Ridenour v. Equity Supply Co.

NO. 82-320 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1983 DAREL R. RIDENOUR, Claimant and Respondent, EQUITY SUPPLY COMPANY, and GLACIER GENERAL ASSURANCE COMPANY, Defendants and Appellants. Appeal from: Workers' Compensation Court Tim Reardon, Judge presidina, Counsel of Record: For Appellants: Garlington, Lohn & Robinson, Missoula, Montana For Respondent: James E. Vidal, Kalispell, Montana - Decided. June 30, 1983 JUN wed. 3 0 1983 . .. . - --- Clerk Mr. J u s t i c e J o h n Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n of the Court. In this case we are asked to review an order granting workers' c o m p e n s a t i o n b e n e f i t s t o r e s p o n d e n t , D a r e 1 R. Ridenour. A p p e l l a n t s c l a i m t h a t b e n e f i t s s h o u l d h a v e b e e n awarded u n d e r t h e Occupational Disease A c t rather than t h e Workers' Compensation Act. W f i n d t h a t b e n e f i t s were p r o p e r l y a w a r d e d , t h e r e f o r e we e affirm. Claimant had worked for Equity Supply Company for about twelve years. He worked p r i m a r i l y w i t h i n t h e f e r t i l i z e r d e p a r t - ment, but he a l s o worked a s a handyman. C l a i m a n t had smoked c i g a r e t t e s s i n c e 1944. Smoking, combined w i t h t w e l v e y e a r s of work i n a d u s t y e n v i r o n m e n t had r e s u l t e d i n C h r o n i c O b s t r u c t i v e Pulmonary Disease (COPD) . COPD i s a m e d i c a l term d e s c r i b i n g a spectrum of lung diseases, including asthma, bronchitis, and emphysema. With t h e COPD, c l a i m a n t was a b l e t o p e r f o r m h i s j o b , a l t h o u g h a t times he e x p e r i e n c e d s h o r t n e s s of b r e a t h . Prior to the injury date, claimant had visited a family physician. C l a i m a n t c o m p l a i n e d of t i r e d n e s s and s h o r t n e s s of breath. The doctor noted that h i s breath sounds were q u i t e d i s t a n t , which c o u l d be a r e s u l t of COPD which c a n be s e c o n d a r y t o a smoking history. On December 1 8 , 1 9 7 8 , c l a i m a n t was a s k e d t o r e p a i r a mecha- n i s m on t o p of a grain bin. Upon receiving instructions, he a s c e n d e d on a m a n - l i f t in the grain elevator section. He l e f t the man-lift and proceeded through a small shed and on to an eighty-foot catwalk. When he r e a c h e d t h e r e p a i r s i t e he d e c i d e d h e needed a d d i t i o n a l t o o l s . H e w e n t back a c r o s s t h e c a t w a l k i n order to take the man-lift t o t h e ground l e v e l . He e n t e r e d t h e s h e d and was overcome by a h i g h c o n c e n t r a t i o n of g r a i n d u s t pro- d u c e d by an u n l o a d i n g o p e r a t i o n which was t a k i n g p l a c e below. He could hardly see but he made his way to the man-lift and descended to the main floor. As he proceeded down, he experienced extreme breathing difficulties. The claimant was immediately taken to a physician. The treating physician prescribed epinephrine to relieve bronchial s p a s m , and d i a g n o s e d R i d e n o u r ' s c o n d i t i o n as a c u t e a s t h m a t i c b r o n c h i t i s . After t h i s i n c i d e n t , c l a i m a n t could not perform h i s usual job. H e attempted to perform less demanding chores, yet was unsuccessful. He f i n a l l y c e a s e d employment on May 2 0 , 1 9 7 9 . The medical evidence consists primarily of testimony from three physicians; Dr. Maloney, a family p r a c t i t i o n e r , and two pulmonary s p e c i a l i s t s , Dr. Power and D r . Schimke. Dr. Maloney had s e e n r e s p o n d e n t p r i o r t o and i m m e d i a t e l y a f t e r t h e i n c i d e n t o n December 1 8 . Dr. Maloney t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e s i n g l e g r a i n d u s t inhalation of December 1 8 would not have caused respondent's COPD. In other words, t h e r e was c l e a r l y a p r e - e x i s t i n g con- dition. Dr. Maloney i n d i c a t e d t h a t e v e n i f t h e i n h a l a t i o n i n c i - d e n t had not occurred, i t was p r o b a b l e t h a t respondent, if he c o n t i n u e d t o smoke and work i n t h e same e n v i r o n m e n t , would even- t u a l l y become d i s a b l e d a s a r e s u l t of h i s COPD. However, the time f r a m e c o u l d n o t be p r e d i c t e d , he may h a v e made i t t o r e t i r e - ment age. Dr. Schimke t e s t i f i e d t h a t respondent's c h e s t x-rays indi- cated t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of emphysema f o r a t least ten to fifteen years prior to examination and that t h e r e was no new d i s e a s e t r a c e a b l e t o t h e i n c i d e n t on December 1 8 . H e d e s c r i b e d t h e inha- lation as a "severe but temporary illness and disability" however, t h e o n e e p i s o d e "may h a v e r e s u l t e d i n more a s t h m a and more b o n c h i t i s , which c o u l d f l a r e up more r e a d i l y i n t h e e n s u i n g months and years." Dr. Power agreed that there was a pre- e x i s t i n g c o n d i t i o n t h a t c o u l d n o t h a v e b e e n c a u s e d by t h e s i n g l e inhalation of grain dust. He described the incident as a t r i g g e r i n g mechanism. According t o D r . Power, p e o p l e w i t h t h i s k i n d of condition experience r e d u c t i o n i n lung f u n c t i o n over a p e r i o d of time w i t h o u t b e i n g k e e n l y a w a r e t h a t t h e y h a v e a m a j o r p r o b l e m o t h e r t h a n s h o r t n e s s of b r e a t h . Then a n i n c i d e n t o c c u r s " w h i c h i s r e a l l y t h e l a s t s t r a w t h a t k i n d of b r e a k s t h e c a m e l ' s back" t h a t c a u s e s d i s a b i l i t y . Ridenour's c l a i m f o r b e n e f i t s was t r e a t e d a s a c l a i m under the Occupational Disease Act. The Division of Workers' C o m p e n s a t i o n computed R i d e n o u r ' s b e n e f i t s t o be $3.93 p e r week. On May 26, 1981, Ridenour refiled his claim to indicate his d e s i r e t o seek b e n e f i t s u n d e r t h e Workers' Compensation A c t f o r t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y due t o an a c c i d e n t . A h e a r i n g was h e l d in the Workers' Compensation Court on J u l y 1 6 , 1 9 8 1 , J u d g e Hunt p r e - siding. Prior to decision, Judge Hunt left the bench. The newly-appointed judge, Timothy Reardon, disqualified himself. J u r i s d i c t i o n was assumed by D i s t r i c t J u d g e Gordon B e n n e t t who a p p o i n t e d Roger T i p p y a s a h e a r i n g s e x a m i n e r . Mr. T i p p y r e v i e w e d t h e record and e n t e r e d f i n d i n g s of f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s of law and judgment; ruling that claimant was entitled to permanent t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y b e n e f i t s under t h e Workers' Compensation A c t a t t h e r a t e of $145.33 p e r week. T h e r e a f t e r , Judge B e n n e t t adopted in full, and w i t h o u t e x c e p t i o n , t h e f i n d i n g s and c o n c l u s i o n s of the h e a r i n g s examiner. The insurer and employer then brought t h i s appeal. W a r e asked e to address two issues; first, whether i t was e r r o r t o a l l o w e l e c t i o n by t h e c l a i m a n t b e t w e e n t h e p r o v i s i o n s of t h e O c c u p a t i o n a l D i s e a s e A c t and t h e W o r k e r s ' Compensation A c t , and s e c o n d , w h e t h e r i t was e r r o r t o c o n c l u d e t h a t c l a i m a n t s u f - f e r e d a n i n j u r y a s d e f i n e d i n s e c t i o n 39-71-119, MCA. W address e these issues in turn. The f o c u s of appellants' argument i n r e l a t i o n t o the first issue is t h a t claimant suffered from an occupational disease, therefore, his exclusive remedy occurs under the Occupational Disease Act. Appellants cite the definition of occupational disease found in section 39-72-102(11), MCA, " 'Occupational d i s e a s e ' means a l l d i s e a s e s a r i s i n g o u t of o r c o n t r a c t e d from and i n t h e c o u r s e of employment." Appellants also c i t e the statutory causation section which refines "arising out of . employment; " s e c t i o n 39-72-408, MCA: "Proximate c a u s a t i o n . Occupational d i s e a s e s s h a l l be deemed t o a r i s e o u t of t h e employment only i f : " ( 1 ) t h e r e is a d i r e c t c a u s a l c o n n e c t i o n be- t w e e n t h e c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r which t h e work i s p e r f o r m e d and t h e o c c u p a t i o n a l d i s e a s e ; " ( 2 ) t h e d i s e a s e c a n be s e e n t o h a v e f o l l o w e d a s a n a t u r a l i n c i d e n t of t h e work a s a r e s u l t o f t h e e x p o s u r e o c c a s i o n e d by t h e n a t u r e of t h e employment; " ( 3 ) t h e d i s e a s e c a n be f a i r l y t r a c e d t o t h e employment a s t h e p r o x i m a t e c a u s e ; " ( 4 ) t h e d i s e a s e d o e s n o t come from a h a z a r d t o which workmen would h a v e b e e n e q u a l l y e x p o s e d o u t s i d e of t h e employment; "(5) the disease is incidental to the c h a r a c t e r of t h e b u s i n e s s and n o t i n d e p e n d e n t o f t h e r e l a t i o n of e m p l o y e r and e m p l o y e e . " Appellants argue that claimant's condition fits the above statutory definitions, therefore claimant's remedy c a n o n l y be with the Occupational Disease Act, as specified in section 39-72-305, MCA, "The right to recover compensation p u r s u a n t t o t h e p r o v i s i o n s of t h i s c h a p t e r f o r o c c u p a t i o n a l d i s e a s e s . . . is the exclusive remedy therefor against an employer . . ." W e disagree. W h o l d t h a t a l t h o u g h c l a i m a n t may h a v e had a e compensable disease under the Occupational Disease Act, that status did not preclude eligibility under the Workers' Compensation A c t . I n o t h e r words, a particular claimant could m e e t t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of b o t h a c t s , t h u s he would be a l l o w e d t o c h o o s e h i s remedy. To a l l o w an e l e c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e two a c t s does not violate the exclusive remedy language of section 39-72-305, MCA. The l e g i s l a t u r e o n l y i n t e n d e d t h a t a n e m p l o y e e n o t h a v e a common l a w a c t i o n a g a i n s t h i s e m p l o y e r . Appellants cite three cases in support of their position. The e a r l i e s t c a s e i s Summer v. V i c t o r C h e m i c a l Works (9th Cir. 1 9 6 1 ) , 298 F.2d 66. I n Summer t h e employee i n s t i t u t e d a n a c t i o n f o r personal i n j u r i e s i n s t a t e c o u r t which was l a t e r t r a n s f e r r e d to federal court. The Federal District Court dismissed the action on the ground that the employee's disability was the result of an accident, thus his remedy was under t h e Montana Workers' Compensation A c t . Upon r e v i e w , t h e n i n t h c i r c u i t c o u r t of appeals held that an employee who allegedly suffered an i n d u s t r i a l a c c i d e n t c o u l d m a i n t a i n an a c t i o n a g a i n s t h i s employer who had not elected t o be covered by t h e O c c u p a t i o n a l D i s e a s e Act. The c o u r t r e l i e d upon a s e c t i o n of t h e a c t which s p e c i f i - c a l l y p r o h i b i t e d common law a c t i o n s a g a i n s t e m p l o y e r s , e x c e p t i n t h o s e c a s e s where e m p l o y e e s were n o t e l i g i b l e f o r b e n e f i t s u n d e r the A c t or i n t h o s e c a s e s where e m p l o y e e s r e j e c t e d c o v e r a g e of t h e Act. T h i s s e c t i o n was r e p e a l e d i n 1 9 7 9 . Summer d e a l t w i t h a d i f f e r e n t s t a t u t o r y s c h e m e , and w h i l e t h e c a s e may be h e l p f u l , i t is certainly not controlling. In fact, the case stands for liberal s e l e c t i o n of remedies; a philosophy not beneficial to appellants. N e x t , w e a r e c i t e d t o Anaconda Co. v . D i s t r i c t C o u r t ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 1 6 1 Mont. 3 1 8 , 5 0 6 , P.2d 8 1 , w h e r e t h e c l a i m a n t b r o u g h t a n a c t i o n against his employer for injuries suffered in an underground mine. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t a l l o w e d t h e a c t i o n t o p r o c e e d , c o n t r a r y t o the employer's a s s e r t i o n t h a t t h e l a w s u i t was b a r r e d by t h e p r o v i s i o n s of t h e Workers ' C o m p e n s a t i o n Act and t h e O c c u p a t i o n a l Disease A c t . The e m p l o y e r t h e n p e t i t i o n e d t h i s C o u r t f o r a w r i t of supervisory control. T h i s C o u r t g r a n t e d t h e w r i t and d i r e c t e d the District Court to order summary judgment in favor of the employer. It is c l e a r t h a t the claimant brought h i s personal i n j u r y action a f t e r h i s claim for occupational disease b e n e f i t s had been rejected. In ordering summary judgment for the employer, we cited section 92-1308, RCM, 1947, (now section 39-32-305, amended) w h i c h p r e c l u d e s a common law a c t i o n a g a i n s t a n employer, even where a c l a i m a n t h a s f a i l e d t o prove e n t i t l e - ment t o o c c u p a t i o n a l d i s e a s e b e n e f i t s . Finally, a p p e l l a n t s c i t e D a y t o n v. Boeing Company ( D . Mont. 1 9 7 5 ) , 389 F.Supp. 433, where t h e c l a i m a n t s o u g h t damages for injuries sustained by exposure to electromagnetic pulses and laser radiation. The Montana F e d e r a l D i s t r i c t C o u r t , r e l y i n g on t h i s C o u r t ' s h o l d i n g i n A n a c o n d a , r u l e d t h a t a n employee who s u f - f e r s a d i s e a s e t h a t is c o v e r e d by t h e O c c u p a t i o n a l D i s e a s e A c t h a s no common law remedy a g a i n s t h i s e m p l o y e r . Appellants' r e l i a n c e on t h e s e t h r e e c a s e s i s m i s p l a c e d . In a l l of these cases, the exclusive remedy q u e s t i o n i s r a i s e d in t h e c o n t e x t of a p e r s o n a l injury action. The q u e s t i o n i n t h e s e c a s e s was w h e t h e r o r n o t a damage a c t i o n c o u l d be m a i n t a i n e d in v i e w of t h e remedies provided t h r o u g h t h e Workers' Compensation and O c c u p a t i o n a l D i s e a s e A c t s . I n t h e c a s e b e f o r e u s now, that is not the question. It i s o b v i o u s t o u s t h a t t h e l a n g u a g e of s e c t i o n 39-72-305, MCA, was o n l y m e a n