Preston v. McDonnell

                                         NO.   82-319

                  I N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

                                               1983




JAMES E .    PRESTON a n d ELIZABETH PRESTON,

                                          P l a i n t i f f s and Appellants,

                 VS.


SIDNEY G .    McDONNELL,

                                          Defendant and Respondent.




Appeal   from:    D i s t r i c t Court of t h e T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
                  I n and f o r t h e County o f Yellowstone
                  Honorable W i l l i a m J Speare, Judge p r e s i d i n g .

Counsel of     Record:

                  For Appellants:

                         Whalen & Whalen, B i l l i n g s , Montana
                         Hauf a n d F o r s y t h e , B i l l i n g s , Montana

                  For Respondent:

                         Moulton, Bellingham,              Longo      &   Mather,     Billings,
                          Montana




                                          S u b m i t t e d on b r i e f s :   January 6,       1983

                                                         Submitted:            February 2 4 , 1983

Filed:
Mr.    J u s t i c e L . C. G u l b r a n d s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n of     the Court.


       E l i z a b e t h P r e s t o n and James P r e s t o n , m o t h e r and s o n , b r o u g h t

t h i s a c t i o n t o r e s c i n d two c o n t r a c t s t h e y had w i t h t h e d e f e n d a n t ,

S i d n e y McDonnell.            Upon a s p e c i a l        jury verdict              finding      neither

fraud       nor     failure      of     consideration,            the D i s t r i c t     Court       of    the

Thirteenth            Judicial          District,          Yellowstone              County,          entered

judgment          f o r McDonnell      .       McDonnell was t h e r e a f t e r awarded $ 9 , 5 0 0

i n a t t o r n e y f e e s and $210 i n c o s t s .

       I n e a r l y 1 9 7 7 , J a m e s P r e s t o n and h i s m o t h e r E l i z a b e t h P r e s t o n

bought        a    bakery       in     Billings,         Montana.           In     1978    they       became

i n t e r e s t e d i n b u y i n g a n o t h e r b a k e r y i n Red Lodge, Montana.                   James

Preston           inspected      the    Red       Lodge    bakery,      noting          that    it     needed

c l e a n i n g and m i n o r r e p a i r s .

       On J a n u a r y    5,    1979,         Prestons     bought      the       Red    Lodge       bakery.

Two c o n t r a c t s were s i g n e d , o n e f o r t h e p u r c h a s e of             the business,

the other f o r the r e a l property.                     I n t h e c o n t r a c t f o r t h e s a l e of

the business,             the    s e l l e r , McDonnell      ,   expressly represented                    that

t o h i s knowledge,            he had c o m p l i e d w i t h a l l g o v e r n m e n t r u l e s and

regulations.

       The c o n t r o v e r s y h e r e c e n t e r s upon t h e d i f f i c u l t y t h e P r e s t o n s

t h e n had        in obtaining         a      license    from t h e Montana D e p a r t m e n t of

Health    .
       On J a n u a r y 3 0 ,     1979,         two   inspectors       from       t h e D e p a r t m e n t of

H e a l t h a t t e m p t e d t o i n s p e c t t h e b a k e r y , b u t were r e f u s e d e n t r y by

the Prestons.              The       inspectors        returned        on    February          1 and       were
allowed t o complete t h e i r i n s p e c t i o n .

       The     inspectors         noted        many v i o l a t i o n s of       the s t a t e ' s    health

standards.            These      violations,           or deficiencies, resulted                      mostly

from     inadequate         cleaning.             Other d e f i c i e n c i e s     included         l a c k of

a d e q u a t e l i g h t i n g , s t o r a g e of food t o o close t o t h e f l o o r , no f a n

in    the      lavatory,        and        a   two-compartment           rather         than    a     three-

compartment s i n k .

       The H e a l t h D e p a r t m e n t t h e n r e q u e s t e d    t h e P r e s t o n s to make a

" p l a n of      correction,"         o u t l i n i n g when and how t h e y would c o r r e c t
the     deficiencies.               The D e p a r t m e n t wanted           t h i s plan      within     ten

days.       The P r e s t o n s d i d n o t s u b m i t a p l a n , c l a i m i n g t h a t i t would

b e t o o e x p e n s i v e to c o r r e c t a l l of         the d e f i c i e n c i e s a t once.         A t

t r i a l , James P r e s t o n e s t i m a t e d t h a t it would cost b e t w e e n $ 4 0 , 0 0 0

a n d $ 6 0 , 0 0 0 t o b r i n g t h e b a k e r y up to s t a n d a r d s .

       Prestons          continued           to      have       problems           with       the     Health

Department          throughout          t h a t year.          A    hearing        was h e l d b e f o r e a
Department           hearing's          officer,          with       no     satisfactory            results.

While      the Prestons            were n e v e r g i v e n a l i c e n s e ,           t h e y were a l s o

never expressly denied one.                         Meanwhile,            t h e b a k e r y w a s o p e n and

operating.

       Frustrated          by     their      inability         to o b t a i n      a health         license,

t h e P r e s t o n s s e n t a n o t i c e of r e s c i s s i o n t o McDonnell i n J a n u a r y

1980.       T h i s was t h e f i r s t t i m e McDonnell knew t h a t P r e s t o n s were

having d i f f i c u l t y g e t t i n g a l i c e n s e .          Prestons closed the bakery

on     February          27,      1980,       returning            their      keys       to    McDonnell.

      McDonnell          t o o k p o s s e s s i o n of     the     b a k e r y on March        10,    1980.

After      spending approximately $4,200 to c o r r e c t t h e d e f i c i e n c i e s

l i s t e d by t h e H e a l t h D e p a r t m e n t , he o b t a i n e d a h e a l t h l i c e n s e and

reopened t h e bakery.

      Prestons         brought        this     action       f o r r e s c i s s i o n on t h e       grounds

t h a t McDonnell          fraudulently represented                       that     the bakery was           in

f u l l c o m p l i a n c e w i t h D e p a r t m e n t of H e a l t h s t a n d a r d s .

      McDonnell had o p e r a t e d t h e b a k e r y f o r n e a r l y s e v e n t e e n y e a r s .

H e had o b t a i n e d a h e a l t h l i c e n s e f o r t h e y e a r s 1 9 7 3 , 1 9 7 5 , 1 9 7 6 ,

1977,      and    1978.         The D i s t r i c t C o u r t r e f u s e d       to a d m i t i n t o e v i -
d e n c e two c o n d i t i o n a l h e a l t h l i c e n s e s McDonnell r e c e i v e d            i n 1968

and 1969.

      The P r e s t o n s h a v e r a i s e d two i s s u e s on a p p e a l :

      1.     Whether        the     District        Court      erred       by n o t     admitting       into

e v i d e n c e t h e two c o n d i t i o n a l h e a l t h l i c e n s e s g i v e n t o McDonnell

i n 1 9 6 8 and 1 9 6 9 .

      2.     Whether        the     District         Court         erred     by    awarding         attorney

f e e s and c o s t s to McDonnell.
       In    the        first       issue:       appellants             argue       that           the       conditional

health       licenses            are     relevant            because         they        tend           to     show     that

McDonnell          knew         the      bakery        would          not        meet       health             standards.

R e s p o n d e n t claims, and t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t d e c i d e d , t h a t t h e con-

d i t i o n a l l i c e n s e s were so remote i n t i m e t h a t t h e y had l i t t l e , i f

a n y , p r o b a t i v e v a l u e and w e r e t h e r e f o r e n o t r e l e v a n t .

       I n d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r e v i d e n c e is t o o r e m o t e to be r e l e v a n t ,

a   trial      court          is n o t      guided      by a n y           fixed     rules.                  Rather,     the

n a t u r e of     t h e e v i d e n c e and          the     c i r c u m s t a n c e s of             the     particular

case     must       control,                2 Wigmore,            Evidence          S437           (Chadbourn r e v .

