!,lo. 82-120
IN THE SUPREP4E COUST OF THE SYATE I)F YOTJ?P.hJP+
3.913
LOUIS J .
P l a i n t i f f and Respondent,
THE BOARD O TRUSTEES OF SCHOOL DIST.
F
NO. 2 8 , LAKE COUNTY, MONT., s a i d Board
c o n s i s t i n 9 o f LILLIAN STROTJG, e t al.,
D e f e n d a n t s and A p p e l l a n t s .
Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Fourth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
I n a n d f o r t h e County o f L a k e , The E o n o r a b l e
D o u g l a s G. H a r k i n , J u d g e p r e s i d i n g .
Counsel o f Record:
For A p p e l l a n t s :
J o h n F r e d e r i c k , County A t t o r n e y , P o l s o n , Montana
For Respondents:
J o n E . E l l i n g s o n a n d Nancy 4.;. ploe, M i s s o u l a ,
Montana
- - .- - - -
-
Submitted on B r i e f s : Plarch lr), 1993
Decided. May 1 9 , 1 9 8 3
Filed: MAY191983
8
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clerk
Mr. C h i e f J u s t i c e F r a n k I . H a s w e l l d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n o f
the Court.
A teacher recovered a judgment against the School
Board for its violation of Montana's Open Meeting Law,
w r o n g f u l t e r m i n a t i o n o f employment, and damages o f $ 1 9 , 4 0 0 ,
a t t o r n e y f e e s and c o s t s . The S c h o o l Board a p p e a l s .
Plaintiff is Louie J. Jarussi, a nontenured high
school principal and teacher in St. Ignatius, Montana.
Defendant i s t h e Board o f T r u s t e e s of S c h o o l D i s t r i c t No.
28, Lake County.
J a r u s s i was f i r s t employed by t h e Board f o r t h e 1976-
77 school year. During the 1977-78 school year, h e was
employed a s a f u l l t i m e p r i n c i p a l and S p a n i s h t e a c h e r at a
s a l a r y of $18,486. The r e c o r d i n d i c a t e s h e was a n e x c e p -
t i o n a l t e a c h e r and p r i n c i p a l .
On F e b r u a r y 1, 1 9 7 8 , J a r u s s i m e t w i t h t h e Board a n d
r e q u e s t e d a s a l a r y of $21,000 f o r t h e f o l l o w i n g s c h o o l y e a r .
The Board c l o s e d t h e m e e t i n g a p p a r e n t l y t o d i s c u s s J a r u s s i ' s
request. J a r u s s i c l a i m e d he o b j e c t e d t o t h e c l o s u r e , b u t no
, .
s u c h a c t i o n was r e c o r d e d i n t h e m i n u t e s o f t h e m e e t i n g . The
Board thereafter returned to open s e s s i o n and offered
J a r u s s i $19,200, t h e o f f e r t o be a c c e p t e d by March 8 .
J a r u s s i immediately contacted l e g a l counsel t o proceed
a g a i n s t t h e Board f o r i m p r o p e r l y c l o s i n g t h e m e e t i n g . The
Board's presiding officer expressed the Board's anger to
J a r u s s i o v e r h i s c o m p l a i n t and i n d i c a t e d i t would n o t h e l p
h i s employment s i t u a t i o n .
Jarussi claimed he verbally accepted the offer of
employment on March 8. The Board disputed this, and no
a c c e p t a n c e is n o t e d i n t h e m i n u t e s .
The preliminary budget, including a provision for
J a r u s s i ' s p o s i t i o n , was a p p r o v e d on March 1 5 .
The Board m e t a g a i n on March 29. P a r t of t h e meeting
was a g a i n c l o s e d w i t h o u t a d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t t h e demand o f
individual privacy clearly exceeded t h e merits of public
disclosure. During t h e c l o s u r e of t h e meeting the Board
u n a n i m o u s l y d e c i d e d t o w i t h d r a w i t s o f f e r o f employment t o
Jarussi. Thereafter, t h e m e e t i n g was o p e n e d , and a f o r m a l
motion was approved withdrawing the salary increase
previously offered Jarussi.
The Board n e v e r o f f i c i a l l y n o r s p e c i f i c a l l y e l i m i n a t e d
J a r u s s i ' s p o s i t i o n according t o t h e Board's records.
On A p r i l 7 , J a r u s s i demanded a s t a t e m e n t o f termina-
t i o n by t h e B o a r d . The Board s e r v e d n o t i c e o f t e r m i n a t i o n
o n A p r i l 21.
On A p r i l 2 8 , J a r u s s i f i l e d s u i t a g a i n s t t h e B o a r d i n
t h r e e counts: (1) f o r v i o l a t i o n o f M o n t a n a ' s Open M e e t i n g
Law a d v e r s e l y a f f e c t i n g h i s r i g h t s and s e e k i n g t o h a v e t h e
Board's decisions declared void; (2) failure t o properly
t e r m i n a t e him i n v i o l a t i o n o f s t a t u t e ; a n d , (3) retaliation
a g a i n s t him f o r e x e r c i s i n g h i s r i g h t s u n d e r Montana I s Open
M e e t i n g Law by w i t h d r a w a l o f t h e o f f e r o f employment.
I n June J a r u s s i requested release from h i s e x i s t i n g
contract of employment to seek other employment. He
a c c e p t e d a p o s i t i o n i n A l a s k a and r e p o r t e d t o work i n J u l y .
Following a j u r y t r i a l , j u d g m e n t was e n t e r e d a w a r d i n g
J a r u s s i $16,500 for h i s loss i n selling h i s property, and
$ 2 , 9 0 0 moving e x p e n s e s . The j u d g m e n t a l s o i n c l u d e d a d e t e r -
m i n a t i o n by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t w i t h o u t a j u r y t h a t t h e Board
had violated Montana's Open Meeting Law and voided the
decision of the Board withdrawing its previous offer of
employment to Jarussi. The judgment included an award of
attorney fees and costs. Following denial of its motion for
a new trial, the Board appeals.
Three issues are raised on appeal:
1. Was Jarussi required to exhaust his administrative
remedies before filing suit in District Court?
2. Should a new trial have been granted because ex-
cessive damages were awarded under the influence of passion
or prejudice?
3. Did the School Board violate Montana's Open Meet-
ing Law?
The Board contends that Jarussi was required to
exhaust his administrative remedies by appealing the Board's
decision to the county superintendent of schools before
seeking judicial relief in the courts, citing section 20-3-
210, MCA, giving the county superintendent sole jurisdiction
to decide this controversy.
We hold that Jarussi was not required to exhaust
administrative remedies within the educational apparatus
before filing suit in the District Court.
The District Court is expressly granted jurisdiction
to void any decision in violation of Montana's Open Meeting
Law. The pertinent statute provides:
"Voidability. Any decision made in vio-
lation of 2-3-203 [statutory implementa-
tion of Montana's Open Meeting Law] may
be declared void by a district court
having jurisdiction. A suit to void any
such decision must be commenced within 30
days of the decision." (Bracketed de-
scriptive phrase added. ) Section 2-3-
213, MCA.
We have previously upheld the jurisdiction of the Dis-
trict Court in actions to enforce Montana's Open Meeting
Law. Board of Trustees, Huntley Project School Dist. 24 v.
Board of County Commissioners, Yellowstone County (1980),
Mon t . , 606 P.2d 1069, 38 St.Rep. 175. Further,
statutory time constraints negate exhaustion of administra-
tive remedies before the county superintendent of schools
and the State Superintendent of Public Instruction.
Moreover, the exhaustion doctrine does not apply to
constitutional issues. Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles
(1944), 321 U.S. 144, 64 S.Ct. 474, 88 L.Ed. 635; 1
Am.Jur.2d Administrative Law, S 185 at 484-490. Here,
Jarussi claims violation of his constitutional right to
observe the deliberations of the School Board under the
right to know provisions of the Montana Constitution,
Article 11, Section 9. Constitutional questions are
properly decided by a judicial body, not an administrative
official, under the constitutional principle of separation
of powers. Art. 111, Section 1, 1972 Mont. Const.
Next, the Board contends that the jury awarded Jarussi
excessive damages under the influence of passion and preju-
dice. The Board argues that the jury exercised no critical
judgment in its award of economic damages to Jarussi, disre-
garded the disparity between his increased salary in Alaska
compared to his salary in Montana, and had to "speculate
wildly" concerning cost of living differences between Alaska
and Montana, and that Jarussi's claim of economic losses
lacked specificity. The Board points out that the jury
award for loss on the sale of Jarussi's property was the
midpoint in the range of Jarussi's testimony; awarded him
actual costs including travel and lodging expenses for
trial, all attorney fees and all court costs; that the
minimal period of deliberation and the unanimous verdict
indicate a passion and p r e j u d i c e t o punish t h e Board; and
t h a t t h e jury apparently disregarded t h e i n s t r u c t i o n t h a t it
could not award damages for pain and suffering, l o s s of
consortium, mental distress, l o s s of r e p u t a t i o n and could
o n l y award t a n g i b l e p e c u n i a r y l o s s e s .
I t is i m p o r t a n t t o n o t e t h a t t h e j u r y awarded damages
i n t h i s case f o r w r o n g f u l t e r m i n a t i o n o f J a r u s s i ' s employ-
m e n t , n o t f o r v i o l a t i o n o f M o n t a n a ' s Open M e e t i n g Law. The
damage a w a r d m u s t be r e a s o n a b l e . S e c t i o n 27-1-302, MCA. The
d a m a g e s m u s t b e s u p p o r t e d by s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e . Johnson
v. M u r r a y ( 1 9 8 2 ) , Mont. , 656 P.2d 1 7 0 , 39 S t . R e p .
2257; B j e r u m v. Wieber ( 1 9 6 7 ) , 1 4 9 Mont. 375, 427 P.2d 62.
The law r e q u i r e s o n l y t h a t t h e t r i e r o f f a c t e x e r c i s e calm
a n d r e a s o n a b l e j u d g m e n t a n d t h e amount o f t h e award r e s t s o f
necessity in the sound discretion of the trier of fact.
Johnson v. Murray, supra. When t h e r e i s s t r o n g e v i d e n c e o f
the f a c t of damage, defendant should n o t escape l i a b i l i t y
b e c a u s e t h e amount o f damage c a n n o t b e p r o v e n w i t h p r e c i -
sion. Johnson v. Murray, supra, c i t i n g Winsness v. M.J.
Conoco D i s t r i b u t o r s ( U t a h 1 9 7 9 ) , 5 9 3 P.2d 1303.
Here Jarussi testified that he l o s t between $16,000
a n d $ 1 7 , 0 0 0 when h e h a d t o h a s t i l y s e l l m o s t o f h i s p e r s o n a l
property i n view of h i s move t o A l a s k a . He testified he
h e l d a g a r a g e s a l e and t h a t " t h e move c l e a n e d m e o u t . " He
kept a record of sales of the various i t e m s and what h e
originally paid for them, which was not introduced into
evidence. He testified t h a t h i s a c t u a l moving c o s t s were
$2,902.50. T h i s t e s t i m o n y was n o t d i s p u t e d o r q u e s t i o n e d o n
cross-examination. No e v i d e n c e w a s p r e s e n t e d by t h e B o a r d
r e f u t i n g J a r u s s i ' s c l a i m e d damages.
W h o l d t h e damages awarded were s u p p o r t e d by s u b s t a n -
e
t i a l e v i d e n c e and t h e j u r y e x e r c i s e d r e a s o n a b l e judgment i n
determining the amount of the award. The jury awarded
$16,500 for losses on the sale of Jarussi's personal
p r o p e r t y which was w i t h i n t h e r a n g e of h i s t e s t i m o n y . The
jury a l s o awarded $2,900 moving c o s t s which was slightly
l e s s than h i s testimony. The j u r y awarded c o u r t c o s t s and
a t t o r n e y f e e s p u r s u a n t t o s e c t i o n 2-3-221, MCA. The j u r y
a l s o awarded a c t u a l c o s t of t r a v e l and l o d g i n g e x p e n s e s f o r
t r i a l which was n o t i n c l u d e d i n t h e judgment.
The d i f f e r e n c e i n s a l a r y and c o s t of l i v i n g between
Alaska and Montana is irrelevant as no items of damages
encompassed t h i s d i f f e r e n c e . No e v i d e n c e was i n t r o d u c e d by
t h e Board s u p p o r t i n g an o f f s e t on t h i s b a s i s . The v e r d i c t
is c l e a r t h a t no damages were awarded f o r p a i n and s u f f e r -
i n g , l o s s of c o n s o r t i u m , m e n t a l d i s t r e s s , l o s s of r e p u t a t i o n
o r noneconomic o r i n t a n g i b l e damage. Where, as here, the
amount of damages is clear and uncontradicted, a short
p e r i o d of j u r y d e l i b e r a t i o n and a unanimous v e r d i c t w i l l n o t
s u p p o r t a c l a i m of e x c e s s i v e damages i n f l u e n c e d by p a s s i o n
or prejudice.
Finally, the Board contends it did not violate
Montana's Open Meeting Law. The Board a r g u e s t h a t c l o s u r e
was p r o p e r under a statutory provision permitting closure
"to discuss a strategy to be followed with respect to
c o l l e c t i v e bargaining."
The Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n p r o v i d e s :
" R I G H T TO KNOW. No p e r s o n s h a l l be de-
p r i v e d of t h e r i g h t t o examine documents
o r t o o b s e r v e t h e d e l i b e r a t i o n s of a l l
p u b l i c b o d i e s o r a g e n c i e s of s t a t e
g o v e r n m e n t and i t s s u b d i v i s i o n s , except
i n c a s e s i n w h i c h t h e demand o f indivi-
dual privacy c l e a r l y exceeds t h e merits
of p u b l i c d i s c l o s u r e . " A r t . 11, Section
9 , 1 9 7 2 Mont. C o n s t .
A statutory implementation of t h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l mandate
p r o v i d e s t h a t m e e t i n g s of a s c h o o l board s h a l l be "open t o
the public." S e c t i o n 2-3-203(1), MCA. Subsection ( 3 ) of
t h a t s t a t u t e provides t h e following exceptions:
"However, a m e e t i n g may b e c l o s e d t o
d i s c u s s a s t r a t e g y t o be f o l l o w e d w i t h
r e s p e c t t o c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g o r liti-
g a t i o n when a n o p e n m e e t i n g would h a v e a
d e t r i m e n t a l e f f e c t on t h e b a r g a i n i n g o r
litigating position of the public
agency. "
T h e r e i s no c l a i m o r e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e l i t i g a t i o n e x c e p t i o n
in the statute applies. The Board relies s o l e l y on the
c o l l e c t i v e bargaining exception. The resolution of this
i s s u e d e p e n d s on t h e c o r r e c t m e a n i n g o f t h e t e r m " c o l l e c t i v e
bargaining."
The appropriate guide to determine the meaning of
words and phrases is section 1-2-106, MCA. The statute
reads :
" C o n s t r u c t i o n o f w o r d s a n d p h r a s e s . Words
and p h r a s e s used i n t h e s t a t u t e s of
~ o n t a n a a r e construed according t o t h e
c o n t e x t and t h e a p p r o v e d u s a g e o f t h e
l a n g u a g e , b u t t e c h n i c a l w o r d s and p h r a s e s
and s u c h o t h e r s a s h a v e a c q u i r e d a p e c u -
l i a r and a p p r o p r i a t e m e a n i n g i n l a w o r
a r e d e f i n e d i n c h a p t e r 1, p a r t 2, a s
amended, a r e t o b e c o n s t r u e d a c c o r d i n g t o
s u c h p e c u l i a r and a p p r o p r i a t e m e a n i n g o r
definition."
The common meaning o f t h e t e r m " c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g "
is identical to t h a t used in the technical, l e g a l sense.
The American College Dictionary defines collective
b a r g a i n i n g a s " t h e p r o c e s s by w h i c h w a g e s , h o u r s , r u l e s , and
w o r k i n g c o n d i t i o n s a r e n e g o t i a t e d a n d a g r e e d upon by a u n i o n
with an employer for all the employees collectively whom it
represents." American College ~ i c t i o n a r y 236 (1966).
Black's defines collective bargaining as:
". . . a procedure looking toward making
of collective agreements between employer
and accredited representative of emplo-
yees concerning wages, hours, and other
conditions of employment, and requires
that parties deal with each other with
open and fair minds and sincerely
endeavor to overcome obstacles existing
between them to the end that employment
relations may be stabilized and obstruc-
tion to free flow of commerce prevented.
... Negotiation between an employer and
organized employees as distinguished from
individuals, for the purpose of determin-
ing by joint agreement the conditions of
employment." Black's Law Dictionary,
238-39 (Rev. 5th ed. 1979).
The "appropriate" and "peculiar" meaning of the term
in the law is expressed in the National Labor Relations Act.
It is contemplated in the definition of "unfair labor
practice" that collective bargaining is negotiation between
the employer and a representative of the employees. 29 USCA
Numerous federal cases have held that collective bar-
gaining has the well understood meaning in the law of
settling disputes by negotiation between the employer and
the representative of the employees. See e.g., United
Construction Workers v. Haislip Baking Co. (4th Cir. 1955),
223 F.2d 872. ". .. Collective bargaining is an activity,
presupposing that the employees shall have opportunity in
absence of their employer to canvass their grievances,
formulate their demands in common, and instruct an advocate
who they believe will best press their suit." NLRB v. Stow
Manufacturing Co. (2nd Cir. 1954), 217 F.2d 900, 904.
There is no specific definition of collective bargain-
ing i n Montana law. Therefore, we adopt the definition
b r o u g h t f o r t h by t h e f o r e g o i n g a u t h o r i t y .
We af f irm the D i st r i c t Court ' s conclusion that the
closing of the meeting to discuss Jarussi's employment
s t a t u s does not fall within the collective bargaining
exception, t h u s v o i d i n g a c t i o n t a k e n by t h e Board r e g a r d i n g
Jarussi. Jarussi was dealing with the School Board
r e g a r d i n g h i s own f u t u r e employment. H i s a c t i o n s were n o t
on b e h a l f o f a n y o n e e l s e a n d t h e B o a r d ' s d e c i s i o n s would n o t
affect anyone else. Hence, Jarussi had the right to be
present during t h e Board's deliberations regarding his
f u t u r e with t h e School District.
If we were to adopt the Board's interpretation of
c o l l e c t i v e bargaining, a n o t h e r a v e n u e would b e a v a i l a b l e t o
c l o s e p u b l i c meetings. T h i s undermines t h e p o l i c y of the
Open M e e t i n g Law and i s c o n t r a r y t o t h e l e g i s l a t i v e m a n d a t e
that the open meeting provisions should be liberally
construed.
Affirmed.
f o Chief J u s t i c e
W e concur: