79 Ranch, Inc. v. Pitsch

190. 82-361-

I N THE SUPREME COURT O F TEE STATE O F MONTANA

1983

7 9 RANCH, I N C . , a Mont. c o r p . ,
a n d HARRY VANDERVOORT ,

P l a i n t i f f s and Respondents,

-vs-

REUBEN C . PITSCH,

D e f e n d a n t and A p p e l l a n t .

Appeal f r o n : D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Fourteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
I n a n d f o r t h e County o f Golden V a l l e y ,
The H o n o r a b l e LeRoy XcRinnon, J u d g e p r e s i d i n g .

C o u n s e l of Records

F o r A ~ p e l l a n:
t

F e l t & N a r - t i n ; L a u r e n c e R. I ~ l a r t i nacgued, Bj.llings,
Montana

For Respondents:

Ask & P r a t t : Thomas M. Ask a r g u e d , !?oundup,
Montana
T~loulton, B e l l i n g h a m , Longo & F l a t h e r ; W i l l i a m
Mather a r g u e d & W i l l i a m F o r s y t k e a r g u e d , B i l l i n g s ,
Montana

Submitted: A p r i l 7 , 1983

Decided: June 2 1 , 1983

Filed:
JUN2 1 1983

-----
Clerk
Mr. J u s t i c e L . C. G u l b r a n d s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n of t h e C o u r t .

P l a i n t i f f s , 79 Ranch and H a r r y V a n d e r v o o r t , b e g a n t h i s a c t i o n
i n 1 9 7 7 s e e k i n g t o e n j o i n d e f e n d a n t P i t s c h from u s i n g w a t e r i n

Big Coulee Creek, and seeking a d e t e r m i n a t i o n of each p a r t y ' s
water r i g h t s in the creek. After a hearing, the D i s t r i c t Court
e n t e r e d s c a n t f i n d i n g s and e s t a b l i s h e d t h e f o l l o w i n g w a t e r r i g h t s

and p r i o r i t i e s :
" ( a ) V a n d e r v o o r t -- 50 i n c h e s f o r u s e o n W$
S e c t i o n 23-6N-21E., w i t h p r i o r i t y d a t e a s of
J u n e 1, 1 9 2 4 .

" ( b ) 79 Ranch -- 45 i n c h e s f o r u s e on S W V ~
S e c t i o n 25-5N-19E., w i t h p r i o r i t y d a t e a s of
J u n e 13, 1973.
" ( c ) P i t s c h -- 68 i n c h e s f o r u s e on S e c t i o n
35-5N-19E., w i t h p r i o r i t y d a t e a s of J u l y 1,
1976."
P i t s c h and 79 Ranch a p p e a l e d from t h i s j u d g m e n t , b u t t h e c a s e was

remanded for further f i n d i n g s by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t . See, 79

Ranch, I n c . v. Pitsch (1981), Mont. , 6 3 1 P.2d 6 9 0 , 38
St.Rep. 1048. On remand, t h e ~ i s t r i c tC o u r t amended i t s f i n d i n g s

and c o n c l u s i o n s , and t h e n r e e n t e r e d t h e o r i g i n a l j u d g m e n t q u o t e d
above. P i t s c h and 79 Ranch a g a i n a p p e a l .
Pitsch, 79 R a n c h , and V a n d e r v o o r t own l a n d a l o n g B i g C o u l e e
C r e e k i n G o l d e n V a l l e y C o u n t y , Montana. P i t s c h l i v e s immediately

upstream of 79 Ranch. Vandervoort's ranch is about eighteen
miles downstream.
In 1975, Pitsch bought his land from Bert Schaff. Bert

S c h a f f had d e c i d e d t o b e g i n i r r i g a t i n g h i s l a n d i n 1 9 7 3 and f i l e d
a n o t i c e of a p p r o p r i a t i o n f o r 30 c u b i c f e e t p e r s e c o n d (c.f.s.)
of water. He o r d e r e d a s p r i n k l e r s y s t e m , b u t d i d n ' t r e c e i v e a l l
of the necessary parts and therefore never irrigated. When
P i t s c h b o u g h t t h e l a n d and w a t e r r i g h t s , he i n s t a l l e d a d i f f e r e n t
sprinkler system and began irrigating in July 1976.
79 R a n c h , o p e r a t e d by Eugene S c h a f f , a l s o f i l e d a n o t i c e of

a p p r o p r i a t i o n and o r d e r e d a s p r i n k l e r s y s t e m i n 1 9 7 3 . 79 Ranch
installed the sprinkler system, similar to t h e one ordered by

B e r t S c h a f f , and began i r r i g a t i n g i n J u l y 1 9 7 3 .
Pitsch and 79 Ranch claim a portion of a water right
established in 1893 by the Montana Cattle Company. Montana

C a t t l e Company had f i l e d a n o t i c e of a p p r o p r i a t i o n and i r r i g a t e d ,
by a s e r i e s of d i t c h e s , l a n d now owned by P i t s c h and 79 Ranch.

Testimony a t t r i a l indicated t h a t i r r i g a t i o n by Montana C a t t l e
Company s t o p p e d i n 1 9 1 1 o r 1 9 1 3 .

P i t s c h a l s o c l a i m s a s e p a r a t e w a t e r r i g h t stemming from two
notices of appropriation filed by C l a u d e H i l l , a successor in
interest t o 1/3 of t h e Montana C a t t l e Company w a t e r r i g h t and
predecessor to Pitsch. These notices d i d n o t comply w i t h t h e
s t a t u t o r y procedures. Testimony a t t r i a l indicated t h a t a few
a c r e s of P i t s c h ' s l a n d was i r r i g a t e d i n t h e 1 9 2 0 ' s . No f i r m e v i -

d e n c e was p r e s e n t e d , however, showing e x a c t l y when t h e d i t c h e s
were used, how much water they carried, and which l a n d s were
i r r i g a t e d a t which times.

Vandervoort traces his water right from four notices of
appropriation: 1,000 miner's inches f i l e d i n 1902, 100 miner I s

i n c h e s f i l e d i n 1 9 0 9 , 320 m i n e r ' s i n c h e s f i l e d on J u n e 11, 1 9 2 5 ,

and 300 i n c h e s f i l e d i n 1 9 2 6 .
The d i s p u t e h e r e a r o s e i n t h e d r y summer of 1 9 7 7 . 79 Ranch
and V a n d e r v o o r t c l a i m t h a t when P i t s c h began i r r i g a t i n g i n J u n e
of 1977, t h e r e was i n s u f f i c i e n t water in the creek for their

cattle and fields. Negotiations failed and this lawsuit

followed.
W h i l e t h e main i s s u e on a p p e a l is whether the water r i g h t s
c l a i m e d by P i t s c h and 79 Ranch w e r e a b a n d o n e d , Pitsch has also
r a i s e d t h e f o l l o w i n g o t h e r i s s u e s on a p p e a l :

1. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d by f a i l i n g t o f i n d t h a t
Pitsch's predecessor in interest, Claude H i l l , had acquired a
water r i g h t in the 1920's.
2. Whether the District Court erred by finding t h a t Bert
Schaff f a i l e d t o exercise reasonable diligence.

3. Did t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r i n f i n d i n g t h a t V a n d e r v o o r t ' s
r i g h t t o u s e 50 i n c h e s of w a t e r h a s a p r i o r i t y d a t e of J u n e 1 ,
1924?

4. Did t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r i n f i n d i n g t h a t 79 Ranch may
a p p r o p r i a t e 45 i n c h e s of w a t e r under t h e J u n e 1 3 , 1 9 7 3 , n o t i c e of

a p p r o p r i a t i o n f i l e d by Eugene S c h a f f ?

The D i s t r i c t Court found t h a t the water r i g h t s claimed by
P i t s c h and 79 Ranch had b e e n abandoned b e c a u s e t h e w a t e r had n o t

b e e n used f o r a t l e a s t f o r t y , and p e r h a p s a s many a s s i x t y suc-

cessive years. P i t s c h and 79 Ranch a r g u e t h a t t h e mere showing
of nonuse e v e n f o r a l o n g p e r i o d of time, is not s u f f i c i e n t t o
s u p p o r t a f i n d i n g of abandonment. W disagree.
e

Abandonment of a w a t e r r i g h t i s a q u e s t i o n of f a c t . Section
89-802, Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, (applicable here,

repealed i n 1973). Our s c o p e of review is t h e r e f o r e l i m i t e d t o

d e t e r m i n i n g whether t h e r e is s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t t h e
District Court's findings. B a g n e l l v. Lemery ( 1 9 8 3 ) , Mont.

-, 657 P.2d 608, 40 S t . R e p . 58. F o r t y y e a r s of nonuse is

s t r o n g e v i d e n c e of an i n t e n t t o a b a n d o n a w a t e r r i g h t , and, in
e f f e c t , r a i s e s a r e b u t t a b l e p r e s u m p t i o n of abandonment. Because

P i t s c h and 79 Ranch h a v e f a i l e d t o rebut t h i s presumption, the

D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s f i n d i n g m u s t be a f f i r m e d .
The a p p r o p r i a t i o n of water is based on i t s b e n e f i c i a l use.

When t h e a p p r o p r i a t o r or h i s successor i n i n t e r e s t abandons o r

c e a s e s t o use t h e water f o r i t s b e n e f i c i a l u s e , t h e w a t e r r i g h t
ceases. Section 89-802, R.C.M., 1947 ( r e p e a l e d 1973 ). This
fundamental principle has long governed the determination of

water r i g h t s i n Montana. I n Power v. Switzer ( 1 8 9 8 ) , 2 1 Mont.
523, 55 P. 32, this controlling p o l i c y of beneficial use was

explained:
". . . I t h a s been a m i s t a k e n i d e a i n t h e
minds of many, not familiar with the
c o n t r o l l i n g p r i n c i p l e s a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e use
o f w a t e r i n a r i d s e c t i o n s , t h a t he who h a s
d i v e r t e d , o r ' c l a i m e d ' and f i l e d a c l a i m o f ,
w a t e r f o r any number of g i v e n i n c h e s , h a s
thereby acquired a valid r i g h t , good a s
a g a i n s t a l l subsequent persons. But, a s the
s e t t l e m e n t of t h e c o u n t r y h a s a d v a n c e d , t h e
g r e a t v a l u e of t h e u s e of w a t e r h a s become
more and more a p p a r e n t . L e g i s l a t i o n and j u d i -
c i a l e x p o s i t i o n have, a c c o r d i n g l y , proceeded
with increasing caution to restrict
a p p r o p r i a t i o n s t o s p h e r e s of u s e f u l n e s s and
b e n e f i c i a l purposes. A s a r e s u l t , t h e law,
c r y s t a l i z e d i n s t a t u t o r y form, i s t h a t an
 a p p r o p r i a t i o n of a r i g h t t o t h e use of r u n n i n g
w a t e r f l o w i n g i n t h e c r e e k s m u s t be f o r some
u s e f u l o r b e n e f i c i a l p u r p o s e , and when t h e
appropriator, or h i s successor i n i n t e r e s t ,
a b a n d o n s and c e a s e s t o u s e t h e w a t e r f o r s u c h
purpose, the r i g h t ceases. ( S e c t i o n s 1880,
1 8 8 1 , C i v i l C o d e . ) " 2 1 Mont. a t 529.

W a t e r r i g h t s have t h e r e f o r e been l i m i t e d t o t h e amount of w a t e r
a c t u a l l y put to a beneficial use, despite t h e amount of water
d i v e r t e d o r c l a i m e d u n d e r a n o t i c e of a p p r o p r i a t i o n . See a l s o ,

Conrow v. Huffine ( 1 9 1 4 ) , 48 Mont. 437, 1 3 8 P. 1094; Peck v.
Simon (1935), 1 0 1 Mont. 12, 52 P.2d 164; Galiger v. McNulty
( 1 9 2 7 ) , 80 Mont. 3 3 9 , 260 P. 401.

I n d e t e r m i n i n g t h e abandonment of a water r i g h t , t h i s Court
h a s o f t e n r e c o g n i z e d t h e r u l e t h a t mere nonuse of t h e w a t e r d o e s
not constitute abandonment. To p r o v e abandonment, one h a s to

prove the other party intended to abandon his water right.
A t c h i s o n v. P e t e r s o n ( 1 8 7 2 ) , 1 Mont. 5 6 1 , P. - 1
T u c k e r v.
J o n e s ( 1 8 8 8 ) , 8 Mont. 225, 1 9 P. 5 7 1 ; Thomas v. B a l l ( 1 9 2 3 ) , 66

Mont. 1 6 1 , 2 1 3 P . 597; M u s s e l s h e l l V a l l e y F. & L. Co. v . Cooley
( 1 9 2 9 ) , 86 Mont. 2 7 6 , 283 P. 213; S t . Onge v. B l a k e l y ( 1 9 2 6 ) , 76
Mont. 1, 245 P. 5 3 2 ; Shammel v. Vogl ( 1 9 6 4 ) , 1 4 4 Mont. 3 5 4 , 396

P.2d 1 0 3 .
N e v e r t h e l e s s , s e v e r a l Montana c a s e s have a l s o r e c o g n i z e d t h a t
nonuse, while not conclusive, is evidence of an intention to

abandon. I n S m i t h v . Hope Mining Co. ( 1 8 9 6 ) , 1 8 Mont. 4 3 2 , 4 5 P.

632, t h i s C o u r t s t a t e d t h a t n i n e y e a r s of nonuse " i s c e r t a i n l y
very potent evidence, if it stood alone, of an intention to

abandon." 1 8 Mont. a t 438. I n our m o s t r e c e n t c a s e c o n s i d e r i n g
this issue, Holmstrom Land Co. v. Meagher Cty. Newlan Creek
Water D i s t r i c t ( 1 9 8 0 ) , Mont. , 6 0 5 P.2d 1 0 6 0 , 37 S t . R e p .
295, we stated that seventy-five years of nonuse is "clear
e v i d e n c e " of abandonment. 605 P.2d a t 1 0 6 9 .
H e r e , t h e e v i d e n c e c l e a r l y shows a t l e a s t f o r t y y e a r s of con-

tinuous nonuse of the water rights claimed by Pitsch and 79

Ranch. As i n S m i t h and Holmstrom, s u c h a l o n g p e r i o d of nonuse
i s s t r o n g e v i d e n c e of a n i n t e n t t o abandon t h e w a t e r r i g h t s . In
e f f e c t , s u c h a l o n g p e r i o d of c o n t i n u o u s nonuse r a i s e s t h e r e b u t -
t a b l e p r e s u m p t i o n of a n i n t e n t i o n t o a b a n d o n , and s h i f t s t h e bur-

d e n of p r o o f o n t o t h e n o n u s e r t o e x p l a i n t h e r e a s o n s f o r n o n u s e .
T h i s c o n c l u s i o n is h i g h l y c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e f u n d a m e n t a l p o l i c y

that a water right does n o t mean p o s s e s s i o n of a quantity of

water, but its beneficial u s .
The C o l o r a d o Supreme C o u r t r e c e n t l y e x p r e s s e d w e l l how t h e
burden of proof s h i f t s onto t h e nonuser o n c e a l o n g p e r i o d of

n o n u s e h a s b e e n shown:
"Under C o l o r a d o w a t e r l a w , abandonment of a
w a t e r r i g h t r e q u i r e s a c o n c u r r e n c e of nonuse
and i n t e n t t o a b a n d o n . However, i n t e n t i s t h e
v e r y e s s e n c e of abandonment. ... I n t e n t may
b e shown e i t h e r e x p r e s s l y o r by i m p l i c a t i o n ,
w i t h nonuse f o r a l o n g p e r i o d of time b e i n g
e v i d e n c e of an i n t e n t t o a b a n d o n . ... Nonuse
a l o n e w i l l n o t e s t a b l i s h abandonment where t h e
owner i n t r o d u c e s s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e t o show
t h a t d u r i n g t h e p e r i o d of nonuse t h e r e n e v e r
was any i n t e n t i o n t o p e r m a n e n t l y d i s c o n t i n u e
t h e u s e of w a t e r ." [ C i t a t i o n s omitted .I
B e a v e r P a r k W a t e r , I n c . v . C i t y of V i c t o r
(1982 I CO~O. I 649 P.2d 3 0 0 , 302.
To rebut the presumption of abandonment, there must be
established some fact or condition excusing long periods of

n o n u s e , n o t m e r e l y e x p r e s s i o n s of d e s i r e o r h o p e . C F & I Steel

Corporation v. Purgatoire River Water Conservation D i s t r ict

(Colo. 1 9 7 3 ) , 515 P.2d 456; Cundy v. Weber (S.Dak. 1 9 4 1 ) , 300

N.W. 1 7 ; C i t y of Anson v. A r n e t t (Tex. 1 9 5 2 ) , 250 S.w.2d 450.
Here, P i t s c h argues t h a t h i s predecessors i n i n t e r e s t did not

have s u f f i c i e n t funds t o i r r i g a t e . Such a broad claim, unsup

p o r t e d by more s p e c i f i c e v i d e n c e , i s n o t s u f f i c i e n t t o r e b u t t h e
p r e s u m p t i o n of abandonment. I n r e s p o n s e t o t h i s same a r g u m e n t ,

t h e Colorado Court has s t a t e d :
". . . C o n s i d e r i n g t h e l a r g e demands f o r a l l
of t h e appropriatable water i n t h i s s t a t e
. . . i t m i g h t be s a i d t h a t n e a r l y e v e r y
abandoned w a t e r r i g h t c o u l d h a v e i t s non-use
j u s t i f i e d by t h e e c o n o m i c s t h a t m i g h t p r e v a i l
sometime i n t h e f u t u r e f o r u s e of t h i s w a t e r .
. . . T h i s gleam-in-the-eye philosophy is not
c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e p r o t e c t i o n and p r e s e r -
v a t i o n of e x i s t i n g w a t e r r i g h t s . " [Citations
o m i t t e d ] CF & I S t e e l C o r p o r a t i o n , 515 P.2d a t
458.

79 R a n c h ' s p r e d e c e s s o r i n i n t e r e s t , R a l p h S c h a f f , s t a t e d t h a t
he was a dry land farmer and didn't know how to irrigate.

Neither Bert Schaf f , Pitsch's predecessor in interest, nor
Eugene S c h a f f , t h e owner of 79 Ranch, knew he had a c l a i m t o a n

1893 w a t e r right when he filed a notice for appropriation in
1973. The P i t s c h l a n d may have b e e n i r r i g a t e d i n t h e 1 9 2 0 1 s , b u t

no c l e a r e v i d e n c e was p r e s e n t e d showing how much and when.

The D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s of abandonment a r e t h e r e f o r e
affirmed. This determination applies to t h e 1893 w a t e r right
c l a i m e d by 79 R a n c h , a s w e l l a s t h e 1 8 9 3 and 1 9 2 0 ' s w a t e r r i g h t s

c l a i m e d by P i t s c h .
It should be noted that in section 85-2-404, MCA, the
legislature has provided that ten successive years of nonuse

w h i l e w a t e r was a v a i l a b l e c r e a t e s a p r i m a f a c i e p r e s u m p t i o n of
abandonment. T h i s p r e s u m p t i o n w i l l be a p p l i e d a f t e r a l l e x i s t i n g
w a t e r r i g h t s have been a d j u d i c a t e d u n d e r p a r t 2 o f T i t l e 8 5 , MCA.
In our holding, here, we a r e simply recognizing t h i s general,

modern t r e n d , and p r o v i d i n g a n a p p r o a c h f o r t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n of
abandonment of w a t e r r i g h t s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e e x p r e s s i n t e n t of

our l e g i s l a t u r e .
On May 30, 1973, Bert Schaff, Pitsch's predecessor in

i n t e r e s t , f i l e d a n o t i c e of a p p r o p r i a t i o n of 30 c . f . s . of w a t e r .

Schaff had purchased a new sprinkler system, but failed to
receive c e r t a i n necessary parts. Under s e c t i o n 89-811, R.C. M.

1947 (repealed 1973), a person is required to proceed with
reasonable diligence to d i v e r t the water.

Pitsch claims that Bert Schaf f proceeded with reasonable
d i l i g e n c e by o r d e r i n g t h e s p r i n k l e r s y s t e m and t h a t f a i l u r e of
delivery reasonably explains any delay. Also, Schaf f ' s
negotiations for s a l e of h i s land postponed d e v e l o p m e n t of an
i r r i g a t i o n system.

" R e a s o n a b l e d i l i g e n c e " i s a q u e s t i o n of f a c t t o be d e t e r m i n e d

on a case-by-case basis. Montana D e p a r t m e n t of N a t u r a 1 R e s o u r c e s
& C o n s e r v a t i o n v. I n t a k e Water Company ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 1 7 1 Mont. 416, 5 5 8
P.2d 1110. H e r e , t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t found a l a c k of r e a s o n a b l e
d i l i g e n c e on t h e p a r t of B e r t S c h a f f . Such f i n d i n g s w i l l n o t be
d i s t u r b e d by t h i s C o u r t u n l e s s t h e r e is a c l e a r p r e p o n d e r a n c e of
the evidence against them. S m i t h v. Krutar ( 1 9 6 9 ) , 1 5 3 Mont.
3 2 5 , 457 P.2d 459.
Here, t h e r e was a three-year and three-month d e l a y between
t h e f i l i n g of t h e n o t i c e and a c t u a l d i v e r s i o n . Pitsch argues the

delay was excusable or reasonable, and therefore his claimed

w a t e r r i g h t s h o u l d r e l a t e back t o S c h a f f ' s f i l i n g of the notice
of appropriation. The test is whether t h e r e was a n on-going

effort to prosecute the construction of an irrigation system.
S e e I n t a k e Water Co., supra. While t h e r e c o r d shows t h a t S c h a f f
p u r c h a s e d a s p r i n k l e r s y s t e m , i t d o e s n o t show a n on-going effort

t o p r o c e e d t o c o m p l e t i o n and d i v e r s i o n . The o r i g i n a l s p r i n k l e r
system purchased by Schaff was neither installed nor used to
d i v e r t water. P i t s c h p u r c h a s e d and i n s t a l l e d a whole new s y s t e m .

The record therefore supports the District Court's conclusion
t h a t Schaf f failed t o d i l i g e n t l y p r o s e c u t e t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of

t h e s p r i n k l e r system.
P i t s c h c l a i m s t h e r e i s no s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t t h e
District Court's determination that all 50 inches awarded to
V a n d e r v o o r t h a s a p r i o r i t y d a t e of 1 9 2 4 . Pitsch argues t h a t the

e v i d e n c e shows o n l y 30 i n c h e s w i t h a p r i o r i t y d a t e i n t h e 1 9 2 0 1 s ,
and the remaining 20 inches with a priority date of 1941.
I n V i d a l v. K e n s l e r ( 1 9 3 5 ) , 1 0 0 Mont. 5 9 2 , 5 1 P.2d 2 3 5 , this

Court stated that the fixing of an arbitrary date of
a p p r o p r i a t i o n is h a r m l e s s e r r o r u n l e s s t h e o b j e c t i n g c l a i m a n t c a n
show t h a t h i s w a t e r r i g h t a n t e d a t e s t h e d a t e f i x e d f o r a n o t h e r .
H e r e , P i t s c h h a s n o t shown a w a t e r r i g h t p r i o r t o e i t h e r 1 9 2 4 o r
1941 and therefore the error, if any, in setting the 1924
p r i o r i t y d a t e is harmless. I t s h o u l d be n o t e d that t h i s rule in

-
V i d a l a p p l i e s o n l y when t h e p r i o r i t y d a t e and n o t t h e amount of

w a t e r is c h a l l e n g e d .
Pitsch points out that the only e v i d e n c e on record shows

t h a t 79 Ranch h a s used 30 i n c h e s of w a t e r and n o t 45 i n c h e s a s
d e t e r m i n e d by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t . While 79 Ranch f i l e d a n o t i c e

o f a p p r o p r i a t i o n f o r more t h a n 45 i n c h e s , a w a t e r r i g h t i s d e t e r -

mined by t h e e x t e n t of t h e u s e . I r i o n v. Hyde ( 1 9 3 8 ) , 1 0 7 Mont.

84, 8 1 P.2d 353. S i n c e t h e o n l y e v i d e n c e on t h e record shows

t h a t 79 Ranch h a s used 30 i n c h e s of w a t e r and n o t 45 i n c h e s , t h e

D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s judgment must be m o d i f i e d a c c o r d i n g l y .

In summary, the D i s t r i c t Court's judgment is a f f i r m e d w i t h

respect t o Vandervoort's water rights. The judgment s h o u l d be

modified to r e d u c e 79 R a n c h ' s w a t e r r i g h t from 45 i n c h e s t o 3 0

inches.

W e c a n n o t a f f i r m t h e amount of P i t s c h ' s w a t e r r i g h t and t h e

priority date set for that right. The D i s t r i c t Court, after

f i n d i n g a l a c k of r e a s o n a b l e d i l i g e n c e and t h e r e f o r e no r e l a t i o n

b a c k t o 1 9 7 3 , a p p a r e n t l y g r a n t e d P i t s c h a " u s e " r i g h t a s of 1 9 7 6 .

The Water Use Act of 1 9 7 3 e m p h a t i c a l l y s t a t e d t h a t i t c o n t a i n e d

t h e e x c l u s i v e p r o c e d u r e s f o r a c q u i s i t i o n of a water r i g h t a f t e r

1973. Section 89-880 (1) R . C . M . , 1947 (now s e c t i o n 85-2-301,

MCA.) Nothing on the record suggests Pitsch complied with the

p r o c e d u r e s of t h e Water Use A c t . W t h e r e f o r e acknowledge o n l y
e

that t h e water r i g h t s of Vandervoort and 79 Ranch precede any

w a t e r r i g h t c l a i m e d by P i t s c h .

Remanded f o r m o d i f i c a t i o n of

accordance with t h e views e x p r e s s

We concur:
The Honorable Chan Ettien, District
Judge, sitting in place of Mr. Chief
Justice Frank I. Haswell.
 Mr. Justice Fred J. Weber respectfully dissents as
follows :

While I concur in the result reached by the majority
opinion, I respectfully dissent from a portion of the legal
conclusions upon which it is based.
The majority refers to decisions of this Court which
established the rule that mere non-use of water does not
constitute abandonment, and that proof of intent to abandon
the water right is a necessary element in proving
abandonment. That rule has been stated and restated a number
of times in the cases cited in the majority opinion. In
Shammel v. Vogl (1964), 144 Mont. 354, 396 P.2d 103, Chief
Justice Harrison pointed out that the testimony presented by
the defendants in substance showed that the ditch in question
was not carrying water from 1914 to 1956. He pointed out
there was other evidence presented of water in the ditch. In
affirming the holding of the District Court that the ditch
had not been abandoned, the Court stated:
"The loss of a water right or a ditch right by
abandonment is a serious occurrence in Montana and
other semi-arid western states. The early case of
Thomas v. Ball, 66 Mont. 161, 213 P.597, stated in
this connection: 'The authorities are all of one
accord in holding that - party
the claiming
abandonment - - burden
has the of rovinq his
contention a preponderance of T h e gidence, a
t h a t s t a b l i < h abandonment theevidence - -
-- to that
effect should be clear and definite.' 66 Mont.
161, at 168, 2 1 3 P.597, at 600. We find no error
in the court's findins that the Weidman ditch riaht 4

had not been abandoned. Mere nonuser is not
sufficient to establish abandonment, a n i the
testimony presented by the defendants relates
- -
exclusively-to establishinq periods of nonuser. No
evidence -of intent to abandon is ~resented."
(Emphasis supplied.) l m ~ o n t . at 362, 396 P.2d at

Shammel follows many preceding cases and, in particular, the
leading cases of St. Onge V. Blakely (1926) 76 Mont. 1, 245
P. 532, and Thomas v. Ball (1923) 66 Mont. 161, 213 P. 597.

Shammel has not been modified or overruled by this Court.
 As pointed out in the majority opinion, in Holmstrom
Land Co. v. Meagher County Newlan Creek (1979) Mont . I

605 P.2d 1060, 1069, 36 St.Rep. 1403, 1413, this Court
stated:
". . . Seventy five years of non-use is sufficient
to provide 'clear evidence' of abandonment."
Taking the evidence in a light most favorable to Thorson, we
concluded that all but 80 miner's inches were lost through
abandonment.
The majority opinion here takes a significant step in
holding that not only is a long period of non-use strong
evidence of intent to abandon, but that continuous non-use
raises the rebuttable presumption of an intention to abandon
and shifts the burden of proof to the non-user to explain the
reasons for non-use. As authority for that conclusion the
majority then refers to Colorado decisions.
Unfortunately, the majority in this case as well as the
majority in Holmstrom did not analyze Shammel and the
numerous earlier cases. Prior to Holmstrom the clear rule

under the decisions of this Court was that a party claiming
abandonment had the burden of proving his contention by a
preponderance of the evidence. Mere non-user was not
sufficient to establish abandonment. While Holmstrom may be
explained as merely restating a previous rule that non-use is
evidence of abandonment, though not conclusive, the present
majority opinion proceeds well beyond that point. As stated
by the majority, a long period of continuous non-use raises

the rebuttable presumption of an intention to abandon and
shifts the burden of proof to the non-user. While the
majority expressly did not overrule Shammel that is the
effect of the opinion. Long established rights to the use of
water deserve more accurate analysis and treatment. As
stated in Shamrnel, the loss of a water right by abandonment
is a serious occurrence in Montana.
I am particularly concerned as to the effect of the
majority opinion on the adjudication of water rights under
Chapter 2 of Title 85, MCA. Neither the majority here nor
the Holmstrom opinion demonstrates a reason for such a
significant change in the long-standing rule on abandonment
of water rights.
The H o n o r a b l e J . Chan E t t i e n , D i s t r i c t J u d g e , d i s s e n t i n g .

I dissent.

At a t i m e when t h e f i x i n g of Montana w a t e r r i g h t s is i n a

transitional stage, the Court is o v e r t u r n i n g a r u l e which has

b e e n a n i n t e g r a l p a r t of Montana w a t e r law f o r a l m o s t 1 0 0 y e a r s .
Tucker v. Jones (1888), 8 Mont. 225, 230, 19 P. 571.
That r u l e is: "non-use s t a n d i n g a l o n e is n o t s u f f i c i e n t t o

e s t a b l i s h abandonment of a w a t e r r i g h t . "
Mere l a p s e o f time during which there is no u s e does not
constitute abandonment without proof of a clear intention to

abandon. M u s s e l s h e l l V a l l e y Farming & L i v e s t o c k Co. v. Cooley
( 1 9 2 9 ) , 86 Mont. 276, 283 P. 213; Moore v. Sherman ( 1 9 1 6 ) , 52
Mont. 542, 1 5 9 P. 966; F e a t h e r m a n v. H e n n e s s y ( 1 9 1 1 ) , 4 2 Mont.

535, 1 1 3 P. 751; T u c k e r v. Jones, 8 Mont. a t 225. Abandonment
must i n c l u d e proof of i n t e n t t o abandon. T u c k e r v. J o n e s , s u p r a ;
McCauley v . McKeig ( 1 8 8 9 ) , 8 Mont. 3 8 9 , 2 1 P. 2 2 . T h e r e m u s t be

c o n c u r r e n c e i n r e l i n q u i s h m e n t of p o s s e s s i o n and i n t e n t t o aban-
don. Thomas v . Ball ( 1 9 2 3 ) , 66 Mont. 1 6 1 , 2 1 3 P. 597. See
also, I r i o n v. Hyde (1938), 1 0 7 Mont. 84, 8 1 P.2d 353. The

requirement of intent to abandon is a cardinal principle of
Montana water l a w , which h a s b e e n u p h e l d by t h e c o u r t s and r e l i e d
upon b y M o n t a n a ' s f a r m e r s and r a n c h e r s f o r o v e r a c e n t u r y .

The 1 9 7 3 W a t e r Act provides for a d j u d i c a t i o n of a l l water
r i g h t s c l a i m e d b e f o r e J u l y 1, 1 9 7 3 , t o be d e t e r m i n e d u n d e r the
s t a t u t o r y and c a s e l a w a p p l y i n g t o a p p r o p r i a t i o n and u s e of w a t e r

r i g h t s before t h a t date.
MCA 85-2-404 relating to abandonment under the 1973 act
stated that: MCA-85-2-404 ". . . d o e s not apply t o r i g h t s u n t i l
t h e y have been determined i n accordance w i t h . . ." t h e water l a w
i n e x i s t e n c e p r i o r t o J u l y 1, 1 9 7 3 .

On J u l y 1, 1 9 7 3 , the r u l e was t h a t n o n u s e r a l o n e was n o t

s u f f i c i e n t t o e s t a b l i s h a b a n d o n m e n t of a w a t e r r i g h t . To me, i t
i s clear the l e g i s l a t u r e wanted the s t a t u s quo o n p r e - J u l y 1,

1973, water law to be maintained until water rights were
e s t a b l i s h e d under t h e 1973 A c t . O v e r t u r n i n g a 1 0 0 y e a r r u l e is

n o t m a i n t a i n i n g t h e s t a t u s quo.
B e g i n n i n g w i t h t h e e f f e c t i v e d a t e of t h e 1 9 7 3 W a t e r A c t , this

w r i t e r , i n h i s p r a c t i c e of l a w , and I am s u r e o t h e r a t t o r n e y s i n

t h e i r s , b e g a n t o be c o n s u l t e d by f a r m and r a n c h p e o p l e on t h e i r
water r i g h t s . I t was n o t u n u s u a l t h a t an o l d a p p r o p r i a t i o n and

i r r i g a t i o n s y s t e m was p r e s e n t , b u t had n o t b e e n i n u s e f o r many
years, twenty, thirty, forty, f i f t y y e a r s o r more. I t was my

a d v i c e , and I ' m s u r e t h e a d v i c e of my p r o f e s s i o n a l c o l l e a g u e s , to

f i l e a c l a i m of r i g h t b a s e d on s u c h a p p r o p r i a t i o n . Such a d v i c e

was g r o u n d e d on t h e rule t h a t nonuse standing a l o n e could not
c o n s t i t u t e t h e abandonment of a water r i g h t . C l a i m s w e r e made

and f i l e d w i t h t h e w a t e r c o u r t s on t h e s t r e n g t h of the ancient
law.
Back i n t h e 1 9 6 0 1 s , t h e S t a t e Water C o n s e r v a t i o n Board made a

water resource survey of the state. The survey covered the
h i s t o r y of l a n d and w a t e r use i n i r r i g a t e d a r e a s , maps showing
irrigated areas, and water right data of appropriation and

decrees for each county. It i s common f o r t h e maps to show
a n c i e n t i r r i g a t i o n works "not i n use," b u t which had had w a t e r
a p p l i e d by t h o s e works t o i r r i g a t i o n .

It i s my u n d e r s t a n d i n g that such ancient i r r i g a t i o n works
w e r e mapped b e c a u s e of t h e l o n g s t a n d i n g r u l e a g a i n s t abandonment
b e i n g d e t e r m i n e d s o l e l y by n o n u s e . Many o l d n o n u s e s y s t e m s w e r e

worked i n t o c l a i m s f i l e d w i t h t h e w a t e r c o u r t a s e x i s t i n g r i g h t s .
In 1980, this Court was faced with Holmstrom LD. Co. v.
Meagher C o u n t y , e t a l . ( 1 9 8 0 ) , Mont. , 605 P.2d 1 0 6 0 , 36

St.Rep. 1903. The particular right in question involved an
e a r l i e r c o n v e y a n c e of 337 i n c h e s of w a t e r s e p a r a t e and a p a r t from
land. The g r a n t e e s had t w e n t y a c r e s of land s u b j e c t t o i r r i g a -

t i o n and e i g h t y i n c h e s of t h e 337 i n c h c o n v e y a n c e a p p l i e d . The
257 i n c h b a l a n c e was n e v e r used. T h i s Court found, under the
c i r c u m s t a n c e s , t h a t t h e unusued 257 i n c h e s had b e e n abandoned by

nonuse, saying: " S e v e n t y - f i v e y e a r s of non-use is s u f f i c i e n t t o
p r o v i d e ' c l e a r e v i d e n c e ' o f abandonment."
It is w e l l a t t h i s s t a g e t o again point out t h a t a water
r i g h t is s u b j e c t t o t r a n s f e r s e p a r a t e and d e t a c h e d from l a n d , as

w e l l as b e i n g t r a n s f e r r e d w i t h t h e l a n d . Y e l l o w s t o n e V a l l e y Co.
v . A s s o c i a t e d M o r t g a g e I n v e s t o r s ( 1 9 3 0 ) , 8 8 Mont. 7 3 , 290 P . 255;
S t . Onge v. B l a k e l y ( 1 9 2 6 ) , 7 6 Mont. 1, 2 4 5 P. 5 3 2 .

The former is the circumstance of Holmstrom.
A water right, t h e u s e of which h a s b e e n a p p l i e d t o l a n d ,

becomes a p p u r t e n a n t t o t h a t l a n d . T u c k e r v. J o n e s , s u p r a .
Nonuser of a n u n a t t a c h e d r i g h t c a n n o t become v e s t e d b e c a u s e
i t h a s n o t b e e n a p p l i e d b e n e f i c i a l l y w i t h i n a r e a s o n a b l e time of

its acquisiton. F o r e x a m p l e , a w a t e r company h a s a n u n a t t a c h e d
right which must be applied beneficially within a reasonable
time, whether it be for irrigation, domestic, commercial or
i n d u s t r i a l u s e , o r i t may be l o s t . v . Tintinger (1911), 45
Mont. 1 5 4 , 177-178, 1 2 2 P. 5 7 5 .
I n our case, both types of transfer are present. The 7 9

Ranch claim was by r e a s o n o f Y e l l o w s t o n e LD. Co. I s c o n v e y a n c e of
S e c t i o n 25 w i t h a n a p p u r t e n a n t 8 3 . 3 3 i n c h e s of t h e Mont. C a t t l e

- right.
Co.
P i t s c h claims 1 6 6 . 6 6 i n c h e s , u n a t t a c h e d , d a t e d J u n e 1, 1 9 1 2 ,
o f t h e Mont. C a t t l e a p p r o p r i a t i o n by r e a s o n of Y e l l o w s t o n e LD. I s

conveyance of S e c t i o n 3 5 and 1 6 6 . 6 6 i n c h e s of t h e Mont. Cattle

appropriation to Claude Hill. Evidence indicated about 74.3

a c r e s was i r r i g a t e d i n t h e 1 9 2 0 ' s i n t h e n o r t h e r n p a r t of S e c t i o n
35. Thus, we have a s i t u a t i o n where a b o u t 92.3 i n c h e s of the
Y e l l o w s t o n e LD. transfer was never used for a period of over
seventy-five years.
Holmstrom fails to consider its effect on mining rights.
L o c a t o r s o f l o d e claims of t e n l o c a t e d a m i l l s i t e i n c o n j unc-

t i o n w i t h t h e i r claims, and a p p r o p r i a t e d w a t e r f o r t h e o p e r a t i o n

of their m i l l . The v a g a r i e s of m i n e r a l p r i c e s h a v e o f t e n l e f t

these properties inoperable, though ownership was maintained.

There are patented and other lode claims which, with their
millsites, h a v e n o t o p e r a t e d f o r p e r i o d s up t o f i f t y , sixty, or
s e v e n t y y e a r s , b u t have p o t e n t i a l g i v e n t h e r i g h t economic con-

ditions.

Placer operations appropriated water to wash gold or gem
bearing gravels. Many such v e n t u r e s have b e e n down for long

y e a r s b e c a u s e economic c o n d i t i o n s h a v e n o t j u s t i f i e d operation.
It is no a r g u m e n t t o s a y s e v e n t y - f i v e y e a r s o r s o of nonuse
i s abandonment, because it is o b v i o u s i n s u c h mining s i t u a t i o n s

t h e owners i n t e n d t o u s e t h e w a t e r r i g h t i n mining o p e r a t i o n s a t
some time.
The m a j o r i t y c i t e s S m i t h v. Hope Min. Co. ( 1 8 9 6 ) , 1 8 Mont.

4 3 2 , 45 P. 6 3 2 , i n s u p p o r t of its p o s i t i o n . The c a s e i s t o t h e
contrary.
The Hope and A l g o n q u i n companies were silver producers at

Philipsburg, Montana, which had s e t t l e d t h e i r w a t e r r i g h t s from
F r o s t Creek. With t h e d e m o n e t i z a t i o n of silver, t h e Algonquin
mill s h u t down b u t was k e p t under m a i n t e n a n c e and s e c u r i t y f o r

n i n e y e a r s o r more. I t was a r g u e d t h a t t h e A l g o n q u i n had aban-
doned i t s w a t e r r i g h t by t h e n i n e y e a r n o n u s e r .
The C o u r t p r e f a c e d i t s remark q u o t e d by t h e m a j o r i t y h e r e by

c i t i n g t h e accepted r u l e : " . . . mere n o n u s e r of a w a t e r r i g h t
i s n o t a n abandonment." S m i t h v. Hope Min. Co. 18 Mont. a t 439,
and f o l l o w e d t h e m a j o r i t y q u o t e w i t h t h e s e words:

" I t c a n n o t be c o n t e n d e d f o r a moment t h a t
t h e r e was a s c i n t i l l a of e v i d e n c e t e n d i n g t o
p r o v e t h a t t h e A l g o n q u i n Company i n t e n d e d t o
abandon t h e m i l l . E v e r y a c t shows t h a t t h e y
d i d not so intend. They d i d n o t u s e t h e
w a t e r , s i m p l y b e c a u s e t h e m a c h i n e r y of t h e
m i l l was n o t i n m o t i o n . When it t h u s a p p e a r s
t h a t t h e i n t e n t i o n was c l e a r l y n o t t o abandon
t h e p r i n c i p a l e s t a t e ( t h a t is, t h e m i l l ) , we
c a n n o t h o l d t h a t t h e f a c t of t e m p o r a r y and
n e c e s s a r y n o n u s e r of t h e a p p u r t e n a n c e ( t h a t
i s , t h e w a t e r ) was any e v i d e n c e w h a t e v e r of a n
i n t e n t t o abandon t h a t a p p u r t e n a n c e . The
a p p u r t e n a n c e was a n e c e s s i t y t o t h e m i l l , and
t h e i n t e n t i o n t o abandon t h a t a p p u r t e n a n c e
must c l e a r l y appear. (See cases l a s t cited.)
W think the contrary c l e a r l y appears i n t h i s
e
case. I f we s u s t a i n t h e f i n d i n g of t h e
d i s t r i c t c o u r t a s t o t h e abandonment, i t would
be holding, i n p r a c t i c a l a f f a i r s , t o t h i s
effect, viz., that if, through the
v i c i s s i t u d e s of m i n i n g , a company f i n d s i t s e l f
 obliged t o close its m i l l for a considerable
p e r i o d , -- a p e r i o d a s l o n g a s t h e s t a t u t e of
l i m i t a t i o n s , -- t h e n , i n o r d e r t o p r e s e r v e t h e
water r i g h t appurtenant t o t h e m i l l , they w i l l
n o t be p e r m i t t e d t o a l l o w t h e w a t e r t o r e m a i n
i d l e , b u t must c o n t i n u e i t s u s e . To c o n t i n u e
i t s u s e t h e y m u s t keep t h e m a c h i n e r y of t h e
m i l l moving. These views l e a d i n t o absur-
dities. They s i m p l y d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t , i f a
m i l l i n g o r m i n i n g company i s o b l i g e d t o c l o s e
i t s m i l l , and t h u s c e a s e t h e u s e of i t s w a t e r
r i g h t f o r a p e r i o d e q u a l t o t h e s t a t u t e of
l i m i t a t i o n s , i t w i l l by s u c h a n a c t be deemed
t o have abandoned t h e w a t e r r i g h t , which is a n
absolutely necessary appurtenance t o the m i l l .
W c a n n o t s u b s c r i b e t o any s u c h d o c t r i n e a s
e
this."
One wonders w h a t t h e A n a c o n d a ' s s i t u a t i o n w i l l be w i t h i t s

water right appurtenance to its smelter and concentrator at

Anaconda i f it c a r r i e s o u t i t s announced i n t e n t i o n t o r a z e t h o s e
p r o p e r t i e s t o t h e ground.

It i s s a f e t o s a y t h a t t h e p r e s e n t owners of t h e Hope and

A l g o n q u i n p r o p e r t i e s a r e h o l d i n g t h e i r l o d e c l a i m s and m i l l s i t e s ,
e v e n t h o u g h t h e m i l l s a r e l o n g g o n e , l o o k i n g t o t h e d a y of p r o -

f i t a b l e o p e r a t i o n , and s t i l l c l a i m t h e i r a p p r o p r i a t i o n s t o t h e i r
millsites.
Nor, i s t h e r e p r e j u d i c e t o j u n i o r u s e r s , b e c a u s e u s e of t h e
w a t e r is r i g h t f u l l y t h e i r s i f t h e s e n i o r r i g h t i s n o t b e i n g u s e d .

I t i s t h e h i s t o r y of Montana w a t e r t h a t , if t h e r e is a use f o r
i t , i t w i l l be u s e d . The w a t e r w i l l be of b e n e f i t t o someone.
J u d g e McKinnon, i n f i n d i n g abandonment of t h e Montana C a t t l e

&
C 1 9 8 3 r i g h t m u s t h a v e r e l i e d on Holmstrom. T h e r e is no o t h e r
b a s i s f o r such r u l i n g .
To a f f i r m e f f e c t s d e s t r u c t i o n of t h e o l d r u l e . The o l d r u l e

had t h e q u a l i t y of being i n b l a c k and w h i t e ; t h e r e was no i n -
between. Everyone understood. T h i s C o u r t h a s now i n t r o d u c e d
c o n f u s i o n and c h a o s t o t h e 1 9 7 3 A c t . I n t h e n e x t few y e a r s w a t e r
judges are going to be considering water claims reflecting
v a r i o u s p e r i o d s of n o n u s e r .

Under Holmstrom and t h e p r e s e n t c a s e , where i s t h e c u t - o f f

which says a given period constitutes abandonment?
W have
e four water judges. Is t h i s C o u r t g o i n g to give
*

d i r e c t i o n t o t h e p r o b l e m of n o n u s e r , o r , w i l l each w a t e r judge be

f r e e t o e s t a b l i s h h i s own c u t - o f f rule?

The o l d r u l e s h o u l d be k e p t b e c a u s e i t i s of e v e n a p p l i c a t i o n
t o a l l , and e v e r y o n e i s f a m i l i a r w i t h i t .
Holmstrom i s e a s i l y d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e . I t had a d e t a c h e d r i g h t

and i t s p u r c h a s e r was bound w i t h i n a r e a s o n a b l e time t o a p p l y i t
t o i d e n t i f i a b l e land. B a i l e y v. Tintinger, supra. He made no
e f f o r t t o a p p l y more t h a n e i g h t y i n c h e s t o h i s l a n d . A failure

t o a p p l y an u n a t t a c h e d w a t e r right to use w i t h i n a r e a s o n a b l e
t i m e a f t e r a c q u i s i t i o n is s u s t a i n a b l e e v i d e n c e of i n t e n t t o aban-
don. On t h e o t h e r h a n d , an e x t e n d e d nonuse of w a t e r t o l a n d t o

w h i c h it i s a p p u r t e n a n t i s n o t a l o n e e v i d e n c e of i n t e n t t o aban-
don.

The p r e s e n t c a s e h a s b o t h s i t u a t i o n s .
Under t h e e v i d e n c e i n t h i s c a s e , I would f i n d :
(1) Under t h e o l d r u l e , t h a t t h e r e had n o t b e e n abandonment

o f t h e o n e - s i x t h of t h e 1 8 9 3 r i g h t a p p u r t e n a n t t o S e c t i o n 25-5-19

a s c l a i m e d by 79 R a n c h , and t h a t i t was e n t i t l e d t o o n e - s i x t h o r
8 3 . 3 i n c h e s of t h e 1 8 9 3 r i g h t ;
(2) t h a t 74.3 i n c h e s of t h e o n e - t h i r d 1 8 9 3 r i g h t conveyed t o

C l a u d H i l l t h e n c e t o P i t s c h was a p p l i e d t o t h e n o r t h e r n p a r t of
S e c t i o n 35-5-19, and had n o t b e e n a b a n d o n e d ;
(3) t h a t 92.36 inches of t h e 1893 r i g h t conveyed to H i l l

a l o n g w i t h S e c t i o n 35 had n o t b e e n u s e d , and was a b a n d o n e d ; and
(4) t h a t t h e V a n d e r v o o r t r i g h t be a f f i r m e d , it b e i n g shown

that Vandervoort's undisturbed possession and use was for a
p e r i o d of t i m e i n e x c e s s of t h e t i m e n e c e s s a r y t o a c q u i r e t i t l e
b y p r e s c r i p t i o n , s t a n d i n g a l o n e , and was s u f f i c i e n t t o v e s t r i g h t
t o u s e of water a s of 1924. Cook v. Hudson ( 1 9 4 0 ) , 1 1 0 Mont.

-
: Judqe, s i t t i n q i n p l a c e
t
o f M r . c h i e f - ~ u s t i c e~ ; a n k I .
Mr. Justice Frank B. Morrison, Jr. specially concurs as
follows :
I concur in the result but would like to add these
comments.
My dissenting opinion filed in 79 Ranch, Inc. v. Pitsch

(1981), Mont. , 631 P.2d 690, 38 St.Rep. 1048,
accurately sets forth my views in this matter. However,
upon remand to the District Court, findings of fact were
made with respect to reasonable diligence and those findings
bind me in reviewing this appeal.
There is evidence in the record which would support a
finding of reasonable diligence by Pitsch's predecessor-in-
interest but I am unable to say that the trial court abused
its discretion in finding lack of diligence. Therefore, I
must vote to affirm though, had I been the trial judge,
reasonable diligence would have been found and the Pitsch
right therefore would date from 1973 and. would be exercised
pursuant to filing.