t t o p r o h i b i t p e r s o n a l i n j u r y a c t i o n s a g a i n s t employers. The l e g i s l a t u r e d i d n o t intend t o prevent a choice between s t a t u t o r y remedies. T h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is s u p p o r t e d i n s e v e r a l s e c t i o n s of both a c t s . W m u s t r e a d a l l of e t h e s e sec- tions together to discern legislative intent. A s w e s a i d i n Home Building and Loan A s s o c i a t i o n of H e l e n a v. Fulton (1962), 141 Mont. 113, 1 1 5 , 3 7 5 P.2d 312, 313, " s t a t u t e s m u s t be r e a d and considered i n t h e i r e n t i r e t y and t h e l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t may n o t b e g a i n e d from t h e w o r d i n g of any p a r t i c u l a r s e c t i o n o r s e n t e n c e , b u t o n l y from a c o n s i d e r a t i o n of t h e w h o l e . " First, section 39-72-305, MCA, the very section o n which appellants' argument is b a s e d , d i s t i n g u i s h e s b e t w e e n t h e remedy p r o v i d e d i n t h e O c c u p a t i o n a l D i s e a s e Act and t h e remedy a f f o r d e d t h r o u g h a damage a c t i o n . S u b s e c t i o n (1) makes i t c l e a r t h a t t h e r i g h t t o recover compensation a g a i n s t p r o p e r l y insured employers is provided w i t h i n t h e A c t . Subsection ( 2 ) then adopts provi- sions of the Workers' Compensation A c t relating to uninsured employers. One of t h o s e a d o p t e d p r o v i s i o n s d e a l s w i t h t h e r i g h t o f a n employee t o e l e c t b e t w e e n h i s r e m e d i e s , i n c l u d i n g t h e r i g h t to bring a damage action against his employer. Section 39-71-508, MCA. Another s e c t i o n w i t h i n t h e Occupational Disease A c t s u p p o r t s our interpretation. S e c t i o n 39-72-709, MCA, states: " [c] ompen- sation payable pursuant to the terms of this chapter to the c l a i m a n t , h i s b e n e f i c i a r i e s , o r d e p e n d e n t s s h a l l be d i m i n i s h e d by t h e amount of any c o m p e n s a t i o n p a i d or t o be p a i d him o r them under the Workers' Compensation Act of Montana or any other workers ' compensation act ." The l e g i s l a t u r e r e c o g n i z e d that a p a r t i c u l a r c o n d i t i o n c o u l d be c o m p e n s a b l e u n d e r e i t h e r a c t , and i n s u c h s i t u a t i o n s , d o u b l e b e n e f i t s w i l l n o t be a l l o w e d . W o f f e r o n e f u r t h e r example found i n t h e W o r k e r s ' Compensa- e tion Act. Section 39-71-119 ( 2 ) , MCA, defines injury as, " c a r d i o v a s c u l a r o r pulmonary o r r e s p i r a t o r y d i s e a s e s c o n t r a c t e d by a paid f i r e f i g h t e r . . . Nothing herein s h a l l construed t o e x c l u d e a x o t h e r workinq person who s u f f e r s g c a r d i o v a s c u l a r , pulmonary, or respiratory disease while i d t & course and scope i f o his employment." (emphasis added) The l e g i s l a t u r e , i n pro- v i d i n g t h a t c e r t a i n d i s e a s e s of p a i d f i r e f i g h t e r s be c o m p e n s a b l e under the Workers' Compensation Act, recognized that non- firef ighters with cardiovascular, pulmonary or respiratory d i s e a s e s m i g h t w e l l be e n t i t l e d t o b e n e f i t s u n d e r t h e Workers' Compensation A c t rather than the Occupational Disease A c t . In other words, the legislature realized that these kinds of diseases, while normally considered under the Occupational Disease Act, c o u l d be c o m p e n s a b l e a s i n j u r i e s u n d e r t h e d e f i n i - t i o n of s u b s e c t i o n (1) of 39-71-119, MCA. T h i s is j u s t such a c a s e and w e now c o n s i d e r w h e t h e r t h e c o u r t e r r e d by c o n c l u d i n g t h a t c l a i m a n t s u f f e r e d an i n j u r y . An i n j u r y i s d e f i n e d a s a " t a n g i b l e h a p p e n i n g of a t r a u m a t i c n a t u r e from a n u n e x p e c t e d c a u s e o r u n u s u a l strain resulting in e i t h e r e x t e r n a l o r i n t e r n a l p h y s i c a l harm and s u c h p h y s i c a l con- d i t i o n a s a r e s u l t t h e r e f r o m and e x c l u d i n g d i s e a s e - t r a c e a b l e not - injury to . . ." S e c t i o n 39-71-119 ( l ) , MCA. ( e m p h a s i s added ) Appellants very capably discuss case law in relation to the e x c l u s i o n of d i s e a s e s n o t t r a c e a b l e t o i n j u r y . W e a r e asked t o pay particular attention to LaForest v. Safeway Stores, Inc. ( 1 9 6 6 ) , 1 4 7 Mont. 431, 414 P.2d 200, which supposedly contains t h e g u i d i n g p r i n c i p l e s f o r r e s o l u t i o n of t h i s i s s u e . I n LaForest we reversed an order awarding workers' compen- sation benefits because the medical evidence showed that claimant's bursitis existed before, and was n o t caused by the alleged accident. Appellants contend that the same situation e x i s t s i n t h i s case, t h e r e f o r e t h e c l a i m a n t is not e n t i t l e d t o workers' compensation benefits. Although the same factual s i t u a t i o n may e x i s t (Mr. R i d e n o u r ' s COPD e x i s t e d l o n g b e f o r e t h e date of the accident, and no new disease was caused by the massive i n h a l a t i o n ) it does not follow t h a t workers' compensation b e n e f i t s a r e precluded. I n L a F o r e s t we were not asked t o a d d r e s s t h e a g g r a v a t i o n o r a c c e l e r a t i o n f a c t o r , w h i l e i n t h i s c a s e it is the central issue. For many years it has been the rule i n Montana that the e m p l o y e r t a k e s h i s employee a s he f i n d s him, and a s we s a i d in Gaffney v. I n d . Acc. Board ( 1 9 5 5 ) , 129 Mont. 3 9 4 , 4 0 1 , 287 P.2d 2 5 6 , 2 5 9 , " [ t j h e f a c t t h a t a n employee was s u f f e r i n g from a p r e - e x i s t i n g d i s e a s e o r d i s a b i l i t y does not preclude compensation i f the disease or d i s a b i l i t y was a g g r a v a t e d or accelerated by a n industrial i n j u r y which a r o s e o u t of and i n t h e c o u r s e of the employment . ' I Consequently, t h e q u e s t i o n h e r e is whether o r not Mr. R i d e n o u r ' s COPD was a g g r a v a t e d o r a c c e l e r a t e d by t h e i n h a l a - t i o n i n c i d e n t on December 1 8 , 1978. A p p e l l a n t s d i s c u s s s e v e r a l c a s e s d e a l i n g w i t h a g g r a v a t i o n and a c c e l e r a t i o n of pre-existing c o n d i t i o n s and c a u t i o n u s t o keep i n mind t h a t i n t h i s c a s e , w e a r e d e a l i n g w i t h " a p r e - e x i s t i n g , d e f i n e d and c e r t i f i e d o c c u p a t i o n a l d i s e a s e . " I t appears we a r e b e i n g asked t o d i s t i n g u i s h between a p r e - e x i s t i n g c o n d i t i o n and a pre-existing disease. However, t h e r e i s no s u c h d i s t i n c t i o n i n the a p p l i c a t i o n of the a g g r a v a t i o n and acceleration rule. An employer accepts his employee with all of his injuries and diseases. W have r e c o g n i z e d t h a t d i s e a s e s a r e s u b j e c t t o a g g r a - e vation or acceleration. I n Wight v. Hughes L i v e s t o c k Co., Inc., (1981)I Mont. --- , 634 P.2d 1 1 8 9 , 38 S t . R e p . 1 6 3 2 , we w e r e a s k e d t o r e v i e w a f i n d i n g of t h e C o m p e n s a t i o n C o u r t which i m p l i e d that claimant's s p i n a l d i s e a s e was a g g r a v a t e d by a n i n d u s t r i a l accident. W af f i r m e d , e making no d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n d i s e a s e s and i n j u r i e s . Appellants' caution, that we are dealing with "a pre- existing, d e f i n e d and c e r t i f i e d o c c u p a t i o n a l d i s e a s e ," s u r f a c e s a g a i n i n d i s c u s s i o n of G r e g e r v . United P r e s t r e s s , Inc. (1978), 1 8 0 Mont. 348, 590 P.2d 1121. I n Greger t h e c e n t r a l i s s u e was t h e same a s i n t h i s c a s e ; w h e t h e r c l a i m a n t ' s c o n d i t i o n was com- pensable under the Occupational Disease Act or the Workers' Compensation A c t . Mr. G r e g e r had worked r e g u l a r l y w i t h c o n c r e t e . H e l e a r n e d t h a t he was a l l e r g i c t o chromium and n i c k e l which a r e additives to the cement mixture. He developed contact der- matitis. The t r e a t i n g p h y s i c i a n t e s t i f i e d t h a t c l a i m a n t s u f f e r e d b o t h a n i n j u r y and a n o c c u p a t i o n a l d i s e a s e . However, t h e i n s u r e r had treated t h e c l a i m a s o n e f o r o c c u p a t i o n a l d i s e a s e and p a i d benefits for only that period of time in which claimant was t o t a l l y disabled. The W o r k e r s ' Compensation Court h e l d f o r t h e i n s u r e r and we a f f i r m e d . A p p e l l a n t s c o r r e c t l y argue that our holding i n Greqer was b a s e d i n p a r t on t h e f a c t t h a t e a c h s t a t u t o r y e l e m e n t of o c c u p a - tional disease was satisfied. Therefore, according to a p p e l l a n t s , s i n c e Mr. R i d e n o u r ' s c o n d i t i o n met t h e same s t a t u t o r y elements, the same h o l d i n g should apply. However, appellants m i s i n t e r p r e t our reasoning. Our h o l d i n g d i d n o t p r o h i b i t e l i g i - bility under the Workers' Compensation Act simply because c l a i m a n t ' s c o n d i t i o n f i t t h e d e f i n i t i o n of o c c u p a t i o n a l d i s e a s e . I n G r e g e r t h e r e was n o t a n i n j u r y . C l a i m a n t was e x p o s e d t o t h e cement additives over a period of time. T h e r e was never "a tangible happening of a traumatic nature ." We held that a l l e r g i e s which a r e a g g r a v a t e d by work e x p e r i e n c e r e s u l t i n occu- pational disease; noting t h a t the " p u r p o s e of the occupational disease act is t o c o m p e n s a t e w o r k e r s who c o n t r a c t a d i s e a s e o r have inert d i s e a s e s when no 'accident' is involved, or as in M o n t a n a , w h e r e t h e r e is no ' i n j u r y ' . . ." G r e q e r , 1 8 0 Mont. a t 354, 590 P.2d a t 1 1 2 4 . We have carefully reviewed the evidence in t h i s case and c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e c o u r t p r o p e r l y r u l e d t h a t Mr. R i d e n o u r s u f f e r e d an injury. Our f u n c t i o n i n r e v i e w i n g t h e s e d e c i s i o n s i s o n l y t o determine whether substantial evidence exists to support the f i n d i n g s and c o n c l u s i o n s , and w e c a n n o t impose o u r j u d g m e n t a s t o t h e w e i g h t of t h e e v i d e n c e . V i e t s v. S w e e t G r a s s County ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 1 7 8 Mont. 337, 583 P.2d 1070. T h e r e is no d o u b t t h a t c l a i m a n t met h i s e v i d e n t i a r y h u r d l e . Af f i r m e d . W concur: e ~ h i edf J u9s t i 0e . ~ 4 C c