1979).        For t h i s r e a s o n ,          t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n of r e m o t e n e s s is l e f t

in great part                t o the t r i a l court's discretion.                                 Wigmore,
                                                                                                   - -
                                                                                                    -                 supra;

Courtney v.             Courtney            (1975),     --    - .      Alaska       .-             ,   5 4 2 P.2d       164;

Gilliland          v.    Rhoads         (1975),                   -   Wyo.                   ,     539        P.2d    1221;

Blankenship             v.     Brookshier           (1966),           91     Ida.       317,           420     P.2d     800;

and Morrison v. B r a d l e y ( 1 9 8 0 ) ,                  .-   -    C o l o .App.        - --       , 6 2 2 P.2d 8 1 ,
c e r t . g r a n t e d Dec. 1 5 , 1 9 8 0 .             The t r i a l c o u r t ' s d e t e r m i n a t i o n of

relevancy          is        subject        to    review          only       in    the       case         of    manifest

abuse.        S e e a l s o G u n d e r s o n v. B r e w s t e r ( 1 9 7 0 ) , 1 5 4 Mont. 4 0 5 , 466

P.2d     5 8 9 ; Cech v.            S t a t e (1979),         -         Mont.       -- --     , 6 0 4 P.2d 9 7 , 36
St.Rep.       2185.

       Here,       t h e District Court d i d not abuse its d i s c r e t i o n .                                        The

c o n d i t i o n of     t h e b a k e r y t e n y e a r s p r i o r to i t s s a l e c o u l d e a s i l y

be c o n s i d e r e d       t o o r e m o t e and      irrelevant.                 Many o l d d e f i c i e n c i e s

may h a v e b e e n c o r r e c t e d , w h i l e new, y e t s i m i l a r , d e f i c i e n c i e s may

have      arisen.               The      District            Court         did     not        err        by      refusing

admission of t h e c o n d i t i o n a l h e a l t h l i c e n s e s .

       A p p e l l a n t s a r g u e i n t h e n e x t i s s u e t h a t McDonnell s h o u l d n o t

b e a w a r d e d a t t o r n e y f e e s and c o s t s .              They claim t h a t t h e c o n t r a c t

p r o v i s i o n s a l l o w i n g a t t o r n e y f e e s a p p l y o n l y t o en£ o r c e m e n t and

not     rescission             of     the    contract.                This    contention                 l a c k s merit.

       An a r g u m e n t s i m i l a r t o a p p e l l a n t s '            c o n t e n t i o n was r a i s e d          in

Winer v.         J o n a l C o r p o r a t i o n ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 1 6 9 Mont. 2 4 7 , 5 4 5 P.2d                         1094.

I n Winer,         t h e a p p e l l a n t s c l a i m e d t h e i r a c t i o n t o r e c o v e r damages
f o r b r e a c h of      contract,         fraud,           and      conspiracy,               was g r o u n d e d    in

tort     and      not    in       contract       law,        and        therefore            no    attorney          fees

should       be     awarded.             This        Court      summarily concluded                      that        this

a r g u m e n t had no m e r i t , e s p e c i a l l y i n v i e w of a p p e l l a n t s ' r e q u e s t s

f o r a t t o r n e y f e e s i n a l l c o u n t s of              t h e i r pleadings.                Similarly,

here,      a p p e l l a n t s amended       t h e i r complaint seeking attorney                                 fees,

and o n l y o b j e c t e d        t o a n award          of     a t t o r n e y f e e s a f t e r McDonnell

prevailed in the action.

       Moreover,         in       Compton       v.     Alcorn           ( 1 9 7 6 ) r 1 7 1 Mont.          230,       557

P.2d     292,       this      Court       allowed         attorney              fees       in     an   action         for

rescission.             W e reasoned         t h a t s e c t i o n 28-3-704,                    MCA,    provides a

r e c i p r o c a l r i g h t t o a t t o r n e y f e e s t o a l l p a r t i e s to t h e c o n t r a c t

in     any     action        on    the    contract.              Using          the       same r e a s o n i n g ,     in

Bartmegs v .         Bourassa         (1982),         -- .--.    Mont.       -        .,    639 P.2d       1 1 4 7 , 39

St.Rep.        5 6 , w e a l l o w e d a t t o r n e y f e e s b a s e d on a c o n t r a c t t h a t was

void     a b i-n i t i o .
         --    -                  Here,     because             the      contracts            provide       for       the

award     of      attorney         fees    and        costs        to     the    prevailing             party,        the

award o f f e e s and c o s t s was p r o p e r .

       F i n d i n g no e r r o r ,      the District




We concur: