No. 13034
I N THE SUPREME C U T OF T E STATE OF M N A A
OR H OTN
1975
THE STATE O MONTANA,
F
P l a i n t i f f and Respondent,
-vs -
R N L LEE CRAIG,
O AD
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Tenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
Honorable LeRoy McKinnon, Judge p r e s i d i n g .
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant :
Floyd A. Brower argued, Roundup, Montana
For Respondent :
Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena,
Montana
Thomas A. Budewitz, A s s i s t a n t Attorney General,
argued, Helena, Montana
William A . Spoja, Jr. County Attorney, Lewistown,
Montana
Submitted: December 12, 1975
Decided : a 1 9 1976
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Filed :
Mr. Chief Justice James T. Harrison delivered the Opinion of
the Court.
This is an appeal from a jury verdict entered in the
district court, Fergus County, finding defendant guilty of a
felony--sexual intercourse without consent.
A complaint was filed in Lewistown justice court on
April 3, 1974, charging defendant with a violation of section
94-5-503, R.C.M. 1947, sexual intercourse without consent, a
felony. On April 5, 1974, an information was filed in Fergus
County district court charging defendant with the offense.
On February 13, 1975, defendant moved the district court
for a change of venue due to adverse pretrial publicity. The
district court denied the motion.
On March 10, 1975, defendant moved the district court
for production of certain physical evidence. The district court
granted the motion. When the State was unable to produce the
evidence, defendant moved the district court to dismiss the in-
formation due to denial of due process. The district court denied
the motion.
Trial commenced on March 12, 1975. After the State's
first witness had been sworn and testimony given, defendant, in
chambers, moved the district court to dismiss the case on the
grounds that section 94-5-503, R.C.M. 1947, was an unconstitution-
al denial of equal protection of the laws. The district court
denied the motion on March 13, 1975.
On March 14, 1975, the jury found defendant guilty as
charged. The district court subsequently sentenced defendant
to ten years in the state penitentiary.
Defendant appeals the conviction and sentencing.
Two issues are presented for consideration by this Court:
1. Whether the district court should have granted the
motion to dismiss due to the State's failure to produce certain
physical evidence.
2. Whether s e c t i o n 94-5-503, R.C.M. 1947, u n c o n s t i t u -
t i o n a l l y d e p r i v e d him of e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n of t h e l a w s .
Defendant c o n t e n d s t h e S t a t e ' s f a i l u r e t o produce c e r -
t a i n p h y s i c a l e v i d e n c e d e n i e d h i s r i g h t t o a f a i r t r i a l and due
p r o c e s s of l a w a s r e q u i r e d by t h e F o u r t e e n t h Amendment t o t h e
United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n .
The S t a t e , a l t h o u g h under o r d e r o f t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ,
w a s n o t a b l e , due t o n e g l i g e n t l o s s , misplacement o r d e s t r u c t i o n ,
t o produce t h e f o l l o w i n g p h y s i c a l e v i d e n c e : a l l p i e c e s of t h e
nightgown owned by t h e c o m p l a i n i n g w i t n e s s , t h e b e d s h e e t and
p i l l o w c a s e from t h e c o m p l a i n i n g w i t n e s s ' r e s i d e n c e , t h e p a n t i e s
worn by t h e c o m p l a i n i n g w i t n e s s , and t h e s h o r t s and l o n g j o h n s
owned and worn by d e f e n d a n t .
By n o t b e i n g a b l e t o produce t h e p h y s i c a l e v i d e n c e it
was c o n t e n d e d , t h e S t a t e i s i n e f f e c t w i t h h o l d i n g o r s u p p r e s s i n g
such evidence. Only i n t e n t i o n a l o r d e l i b e r a t e s u p p r e s s i o n o f
e v i d e n c e i s a p e r se v i o l a t i o n of due p r o c e s s s u f f i c i e n t t o re-
verse o r n u l l i f y a conviction. United S t a t e s v . Keogh, 391 F.2d
138 (2nd C i r . ) . Negligent o r passive suppression w i l l overturn
a c o n v i c t i o n i f p r e j u d i c e c a n be shown by t h e s u p p r e s s i o n . United
S t a t e s v. C o n s o l i d a t e d L a u n d r i e s Corp., 291 F.2d 563 (2nd C i r . ) .
G e n e r a l l y , s u p p r e s s e d e v i d e n c e must be m a t e r i a l t o e i t h e r
g u i l t o r punishment. Brady v . Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct.
1194, 1 0 L ed 2d 2 1 5 . I n o r d e r t o amount t o d e n i a l o f due p r o c e s s ,
n e g l i g e n t l y s u p p r e s s e d e v i d e n c e must be v i t a l t o t h e d e f e n s e of
t h e accused. United S t a t e s ex r e l . Thompson v. Dye, 221 F.2d
763 ( 3 r d C i r . ) , cert.den. 350 U.S. 875, 7 6 S.Ct. 1 2 0 , 100 L ed
773. To o b t a i n a new t r i a l , t h e a c c u s e d must show more t h a n
s u p p r e s s i o n ; h e must show t h e e v i d e n c e w a s m a t e r i a l and o f some
s u b s t a n t i a l u s e t o him. United S t a t e s v . Tomaiolo, 378 F.2d 26
(2nd C i r . ) , cert.den. 389 U.S. 886, 88 S . C t . 1 5 9 , 1 9 L ed 2d
184. The s u p p r e s s e d e v i d e n c e must b e e x c u l p a t o r y , i . e . , would
have t e n d e d t o c l e a r t h e a c c u s e d o f g u i l t , t o v i t i a t e a c o n v i c -
tion. Brady; L o r a i n e v . U n i t e d S t a t e s , 396 F.2d 335 ( 9 t h C i r . ) ,
cert.den. 393 U.S. 933, 89 S.Ct. 292, 21 E ed 2d 270; L e e v .
U n i t e d S t a t e s , 388 F.2d 737 ( 9 t h C i r . ) .
Negligent suppression r e q u i r e s a r e v e r s a l of a conviction
where t h e r e s u l t would have been d i f f e r e n t had t h e e v i d e n c e been
disclosed. Simos v . Gray, 356 F.Supp. 265. In the instant case
t h e r e s u l t would n o t have been a f f e c t e d , o n e way o r t h e o t h e r ,
by t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f t h e m i s s i n g p h y s i c a l e v i d e n c e . Photo-
g r a p h s o f t h e p i l l o w c a s e , p a n t i e s and b e d s h e e t w e r e i n t r o d u c e d ,
without objection. A p o r t i o n o f t h e nightgown was i n t r o d u c e d .
The i n t r o d u c t i o n i n t o e v i d e n c e o f t h e a c t u a l o b j e c t s was n o t v i t a l
t o d e f e n d a n t ' s defense, a s they w e r e n o t of an exculpatory nature.
The a b s e n c e o f t h e l o n g j o h n s and s h o r t s w e r e n o t p r e j u d i c i a l ,
s i n c e t h e S t a t e n e v e r c o n t e n d e d t h e y had b l o o d o r semen, and t h e
p o l i c e c h i e f e v e n t e s t i f i e d none was f o u n d . The Kansas Supreme
C o u r t found a s i m i l a r r e q u e s t f o r i n t r o d u c t i o n o f s h o e s a s " f r i v -
o l o u s " , where t h e f o o t p r i n t s t o b e matched w e r e n o t e v e n c o n t e n d -
ed t o b e t h o s e o f t h e a c c u s e d . S t a t e v . Ingram, 198 Kan. 517, 426
P.2d 98, 100. S e e , a l s o , H a l e v . S t a t e , 248 I n d . 630, 230 N.E.2d
432; S t a t e v . Counterman, 8 Ariz.App. 526, 448 P.2d 96.
A f a c t u a l question a r o s e regarding t h e pillowcase due t o
a c a p t i o n on t h e back o f t h e p h o t o g r a p h o f s a i d p i l l o w c a s e . The
caption read: "Blood o n p i l l o w i n bedroom". D e f e n d a n t was s a t -
i s f i e d t h a t b l o o d w a s found o n t h e p i l l o w c a s e , t h e o n l y q u e s t i o n
was t h e s o u r c e o f t h e b l o o d . The e x a m i n i n g p h y s i c i a n w a s u n a b l e
t o answer t h a t q u e s t i o n , a s was t h e c o m p l a i n a n t . The i n t r o d u c -
t i o n o f t h e p i l l o w c a s e would n o t have answered t h e q u e s t i o n . Its
i n t r o d u c t i o n was n o t v i t a l n o r m a t e r i a l t o t h e d e f e n s e .
Defendant c i t e d a number o f c a s e s r e v e r s i n g c o n v i c t i o n s
due t o l o s s o r d e s t r u c t i o n o f e v i d e n c e . These c a s e s a r e a l l
distinguishable. I n r e Cameron, 68 Cal.2d 487, 67 C a l . R p t r .
529, 439 P.2d 633, and United S t a t e s v . Heath, 147 F.Supp. 877,
a f f ' d 260 F.2d 623 ( 9 t h C i r . ) , d e a l t with t h e l o s s of evidence
v i t a l t o t h e a c c u s e d ' s d e f e n s e ; w e have found t h e e v i d e n c e i n
t h e i n s t a n t c a s e was n o t v i t a l t o t h e d e f e n s e . I m b l e r v. Craven,
298 F.Supp. 795,dealt with t h e a c t u a l i n t e n t i o n a l suppression of
exculpatory evidence. A p p l i c a t i o n o f Newbern, 175 C.A.2d 862,
1 Cal.Rptr. 80, d e a l t w i t h t h e r e f u s a l o f o f f i c e r s t o a l l o w t h e
a c c u s e d a blood t e s t , a t h i s own e x p e n s e , t o p r o v e i n n o c e n c e o f
a drunk c h a r g e . zn t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , t h e o f f i c e r s may have been
n e g l i g e n t , b u t t h e r e i s no e v i d e n c e t h e y r e f u s e d d e f e n d a n t t h e
e x e r c i s e o f any o f h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s .
The d i s t r i c t c o u r t was c o r r e c t i n d e n y i n g t h e motion t o
d i s m i s s f o r f a i l u r e t o produce t h e p h y s i c a l e v i d e n c e .
The second i s s u e p e r t a i n s t o t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of
s e c t i o n 94-5-503 ( I ) , R.C.M. 1947, a s worded p r i o r t o 1975.
P r i o r t o t h e 1975 r e v i s i o n , s e c t i o n 94-5-503(1) read:
"A m a l e p e r s o n who knowingly h a s s e x u a l i n t e r -
course without consent with a female n o t h i s
s p o u s e commits t h e offense of sexual i n t e r -
course without consent." (Emphasis added.)
S e c t i o n 94-5-503 (1) p r e s e n t l y r e a d s :
"A p e r s o n who knowingly h a s s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e
w i t h o u t c o n s e n t w i t h a p e r s o n n o t h i s spouse
commits t h e o f f e n s e o f s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h -
o u t consent." (Emphasis a d d e d . )
Defendant c o n t e n d s t h e pre-1975 v e r s i o n o f t h e s t a t u t e i s
an u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y a r b i t r a r y d i s t i n c t i o n based s o l e l y upon
sex. I t i s a r g u e d t h e former s e c t i o n v i o l a t e s t h e e q u a l pro-
t e c t i o n c l a u s e of t h e F o u r t e e n t h Amendment t o t h e United S t a t e s
C o n s t i t u t i o n and t h e e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n p r o v i s i o n of A r t i c l e 11,
S e c t i o n 4 , 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n .
The United States Supreme Court in Lindsley v. Natural
Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 31 S.Ct. 337, 55 L.Ed 369, 377,
has set down the following rules to test whether a classifica-
tion is arbitrary and consequently denies equal protection of
the laws:
" * * * 1. The equal-protection clause of the
14th Amendment does not take from the state the
power to classify in the adoption of police laws,
but admits of the exercise of a wide scope of
discretion in that regard, and avoids what is
done only when it is without any reasonable basis,
and therefore is purely arbitrary. 2. A classifi-
cation having some reasonable basis does not offend
against that clause merely because it is not made
with mathematical nicety, or because in practice
it results in some inequality. 3. When the class-
ification in such a law is called in question, if
any state of facts reasonably can be conceived
that would sustain it, the existence of that state
of facts at the time the law was enacted must be
assumed. 4. One who assails the classification
in such a law must carry the burden of showing
that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis,
but is essentially arbitrary."
A State's right to make reasonable classifications was
upheld by the Supreme Court in Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia,
253 U.S. 412, 40 S.Ct. 560, 64 L.Ed 989, 990, wherein Mr. Justice
Pitney said:
"It is unnecessary to say that the 'equal protection
of the laws' required by the 14th Amendment does not
prevent the states from resorting to classification
for the purposes of legislation. Numerous and
familiar decisions of this court establish that they
have a wide range of discretion in that regard. But
the classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary,
and must rest upon some ground of difference having
a fair and substantial relation to the object of
the legislation, so that all persons similarly cir-
cumstanced shall be treated alike. * * * "
In Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 92 S.Ct. 251, 30 L ed 2d
225, the Supreme Court found unconstitutional the classification
based on sex in the Idaho probate laws granting a preference to
males over equally entitled females in administering estates.
Applying the Royster Guano language, the Court found no ration-
al relationship between the legislation and the objective sought.
See, also, Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 93 S.Ct. 1764,
36 L ed 2d 583.
In applying the Lindsley rules and the language in
Royster Guano, we find the language of former section 94-5-503
is not arbitrary, and therefore is not an unconstitutional
classification based on sex.
Some inequality existed in the law as written prior to
the 1975 change. The Legislature recognized this fact and
changed the law to prohibit acts by both men and women. The
Lindsley rules allow such inequality, so long as there is some
reasonable basis for the inequality.
Rape is not the only crime prescribed in section 94-5-503.
The statute also includes all other forms of sexual relations
without consent. Such actions could be committed by a woman as
well as a man. The objective of the legislation was to prevent
sexual attacks. Historically such attacks have been by men upon
women. Even today the vast majority of violations of this type
of statute are by males upon females. The Legislature is not
able to correct all of the evils of society in one piece of
legislation; that the legislation contains some inequality does
not make it unconstitutional unless those similarly classified
are treated differently or the classifications are arbitrary.
Lindsley; State v. Ewald, 63 Wis.2d 165, 216 N.W.2d 213.
Defendant has not shown prejudice to him by the omission
of women from the prohibitions of former section 94-5-503, R.C.M.
1947. He cannot claim that he is of the class which has been
excluded from either protection or prosecution. On the contrary,
he seeks to assert the rights of others to avoid punishment under
a statute which he asserts is unconstitutional, but which would
nevertheless subject him to liability even though extended to all
persons. Bachtel v. Wilson, 204 U.S. 36, 27 S.Ct. 243, 51 L.Ed
357; State v. Sluder, 11 Wash.App. 8, 521 P.2d 971.
Even under the former section 94-5-503, R.C.M. 1947,
a woman committing an act proscribed under that section would
still be prosecutable for assault (section 94-5-201, R.C.M.
1947) or aggravated assault (section 94-5-202, R.C.M. 1947).
If a woman was involved in the illegal action, other than as
the victim, she could be prosecuted under section 94-2-107, R.C.M.
1947, as an aider and abetter; she could not escape prosecution
and conviction because of her sex,
The district court was correct in denying defendant's
motion to dismiss.
We affirm.
/ / Chief ~ustice
We concur: L
Justices I