State v. Lapp

No. 82-127

I N THE SUPREME COURT O THE STATE O MONTANA
F F
1983

STATE O MONTANA,
F

P l a i n t i f f and Respondent,

VS .
CLIVE LAPP,

Defendant and A p p e l l a n t .

Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e S i x t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
I n and f o r t h e County o f C u s t e r
Honorable A. B. M a r t i n , J u d g e p r e s i d i n g .

Counsel of Record:

For A p p e l l a n t :

Brown and Huss, Miles C i t y , Montana
George Huss a r g u e d , M i l e s C i t y , Montana

F o r Respondent :

Hon. Mike G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , Montana
James M. S c h e i e r a r g u e d , L e g a l I n t e r n , O f f i c e o f
A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , Montana
K e i t h D. Haker, County A t t o r n e y , P l i l e s C i t y , Montana

Submitted: November 2 4 , 1982

Decided: February 4 , 1983
 Mr. C h i e f J u s t l c e F r a n k I . H a s w e l l d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n o f
the Court.

D e f e n d a n t Lapp was c h a r g e d and c o n v i c t e d o f n e g l i g e n t
h o m i c i d e by a C u s t e r C o u n t y j u r y . H e now a p p e a l s t h e j u d g -

ment o f c o n v i c t i o n and t h e d e n i a l o f h i s m o t i o n t o s u p p r e s s .
W affirm.
e

At a r o u n d 6:00 a.m. on S e p t e m b e r 1 6 , 1981, d e f e n d a n t
Lapp was i n v o l v e d i n a t w o - c a r c o l l i s i o n i n C u s t e r County.
L a p p ' s v e h i c l e was p r o c e e d i n g e a s t i n t h e west-bound l a n e of
I n t e r s t a t e 94, a d i v i d e d highway, when i t c o l l i d e d w i t h a
vehicle driven by Merlin Benjamin. Benjamin died as a

r e s u l t of i n j u r i e s s u s t a i n e d i n t h e a c c i d e n t .

Lapp was t a k e n t o t h e h o s p i t a l by a m b u l a n c e b e f o r e t h e
i n v e s t i g a t i n g highway p a t r o l m a n , Robert Bishop, arrived a t
t h e scene. B i s h o p ' s i n v e s t i g a t i o n showed t h a t t h e B e n j a m i n
vehicle had been traveling very slowly at t h e moment of
c o l l i s i o n , while the vehicle with l i c e n s e p l a t e s registered

t o Lapp was t r a v e l i n g a t a p p r o x i m a t e l y 80 m.p.h.
B i s h o p l e f t t h e a c c i d e n t s c e n e but was c a l l e d b a c k a
short time later. On t h e s e c o n d v i s i t , Bishop t a l k e d to

Dale Cunningham, the other occupant of t h e Lapp v e h i c l e .
Cunningham had left the car after t h e a c c i d e n t and later
returned after Bishop's initial departure. Bishop ques-

tioned Cunningham b r i e f l y a b o u t t h e a c c i d e n t . Cunningham

told the officer his name, stated that he had not been
d r i v i n g and t o l d B i s h o p t h a t Lapp was t h e d r i v e r . Cunning-
ham was t h e n t a k e n t o t h e h o s p i t a l by a m b u l a n c e .

B i s h o p f i r s t q u e s t i o n e d Lapp a t t h e h o s p i t a l a t 1 0 : 2 5
a.m. t h a t morning. Lapp had b e e n a d m i t t e d t o t h e e m e r g e n c y

room f o r minor i n j u r i e s and f o r o b s e r v a t i o n . Bishop asked

Lapp his name, date of birth, and whether he had been
driving the vehicle at the time of the accident. Lapp

r e s p o n d e d w i t h h i s name and d a t e o f b i r t h . He t h e n s t a t e d

t h a t h e was d r i v i n g , t h a t t h e a c c i d e n t was " a l l h i s f a u l t , "

and t h a t t h e y " c o u l d d o a n y t h i n g t h e y w a n t e d t o " w i t h him.

Lapp was n o t g i v e n a M i r a n d a w a r n i n g p r i o r t o ques-

tioning. There were two nurses present while Lapp was

questioned. At no time prior to, during or immediately

after his t a l k w i t h Lapp d i d B i s h o p p l a c e d e f e n d a n t u n d e r

arrest.

Lapp's blood-alcohol analysis established a blood

a l c o h o l c o n t e n t of approximately .225% a t t h e t i m e of the

accident. Bishop f u r t h e r examined b o t h v e h i c l e s and d i s -

c o v e r e d a t o o t h imbedded i n L a p p ' s d a s h b o a r d n e a r t h e c e n t e r

b u t on t h e p a s s e n g e r side. I t was l a t e r established that

t h e t o o t h was C u n n i n g h a m ' s .

Lapp p r e s e n t s f o u r i s s u e s o n a p p e a l :

( I ) Whether d e f e n d a n t was " i n c u s t o d y " when q u e s t i o n e d

by P a t r o l m a n B i s h o p ;

( 2 ) Whether t h e a t t e n d i n g p h y s i c i a n should have been

allowed t o t e s t i f y a s t o whether i n j u r i e s s u f f e r e d by the

o t h e r occupant of d e f e n d a n t ' s c a r were c o n s i s t e n t w i t h h i s

having s t r u c k t h e s t e e r i n g wheel;

( 3 ) Whether t h e j u r y was p r o p e r l y instructed on the

factors to consider in determining the reliability of

d e f e n d a n t ' s a d m i s s i o n ; and

( 4 ) Whether s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e s u p p o r t s t h e v e r d i c t .

Lapp first contends that he was "in custody" when
q u e s t i o n e d by P a t r o l m a n B i s h o p a t t h e h o s p i t a l . He argues

t h a t a t t h a t p o i n t o f q u e s t i o n i n g h e h a d become t h e f o c u s o f

the investigation and that the questioning had therefore
p a s s e d from t h e i n v e s t i g a t o r y s t a g e t o t h e a c c u s a t o r y s t a g e

as distinguished i n E s c o b e d o v. Illinois ( 1 9 6 4 ) , 378 U . S .

478, 84 S . C t . 1 7 5 8 , 1 2 L.Ed.2d 977. Defendant a s s e r t s t h a t

where s u c h a c c u s a t o r i a l a t t e n t i o n h a d f o c u s e d upon him, the

q u e s t i o n i n g became c u s t o d i a l i n t e r r o g a t i o n and t h e p a t r o l m a n

was r e q u i r e d t o g i v e M i r a n d a w a r n i n g s p r i o r t o q u e s t i o n i n g .

Miranda v. Arizona ( 1 9 6 6 ) , 384 U.S. 436, 86 S . C t . 1602, 16

E.Ed.2d 694. Where the patrolman failed to give such

warnings, Lapp c o n c l u d e s t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court erred in

f a i l i n g t o suppress h i s statement. Lapp a l s o a r g u e s t h a t

t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s of q u e s t i o n i n g were such as t o s i g n i f i -
c a n t l y d e p r i v e him o f h i s f r e e d o m o f a c t i o n . W r e j e c t both
e

arguments.

Lapp's r e l i a n c e on E s c o b e d o ' s distinction between

investigatory and accusatory stages is misplaced. The

U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t , i n Miranda, defined "custodial

i r r t e r r o g a t i o n " a s " q u e s t i o n i n g i n i t i a t e d by law e n f o r c e m e n t

officers after a person has been taken into custody or

o t h e r w i s e d e p r i v e d of h i s freedom o f a c t i o n i n any s i g n i f i -

c a n t way." 384 U . S . a t 4 4 4 , 86 S . C t . a t 1 6 1 2 , 1 6 L.Ed.2d at

706. (Emphasis added.) In Footnote 4 following that

definition the Court stated: "This i s w h a t we m e a n t in

E s c o b e d o when w e s p o k e o f a n i n v e s t i g a t i o n w h i c h h a d f o c u s e d

on an accused." M i r a n d a , 384 U.S. a t 4 4 4 , 86 S . C t . a t 1612,

1 6 L.Ed.2d a t 706. The C o u r t h a s s i n c e f l a t l y a p p l i e d t h e

r u l e t n a t " M i r a n d a w a r n i n g s a r e r e q u i r e d o n l y when t h e r e h a s

been such a r e s t r i c t i o n on a p e r s o n ' s freedom a s t o r e n d e r

him 'in custody.'" Oregon v. lblathiason (1977), 429 U.S.

4 9 2 , 4 9 5 , 97 S . C t . 7 1 1 , 7 1 4 , 50 L.Ed.2d 7 1 4 , 719. (Emphasis

added. )
 T h i s C o u r t h a s f o l l o w e d O r e g o n v. X a t h i a s o n i n apply-

ing t h a t test. S t a t e v. Graves ( 1 9 8 1 ) , Mont. I

6 2 2 P.2d 2 0 3 , 207, 38 S t . R e p . 9 , 12; S t a t e v. Dupre (1982),

Nont . , 650 P.2d 1 3 8 1 , 39 S t . R e p . 1660. I n Dupre,

t h i s Court s t a t e d t h a t "[a] custodial interrogation situa-

tion requiring Miranda warnings is not created simply

because an individual is the focus of an investigation."

650 P.2d a t 1 3 8 4 , 39 S t . R e p . a t 1663. The issue then

becomes w h e t h e r Lapp was " d e p r i v e d o f h i s f r e e d o m o f a c t i o n

i n a n y s i g n i f i c a n t way." W h o l d t h a t h e was n o t .
e

C o u r t s have considered a number o f factors in deter-

mining whether a s u s p e c t is i n c u s t o d y o r h a s been s i g n i -
f i c a n t l y deprived of h i s freedom of a c t i o n f o r purposes of

iqiranda warnings. The f a c t o r s i n c l u d e t h e p l a c e o f i n t e r r o -

gation, the t i m e of interrogation, persons present during

interrogation, whether Miranda warnings were gratuitously

given, t h e l e n g t h and mood o f i n t e r r o g a t i o n , and w h e t h e r o r

n o t t h e s u s p e c t was a r r e s t e d f o l l o w i n g q u e s t i o n i n g . Cummings

v. S t a t e ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 27 Md.App. 3 6 1 , 3 4 1 A.2d 2 9 4 , 303-305. In

Cummings, the court also noted the irrelevancy of the

" i n v e s t i g a t i v e f o c u s " c r i t e r i a f o l l o w i n g Miranda. 3 4 1 A. 2d

a t 306. It distinguished Escobedo's subjective rule (whe-

t h e r a p o l i c e o f f i c e r t h i n k s t h a t t h e s u s p e c t is t h e f o c u s

of the investigation) from t h e o b j e c t i v e Miranda standard

( w h e t h e r o r n o t a r e a s o n a b l e p e r s o n b e i n g i n t e r r o g a t e d would

f e e l h e was i n c u s t o d y o r o t h e r w i s e s i g n i f i c a n t l y d e p r i v e d

of h i s freedom). S e e a l s o , Lowe v . U n i t e d S t a t e s ( 9 t h C i r .

1969), 407 F.2d 1 3 9 1 , 1 3 9 7 ; W i l l i a m s v. United S t a t e s ( 9 t h

Cir. 1 9 6 7 ) , 381 F.2d 20, 22. The c o u r t i n Cummings n o t e d

that the majority of cases have held that in-hospital
q u e s t i o n i n g d o e s n o t amount t o c u s t o d i a l i n t e r r o g a t i o n . 341

A.2d a t 301.

T h e r e t h e q u e s t i o n i n g t o o k p l a c e i n a h o s p i t a l room a t

about noon. The suspect's wife and another person were

present during the brief and n o n a c c u s a t o r y interview. Re

was not placed under arrest before, during or after the

questioning. The court found that the questioning was

noncustodial i n nature.

In the instant case, Lapp was questioned in the

emergency room of the hospital with two nurses present.

Patrolman Bishop asked Lapp only his name, his date of

birth, w h e t h e r h e was d r i v i n g , w h a t s p e e d h e was t r a v e l i n g ,

and w h e t h e r h e would be w i l l i n g t o t a k e a b l o o d test. He

was not placed under a r r e s t before, during or immediately

following t h e questioning.

This Court has previously considered in-hospital

interrogation. State ex rel. Berger v. District Court

(1967), 1 5 0 Mont. 1 2 8 , 432 P.2d 93. There, we noted t h a t

t h e d e f e n d a n t was n o t " i n c u s t o d y " i n a n y l e g a l s e n s e o f t h e

word. Nor was s h e o t h e r w i s e s i g n i f i c a n t l y d e p r i v e d o f her

freedom. We held that the District Court erred in

s u p p r e s s i n g s t a t e m e n t s when no c o e r c i o n w a s u s e d t o o v e r c o m e

the suspect's freedom of choice. Our position has not

changed. See a l s o : P e o p l e v. G i l b e r t ( 1 9 6 7 ) , 8 Plich.App.

393, 1 5 4 N.W.2d 800; S t a t e v. S a n d o v a l ( 1 9 6 9 ) , 92 I d a h o 8 5 3 ,

4 5 2 P.2d 350; S t a t e v. Brunner (1973), 2 1 1 Kan. 596, 507

P.2d 233. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t p r o p e r l y d e n i e d L a p p ' s m o t i o n

t o s u p p r e s s upon f i n d i n g t h a t t h e q u e s t i o n i n g was n o n c u s t o -

d i a l i n nature.

Lapp next raises the argument that the attending
p h y s i c i a n should have Seen allowed t o t e s t i f y a s t o whether
injuries suffered by Cunningham w e r e consistent with his
having s t r u c k t h e s t e e r i n g wheel. During cross-examination

of t h e p h y s i c i a n by d e f e n s e c o u n s e l , t h e f o l l o w i n g e x c h a n g e
took p l a c e :
"Q. A r e t h e r e anything--is t h e r e any-
t h i n g a b o u t Mr. L a p p ' s i n j u r i e s f r o m y o u r
e x a m i n a t i o n o f him, t h a t i s c o n s i s t e n t
with h i s being t h e d r i v e r ?
"MR. HAKER: I ' m going t o o b j e c t t o t h a t .

"THE COURT: Sustained.
"BY MR. H U S S : Q. Bave you i n y o u r y e a r s
o f t r a i n i n g and a s a p h y s i c i a n and s u r -
g e o n , had a n o p p o r t u n i t y t o v i e w v i c t i m s
of a u t o m o b i l e a c c i d e n t s ? A. Yes.

"Q. A p p r o x i m a t e l y how many v i c t i m s o f
a u t o m o b i l e a c c i d e n t s would you s a y y o u ' v e
s e e n ? A. Hundreds.

Q. I n v i e w i n g t h o s e v i c t i m s , a r e you
a b l e to--and t h e t y p e s of i n j u r i e s t h a t
t h e y r e c e i v e d , a r e you a b l e t o a r r i v e a t
a n y c o n c l u s i o n s a s t o how t h e y r e c e i v e d
t h e i r i n j u r i e s i n an a u t o r n o b i l e a c c i d e n t ?
A. You n o r m a l l y d o n ' t d o t h a t , b e c a u s e I
t h i n k i t ' s c o n j e c t u r e on o u r p a r t , s o w e
t a k e c a r e of what i s wrong a n d u s u a l l y
f o c u s on t h a t . "
D e i e n s e c o u n s e l t h e n made f o u r a t t e m p t s t o a s k t h e d o c t o r

w h e t h e r t h e i n j u r i e s s u s t a i n e d by Cunningham w e r e c o n s i s t e n t

with the injuries that can be sustained by striking a
s t e e r i n g wheel. The S t a t e o b j e c t e d i n e a c h i n s t a n c e on t h e
b a s i s t h a t t h e w i t n e s s h a d i n d i c a t e d i t would b e c o n j e c t u r e

on his part to try to state that. The District Court
s u s t a i n e d each o b j e c t i o n . On the t h i r d attempt, the court
s u s t a i n e d on t h e b a s i s t h a t d e f e n s e c o u n s e l was i n v a d i n g t h e
p r o v i n c e of t h e j u r y .
D e f e n d a n t a r g u e s t h a t t h e p h y s i c i a n was n o t a s k e d t o
draw t h e u l t i m a t e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t Cunningham had s t r u c k t h e
steerlng wheel with his chest. Rather, the doctor was

properly asked a s an e x p e r t witness t o g i v e an opinion a s t o

t h e c a u s e of injuries. W a g r e e t h a t under normal circum-
e

s t a n c e s t h e d o c t o r ' s o p i n i o n a s t o t h e c a u s e o f Cunningham's

i n j u r i e s would h a v e b e e n a d m i s s i b l e . S t a t e v. Close ( 1 9 8 1 ) ,

Mont . , 6 2 3 P.2d 940, 946, 38 St.Rep. 177, 184.

The D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d i n s u s t a i n i n g t h e o b j e c t i o n o n t h e

b a s i s t h a t t h e q u e s t i o n invaded t h e province of t h e jury.

Where p r e j u d i c e i s a l l e g e d i n a c r i m i n a l c a s e , i t w i l l

n o t be presumed b u r must be e s t a b l i s h e d from t h e r e c o r d t h a t

a s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t h a s been denied. S t a t e v. Dupre, 650

P.2d a t 1 3 8 6 , 39 S t . R e p . a t 1666.

In t h e i n s t a n t case defense counsel l a i d an inadequate

foundation for eliciting testimony on the cause of the

injuries. The p h y s i c i a n s p e c i f i c a l l y s t a t e d t h a t h e d i d n o t

normally form conclusions as to t h e c a u s e of injuries in

automobile a c c i d e n t s b e c a u s e i t would o n l y b e c o n j e c t u r e o n

his part. The o b j e c t i o n s s h o u l d h a v e b e e n s u s t a i n e d o n t h a t

basis. Further, detailed t e s t i m o n y was e l i c i t e d on L a p p ' s

fairly minor injuries and on Cunningham's extensive

injuries. Finally, t h e two a m b u l a n c e a t t e n d a n t s testified

t h a t Cunningham's i n j u r i e s were c o n s i s t e n t w i t h i m p a c t w i t h

a s t e e r i n g wheel a n d t h a t Lapp h a d n o i n j u r i e s c o n s i s t e n t

with such impact.

T h e r e was s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e b e f o r e t h e j u r y o n t h e

e x t e n t of b o t h i n d i v i d u a l s ' i n j u r i e s and t h e p o s s i b l e c a u s e s

of t h o s e i n j u r i e s t o a l l o w a j u r y d e t e r m i n a t i o n . Cf. Weber

v. B i d d l e ( 1 9 6 7 ) , 72 Wash.2d 2 2 , 4 3 1 P.2d 7 0 5 , 708. Defen-

dant has failed t o demonstrate prejudice. Any error was

harmless. S t a t e v. Fitzpatrick (1980), Mont. I
 Defendant n e x t c h a l l e n g e s t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s r e f u s a l

t o g i v e a jury i n s t r u c t i o n d e t a i l i n g f a c t o r s the jury should

consider i n determining t h e r e l i a b i l i t y o f d e f e n d a n t ' s ad-

mission. H e contends t h a t the following i n s t r u c t i o n should

have been given:

" I n c o n s i d e r i n g t h e w e i g h t and e f f e c t o f
p r i o r s t a t e m e n t s , i f a n y , by a w i t n e s s
inconsistent with the witnesses [sic]
t e s t i m o n y a t t r i a l , you may c o n s i d e r t h e
w i t n e s s e s [ s i c ] p h y s i c a l a n d m e n t a l con-
d i t i o n a t t h e t i m e o f t h e making o f s u c h
s t a t e m e n t , h i s i n t o x i c a t i o n o r l a c k of
i n t o x i c a t i o n , w h e t h e r s u c h s t a t e m e n t was
g i v e n under o a t h , any b i a s , p r e j u d i c e ,
i n t e r e s t o r m o t i v e t h a t t h e w i t n e s s may
h a v e had i n making s u c h s t a t e m e n t and
whether t h e w i t n e s s a d m i t s o r d e n i e s t h e
making of s u c h p r i o r s t a t e m e n t . "

T h i s C o u r t h a s p r e v i o u s l y h e l d t h a t "where t h e j u r y i s a d e -

quately instructed no e r r o r occurs for failure to give a

party's proposed instruction which is already covered."

S t a t e v. S m i t h ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 168 Mont. 9 3 , 1 0 0 , 5 4 1 P.2d 3 5 1 , 355.

I n such a s i t u a t i o n , counsel has f u l l opportunity t o argue

t h e m e r i t s of the defense. Here, s u b s t a n c e of the refused

instruction was adequately covered by I n s t r u c t i o n No. 17,

which d e f i n e d a d m i s s i o n s and t h e n s t a t e d :

"You a r e t h e e x c l u s i v e j u d g e s a s t o whe-
t h e r a n a d m i s s i o n was made by t h e d e f e n -
d a n t and i f t h e s t a t e m e n t i s t r u e i n
whole o r i n p a r t . I f you s h o u l d f i n d
t h a t such s t a t e m e n t is e n t i r e l y u n t r u e ,
you m u s t r e j e c t i t . I f you f i n d i t i s
t r u e i n p a r t , you may c o n s i d e r t h a t p a r t
which you f i n d t o be t r u e .

"Evidence of an o r a l a d m i s s i o n of t h e de-
f e n d a n t o u g h t t o be viewed w i t h c a u t i o n . "

Defense counsel e l i c i t e d e x t e n s i v e testimony concern-

ing Lapp's injuries, his disorientation, and all of the

circumstances surrounding the admission. The jury was
adequately instructed.

Defendant finally challenges the s u f f i c i e n c y of the

evidence. He a r g u e s t h a t unrefuted evidence presented by

the defense expert witness established that i t was p h y s i -

c a l l y i m p o s s i b l e f o r Lapp t o h a v e beer: i n t h e d r i v e r ' s s e a t

and for Cunningham t o h a v e been in the passenger's seat.

Defendant's expert witness, a former p h y s i c s i n s t r u c t o r a t

Miles C i t y Community C o l l e g e , testified that if t h e r e a r of

the Lapp vehicle swung to the right after impact, the

o c c u p a n t s of t h e c a r would h a v e b e e n t h r o w n t o w a r d t h e r i g h t

of the vehicle. Lapp c o n c l u d e d t h a t Cunningham m u s t h a v e

been i n t h e d r i v e r ' s s e a t s i n c e h i s t o o t h was imbedded in

t h e dashboard t o t h e r i g h t of t h e s t e e r i n g wheel. Defendant

a l s o a r g u e s t h a t t h e i n j u r i e s s u s t a i n e d by t h e two o c c u p a n t s

of the car are consistent t o support the defense contention

t h a t Cunningham was t h e d r i v e r .

This Court applies the standard set forth by the

U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t i n J a c k s o n v . Virginia (1979),

443 U.S. 3 0 7 , 3 1 9 , 99 S . C t . 2781, 2789, 6 1 L.Ed.2d 560, 573,

and a d o p t e d i n S t a t e v. Plouffe (1982), Mont. I

646 P.2d 533, 538, 39 St.Rep. 1064, 1070. The Jackson

standard is "whether, after viewing the evidence in the

l i g h t most f a v o r a b l e t o t h e p r o s e c u t i o n , any r a t i o n a l t r i e r

of f a c t c o u l d h a v e f o u n d t h e e s s e n t i a l e l e m e n t s o f t h e c r i m e

beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t . " 6 4 6 P.2d a t 5 3 8 , 39 S t . R e p . at

1070. Applying t h a t s t a n d a r d , w e f i n d s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e

t o support the verdict.

When f a c e d w i t h c o n f l i c t i n g e v i d e n c e , t h i s Court w i l l

n o t o v e r t u r n t h e a j u r y ' s v e r d i c t where s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e

t o s u s t a i n t h e c o n v i c t i o n is c o n t a i n e d i n the record even
t h o u g h enough e v i d e n c e t o p r o v e t h e c o n t r a r y c o n c l u s i o n i s

a l s o present i n the record. S t a t e v . Campbell ( 1 9 8 0 ) ,
Mont . , 615 P.2d 1 9 0 , 2 0 0 , 37 S t . K e p . 1337, 1348. The
d e f e n d a n t i n C a m p b e l l was a l s o c h a r g e d w i t h n e g l i g e n t homi-
c i d e a f t e r a d e a t h r e s u l t i n g from a n a c c i d e n t . Defendant's

physics expert testified that the driver of the vehicle
would h a v e b e e n thrown f r o m t h e c a r a s a r e s u l t o f t h e c o l -

lision. D e f e n d a n t was f o u n d i n s i d e t h e v e h i c l e . The S t a t e
p r e s e n t e d c o n f l i c t i n g t e s t i m o n y t h a t i n c l u d e d a s t a t e m e n t by

one of the passengers that Campbell was the driver. We

upheld Campbell's c o n v i c t i o n .
Here, t h e S t a t e i n t r o d u c e d e v i d e n c e showing t h a t t h e

l i c e n s e p l a t e s on t h e v e h i c l e were i s s u e d t o Lapp. Defen-
d a n t and Cunningham e a c h t o l d P a t r o l m a n B i s h o p t h a t Lapp was
driving. Cunningham t e s t i f i e d t h a t h e d i d n o t remember e v e r

having d r i v e n Lapp's v e h i c l e . Finally, Cunningham's t o o t h

was imbedded i n t h e d a s h b o a r d on t h e p a s s e n g e r s i d e o f t h e
vehicle. Substantial evidence supports the conviction.
Af f i r m e d .

%e f J JiA p ,
Chi
wst ce t -
u

W e concur:

/ Justices fl