No. 82-245
I N THE SUPREME COURT O F THE STATE O M N A A
F O T N
1983
NANCY J E A N XALLRCE,
P e t i k i o n e r and R e s p o n d e n t ,
-VS-
THOMAS K. WALLACE,
Respondent a n d A p p e l l a n t .
Ap9eal from: D i s t r i c t C o u r t o f t h e F o u r t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
I n and f o r t h e County o f M i s s o u l a , The Wonorable
James B. W h e e l i s , Jud-ge p r e s i d i n g .
C o u n s e l f o r Record:
For Appellant:
P a t t e r s o n , M a r s i l l o , Tornabene & S c h u y l e r ; C h a r l e s
J. T o r n a b e n e , M i s s o u l a , Montana
F o r Respondent :
Ferguson & Pgitchell ;
M i s s o u l a , Montana
Submitted: J a n u a r y 1 7 , 1983
Decided : March 2 5 , 1983
Filed: MAH % 5 /gg3
-- &257,qLu
P
Clerk
-.
Mr. Justice John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n of the
Court.
R e s p o n d e n t ( w i f e ) p e t i t i o n e d t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t of t h e F o u r t h
J u d i c i a l District i n and for the County of Missoula, S t a t e of
Montana, f o r a d e c r e e of d i s s o l u t i o n of m a r r i a g e . F i n d i n g s of
f a c t , c o n c l u s i o n s of l a w , d e c r e e and j u d g m e n t were e n t e r e d March
26, 1982. A p p e l l a n t ( h u s b a n d ) moved f o r a new t r i a l o n A p r i l 6 ,
1982. On May 1 9 , 1 9 8 2 , t h e District Court entered a n amended
d e c r e e and h u s b a n d a p p e a l s .
Husband and wife were married on April 28, 1967, in
Bremerton, Washington. The p a r t i e s had been married fourteen
years when they separated i n January, 1981. They have two
c h i l d r e n from t h e i r m a r r i a g e .
W i f e is t h i r t y - t h r e e y e a r s of a g e . She was unemployed a t t h e
t i m e of the divorce. W i f e h a s a h i g h s c h o o l e d u c a t i o n and h a s
had vocational training as a nurse's aide and as a keypunch
operator. During the marriage, w i f e was employed for a short
t i m e a s a ward s e c r e t a r y i n a h o s p i t a l a p p r o x i m a t e l y n i n e y e a r s
ago. She a l s o worked a s h o r t t i m e as a n u r s e ' s aide four years
ago. W i f e had b r a i n s u r g e r y a p p r o x i m a t e l y n i n e y e a r s a g o . As a
r e s u l t of the surgery, w i f e h a s two s t e e l c l i p s in her skull.
Wife suffers from constant headaches and has a neurological
i m p a i r m e n t c a u s i n g slow r e f l e x a c t i o n on h e r l e f t s i d e .
Husband is also t h i r t y - t h r e e y e a r s of age. He is employed
w i t h t h e B o n n e v i l l e Power A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ( B . P.A. ) . Husband h a s a
h i g h s c h o o l e d u c a t i o n and h a s t a k e n some c l a s s e s a t t h e c o l l e g e
level. He has apparent good mental and physical health.
H u s b a n d ' s wage s c a l e a t t h e t i m e o f h e a r i n g was $ 1 4 . 6 5 p e r h o u r .
He has advanced with B.P.A. as far as he is able without a
college education.
The p a r t i e s a g r e e d t h a t t h e w i f e s h o u l d h a v e c u s t o d y of the
t w o m i n o r c h i l d r e n and t h a t t h e husband s h o u l d be awarded r e a s o n -
able, liberal visitation.
The D i s t r i c t Court divided t h e marital estate as follows:
-
ITEM EQUITY TO HUSBAND TO WIFE
House $ 46,000.00
Bremerton , Washing t o n
House 39,000.00 15,600.00 23,400.00
M i s s o u l a , Montana
Land 3,000.00 3,000.00
B e a v e r t a i l , Montana
Husband ' s R e t i r e m e n t
Account 11,500.00 11,500.00
Personal Property - -9. 6- -0 0.-
-, 00. - - --
.5-,- - 0 . 0 0
80 - -- - - .-3- -0 -. 0-- -
- , 8 -0 0
Subtotal $109,100.00 $35,900.00 $73,200.00
L e s s Marital
L i a b i l i t i e s To
Husband
TOTAL
The D i s t r i c t C o u r t o r d e r e d husband t o pay c h i l d s u p p o r t of
$ 1 8 5 p e r c h i l d p e r month f o r e a c h o f t h e t w o m i n o r c h i l d r e n and
f u r t h e r o r d e r e d t h e c h i l d s u p p o r t p a y m e n t s be i n c r e a s e d b y 5 p e r -
c e n t p e r month p e r c h i l d o n t h e a n n i v e r s a r y o f the decree. The
D i s t r i c t C o u r t a l s o o r d e r e d h u s b a n d t o p a y w i f e $ 1 3 0 p e r month as
maintenance u n t i l h e r d e a t h or r e m a r r i a g e . The D i s t r i c t Court
justified the property division, child s u p p o r t and maintenance
s t a t i n g the respondent is a n a b l e - b o d i e d man and b a s e d upon t h e
e m p l o y m e n t e x p e r i e n c e , a g e and h e a l t h of the parties, husband is
deemed t o h a v e a g r e a t e r o p p o r t u n i t y t h a n w i f e t o a c q u i r e f u t u r e
c a p i t a l assets.
Following t h e e n t r y of judgment, on A p r i l 6 , 1982, husband
moved for a new t r i a l . Husband claimed t h e r e was no c o m p e t e n t
medical testimony to s u p p o r t t h e D i s t r i c t Court's finding that
wife suffered from health problems which would impair her
prospects of finding future employment. On May 3, 1982, the
District Court ordered husband's motion for a new trial be
t r e a t e d as a m o t i o n t o amend t h e j u d g m e n t . On May 1 9 , 1 9 8 2 , t h e
D i s t r i c t C o u r t o r d e r e d t h e d e c r e e be amended. The p r o p e r t y d i v i -
sion, child support and maintenance provisions remained
unchanged. Husband a p p e a l s .
The i s s u e s r a i s e d on a p p e a l a r e :
1. Whether t h e District Court e r r e d i n awarding an a u t o m a t i c
i n c r e a s e i n t h e c h i l d s u p p o r t payments.
2. Whether the District Court I s findings and conclusions
were p r o p e r l y made and b a s e d upon s u b s t a n t i a l c r e d i b l e e v i d e n c e .
3. Whether t h e District Court's property division was in-
equitable.
Here, t h e c o u r t had c r e d i b l e e v i d e n c e of t h e h u s b a n d ' s abi-
lity to contribute to the children's support and that the
c h i l d r e n ' s n e e d s as t h e y g r o w o l d e r , require increased support.
The District Court ordered the child support payments be
i n c r e a s e d b y 5 p e r c e n t p e r month p e r c h i l d o n t h e a n n i v e r s a r y of
the decree. W e assume t h e language of t h e c l a u s e is a m i s t a k e
and t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t m e a n t to o r d e r a 5 p e r c e n t increase per
c h i l d on a n a n n u a l b a s i s , n o t a m o n t h l y b a s i s , and w e d i r e c t t h a t
t h e d e c r e e be m o d i f i e d t o so r e a d .
I n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e , t h e f i n d i n g s by t h e t r i a l c o u r t a p p e a r
t o j u s t i f y the 5 percent annual increase i n c h i l d support:
" [Finding of f a c t no. 13.1 ' B a s e d upon t h e
employment e x p e r i e n c e , a g e and h e a l t h of t h e
p a r t i e s t h e r e s p o n d e n t ( h u s b a n d ) i s deemed t o
have a g r e a t e r opportunity than the p e t i t i o n e r
( w i f e ) t o a c q u i r e f u t u r e c a p i t a l a s s e t s and
income. '
" [ F i n d i n g o f f a c t n o . 1 4 . 1 ' T h e r e s p o n d e n t is
a n a b l e - b o d i e d man, i n 1980 g r o s s e d $ 2 9 , 0 0 0 . 0 0
t h r o u g h h i s e m p l o y m e n t , and i s f i n a n c i a l l y
c a p a b l e o f p a y i n g c h i l d s u p p o r t i n t h e amount
o f $185.00 p e r month p e r c h i l d . ' "
Husband next argues that the District Court's f i n d i n g s of
fact and conclusions of l a w were n o t s u p p o r t e d by substantial
credible evidence. Husband claims t h e r e c o r d l a c k s t h e m e d i c a l
testimony necessary to support the finding that wife's health
p r o b l e m s w a r r a n t t h e i n e q u i t a b l e d i v i s i o n of property. Husband
c l a i m s s i n c e w i f e was t h e o n l y w i t n e s s who t e s t i f i e d c o n c e r n i n g
h e r own h e a l t h , s u c h t e s t i m o n y d o e s n o t c o n s t i t u t e c r e d i b l e e v i -
dence.
T h i s C o u r t h a s s t a t e d s e v e r a l times:
"We w i l l n o t s u b s t i t u t e o u r j u d g m e n t f o r t h a t
o f t h e trier of f a c t , b u t r a t h e r w i l l o n l y
c o n s i d e r whether s u b s t a n t i a l evidence s u p p o r t s
t h e f i n d i n g s and c o n c l u s i o n s . Those f i n d i n g s
w i l l n o t be o v e r t u r n e d b y t h i s C o u r t u n l e s s
t h e r e is a clear p r e p o n d e r a n c e of e v i d e n c e
a g a i n s t them. W e w i l l view t h e evidence i n a
l i g h t most f a v o r a b l e t o t h e p r e v a i l i n g p a r t y ,
r e c o g n i z i n g t h a t s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e may be
weak or c o n f l i c t i n g w i t h o t h e r e v i d e n c e y e t
still support the findings." I n Re Marriage
o f Bosacker ( 1 9 8 0 ) , - Mont
2 5 3 , 2 5 6 , 37 ~ t . ~ e p 4 6 9 , 47i-i----cameron v .
.
. , 609 P.2d
Cameron ( 1 9 7 8 ) , -- Mont - -
9 4 5 , 35 S t . R e p . 1 7 2 3 , 1 7 2 9 .
. r 5 8 7 P.2d 939,
Here, t h e r e w a s no e v i d e n c e which c o n t r a d i c t e d t h e medical
t e s t i m o n y of the wife. Viewing the evidence i n a l i g h t most
f a v o r a b l e to t h e w i f e , we f i n d t h e husband h a s n o t m e t h i s burden
of coming f o r t h with a preponderance of evidence to r e b u t the
wife I s testimony. Husband a r g u e s t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g was
i n e r r o r b e c a u s e t h e r e w a s no c o r r o b o r a t i n g t e s t i m o n y from com-
p e t e n t m e d i c a l a u t h o r i t i e s t o s u p p o r t t h e w i f e ' s own t e s t i m o n y o f
h e r h e a l t h problems. T h i s C o u r t h a s n e v e r s t a t e d t h e r e m u s t be
corroborating testimony from competent medical authorities to
s u p p o r t one p a r t y ' s testimony about h e a l t h problems i n a d i v o r c e
proceeding. Here, t h e h u s b a n d c o u l d h a v e made c o m p e t e n t m e d i c a l
a u t h o r i t y a v a i l a b l e to t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o r e b u t t h e w i f e ' s testi-
mony b u t c h o s e n o t t o d o so. Even t h o u g h a p a r t y ' s testimony
a b o u t t h e i r own h e a l t h p r o b l e m s may be weak, it is s t i l l t h e b u r -
d e n o f t h e o p p o s i n g p a r t y t o o f f e r e v i d e n c e as r e b u t t a l .
The husband further argues the District Court did not
equitably apportion t h e marital a s s e t s as r e q u i r e d by sect i o n
40-4-202, MCA. Husband claims the property division is in-
equitable because the wife received a s u b s t a n t i a l l y dispropor-
tionate amount o f the property. In, I n R e Marriage of Laster
(1982) -- Mont . -- - , 6 4 3 P.2d 5 9 7 , 39 S t . R e p . 737, t h i s Court
stated:
"The D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s d u t y u n d e r s e c t i o n
4 0 - 4 - 2 0 2 ( 1 ) , MCA, is t o c o n s i d e r t h e f a c t o r s
therein and then divide the property
equitably. An e q u i t a b l e d i v i s i o n d o e s n o t
n e c e s s a r i l y mean a n e q u a l d i v i s i o n . A s has
b e e n n o t e d many times by t h i s C o u r t , :...
" ' A l t h o u g h t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t may e q u a l l y
d i v i d e - m a r i t a l a s s e t s , E i i h - a d i T t r i b u t -- G
the i
IS n o t m- a n d a t e d b y s e c t i o n 40-4-202,
-- - - - MCA
-- ...
S e c t i o n 40-4-202 i s f l e x i b l e and i t v e s t s a
good d e a l o f d i s c r e t i o n i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t
. . . w e h a v e s t a t e d , b e f o r e and a f t e r t h e
a d o p t i o n of t h e s t a t u t e , t h a t each case must
b e l o o k e d a t i n d i v i d u a l l y , w i t h a n e y e to i t s
unique circumstances . . . 11I (Citations
omitted.) ( E m p h a s i s a d d e d . ) L a s t e r , 6 4 3 P.2d
-
a t 601.
A s p r e v i o u s l y noted i n t h i s case, t h e w i f e was unemployed a t
t h e t i m e of t h e h e a r i n g . I t was n o t i n e q u i t a b l e to g i v e t h e w i f e
t h e h o u s e i n W a s h i n g t o n , and a l a r g e r p o r t i o n of t h e p r o c e e d s of
the sale of the rental property i n Missoula. Considering the
f a c t t h a t t h e w i f e was unemployed a t t h e t i m e o f h e a r i n g and w a s
t o have custody of the t w o minor c h i l d r e n , h e r n e e d s a r e con-
siderably greater than the husband's. The record shows the
D i s t r i c t C o u r t a t t e m p t e d to make t h e p r o p e r t y d i v i s i o n b a s e d upon
the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of
income, v o c a t i o n a l s k i l l s , employability, liabilities, n e e d s of
the parties and custodial provisions as mandated by sect i o n
40-4-202, MCA. W f i n d no e r r o r i n t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s d i v i s i o n of
e
t h e marital p r o p e r t y .
The judgment is a f f i r m e d .
W e concur:
Chief Justice
Mr. C h i e f J u s t i c e F r a n k I. H a s w e l l , c o n c u r r i n g i n p a r t and
dissenting in part:
I concur i n a f f i r m i n g t h e d i v i s i o n of m a r i t a l p r o p e r t y
and f i n d s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s
f i n d i n g s on t h e w i f e ' s h e a l t h problems.
M q u a r r e l is i n t h e award o f a n a u t o m a t i c a n n u a l i n -
y
crease i n child support. I t is e s s e n t i a l t h a t t h e r e b e an
e v i d e n t i a r y b a s i s t o d e t e r m i n e t h a t i t would b e u n c o n s c i o n -
a b l e t o c o n t i n u e t h e amount o f c h i l d s u p p o r t p a y m e n t s t h e n
in effect. See G a l l v. Gall (1980), Mont. , 608
P.2d 496, 37 S t . R e p . 639. Gall further cautions that the
award of c h i l d s u p p o r t c a n n o t be b a s e d upon "mere s p e c u l a -
t i v e future conditions or possible conditions." 608 P.2d a t
498. Here, t h e r e c o r d is b a r r e n of a n y e v i d e n t i a r y founda-
t i o n f o r the automatic annual increase.
Automatic c o s t of l i v i n g a d j u s t m e n t s i n c h i l d s u p p o r t
payments based on a formula t h a t f l u c t u a t e s w i t h changes i n
t h e Consumer P r i c e I n d e x and c o n s i d e r s t h e f a c t o r s a f f e c t i n g
c h i l d s u p p o r t is p o s s i b l e . S e e F a l l s v. Falls ( 1 9 8 1 ) , 52
N.C.App. 203, 278 S.E.2d 546; Branstad v. Branstad ( I n d . I !appa
19&0), 400 N.E.2d 167. The v i c e o f the automatic cost-of-
living increase in the instant case is that the other
f a c t o r s a f f e c t i n g c h i l d s u p p o r t s e t f o r t h i n s e c t i o n s 40-4-
204 a n d 40-4-208, MCA, w e r e assumed t o r e m a i n c o n s t a n t a n d
the 5 percent annual increase established without eviden-
t i a r y support.
I would vacate the annual cost-of-living increase in
c h i l d s u p p o r t and a f f i r m t h e remainder of t h e d e c r e e .
wssiD
Chief J u s t l c e
Mr. J u s t i c e F r e d J . Weber:
I concur in the foregoing separate opinion of t h e Chief
Justice.
Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea, concurring in part and dissenting
in part:
I also join in the affirmance of the property division
but dissent from the approval of the automatic cost of living
escalator.
This case only demonstrates what has always been known
to be the true basis of family law--the only certainty is
that there is no certainty.
With absolutely no evidentiary foundation, the trial
court ordered child support payments to increase 5 percent
per year. No evidence was offered by the wife that the
husband's salary had increased at any particular rate or that
it would increase at any rate in the future. It can also be
assumed that the husband's needs as time goes by, will
increase. The strange thing here is that an annual increase
in child support was not really a factor in the trial of this
case. Rather, the first suggestion came when the wife
proposed the automatic increase in the proposed find.ings and
conclusions submitted to the trial court after the hearing
was over. With no evidentiary basis in the record, and with
no explanation of why the automatic increase was granted, the
trial court simply ordered it to be. I find this to be a
gross abuse of discretion.