State v. Hall

Yo. 82-232

I N THE SUPREME COURT O TEE STATE O F MONTANA
F

1983

STATE O MONTANA,
F

P l a i n t i f f and R e s p o n d e n t ,

-vs-

K E V I N D. HALL,

Defendant and A p p e l l a n t .

A s p e a l from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eighth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
I n a n d f o r t h e County o f C a s c a d e ,
The H o n o r a b l e J o h n M. McCarvel, J u d g e ? r e s i d i n g .

Counsel o f Record:

For Appellant:

Thomas E . B o l a n d , G r e a t F a l l s , Montana

F o r Respondent:

Hon. Mike G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , Montana
J . F r e d Bourdeau, County A t t o r n e y , G r e a t F a l l s ,
Montana

S u b m i t t e d on B r i e f s : March 1 7 , 1 9 8 3

Decided: MaY 5 1 1 9 8 3

Filed: MAY 5 - 1983

--
Clerk
Mr. Justice John Conway H a r r i s o n delivered t h e O p i n i o n of the
Court.

K e v i n H a l l was c h a r g e d w i t h t h e crime o f f e l o n y t h e f t i n t h e

Eighth J u d i c i a l District, County of Cascade. An information,
filed on January 11, 1982, alleged that Hall purposely or
k n o w i n g l y o b t a i n e d c o n t r o l o v e r a 1 9 6 4 C h e v r o l e t 3/4 ton pickup

truck, knowing that the t r u c k had b e e n s t o l e n by a n o t h e r , and

p u r p o s e l y o r knowingly used, c o n c e a l e d o r abandoned t h e p r o p e r t y
i n s u c h a manner as to d e p r i v e t h e o w n e r . These a l l e g a t i o n s , if

supported, would establish commission of the offense of the£ t

p u r s u a n t t o s e c t i o n 45-6-301 ( 3 ) ( b ) , MCA. The d e f e n d a n t p l e d n o t
g u i l t y and t h e case was p r e s e n t e d to a j u r y . The j u r y r e t u r n e d a

verdict of guilty. The defendant was released on his own
recognizance pending imposition of sentence. Prior to sen-
tencing, d e f e n d a n t f i l e d a m o t i o n f o r a new t r i a l . Hearing on

t h e m o t i o n was h e l d May 7, 1 9 8 2 . The c o u r t d e n i e d t h e motion.
T h e r e a f t e r , o n May 1 0 , 1 9 8 2 , d e f e n d a n t was s e n t e n c e d to t e n y e a r s
imprisonment as a persistent felony offender and five years

i m p r i s o n m e n t f o r t h e crime o f t h e £ t . The f i v e - y e a r s e n t e n c e was

suspended. At the sentencing hearing, d e f e n d a n t made known h i s
intentions to seek review in this Court, and in connection

t h e r e w i t h made a n o r a l m o t i o n t o s t a y t h e e x e c u t i o n of sentence
pending appeal. The w r i t t e n m o t i o n and t h e n o t i c e o f a p p e a l were
f i l e d o n t h a t same d a y . The c o u r t d e n i e d t h e s t a y of e x e c u t i o n ,

a n d d e f e n d a n t was s e n t to t h e s t a t e p r i s o n a t Deer L o d g e .
On A u g u s t 31, 1982, the defendant filed a motion in this
C o u r t t o s t a y t h e a p p e a l and t o remand t h e case to t h e D i s t r i c t

Court. Defendant's motion w a s based upon the claim o f newly-
discovered evidence. On S e p t e m b e r 3 , 1982, t h i s Court granted
defendant's motion and t h e c a s e was a g a i n b e f o r e the D i s t r i c t

Court for a determination of whether a new trial should be

g r a n t e d because of t h e new e v i d e n c e . On November 1 5 , 1 9 8 2 , t h e
D i s t r i c t C o u r t h e a r d a r g u m e n t s and o n November 30 e n t e r e d f i n d -

i n g s o f f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s o f law and d e n i e d d e f e n d a n t ' s m o t i o n
f o r a new t r i a l . In effect, the court ruled t h a t t h e r e was no

new e v i d e n c e on w h i c h t o award a new t r i a l .

The defendant has raised three issues f o r o u r review; (1)

w h e t h e r t h e r e is s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t t h e v e r d i c t of

guilty, ( 2 ) w h e t h e r t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d by n o t g r a n t i n g a new
t r i a l , and ( 3 ) w h e t h e r t h e r e was a d e n i a l o f e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e

of counsel a t trial. W h a v e c a r e f u l l y r e v i e w e d t h e r e c o r d and
e

f i n d no merit i n a p p e l l a n t ' s c o n t e n t i o n s , t h e r e f o r e t h e D i s t r i c t
Court I s j u d g m e n t and s e n t e n c e is a f f i r m e d .
On or a b o u t November 1 3 , 1 9 8 0 , a b l a c k - c o l o r e d 1964 C h e v r o l e t

3/4 t o n p i c k u p was r e p o r t e d s t o l e n f r o m Lucky M o t o r s i n Great
Falls. The p i c k u p was n o t s e e n a g a i n u n t i l more t h a n a y e a r
l a t e r when Wayne Thody s p o t t e d it i n t h e p a r k i n g l o t of a Great

Falls restaurant. Thody had owned the truck prior to trans-
ferring it t o Lucky Motors. Thody knew t h a t Chuck P l a n t , the
owner o f Lucky Motors , had reported the truck stolen. Thody

t e l e p h o n e d P l a n t who i n turn telephoned the police department.
Thody had t h e f o r e s i g h t t o r e l a y t h e l i c e n s e p l a t e n u m b e r , which

was 2T-41247.
The p o l i c e i n v e s t i g a t e d . The l i c e n s e p l a t e number b e l o n g e d
to a 1 9 6 3 g r e e n GMC pickup t r u c k owned by M r . Fladstol, the
defendant's stepfather. A p o l i c e o f f i c e r c o n t a c t e d Mrs. F l a d s t o l

concerning the license p l a t e . Mrs. F l a d s t o l showed t h e o f f i c e r a
vehicle registration, con£ i r m i n g that the number 2T-41247 was
registered f o r a 1 9 6 3 GMC p i c k u p . Mrs. F l a d s t o l a l s o i n f o r m e d

t h e o f f i c e r t h a t t h e GMC t r u c k had r e c e n t l y b e e n i n v o l v e d i n a n
accident i n which h e r s o n , the defendant, was the d r i v e r . The
officer who investigated the accident noted that the license
plate number of the GMC was 2T-41247; taken from the front
l i c e n s e p l a t e on t h e v e h i c l e . The o f f i c e r d i d n o t n o t i c e w h e t h e r

t h e v e h i c l e had a rear l i c e n s e p l a t e .

A t t h i s point, t h e p o l i c e were c o n f u s e d . They had r e c e i v e d a

r e p o r t t h a t a s t o l e n 1 9 6 4 C h e v r o l e t p i c k u p was s e e n b e a r i n g the
same l i c e n s e p l a t e number as a 1 9 6 3 GMC p i c k u p which had r e c e n t l y
been involved i n an a c c i d e n t . The p o l i c e t h o u g h t t h a t Thody had
incorrectly relayed the number on the s t o l e n 1964 Chevrolet.

However, t h e p o l i c e would s o o n l e a r n t h a t no m i s t a k e was made.
Dave R i c h a r d s o n c a l l e d t h e p o l i c e and i n f o r m e d them t h a t h e

t h o u g h t h i s r e c e n t l y a c q u i r e d 1964 b l a c k C h e v r o l e t p i c k u p t r u c k

was a stolen vehicle. About two weeks earlier, Richardson
acquired the 1964 C h e v r o l e t , without title or k e y s , from the
d e f e n d a n t , Kevin H a l l . With t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n , t h e p o l i c e con-
t a c t e d Chuck P l a n t who p o s i t i v e l y i d e n t i f i e d t h e t r u c k as t h e o n e
t h a t was s t o l e n f r o m h i s u s e d car l o t . The p o l i c e t h e n impounded

the vehicle.

When the police first viewed the stolen truck it had no

license plates. However, when questioned about the matter,
Richardson r e t r i e v e d from t h e garbage a l i c e n s e p l a t e w i t h the

number 211-41247, w h i c h s h o u l d h a v e b e e n on t h e 1 9 6 3 GMC owned b y
Mr. Fladstol. R i c h a r d s o n had removed t h e p l a t e a t t h e u r g i n g o f

the defendant. Richardson t e s t i f i e d a t t r i a l t h a t when he g o t

the truck from the defendant the plate was on the vehicle;
a p p a r e n t l y an arrangement whereby t h e t r u c k c o u l d be d r i v e n o n
t h e streets.
According t o t h e s t a t e ' s v e r s i o n of t h e f a c t s , t h e d e f e n d a n t

b e g a n t o w o r r y when h e l e a r n e d t h a t t h e p o l i c e had c o n t a c t e d h i s
mother concerning the license plate. The d e f e n d a n t t h e n con-

t a c t e d R i c h a r d s o n and t o l d him t h a t he s h o u l d remove t h e l i c e n s e

p l a t e and t h r o w it away, and t h a t h e s h o u l d d i s g u i s e t h e t r u c k by
p a i n t i n g i t w i t h g r a y p r i m e r p a i n t b e c a u s e t h e t r u c k was s t o l e n .
I t w a s a f t e r l e a r n i n g t h e s e t h i n g s t h a t Richardson contacted the
police.
The d e f e n d a n t a d m i t s t h a t he t r a n s f e r r e d a p i c k u p t r u c k to
Richardson in exchange for an air compressor and a wheel
balancer. However, t h e d e f e n d a n t claims t h a t the s t o l e n 1964

Chevrolet was not the pickup involved. He claims t h a t he g a v e
R i c h a r d s o n a n o t h e r p i c k u p , a 1962 C h e v r o l e t h a l f - t o n . Concerning
t h e l i c e n s e p l a t e , d e f e n d a n t c o n t e n d s t h a t Richardson must have
removed t h e p l a t e from t h e 1 9 6 3 GMC when i t had b e e n towed t o a

wrecking yard a f t e r t h e a c c i d e n t . H e f u r t h e r a d m i t s t h a t h e con-

t a c t e d R i c h a r d s o n , n o t t o t e l l him t h e t r u c k was s t o l e n , b u t to
q u e s t i o n him a b o u t t h e l i c e n s e p l a t e t h a t h e s u s p e c t e d R i c h a r d s o n
had t a k e n .

The j u r y d i d n o t b e l i e v e d e f e n d a n t ' s v e r s i o n o f t h e f a c t s and
r e t u r n e d a v e r d i c t of g u i l t y . Defendant argues t h a t t h e v e r d i c t
is n o t s u p p o r t e d by s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e . W disagree.
e
I n d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e e x i s t s to s u p p o r t
t h e v e r d i c t , w e w i l l v i e w t h e e v i d e n c e i n a l i g h t most f a v o r a b l e
to the prevailing party. The e v i d e n c e may be i n h e r e n t l y weak and

i t may c o n f l i c t w i t h o t h e r e v i d e n c e y e t s t i l l be deemed s u b s t a n -

tial. G u n n e l s v. Hoyt ( 1 9 8 1 ) , Mont . , 6 3 3 P.2d 1 1 8 7 , 38
St.Rep. 1492.
Appellant argues that the only evidence a g a i n s t him comes
from t h e testimony of Dave Richardson, the p e r s o n who w a s in
possession of the stolen truck when the police began their

investigation. Apparently, the appellant sees a relationship
between t h e d e f i n i t i o n of s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e and R i c h a r d s o n ' s
questionable actions i n t h i s case. Richardson admitted during

d i r e c t e x a m i n a t i o n t h a t he a c c e p t e d t h e 1964 C h e v r o l e t w i t h o u t a
t i t l e and w i t h o u t k e y s . Also, upon l e a r n i n g t h a t t h e v e h i c l e d i d
n o t have a V I N ( v e h i c l e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n number) p l a t e , R i c h a r d s o n

admitted t h a t he i n s t a l l e d a f a k e number p l a t e and o b t a i n e d a
f a k e t i t l e to match. Nonetheless, Richardson maintained t h a t he
d i d n o t know t h e t r u c k was s t o l e n u n t i l a f t e r t h e d e f e n d a n t t o l d

him so.
Regardless of Richardson's actions, c o n c l u s i o n s drawn a b o u t
h i s v e r a c i t y are q u e s t i o n s f o r t h e j u r y . A s we s a i d i n -- u -n e l s ,
G n-

-- -- Mont. a t - , 6 3 3 P.2d a t 1 1 9 1 , 38 S t . R e p . a t 1495, where
the record contains con£ l i c t i n g e v i d e n c e , " t h e c r e d i b i l i t y and
w e i g h t g i v e n t o s u c h c o n f l i c t i n g e v i d e n c e is t h e p r o v i n c e of t h e

j u r y and n o t t h i s C o u r t ."
While Richardson 's t e s t i m o n y was important to the state's
case , it c a n n o t be s a i d t h a t it was t h e o n l y e v i d e n c e a g a i n s t
defendant. Michael Barsotti testified t h a t the defendant t o l d

