No. 82-187
I N THE SUPREME COURT O THE STATE O F M N A A
F OTN
1983
TPANSAMERICA INSURANCE C O . ,
a foreign corporation,
P l a i n t i f f and A p p e l l a n t ,
VS.
WILLIAM D. ROYLE, a s C o n s e r v a t o r o f
Mary Kay H a i n e s , a P r o t e c t e d P e r s o n ;
BYRON D. HAINES and JOYCE WILSON HAINES,
D e f e n d a n t s and R e s p o n d e n t s .
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING :
C o u n s e l o f Record:
For Appellant:
K e e f e r , Roybal, Hanson, S t a c e y & J a r u s s i , B i l l i n g s ,
Dlon t a n a
Gene J a r u s s i a r g u e d , B i l l i n g s , Montana
For Respondents:
C h r i s t i a n , McCurdy & Wold, P o l s o n , Montana
Douglas Wold a r g u e d and J e a n T u r n a g e a r g u e d , P o l s o n ,
Montana
F o r Amicus C u r i a e :
Tim D. H a l l a r g u e d , B i l l i n g s , Montana
Submitted: November 1 2 , 1982
Decided: J a n u a r y 1 2 , 1983
_ .*-
d
&4
Clerk
M r . J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of the
Court.
T h i s case comes f r o m t h e F e d e r a l D i s t r i c t C o u r t by way o f
c e r t i f i c a t i o n p u r s u a n t to Rule 1 o f t h e r u l e s of t h i s C o u r t . At
i s s u e is a n i n s u r a n c e c o m p a n y ' s o b l i g a t i o n to d e f e n d or p r o v i d e
coverage for parents who are being sued by their daughter.
Judge R u s s e l l Smith has c e r t i f i e d the following t w o i s s u e s :
1. "Is the 'household exclusion' in a policy [of auto
insurance] , not certified under the Motor Vehicle Safety
Responsibility A c t , valid?"
2. " I s a p a r e n t immune from a c t i o n i n t o r t b r o u g h t a g a i n s t
him by h i s c h i l d r e n under t h e age of emancipation?"
On November 1 4 , 1 9 8 0 , Mary Kay H a i n e s was i n j u r e d i n a n a u t o
accident. S h e was a p a s s e n g e r i n a car i n which h e r m o t h e r w a s
driving. As a result of her injuries, Mary Kay is now a
quadriplegic. The car was owned b y Mary K a y ' s f a t h e r , Reverend
Byron H a i n e s , and was i n s u r e d by T r a n s a m e r i c a I n s u r a n c e Company.
The insurance policy contained a "household exclusion clause"
w h i c h e x c l u d e s c o v e r a g e f o r " b o d i l y i n j u r y to a n y p e r s o n who is
r e l a t e d b y b l o o d , m a r r i a g e , o r a d o p t i o n to [ t h e i n s u r e d ] , if that
p e r s o n r e s i d e s i n [ t h e i n s u r e d ' s ] household a t t h e t i m e of l o s s . "
Mr. Royle, as conservator for Mary Kay, filed an action
a g a i n s t t h e H a i n e s i n S t a t e C o u r t i n L a k e C o u n t y to r e c o v e r dama-
ges. The H a i n e s demanded t h a t T r a n s a m e r i c a assume t h e i r d e f e n s e
and p r o v i d e c o v e r a g e . Transamerica refused and f i l e d a n a c t i o n
i n F e d e r a l D i s t r i c t C o u r t c l a i m i n g it had no o b l i g a t i o n u n d e r t h e
insurance contract. The parents then sought a declaratory
judgment in state court asking that the "household exclusion
c l a u s e " be d e c l a r e d i n v a l i d . T h a t a c t i o n w a s removed t o F e d e r a l
C o u r t and c o n s o l i d a t e d w i t h t h e T r a n s a m e r i c a a c t i o n . On May 6 ,
1 9 8 2 , J u d g e R u s s e l l S m i t h c e r t i f i e d t h e two i s s u e s t o t h i s C o u r t .
In plaintiff I s v i e w t h e f i r s t i s s u e b o i l s down t o w h e t h e r or
n o t s e c t i o n 61-6-301(1) MCA, prohibits a family exclusion clause
i n an automobile i n s u r a n c e p o l i c y . I n p e r t i n e n t p a r t , t h e above
cited section reads: " E v e r y owner o f a m o t o r v e h i c l e . . . shall
c o n t i n u o u s l y p r o v i d e i n s u r a n c e -a g a i n s t --o-s s -e s-- l t -- ---o m l i a- i -
-- - - l - r - u i n g fr -
. b . .-
. .
-
l -t y - - -. -- b- l - f o r b o d i l y i n j u r y or d e a t h or damage to p r o -
i imposed y a w . .
perty s u f-- e r e d
f by - person
any . . ." (Emphasis added. )
Plaintiff argues simply t h a t the s t a t u t e does not void the
family exclusion clause because the statute only requires
coverage for "liability imposed by law." In o t h e r words, if
Montana r e c o g n i z e s p a r e n t a l immunity from s u i t by t h e i r c h i l d r e n
t h e n M. and Mrs. H a i n e s c a n n o t be l i a b l e ; and s i n c e t h e r e would
r
not be "liability imposed b y law" the family exclusion clause
would be v a l i d . Although n o t stated by p l a i n t i f f , it f o l l o w s
from t h e i r view t h a t the f i r s t q u e s t i o n to be d e c i d e d b y t h i s
Court is the parent-child immunity question. We agree. Our
d e c i s i o n o n i s s u e number t w o w i l l c o n t r o l o u r d e c i s i o n on i s s u e
number o n e . I n o t h e r words, i f we r e c o g n i z e p a r e n t a l immunity,
then the exclusion clause is v a l i d ; and v i c e v e r s a , i f parent-
c h i l d immunity d o e s n o t e x i s t , t h e n t h e e x c l u s i o n c l a u s e m u s t be
i n v a l i d by v i r t u e o f s e c t i o n 61-6-301(1), MCA. As is d i s c u s s e d
l a t e r , w e f i n d t h a t a c h i l d may m a i n t a i n a n a c t i o n a g a i n s t h i s
parent f o r negligence arising o u t of t h e o p e r a t i o n of a motor
vehicle. T h u s , t h e e x c l u s i o n c l a u s e is i n v a l i d . Before reaching
t h e immunity q u e s t i o n , w e m u s t d i s p e l con£ u s i o n c o n c e r n i n g i s s u e
number o n e .
P r i o r t o 1 9 7 9 , Montana l a w r e q u i r e d o n l y c e r t a i n p e r s o n s to
d e m o n s t r a t e and m a i n t a i n f i n a n c i a l s e c u r i t y . T h a t l a w , which is
still on the books, is called the Motor Vehicle Safety
Responsibility Act. ( S e c t i o n s 61-6-101, e t seq. ) O n l y t h o s e who
had their driver's l i c e n s e revoked due to a c o n v i c t i o n o r f o r -
f e i t u r e of b a i l of c e r t a i n motor v e h i c l e laws were r e q u i r e d to
demonstrate financial security, i.e., obtain a liability
insurance policy. See s e c t i o n s 61-6-131(1) and 6 1 - 6 - 1 3 2 ( 1 ) ( a ) ,
MCA. T h u s , o n l y " b a d d r i v e r s " were r e q u i r e d to c a r r y l i a b i l i t y
i n s u r a n c e , and l i a b i l i t y o f t h e i n s u r e r u n d e r t h o s e p o l i c i e s was
"absolute ." S e c t i o n 6 1 - 6 - 1 0 3 ( 6 ) ( a ), MCA. I n o t h e r words, such a
p o l i c y could n o t c o n t a i n e x c l u s i o n s . The i n s u r a n c e company would
then certify that it had insured the "bad driver," section
61-6-133, MCA. Only then could the bad driver regain driving
privileges.
This Court, in interpreting the Safety Responsibility Act
h e l d t h a t o r d i n a r y p o l i c i e s , or t h o s e p o l i c i e s not r e q u i r e d under
the Act, could contain exclusions. B o l d t v. S t a t e Farm M u t u a l
(1968) 1 5 1 Mont. 3 3 7 , 4 4 3 P.2d 33; N o r t h e r n A s s u r a n c e Company v .
Truck I n s u r a n c e Exchange ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 1 5 1 Mont. 132, 439 P.2d 760.
S p e c i f i c a l l y , o r d i n a r y p o l i c i e s could c o n t a i n a family e x c l u s i o n
clause, Mid C e n t u r y I n s u r a n c e Co. v . A m e r i c a n C a s u a l t y Company
( 1 9 6 8 ) , 1 5 2 Mont. 3 2 8 , 449 P.2d 679.
I n summary, p o l i c i e s to be c e r t i f i e d u n d e r t h e A c t c o u l d n o t
contain exclusions ; whereas, p o l i c i e s n o t t o be c e r t i f i e d u n d e r
the Act ( p o l i c i e s of good drivers) could contain exclusions.
However, in 1979 the legislature mandated liability
insurance. E v e r y v e h i c l e owner is now r e q u i r e d t o c e r t i f y to t h e
county treasurer that he possesses an automobile liability
insurance policy. It appears from the briefs that "in the
i n s t a n t case, t h e s u b j e c t i n s u r a n c e P o l i c y was I c e r t i f i e d ' b y t h e
owner of the vehicle [ t h e Haines] as proof of having complied
with the law requiring insurance f o r bodily i n j u r y s u f f e r e d by
any person. ' " Thus, the p o l i c y was certified under the law
requiring mandatory liability insurance but was not certified
under the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act. Had the
p o l i c y been c e r t i f i e d under t h e S a f e t y R e s p o n s i b i l i t y A c t , B o l d t
a n d N o r t h e r n A s s u r a n c e would c o n t r o l and t h e r e s u l t would be t h a t
t h e e x c l u s i o n is i n v a l i d .
When J u d g e S m i t h f r a m e d the issue, he w a s o n l y s a y i n g t h a t
t h i s case d o e s n o t i n v o l v e a c e r t i f i c a t i o n u n d e r P a r t 1 of T i t l e
61, Chapter 6, MCA; the Safety Responsibility Act. Instead,
t h i s case a r i s e s u n d e r P a r t 3 o f t h e same t i t l e and c h a p t e r , t h e
law r e q u i r i n g m a n d a t o r y l i a b i l i t y p r o t e c t i o n . The t w o p a r t s are
independent.
S e c t i o n 61-6-136 , MCA, p r e c l u d e s any r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e
two parts. That s e c t i o n states i n p a r t : " [ t l h i s p a r t s h a l l not
be held t o a p p l y t o or a f f e c t p o l i c i e s of automobile insurance
a g a i n s t l i a b i l i t y w h i c h may now o r h e r e a f t e r be r e q u i r e d b y a n y
o t h e r l a w of t h i s state . . ." O t h e r a u t h o r i t y e x i s t s to show
t h a t p a r t 1 and p a r t 3 are i n d e p e n d e n t . S e e S t a t e Farm v . Q u e e n
(1981) 1 F.Supp. , 38 S t . R e p . 6 0 8 . S e e 7 Arn.Jur.2d
Automobile I n s u r a n c e , S e c ti o n 20 ( 1 9 8 0 ) .
I n c o n c l u s i o n , p a r t 1 o f t i t l e 6 1 c h a p t e r 6 and t h e cases of
-l d t and
B o- Northern -rance
Assu are n o t controlling to the first
issue. More specifically, the statutory restrict ions on
i n s u r a n c e p o l i c i e s c o n t a i n e d i n s e c t i o n 61-6-103 do not apply t o
p o l i c i e s purchased t o f u l f i l l t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of Part 3, Man-
datory Liability Protection.
The e f f e c t of the langauge of t h e M a n d a t o r y I n s u r a n c e Law
requires the l i a b i l i t y p o l i c y to p r o t e c t against bodily injury
and property damage to "any person." In so p r o v i d i n g , the
legislature has expressly outlawed the "household exclusion ."
I n c o n s i d e r i n g t h e p r i n c i p l e i s s u e p r e s e n t e d ; w h e t h e r or n o t
a c h i l d c a n s u e h e r p a r e n t , w e h a v e r e v i e w e d t h e v a s t amount of
w r i t i n g s d o n e on t h e s u b j e c t by c o u r t s , w r i t e r s and o t h e r s and
f i n d t h a t f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n would s e r v e no u s e f u l p u r p o s e . The
i s s u e is o n e o f f i r s t i m p r e s s i o n i n t h i s j u r i s d i c t i o n and w e d o
not believe our case should be determined by the number of
authorities which support o n e r u l e or the other, anymore than
t h a t a j u r y s h o u l d r e s o l v e i s s u e s a c c o r d i n g to t h e number o f w i t -
n e s s e s who a p p e a r on o n e s i d e or t h e o t h e r .
A comprehensive a n n o t a t i o n g i v i n g t h e h i s t o r i c background of
the doctrine is a v a i l a b l e under t h e title " L i a b i l i t y of Parent
f o r I n j u r y t o U n e m a n c i p a t e d C h i l d Caused b y P a r e n t ' s N e g l i g e n c e
- Modern Cases" i n 6 A.L.R.4th 1066. The cases c i t e d a g r e e t h a t
t h e d o c t r i n e is a c r e a t u r e of American j u r i s p r u d e n c e . Prosser ,
Law o f T o r t s , S e c t . 1 2 2 ( 4 t h Ed. 1 9 7 1 ) s u g g e s t s t h a t t h e r e is no
r e a s o n to t h i n k t h a t t h e E n g l i s h law would n o t p e r m i t a c t i o n s f o r
p e r s o n a l t o r t s a s w e l l as d i s p u t e s i n v o l v i n g p r o p e r t y r i g h t s be-
t w e e n c h i l d and p a r e n t . He notes that there are decisions in
Canada and Scotland permitting such act i o n s . Reading both
Prosser, and H a r p e r and James, Law o f T o r t s , V o l . 1, S e c t . 8 . 1 1
( 1 9 5 6 ) , t h e c o n c u r r e n c e is t h a t t h e d o c t r i n e h a s no f o u n d a t i o n i n
E n g l i s h law.
The d o c t r i n e of parental immunity is a judicially created
d o c t r i n e a r i s i n g o u t of a case from t h e S t a t e of Mississippi,
Hewellette v . G e o r g e ( 1 8 9 1 ) , 6 8 Miss. 7 0 3 , 9 S o . 8 8 5 . The case
c i t e s no case a u t h o r i t y f o r i t s h o l d i n g y e t w i t h i n a few s h o r t
years, other jurisdictions adopted it without questioning its
ancestry. Long a f t e r t h e d o c t r i n e became l e g i t i m i z e d thinking ,
c o u r t s and s c h o l a r s b e g a n t o c r i t i c i z e t h e d o c t r i n e d u e t o t h e
i nj u s t i c e s created i n many factual situations. See, Prosser,
S e c t . 1 2 2 a t 864; 1 Harper & James, Law o f T o r t s , S e c t . 8.11 a t
650; Nocktonick v. Nocktonick ( 1 9 8 0 ) , 227 Kan. 758 , 6 1 1 P.2d
135. A s noted i n t h e N o c k t o n i c k case, s u p r a , t h e s e criticisms
r e s u l t e d i n a number o f j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n s which h a v e e r o d e d t h e
d o c t r i n e by c r e a t i n g numerous e x c e p t i o n s . As a result, t h e r e are
few j u r i s d i c t i o n s , if any, recognizing parental immunity i n i t s
o r i g i n a l form.
Some eight exceptions to the doctrine have evolved these
past few y e a r s . Nocktonick, 6 1 1 P.2d a t 138. It is to the
eighth exception, allowing a child to sue his parents for
injuries caused by the negligent o p e r a t i o n of a motor v e h i c l e
t h a t we d i r e c t our consideration.
The p r i n c i p l e r e a s o n relied on by t h e c o u r t s f o r a l l o w i n g a n
a c t i o n by a c h i l d a g a i n s t t h e i r p a r e n t i n a n a u t o m o b i l e a c c i d e n t
case is t h e p r e v a l e n c e o f a u t o m o b i l e l i a b i l i t y i n s u r a n c e . "While
courts concede the existence of automobile insurance cannot
c r e a t e a l i a b i l i t y w h e r e none b e f o r e e x i s t e d , t h e p r e v a l e n c e of
l i a b i l i t y i n s u r a n c e h a s b e e n h e l d t o be a p r o p e r f a c t o r to con-
s i d e r i n d e t e r m i n i n g t h e a p p l i c a b i l i t y o f t h e p a r e n t a l immunity. "
N o c k t o n i c k , 6 1 1 P.2d a t 138-39. The c o u r t s which h a v e r e c o g n i z e d
t h i s e x c e p t i o n have reasoned t h a t t h e p o l i c y r e a s o n s which o r i g i -
n a l l y s u p p o r t e d p a r e n t a l immunity no l o n g e r are a p p l i c a b l e . The
existence of liability insurance prevents family discord and
depletion of family assets in automobile negligence cases;
c o n t r a r y to t h e o r i g i n a l p o l i c i e s . Sorenson v. Sorenson (1975),
369 Mass. 350, 339 N.E.2d 907; and G o l l e r v . White ( 1 9 6 3 ) r 20
P r o b a b l y t h e m o s t p e r s u a s i v e a r g u m e n t a g a i n s t a b r o g a t i o n of
parent-child immunity is t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f f r a u d and c o l l u s i o n .
U n s c r u p u l o u s f a m i l i e s may a t t e m p t t o r e c o v e r u n j u s t i f i e d awards
from i n s u r a n c e companies. While w e r e c o g n i z e t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y ,
w e d o n o t b e l i e v e it j u s t i f i e s d e n i a l o f m e r i t o r i o u s claims. We
a g r e e w i t h t h e Supreme C o u r t of K a n s a s which s a i d :
" [ t l h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f c o l l u s i o n e x i s t s to a
c e r t a i n e x t e n t i n a n y case. Every day we
d e p e n d o n j u r i e s and t r i a l j u d g e s to s i f t e v i -
d e n c e i n o r d e r t o d e t e r m i n e t h e f a c t s and
a r r i v e a t proper verdicts. Experience has
shown t h a t t h e c o u r t s a r e q u i t e a d e q u a t e f o r
t h i s task. I n l i t i g a t i o n b e t w e e n p a r e n t and
c h i l d , j u d g e s and j u r i e s would n a t u r a l l y be
m i n d f u l o f t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p and would be e v e n
more on t h e a l e r t f o r i m p r o p e r c o n d u c t ." 611
P.2d a t 1 4 2 .
W e h a v e b e e n a s k e d t o d e c i d e which r u l e b e s t s e r v e s t h e n e e d s
of justice in this state. I n s e t t i n g Montana's rule, we m u s t
r e c o g n i z e t h a t t h e more r e c e n t d e c i s i o n s r e j e c t i n g p a r e n t a l immu-
n i t y are i n d i c a t i v e o f a " g r o w i n g j u d i c i a l d i s t a s t e f o r a r u l e of
l a w which i n o n e sweep d i s q u a l i f i e d a n e n t i r e c l a s s of injured
minors." Gibson v. Gibson ( 1 9 7 1 ) , 3 Cal.3d 914, 4 7 9 p.2d 648,
650. W e b e l i e v e t h a t t h e a u t h o r i t i e s which f a v o r a b r o g a t i o n of
t h e p a r e n t a l immunity d o c t r i n e s t a t e t h e proper a p p r o a c h i n l i g h t
of modern conditions and conception of what is good public
policy. W see no r e a s o n why c h i l d r e n s h o u l d n o t e n j o y t h e same
e
r i g h t or p r o t e c t i o n and the same l e g a l r e d r e s s f o r w r o n g s d o n e
them as o t h e r s e n j o y . Due t o t h e f a c t t h a t t h i s is a case of
f i r s t i m p r e s s i o n i n Montana and t h e f a c t t h a t w e are n o t encum-
b e r e d b y p r e v i o u s d e c i s i o n s , o u r t a s k is made e a s i e r t h a n o t h e r
s t a t e s who h a v e had to q u a l i f y t h e r u l e i n s e a r c h of justice.
The p r i n c i p l e t h a t a n u n e m a n c i p a t e d m i n o r may n o t s u e a p a r e n t i n
t o r t i s a "man-made r u l e ," and i t is t h e d u t y o f t h e j u d i c i a r y i n
examining it to make such rule as justice requires when the
l e g i s l a t u r e h a s n o t chosen t o act.
O u r h o l d i n g is l i m i t e d t o t h e i s s u e s c e r t i f i e d t o u s by t h e
Federal Court; " i s a parent immune from a c t i o n i n t o r t b r o u g h t
against him by his children under the age of emancipation?"
W h i l e t h e i s s u e c e r t i f i e d t o u s by t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t a s k s " i s a
parent ... in - rt
-
to . . .;" o u r h o l d i n g is l i m i t e d to a c t i o n s
b r o u g h t a g a i n s t a p a r e n t by a c h i l d u n d e r t h e a g e of e m a n c i p a t i o n
i n j u r e d i n t h e o p e r a t i o n of a motor v e h i c l e . To allow s u c h a n
a c t i o n d o e s n o t u n d e r m i n e p a r e n t a l a u t h o r i t y and d i s c i p l i n e , n o r
d o e s it t h r e a t e n t o s u b s t i t u t e j u d i c i a l discretion for parental
d i s c r e t i o n i n t h e care and r e a r i n g o f m i n o r c h i l d r e n . W e must
r e c o g n i z e t h a t t h e r e may be p a r e n t a l e x e r c i s e s of d i s c r e t i o n and
a u t h o r i t y w h i c h would d e s e r v e s p e c i a l p r o t e c t i o n i n a c o u r t of
law. Here, w e m e r e l y remove a n y b a r r i e r t o t h e e n f o r c e m e n t of
l i a b i l i t y i n a n a u t o m o b i l e a c c i d e n t case b r o u g h t by a n uneman-
c i p a t e d minor a g a i n s t a p a r e n t . When c o n f r o n t e d w i t h o t h e r cases
i n v o l v i n g claimed p a r e n t a l immunity, we w i l l a t t h a t t i m e d e t e r -
mine to what extent the doctrine or privilege should be
recognized.
I n a d d i t i o n , w e h o l d t h a t t h e h o u s e h o l d e x c l u s i o n c l a u s e is
i n v a l i d due to its f a i l u r e to "honor t h e r e a s o n a b l e e x p e c t a t i o n s "
of t h e p u r c h a s e r of t h e p o l i c y . See Keeton, Insurance R i g h t s a t
Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 H a r v a r d Law Rev. 961, 967
( 1970). P r o f e s s o r K e e t o n s e t s f o r t h t h i s p r i n c i p l e as f o l l o w s :
"The o b j e c t i v e l y r e a s o n a b l e e x p e c t a t i o n s o f
applicants and intended beneficiaries
r e g a r d i n g t h e terms o f i n s u r a n c e c o n t r a c t s
w i l l be h o n o r e d e v e n t h o u g h p a i n s t a k i n g s t u d y
o f t h e p o l i c y p r o v i s i o n s would h a v e n e g a t e d
those expectations ."
This policy is an adhesion contract that justifies this
C o u r t s c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f t h e consumer a p p r o a c h .
W e h o l d t h a t a p a r e n t is n o t immune from s u i t b r o u g h t by h i s
c h i l d under t h e age of emancipation i n cases involving parental
n e g l i g e n c e i n t h e o p e r a t i o n of a m o t o r v e h i c l e . C o n s e q u e n t l y , we
must hold t h a t a family exclusion clause is v o i d and unenfor-
ceable because s e c t i o n 61-6-301 ( 1), MCA, r e q u i r e s m o t o r i s t s to
c a r r y i n s u r a n c e a g a i n s t l o s s r e s u l t i n g from l i a b i l i t y imposed b y
l a w f o r i n j u r y s u f f e r e d by a n y p e r s o n .
We c o n c u r : i I
3 4wdl1&
Ch*f Justtce
i
D i s t p i c t Judge, s i t t i n g i n
place of Ydr. J u s t i c e F r a ~ k . B
:Piorrison, J r .
Mr. J u s t i c e D a n i e l J . Shea s p e c i a l l y c o n c u r r i n g .
I j o i n t h e m a j o r i t y on t h e i s s u e of t h e "household e x c l u s i o n "
i n the insurance policy. I would go a n o t h e r s t e p , h o w e v e r , on
t h e q u e s t i o n of parental immunity and s i m p l y d e c l a r e t h a t t h i s
Court does not recognize the doctrine and if it is to be
recognized, it is a q u e s t i o n for the legislature, not for the
courts.
The m a j o r i t y c o n f i n e s t h e a b o l i t i o n of p a r e n t a l immunity to
"actions brought a g a i n s t a p a r e n t by a c h i l d u n d e r t h e a g e of
e m a n c i p a t i o n i n j u r e d i n t h e o p e r a t i o n of a m o t o r v e h i c l e ." But,
a s l o n g a s t h i s C o u r t h a s now r e f u s e d t o r e c o g n i z e t h i s d o c t r i n e ,
w e s h o u l d n o t d e c i d e t h a t p o s s i b l y w e may r e c o g n i z e it i n a n o t h e r
context than t h a t which h a s b e e n p r e s e n t e d here. If parental
immunity is t o be r e c o g n i z e d c o m p l e t e l y , or i n any l i m i t e d f o r m ,
i t seems t o m e t h a t t h e l e g i s l a t u r e is t h e p r o p e r p l a c e to d e t e r -
mine the circumstances i n which it s h o u l d o r s h o u l d n o t be so
recognized. T h e s e are p u b l i c p o l i c y q u e s t i o n s b e t t e r l e f t to t h e
legislature; we are ill-equipped to undertake that task.