No. 85-341
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1986
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF
WAYNE T. SNYDER,
Petitioner and Respondent,
and
LENA R . SNYDER,
R.espondent and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Gallatin,
The Honorable Thomas Olson, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Berger Law Firm; Chris J. Nelson, Billings, Montana
For Respondent:
McKinley Anderson, Bozeman, Montana
-
Submitted on Briefs: Dec. 1.8, 1985
Decided: February 20, 1986
Filed: FEB 2 0 I986
-
Clerk
Mr. Justice Fred J. Weber delivered the Opinion of the Court.
The wife appeals from the property distribution in this
dissolution of marriage. We affirm the order of the Gallatin
County District Court.
The issues presented on appeal are:
1. Did the District Court erroneously fail to include a
promissory note valued at $78,121 as part of the marital
estate?
2. Should the District Court have awarded. the wife
either a one-half interest in the family home or its equiva-
-
lent in cash?
The parties married late in life. Their marriage was
dissolved six years later, in 1984, when the husband was
sixty-nine years of age and the wife was sixty. Roth parties
worked during at least part of the marriage. The wife testi-
fied that she had entered into the marriage with the under-
standing that the husband would provide for her financially.
The husband brought to the marriage property worth over
$161,000, including an interest in a family farm, $15,000 in
retirement benefits, and a $55,000 home. While the parties
were married, they sold his home and applied the proceeds to
the purchase of a home which they held as joint tenants ("the
marital home") . Also during the marriage, the interest in
the family farm, which husband and his brother owned, was
reduced to a promissory note from the brother in favor of
husband and wife as tenants in common. The wife brought to
the marriage miscellaneous furniture and appliances of un-
known value. The parties acquired additional assets with a
net value of $27,831 during their marriage.
In its distribution of property, the District Court
ordered that the marital home, valued at $105,000, be sold.
The wife was to receive $20,000 of the proceeds after payment
of the mortgage, and the husband was to receive the remaining
proceeds. The court also award-ed the husband the promissory
note representing the interest in the family farm. The
balance payable on the note was $78,121 at the time of trial.
The total va.lue of the property distributed to husband was
$154,184. He was also assigned $43,855 in liabilities, which
included the mortgage on the marita.1 home. The wife was
awarded property with a total value of $31,800 and assigned
liabilities totaling $6,438. The trial court further awarded.
the wife $100 per month in maintenance, to continue until she
dies or remarries.
Did the District Court erroneously fail to include a
promi-ssory note valued at $78,121 as part of the marital
estate?
The wife acknowledges tha.t husband's interest in the
family farm existed before the parties married. However, she
argues that because the promissory note representing that
interest names her as a tenant in common, it establishes an
irrevocable gift from husband to her, and she should receive
half of the note's value.
Section 40-4-202, MCA, governs division of property in a
dissolution of marriage. That statute, in relevant part,
provides that:
. ..
the court ...
shall ..
. finally equitably
apportion between the parties the property and
assets belonging to either or both, however and
whenever acquired and whether the title thereto is
in the name of the husband or wife or both.
Subsection (3) of that statute further provides that:
Each spouse is considered to have a common owner-
ship in marital property that vests immediately
preceding the entry of the decree of dissolution
...
The question of title is not controlling under this statute.
Morse v. Morse (1977), 174 Mont. 541, 545, 571 P.2d 1147,
1149. In Morse, we upheld a property division in which the
District Court did not give controlling weight to the fact
that the wife quitclaimed certain property to the husband
during the marriage. In a similar manner, we conclude that
the District Court here was not required to give controlling
weight to the tenancy in common form of ownership in its
distribution of the promissory note.
Section 40-4-202, MCA, further provides, in subsection
(1) that:
... In dividing property acquired prior to the
marriage ... the court shall consider those
contributions of the other spouse to the marriage,
including: (a) the nonmonetary contribution of a
homemaker; (b) the extent to which such contribu-
tions have facilitated the maintenance of this
property; and (c) whether or not the property
division serves as an alternative to maintenance
arrangements.
Under this standard, prior acquired property may properly be
included as part of the marital assets where, for example,
contributions of the other spouse have facilitated mainte-
nance o? the property. - In re Marriage of Jorgensen
See
(1978), 180 Mont. 294, 590 P.2d 606. In the present case,
the interest in the family farm was undisputedly property of
the husband prior to this marriage. In evaluating the facts
of the present case under the above statutory standard, we
note that the District Court found that both parties contrib-
uted to make the household operate satisfactorily during
their marriage. There is nothing in the record or in the
briefs submitted to us to support the notion that the wife's
contributions facilitated the maintenance of the interest in
the farm property at any time. The wife was awarded mainte-
nance in addition to the property division in this matter.
We have repeatedly stated that we will not alter the
judgment of a district court in resolving a property distri-
bution unless a c1ea.r abuse of discretion is shown. In this
case, the findings of the District Court set out with partic-
ularity the assets which th.e husband and wife brought into
their marriage. The order also set out the assets acquired
and liabilities incurred during the marriage, which it la-
beled the "marital net estate." The court then provided for
disposition of the property acquired both prior to and during
the marriage. Under the above statutory standards, we cannot
say that the District Court abused its discretion in exclud-
ing the promissory note for the farm from the "marital net
estate", or in awarding it to the husband.
Should the District Court have awarded the wife either a
one-half interest in the family home or its equivalent in
cash?
The wife raises this issue on essentially the same
grounds as her argument under the first issue. She claims
that the husband gifted her with a one-half interest in the
marital home, and argues that the fact that the home is owned
jointly by the parties is evidence of the gift. She contends
that she should tlzerefore be awarded one-half of the home's
value.
As we ha.ve pointed out, Montana's statutory scheme for
disposition of marital property does not give controlling
importance to the way in which title to the property is held.
Rather, the district court is to make an equitable division
of the property, considering the factors set out in
5 40-4-202, MCA. The requirement that the property division
be equitable does not mandate that the division be equal.
Snell v. Snell (Mont. 1983), 668 P.2d 238, 240, 40 St.R.ep.
1359, 1361.
We have reviewed the facts in the record, including the
relatively short duration of the parties' marriage and the
fact that $55,000 toward the price of the marital home was
contributed from husband's pre-marriage assets. The District
Court's disposition of the marital home will allocate to the
husband approximately $51,000 from the sale of the home--the
$105,000 value less the $34,000 mortgage and the $20,000 to
be distributed to the wife. We find no abuse of discretion
in the way in which the District Court distributed the value
of the marital home.
The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.
We concur: d