional shares through a small purchase (5 shares) from
his father's estate and through estate planning gifts from
his father and mother.           At the time of the dissolution, the
husband owned less than half (258 of the 555 shares) of the
ranch corporation.
       In   determining          the   marital    estate    subject   to
distribution, the trial court did not include the 120 shares
the husband had acquired beginning in 1974.                 Rather, the
trial court concluded that the wife did not contribute to the
growth of the marital estate after 1969 and, therefore, she
had no right to share in increases in the estate since that
date.      The court did, however, hold that the wife had an
interest in 138 shares of stock in the family corporation by
1969 and that she had a right to share in the inflationary
growth of the stock to the time of dissolution.
        The trial court valued the total ma.rita1 estate subject
to   distribution       at   $330,514.44.    The   wife    was       awarded
approximately 33 percent of this value, and the husband was
awarded approximately 67 percent of this value.
     To    the wife, the trial court awa.rded all real and
personal property in her possession in Miles City               --   valued
at $57,919, all stock in the public corporations           --   valued at
$8,012.44, and a cash payment of $44,000 as representing her
interest in the family ranch stock.          The husband was to pay
her $20,000 cash within 60 days of judgment and the remaining
$24,000 was to be paid in 60 monthly installments at the rate
of $400 per month, the first payment starting on the day of
judgment.    The total value was $109,931.44.
     To the husband, the trial court awarded all personal
property     on   the    ranch   and   138   shares   of   the       family
corporation.      The personal property was valued at $1,555.
The 138 shares of stock were valued at $263,028, but from
this value the husband was to make the $44,000 cash payment
to the wife for her share in the stock.               The total value
awarded to the husband was $220,583.
     The wife first contends that the trial court erred in
not including in the marital estate the gifts of ranch stock
to the husband from his mother and father.             This Court has
held, however, that it is not mandatory to include in the
marital estate gifted property to one of the parties during
the marriage.     In re Marriage of Jorgenson (1979), 180 Mont.
294, 590 P.2d 606.           The question, of course, is whether there
had   been     an    abuse    of     discretion   by   not     including   the
husband's gifted stock.             We have set forth guidelines for the
equitable division of property acquired by gift or bequest to
one party to the marriage (In re Marriage of Herron (1980),
      Mont .         ,   608 P.2d 97, 37 St.Rep. 387), and we do not
find that the trial court violated these guidelines here.
The trial court properly exercised its discretion in not
including certain gifted              shares of    stock     in the marital

estate.
      Nor do we find an abuse of discretion in the trial court
awarding approximately 67 percent of the marital estate to
the husband and 33 percent to the wife.                  The trial court's
findings and conclusions are extensive and detailed.                   Under
section 40-4-202, MCA, marital assets can be equally divided,
but equal division is not mandated.               'In re Marriage of Kowis

(19831,          Mont    .      ,   658 P.2d 1084, 1088, 40 St.Rep. 149;
Martens v. Martens           (1981),         Mont.         , 637 P.2d 523,
526, 38 St.Rep. 2135.           The trial court considered the facts
and applied the statute, and we find no abuse of discretion.
      Finally, the wife argues that the trial court should
have ordered the husband to pay maintenance to her.                        The
statute (section 40-4-203, MCA), however, does not mandate
maintenance         in   a.11 circumstances ;        rather,    it   requires
maintenance only where the spouse seeking maintenance does
not   have     sufficient property         to provide      for his    or her
reasonable needs and the spouse is unable to support himself
or herself through "appropriate employment."                     See section
40-4-203 (1)(b), MCA.           Here, the wife has been employed for
the last 25 years, she received a home, $8,000 in public
corporation stock, and $44,000 in cash ($20,000 immediately
and the remaining $24,000 to be paid over a five year period
at the rate of $400 per month).   Clearly, the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in denying maintenance.
      The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.




We Concur:




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