h i m t h a t t h e p i c k u p was s t o l e n and t h a t h e ( B a r s o t t i ) s h o u l d t e l l
Richardson to get some paint to cover the original color.
Barsotti also t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t s a i d h e had l e n t t h e

l i c e n s e p l a t e t o R i c h a r d s o n so t h e t r u c k c o u l d be d r i v e n on t h e
streets.
We find substantial evidence to support the verdict of

guilty.
Next, we consider whether the court erred in denying
defendant's motion for a new trial. This issue concerns the

first motion, not the motion made while arguing for newly-
discovered evidence. A p p e l l a n t ' s argument is t w o - f o l d . F i r s t,

a p p e l l a n t claims t h a t t h e c o u r t d i d n o t r e c o g n i z e i t s i n h e r e n t
discretion, and as a result, failed to exercise discretion.
S e c o n d , a p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h a t t h e c o u r t e r r e d by n o t s p e c i f y i n g

its reasons f o r denying t h e motion. T h e s e c o n t e n t i o n s w i l l be

d e a l t with in turn.
W e f i n d it d i f f i c u l t t o i m a g i n e how t h e c o u r t c o u l d d e n y t h e

motion without exercising discretion. Appellant cites the

f o l l o w i n g comment by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t j u d g e :
" W e l l , I h a v e some p e r s o n a l d o u b t s i n my own
mind a b o u t t h i s case. I t is n o t up to m e to
d e c i d e t h e c r e d i b i l i t y of t h e w i t n e s s e s , t h a t
i s f o r t h e j u r y to d e c i d e . The t e s t i m o n y o f
o n e w i t n e s s who is e n t i t l e d t o f u l l c r e d i t is
s u f f i c i e n t f o r t h e p r o o f o f a n y f a c t . And, o f
c o u r s e , twelve people i n t h e j u r y decided t h e
c r e d i b i l i t y o f t h e w i t n e s s e s , so I c a n ' t see
how I c a n t u r n a r o u n d now and t r y t o s a y t h e i r
j u d g m e n t o f c r e d i b i l i t y was wrong. So, there-
f o r e , I ' m g o i n g t o d e n y t h e M o t i o n f o r new
trial."
We do n o t see the above as a judicial denial of i t s own

d i s c r e t i o n a r y power, rather it shows that the court was w e l l
aware o f t h e l i m i t s o f its d i s c r e t i o n . A s we s a i d i n L y n d e s v.

Scofield ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 1 8 0 Mont. 1 7 7 , 1 8 0 , 5 8 9 P.2d 1000, 1002, " ' t h e
t r i a l c o u r t ' s d i s c r e t i o n is e x h a u s t e d when it f i n d s s u b s t a n t i a l

evidence to support t h e v e r d i c t . ' ( c i t a t i o n o m i t t e d ) N e i t h e r may
a D i s t r i c t C o u r t g r a n t a new t r i a l o n l y o n t h e b a s i s t h a t i t c h o s e
to b e l i e v e one l i n e of t e s t i m o n y d i f f e r e n t from t h a t which the
jury believed." The j u d g e ' s comments o n l y r e f l e c t a n a w a r e n e s s

o f t h e above p r i n c i p l e s .
Next, we consider appellant's contention that the court

failed to s p e c i f y reasons f o r d e n i a l of the motion. Appellant
assumes t h a t such r e a s o n s a r e r e q u i r e d . W e are c i t e d to S t a t e v.

W i l l i a m s (1981), - Mont . -- - , 6 3 2 P.2d 3 2 8 , 38 S t . R e p . 1253,
f o r t h e p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t when a t r i a l c o u r t d e n i e s a m o t i o n f o r

new trial, it must state its reasons therefore. Appellant
misreads the case. I n --- l- ,
Wil iams
- we reviewed an o r d e r g r a n t i n g
t h e d e f e n d a n t a new t r i a l . I n g r a n t i n g t h e new t r i a l , t h e c o u r t

d i d not specify its reasons. W noted
e t h a t s e c t i o n 46-16-702,
MCA, "does not r e q u i r e t h a t the District Court expressly state

its reasons for taking whatever action it deems appropriate

regarding [ m o t i o n s f o r new t r i a l ] ." However, w e h e l d t h a t t h e
m a n d a t e s o f R u l e 5 9 ( f ) , M.R.Civ.P. are a p p l i c a b l e to m o t i o n s f o r
new t r i a l i n c r i m i n a l a c t i o n s . R u l e 59 ( f ) , M.R.Civ.P. requires
t h a t "[aJny order of t h e c o u r t g r a n t i n g a new t r i a l , s h a l l spe-
cify the grounds therefor with sufficient particularity as to
apprise the parties and the a p p e l l a t e C o u r t of the rationale
underlying the ruling, and t h i s may be d o n e i n t h e b o d y o f the
o r d e r , or i n an a t t a c h e d o p i n i o n . " W -- a m s- h o l d s t h a t r e a s o n s
-i l l i
m u s t be s t a t e d when g r a n t i n g a new t r i a l , it d o e s n o t h o l d as

s u c h when a c o u r t d e n i e s a m o t i o n f o r new t r i a l .
Even if appellant's reading of W i l l i a m s were
- correct, his

a r g u m e n t would n o t p e r s u a d e t h i s C o u r t . The d i s t r i c t j u d g e d i d
s t a t e h i s r e a s o n s f o r d e n i a l of the motion. I t is e v i d e n t from

the judge's comments c i t e d a b o v e t h a t h e d e f e r r e d to t h e j u r y as
t h e f i n d e r of fact; in effect, ruling t h a t substantial evidence

existed t o support the verdict.
Next, we address a p p e l l a n t ' s assertion t h a t h e was denied

e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of counsel a t the t r i a l level. Appellant

alleges numerous i n s t a n c e s of error, conceding that no single
instance in and of itself would warrant reversal. However,
a p p e l l a n t a s k s t h i s Court t o c o n s i d e r t h e c u m u l a t i v e e f f e c t of
t h e many " e r r o r s and o m i s s i o n s . "
W e have recognized t h a t t h e claim o f ineffective assistance

o f c o u n s e l may be p r e d i c a t e d upon t h e c u m u l a t i v e e f f e c t o f r e p r e -

sentation. I n S t a t e v. McElveen ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 1 6 8 Mont. 5 0 0 , 5 0 9 , 5 4 4
P.2d 820, 824, we s t a t e d : " ' [ a l d e q u a t e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n a cri-
m i n a l p r o c e e d i n g is t h e c u m u l a t i v e a c t o f a f f o r d i n g t h e d e f e n d a n t

an adequate defense ." ( c i t i n g Smotherman v . Beto ( 1 9 6 7 ) , 276
F.Supp. 579, 5 8 6 ) . I n s u p p o r t of h i s a r g u m e n t , a p p e l l a n t a l l e g e s
more t h a n t h i r t y i n s t a n c e s o f e r r o r . W e have c a r e f u l l y reviewed

the record and conclude that a p p e l l a n t was effectively repre-
s e n t e d by t r i a l c o u n s e l . I n r e v i e w i n g t h e r e c o r d , we h a v e b e e n
mindful of t h e s t a n d a r d a d o p t e d b y t h i s C o u r t i n S t a t e v. Rose

(1980 .-- .- Mon t
.- . - - .
. , 6 0 8 P.2d 1 0 7 4 , 1 0 8 1 , 37 S t . R e p .
642, 649-50; " ' [plersons accused of crime a r e e n t i t l e d to the
e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of c o u n s e l a c t i n g w i t h i n t h e r a n g e o f com-

p e t e n c e demanded o f a t t o r n e y s i n c r i m i n a l cases. "
A p p e l l a n t ' s claim is g r o u n d l e s s . W e a r e d i s t u r b e d and i r r i -

t a t e d b y w h a t is a n u n f o u n d e d a t t a c k on t h e c o m p e t e n c e of trial

counsel. I t is o b v i o u s t h a t a p p e l l a t e c o u n s e l s c o u r e d t h e r e c o r d

i n a n e f f o r t t o make h i s c u m u l a t i v e t o t a l as h i g h as p o s s i b l e ;
a p p a r e n t l y n o t c a r i n g w h e t h e r h i s a r g u m e n t s had substance. In

s e v e r a l instances the record is m i s s t a t e d . S e n t e n c e s are t a k e n
o u t of context. Many o f t h e a l l e g e d e r r o r s are n o t errors a t
all, and if there are instances of error, they are trivial.

A p p e l l a n t s e e m s t o c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e b a s i s of a l l e r r o r was
inadequate preparation. As i l l u s t r a t i v e of this point, we are

c i t e d to a p o r t i o n of t h e t r a n s c r i p t w h e r e d e f e n s e c o u n s e l sup-
p o s e d l y t e l l s t h e j u r y i n c l o s i n g a r g u m e n t t h a t " h e d i d n o t meet
w i t h D e f e n d a n t ' s w i t n e s s e s and p r e p a r e them f o r t h i s t r i a l . . ."
In other words, appellant would have us believe t h a t defense

c o u n s e l f a i l e d to i n t e r v i e w h i s own w i t n e s s e s p r i o r to t r i a l , and

e v e n a d m i t t e d it t o t h e j u r y . T h i s is n o t s o . Defense counsel
was a t t e m p t i n g to e x p l a i n i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s i n t h e t e s t i m o n y of h i s
witnesses. He stated, "I d i d n ' t a s k them t o g e t t o g e t h e r and
straighten their s t o r i e s o u t because I wanted them t o a l s o be

honest, and t h e y came and t o l d you w h a t t h e y remembered ." This

i s c l e a r l y n o t a n a d m i s s i o n of f a i l u r e to i n t e r v i e w w i t n e s s e s .
T h i s is c l e a r l y a n e f f o r t t o m i s l e a d t h i s C o u r t .
I n a n o t h e r i n s t a n c e of alleged error, appellant claims t h a t

trial counsel, i n c l o s i n g a r g u m e n t , s t a t e d t h a t he d i d n o t know
if t h e g r e e n GMC had a rear l i c e n s e p l a t e a t t h e t i m e of the
a c c i d e n t ; t h i s s t a t e m e n t being c o n t r a r y to d e f e n d a n t ' s a s s e r t i o n

t h a t t h e r e was a r e a r l i c e n s e p l a t e on t h e v e h i c l e . Appellant
suggests that defense counsel cast doubt o n h i s own c l i e n t ' s

statements. A reading of the t r a n s c r i p t indicates t h a t defense

c o u n s e l made t h e s e r e m a r k s i n r e f e r e n c e to t h e t e s t i m o n y of the
accident investigation officer, who testified that -,
he the
-

o f f i c-- ,
.
er d i d n o t know if t h e r e was a r e a r license plate. In
o t h e r words, d e f e n s e c o u n s e l was m e r e l y r e l a t i n g the off icer's
testimony. A g a i n , t h i s is a n e f f o r t to m i s l e a d t h i s C o u r t .

I n another instance, appellant refers to a p o r t i o n of the

t r a n s c r i p t where t h e " T r i a l C o u r t r e p r i m a n d s t h e p r o s e c u t o r f o r
continually asking hearsay questions (i n s p i t e of no o b j e c t i o n
from the Defense Counsel) and the Court then lectures the

P r o s e c u t o r on t h e d e f i n i t i o n of h e a r s a y and t h e r e a s o n s f o r t h e
hearsay rule." W e see no h i n t of a reprimand from t h e c o u r t ;

rather, w e see a n e x p l a n a t i o n t o t h e j u r y of the hearsay r u l e .

F u r t h e r m o r e , w e n o t e t h a t it was d e f e n s e c o u n s e l ' s h e a r s a y o b j e c -
t i o n t h a t prompted t h e c o u r t ' s comments. A p p e l l a n t ' s r e a d i n g of
t h e t r a n s c r i p t is s t r a i n e d .

S e v e r a l o t h e r a l l e g e d errors i n d i c a t e to u s t h a t a p p e l l a n t
was striving t o make the "error count" as high as possible.
A p p e l l a n t c o m p l a i n s o f t h r e e q u e s t i o n s a s k e d by t h e p r o s e c u t o r of

a police detective. Each of t h e t h r e e q u e s t i o n s c o u l d h a v e b e e n
o b j e c t e d to a s h e a r s a y , y e t d e f e n s e c o u n s e l made no o b j e c t i o n s .

The q u e s t i o n s f o c u s e d on s t a t e m e n t s made by Dave R i c h a r d s o n con-

cerning the fake VIN plate. Appellant contends t h a t defense
c o u n s e l s h o u l d n o t have l e t t h i s t e s t i m o n y i n . Yet, in another
s p e c i f i c a t i o n of a l l e g e d e r r o r , a p p e l l a n t c r i t i c i z e s t r i a l coun-

sel for a perceived failure to cross-examine Richardson con-
c e r n i n g h i s q u e s t i o n a b l e a c t i o n s i n o b t a i n i n g t h e f a k e VIN p l a t e .
A p p e l l a n t sees e r r o r b o t h ways, f i r s t f o r l e t t i n g the testimony

i n , and t h e n f o r n o t g e t t i n g i t i n .

Many o t h e r instances are not e r r o r a t a l l or d e a l with a
question of tactics. Appellant claims that defense counsel

s h o u l d h a v e o b j e c t e d t o t h e a d m i s s i o n of s e v e r a l p h o t o g r a p h s of
the stolen truck, yet he offers no possible grounds for the
objection. Appellant fails to r e c o g n i z e that the photographs

were u s e f u l ; h i s w i t n e s s e s viewed t h e p h o t o g r a p h s and t e s t i f i e d
t h a t they did not represent the pickup t h a t defendant transferred

to Richardson. Also, in connect ion with the photographs;

a p p e l l a n t claims t h a t a n e x c e l l e n t o p p o r t u n i t y was m i s s e d to v o i r
d i r e Chuck P l a n t c o n c e r n i n g t h e i d e n t i t y o f t h e v e h i c l e s i n c e it
h a d b e e n m i s s i n g f o r o v e r a y e a r and s i n c e it was o n l y o n P l a n t ' s

l o t f o r a c o u p l e of weeks. W e d o n o t see a m i s s e d o p p o r t u n i t y ;

rather, w e see w i s e r e s t r a i n t on t h e p a r t o f d e f e n s e c o u n s e l .
P l a n t t e s t i f i e d t h a t he r e c o g n i z e d h i s t r u c k i n t h e p h o t o g r a p h s
because of two distinctive features, homemade mud£ l a p s and b o d y

damage o n t h e d o o r . A c h a l l e n g e of P l a n t on t h e s e p o i n t s c o u l d
have been d e t r i m e n t a l to d e f e n d a n t , n o t b e n e f i c i a l .
Appellant lists several individuals who should have been

c a l l e d as w i t n e s s e s by d e f e n s e c o u n s e l . Supposedly, these indi-
v i d u a l s had a d d i t i o n a l and material in£o r m a t i o n . I t was p a r t l y

o n t h e b a s i s o f a f f i d a v i t s from t h e s e p e o p l e t h a t a p p e l l a n t moved
f o r a new t r i a l o n t h e g r o u n d s of n e w l y - d i s c o v e r e d evidence. In
denying a new trial, the court considered the information in
these affidavits as either cumulative, not probative or not

material.
S e v e r a l o t h e r a l l e g e d errors are d i s c u s s e d by a p p e l l a n t , n o n e

of which d e s e r v e d i s c u s s i o n . These iqclude: e r r o r of d e f e n s e

c o u n s e l f o r r e s e r v i n g h i s opening statement until t h e close o f
the state's case failure to o b j e c t to p r o s e c u t o r i a l comments

during opening statement that defendant was guilty; several
m i s s e d o b j e c t i o n s to l e a d i n g q u e s t i o n s and q u e s t i o n s c a l l i n g f o r

hearsay; e r r o r o f d e f e n s e c o u n s e l f o r r e f e r r i n g to t h e 1 9 6 3 GMC
as a 1964 model; failure of defense counsel to o f f e r a jury
i n s t r u c t i o n on d e f e n d a n t ' s " t h e o r y of t h e case ," y e t a p p e l l a n t

d o e s n o t s u g g e s t what m i g h t have been o f f e r e d ; f a i l u r e of d e f e n s e

c o u n s e l t o o b j e c t to p r o s e c u t o r i a l s t a t e m e n t s on c l o s i n g argument
v o u c h i n g f o r t h e t r u t h f u l n e s s of Dave R i c h a r d s o n ; and f a i l u r e of

d e f e n s e c o u n s e l to e x p l a i n t h e c o n c e p t of r e a s o n a b l e doubt to t h e

jury.
Where ineffective assistance of counsel is claimed, the

d e f e n d a n t must show error o f counsel stemming from n e g l e c t or
i g n o r a n c e and r e s u l t i n g i n p r e j u d i c e t o t h e d e f e n d a n t . S t a t e v.

Morigeau ( 1 9 8 2 ) , - Mon t . -. , 6 5 6 P.2d 1 8 5 , 39 S t . R e p . 2311.
W e see no e r r o r , s i n g l y or c u m u l a t i v e l y , which p r e j u d i c e d d e f e n -

dant.
The assertion of ineffective assistance of counsel is a

serious charge. An attorney's reputation is h i s most p r i z e d
possession. Appellate counsel might have conducted the trial
d i f f e r e n t l y , however,

" t h e f a c t t h a t some o t h e r l a w y e r
h a v e done d i f f e r e n t l y .. . ...
is no ground f o r
would
branding the appointed attorney with the
opprobrium of i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s , or in£ i d e l i t y ,
or incompetency . . . A s no t w o men c a n be
e x a c t l y a l i k e i n t h e p r a c t i c e of t h e pro-
f e s s i o n , it is b a s i c a l l y u n r e a s o n a b l e t o j u d g e
a n a t t o r n e y by w h a t a n o t h e r would h a v e d o n e ,
o r s a y s h e would h a v e d o n e , i n t h e , b e t t e r
l i g h t of hindsight." S t a t e v. Lopez ( 1 9 8 O ) ,
-- Mont . I 6 0 5 P.2d 1 7 8 , 180-81,
37- S t . ~ e p . 3%, -38-9-. ( C i t i n g W i l l i a m s v. B e t o
( 5 t h C i r . 1 9 6 5 ) , 3 5 4 F.2d 6 9 8 , 7 0 6 . )
Our f o l l o w i n g comments a r e n o t intended t o discourage valid
and substantiated a s s e r t i o n s of i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of coun-

sel. The r i g h t to e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of c o u n s e l is g u a r a n t e e d

b y t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n and t h i s S t a t e ' s C o n s t i t u t i o n .
S t a t e v. Rose, s u p r a . An a t t o r n e y would be remiss i n h i s d u t i e s

if he fails t o a c t when h e reasonably believes h i s c l i e n t is
denied this right. However, in t h i s case, a p p e l l a t e counsel
attempted to manufacture a n issue. His argument is n o t only

frivolous, it is b a s e d i n p a r t o n b l a t a n t m i s s t a t e m e n t s of the
record. Such a c t i o n s w i l l n o t be t o l e r a t e d . C o u n s e l is r e m i n d e d

o f D i s c i p l i n a r y R u l e s 7 - 1 0 2 ( A ) ( 2 ) and ( 5 ) w h i c h s t a t e :

" I n h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of a c l i e n t , a lawyer
s h a l l not:

" ( 2 ) k n o w i n g l y a d v a n c e a claim o r d e f e n s e
t h a t is unwarranted under e x i s t i n g l a w ;

" ( 5 ) k n o w i n g l y make a f a l s e s t a t e m e n t of l a w
or f a c t . Canons o f P r o f e s s i o n a l E t h i c s , 1 6 0
Mont. x x i i i , x l i v . "
Finally, we consider a matter raised in appellant's reply

brief. A p p e l l a n t r e a s s e r t s h i s i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of c o u n s e l

argument i n view of an e x h i b i t contained i n respondent's brief.
A p p e l l a n t claims t h a t e x h i b i t 3 o f respondent's brief is " p r o o f
p o s i t i v e t h a t t h e A p p e l l a n t , Kevin H a l l , did not receive ef fec-
t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of c o u n s e l a t h i s t r i a l and h i s c o n v i c t i o n -- u s t
m
be reversed. "
E x h i b i t 3 is a n a f f i d a v i t s i g n e d by d e f e n s e c o u n s e l , s t a t i n g

t h a t "Kevin D. H a l l a d v i s e d af f i a n t t h a t H a l l r e c e i v e d t h e t r u c k
f r o m o n e P e t e P e t e r s o n .I1 F u r t h e r m o r e , d e f e n s e c o u n s e l s t a t e s he
traveled t o t h e Montana S t a t e P r i s o n t o i n t e r v i e w P e t e r s o n who
w a s s e r v i n g time f o r forgery. Apparently, Peterson told defense
c o u n s e l t h a t h e knew n o t h i n g o f t h e b l a c k 1 9 6 4 C h e v r o l e t .
Respondent included this exhibit to counter arguments by

a p p e l l a n t t h a t P e t e r s o n s h o u l d h a v e b e e n c a l l e d a s a w i t n e s s ; and
since he was not called, it helped illustrate ineffective
assistance of counsel. Appellant urges that defense counsel
v i o l a t e d t h e Canons o f P r o f e s s i o n a l E t h i c s by f a i l i n g t o p r e s e r v e
t h e c o n f i d e n c e s and s e c r e t s o f a c l i e n t . We refuse to c o n s i d e r

t h e e x h i b i t and t h e a s s e r t i o n s of a p p e l l a n t . They are n o t r e l e -

v a n t to t h e i s s u e s r a i s e d on a p p e a l , n o r are t h e y p a r t of the
record. W w i l l n o t t o l e r a t e a t t e m p t s to i n t r o d u c e e x t r a n e o u s
e
i n f o r m a t i o n by a t t a c h i n g appendices to b r i e f s . Farmers State
Bank o f Conrad v . I v e r s o n and Bouma ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 1 6 2 Mont. 1 3 0 , 509

A£f irmed .
.

W e concur: