No. 93-325
I N THE SUPREME COURT O F THE STATE OF M N A A
O T N
1984
STATE OF MONTANA,
P l a i n t i f f and Respondent,
RODNEY EUGENE WATSON,
Defendant and A p p e l l a n t .
APPEAL FROM: D i s t r i c t Court o f t h e Fourth J u d i c i a l District,
I n and f o r t h e County o f J l i s s o u l a ,
The H o n o r a b l e J a m e s B . W h e e l i s , J u d g e p r e s i d i n g .
COUNSEL O F RECORD:
For Appellant:
James P a r k T a y l o r
& John E. Riddiough argued,
P u b l i c Defenders, Missoula, llontana
For Respondent:
Hon. Mike G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , I i e l e n a , Montana
Kimberly Kradolpher a r g u e d , A s s t . A t t y . G e n e r a l ,
H e l e n a , Montana
R o b e r t L. Deschamps, 111, C o u n t y A t t o r n e y , M i s s o u l a ,
Montana: R o b e r t S u l l i v a n a r g u e d , Deputy C o u n t y A t t o r n e y ,
M i s s o u l a , Montana
Submitted: March 1 5 , 1 9 8 4
Decided: August 3 , 1984
Filed:
41453 - 1984
Mr. Justice Fred J. Weber delivered the Opinion of the Court.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of attempted
deliberate homicide, aggravated assault and burglary. The
court designated him a dangerous offender and a persistent
felony offender. He was sentenced to 1 0 0 years imprisonment
on each count without possibility of parole or furlough.
Defendant raises two issues on appeal:
(1) Did the trial court err in instructing the jury on
the law of mental disease and defect?
(2) Was it cruel and unusual punishment to sentence the
defendant to 3 0 0 years imprisonment without possibility of
parole or furlough after finding that the defendant suffers
from a serious mental disorder?
We affirm the conviction and the sentencing order.
These facts are undisputed. Defendant began drinking
beer and smoking marijuana during the afternoon of October 2,
1982. Later that evening, he entered a Missoula apartment,
stole some pocket change and a hunting knife, and left when
the occupant awakened. He then entered another apartment,
took a purse, and left. He returned to the second apartment,
entered a bedroom, and stabbed a sleeping women 3 5 times with
the stolen knife. when a man entered the room, the defendant
stabbed him in the leg and fled.
Andrew Floberg's leg had a four-inch puncture wound,
which developed a large blood clot. Although 3 3 of Melissa
Smith's 35 stab wounds were superficial, it took
approximately four hours for an emergency room surgeon to
suture them. The combination of substantial blood loss and a
collapsed lung made her injuries life threatening, but she
survived. Defendant was arrested wearing a jacket stained
with Melissa Smith's blood.
After receiving Miranda warnings and signing an
acknowledgement of advice of rights, the defendant gave a
recorded statement to the police. His confession included
unpublicized details of the crime and an admission that he
entered Melissa Smith's apartment twice - first taking her
purse, then returning with intent to have sexual intercourse
with her. According to his statement, he stabbed Ms. Smith
to subdue her resistance. Defendant's taped confession was
admitted into evidence at trial. It contained no mention of
any demon spirit.
Defendant was charged by information with attempted
deliberate homicide, aggravated assault and burglary. He
pleaded not guilty and noticed his intent to rely on mental
disease or defect. Upon requests from prosecution and
defense counsel, the court ordered five
psychiatric/psychological examinations of the defendant prior
to trial. Defendant was found fit to proceed.
Trial by jury began February 2, 1983. Both the State
and the defense presented lay and expert witnesses, who
testified regarding defendant's mental condition. Defense
witnesses testified regarding the defendant's past
involvement in Satanic worship and defendant's belief that
the demon spirit Asmodeus was in possession of his body on
the night he stabbed Melissa Smith and Andrew Floberg.
The judge instructed the jury on the elements of each of
the crimes charged, burdens of proof, reasonable doubt and
mental disease or defect. The jury was given special verdict
forms, allowing them to find the defendant guilty, not guilty
by reason of mental disease or defect, or not guilty. On
February 10, 1983, the jury returned unanimous verdicts of
guilty on each count.
Prior to the sentencing hearing, the court received
recommendations in a pre-sentence investigation report and
evaluations by one psychiatrist, four clinical psychologists
and a medical doctor. The sentencing court found that the
defenda-nt suffers from a serious mental disorder, but that
the defendant was able to appreciate the criminality of his
conduct and able to conform his conduct to the requirements
of the law.
Based upon the court's designation of defendant as a
persistent felony offender, the defendant was sentenced to
100 years imprisonment for each of the three felony offenses,
sentences to run consecutively. These sentences are within
the statutory maximum terms. See section 46-18-502(2) & (4),
MCA .
Based upon the court's designation of d-efendant as a
dangerous offender and for the protection of society, the
court specified that the defendant shall be ineligible for
parole or participation in the supervised release program.
This restriction on defendant's sentence is authorized by
section 46-18-202 (2), MCA.
In the sentencing order, the court transferred custody
of the defendant to Montana State Prison and requested that
the Warden transfer the defendant to Warm Springs State
Hospital or any other facility deemed appropriate by the
Warden. After a suicide attempt in May 1983, defendant was
in fact transferred from Montana State Prison to Warm Springs
State Hospital.
The record contains a letter from a psychiatrist and a
psychologist at the Warm Springs State Hospital Forensic Unit
indicating that the defendant petitioned for return to
Montana State Prison from the Hospital on June 15, 1983. The
Forensic Unit doctors agreed to his request based upon the
following factors:
"1) The patient stated he can 'make it' in the
prison as long as he is given residence in the
maximum security area. Says things are on a
smaller scale there and he can handle that.
"2) He claimed he would not put up with the larger
group settinq in the prison and would use suicide
to escape that situation. It is our opinion this
choice is based on his preferential reasoning, and
value judgment, and his view of the Bible. It is
not based on psychotic delusions or the commands of
voices or hallucinations. Thus, upon return to
MSP, we recommend this individual remain in the
maximum security area for a long time.
"3) In short, this individual's problem behaviors
and his threat to harm himself is not based on
mental illness, and does not require
hospitalization at this time."
Defendant remains at Warm Springs State Hospital pending this
appeal.
The insanity defense to criminal responsibility evolved
from the concept that punishing those who are blameless for
their actions is morally unacceptable and does nothing to
serve the basic objectives of criminal law, i.e.
rehabilitation and deterrence. "Our collective conscience
does not allow punishment where it cannot impose blame."
Holloway v. United States (D.C.Cir. 19451, 148 F.2d 665,
The English Crown first employed the insanity defense as
a tool of pardon in the 13th Century. Pardons were replaced
by the concept of the "King's Grace," which was granted to
mitigate punishment, not guilt. By the 16th Century, a legal-
rationale developed that absolved certain offenders from
criminal responsibility based on a lack of moral capacity.
"The insane were perceived as infants or 'beasts' in their
moral and cognitive abilities. Deprived of understanding and
memory, such a man could not know what he was doing, nor
could be the object of punishment." N. Fink & N. Larene, -
In
Defense - - Insanity Defense, 62 Mich. B. J. 199 (March
of the
1983). The test for criminal responsibil-ity was whether the
accused "does not know what he is doing, no more than ... a
wild beast." Rex v. Arnold (1724), 16 How.St.Tr. 695, 764.
"Later, English courts began to focus on whether
the accused could distinguish between right and
wrong. They also began to hear medical testimony.
The landmark - -
M'Naghten case made both these trends
a standard part of English and American law."
Washington v. United States (D.C.Cir. 1967), 390
F.2d 444, 445.
Daniel M'Naghten held the delusionary belief that there
was a widespread Tory plot aimed at his ultimate destruction.
In "self-defense," M'Naghten attempted to assassinate the
Tory leader, British Prime Minister Sir Robert Peel, but shot
and mistakenly killed the Minister's secretary, who happened
to be riding in the Minister's carriage at the time. During
a lengthy trial, it was established that M'Naghten's actions
were based upon delusionary, irrational beliefs and that he
suffered from what today might be termed paranoia
schizophrenia. The jury returned a verdict of not guilty by
rea.son of insanity.
Under M'Naghten, the test for insanity was whether the
accused was laboring under such a defective reason from a
disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of
what he was doing or, if he did know it, that he did not know
he was doing what was wrong. Daniel MINaghten's Case
(1843), 10 C.&F. 200, 8 Eng.Rep. 718. he Ml~aghten ~ u l e
relieves a person from criminal responsibility if he was
"laboring under such a defective reason."
Throughout much of the 20th Century, the M'Naghten Rule
continued to be the dominant test for establishing an
insanity defense. A combination of the M'Naghten rule and
the irresistible impulse rule was followed in Montana until
1367, when a. modified version of the Model Penal Code was
enacted. See State v. Noble (1963), 142 Mont. 284, 384 ~ . 2 d
504; State v. Peel (1899), 23 Mont. 358, 59 P. 169.
Sixteen states continue to use the MINaghten standard of
insanity. I. Keilitz & J. Fulton, The Insanity Defense and
Its Alternatives at 22 (National Center for State Courts
1983). Several jurisdictions excuse criminal responsibility
for conduct that resulted from an "irresistible impulse" or a
person's inability to control his actions. Colorado,
Georgia, New Mexico a.nd Virginia use combinations of the
MINaghten and irresistible impulse standards.
The American Law Institute insanity standard is used in
twenty-five state jurisdictions and most of the federal
courts. I. Keilitz & J. Fulton, The Insanity Defense - -
and Its
Alternatives at 22 (National Center for State Courts 1983).
The ALI test provides that a "person is not responsible for
criminal cond-uct if at the time of such conduct as a result
of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity
either to appreciate the criminality (wrongfulness) of his
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of
law." American Law Institute, Model Penal Code, Proposed
Official Draft S4.01, at 74 (1962). Today this formula is
the pred-ominate standard among the state courts, although
most of the states that use it have modified it to some
extent. See I. Keilitz & J. Fulton, The Insanity Defense -
and
Its Alternatives at 22, note b (National Center for State
Courts 1983).
In 1967 Montana adopted a modified version of the ALI
standard:
" (a) A person is not responsible for criminal
conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result
of mental disease or defect he is unable either to
appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of law.
" (b) As used in this chapter, the term 'mental
disease or defect' does nct include an abnormality
manifested only by re-repeated criminal or
otherwise antisocial conduct." Section 95-501,
R.C.M. 1947. (enacted by Sec. 1, Ch. 196, L.
1967).
A person was excused from criminal responsibility if he
was unable to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. This was
a stricter standard than the ALI model provision. Under the
ALI standard, he was excused if he lacked substantial
capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of law. In addition,
subsection ( b ) of 95-501, R.C.M. 1947 excluded from mental
disease or defect any abnormality manifested only by repeated
criminal or other antisocial conduct.
In 1979 the Montana Legislature repealed subsection (a),
leaving subsection (b) in effect. This was termed an
abolition of the insanity defense. In a similar manner in
1982, the Idaho Legislature abolished the insanity defense.
See Idaho Code S18-207 (1982). In these two states, other
procedures have been substituted for the independent,
affirmative defense of insanity. See Bender, After
Abolition: The Present State - - Insanity Defense -
of the in
Montana, 45 Mont. L. Rev. 133 (1984); sections 46-14-311 &
-312, MCA; Idaho Code S19-2523 (1982).
Current Montana law, Title 46, Chapter 14, Part 1,
states:
Relevance of Mental Disease or Defect
"46-14-101. Mental disease or defect. As used in
this chapter, the term 'mentT1 disease or defect'
does not include an abnormality manifested only by
repeated criminal or other antisocial conduct.
"46-14-102. Evidence of mental disease or defect
admissible - prove state - -
to of mind. ~vidence that
t h e d e f e n d a n t s u f f e r e d from a m e n t a l d i s e a s e o r
d e f e c t i s a d m i s s i b l e whenever it i s r e l e v a n t t o
prove t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t d i d o r d i d n o t have a
s t a t e of mind which i s an e l e m e n t o f t h e o f f e n s e .
"46-14- 103. Mental d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t e x c l u d i n
f i t n e s s. - p r o c e e d .
to No p e r s o n x h o , a s a r e s u l t o z
mental d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t , i s unable t o understand
t h e p r o c e e d i n g s a g a i n s t him o r t o a s s i s t i n h i s own
d e f e n s e s h a l l be t r i e d , c o n v i c t e d , o r s e n t e n c e d f o r
t h e commission o f an o f f e n s e s o l o n g a s such
incapacity endures."
I n Montana, a t t h i s time, evidence of a mental d i s e a s e
or defect is admissible p r i o r to trial t o prove that the
d e f e n d a n t i s u n f i t t o proceed. During t r i a l , e v i d e n c e o f a
mental disease or defect is admissible to prove that a
defendant lacked a particular state of mind which is an
element of t h e crime. The former c o n c e p t o f inability t o
appreciate the criminality or to conform conduct to the
r e q u i r e m e n t s o f law i s now c o n t a i n e d o n l y i n t h e s e n t e n c i n g
statute.
"46-14-311. C o n s i d e r a t i o n of m e n t a l d i s e a s e o r
defect i n sentencina. whenever a d e f e n d a n t i s
c o n v i c t e r o n a v e r d i c t o r a p l e a o f g u i l t y and he
c l a i m s t h a t a t t h e t i m e o f t h e commission o f t h e
o f f e n s e o f which he was c o n v i c t e d he was s u f f e r i n g
from a m e n t a l d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t which r e n d e r e d him
u n a b l e t o a p p r e c i a t e t h e c r i m i n a l i t y o f h i s conduct
o r t o conform h i s conduct t o t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s o f
law, t h e s e n t e n c i n g c o u r t s h a l l c o n s i d e r any
r e l e v a n t e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d a t t h e t r i a l and s h a l l
r e q u i r e such a d d i t i o n a l e v i d e n c e a s i t c o n s i d e r s
necessary f o r t h e determination of t h e i s s u e ,
i n c l u d i n g e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e d e f e n d a n t and a r e p o r t
t h e r e o f a s provided i n 46-14-202 and 46-14-203."
For t h e f i r s t t i m e s i n c e 1967, t h i s C o u r t i s f a c e d w i t h
t h e need f o r d e f i n i n g m e n t a l d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t w i t h o u t t h e
r e p e a l e d language o f former s e c t i o n 95-501, R.C.M. 1947. In
addition, we must d-etermine t h e p r o p e r application of the
a l t e r n a t i v e s e n t e n c i n g s t a t u t e i n a c a s e where t h e s e n t e n c i n g
judge has concluded t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t d o e s s u f f e r from a
s e r i o u s mental d i s o r d e r , b u t t h a t h i s mental c o n d i t i o n d i d
- r e n d e r him u n a b l e t o a p p r e c i a t e t h e c r i m i n a l i t y o f h i s
not
conduct or unable to conform his conduct to the requirements
of the law.
Did the court err in instructing the jury on the law of
mental disease or defect?
Defendant contends that section 46-14-101, MCA creates a
conclusive presumption, the effect of which was to tell the
jury that they should accept as true, without proof, that a
mental disease or defect is not an abnormality manifested
only by repeated criminal or antisocial behavior. Defendant
contends that if the jury found that he had a mental disease
manifested only by antisocial or criminal behavior, then they
were instructed to find that he did not suffer from a mental
disease. Defendant argues that because his mental disease
was manifested primarily by repeated criminal or antisocial
behavior, the jury was misled to presume that he had the
state of mind required as an element of each offense. He
contends that section 46-14-101, MCA creates an
unconstitutional, mandatory presumption as to defendant's
mental state or intent. We disagree.
The jury was instructed on the presumption of innocence
and the State's burden of proving each and every element
beyond a reasonable doubt. In addition, the jury was
specifically instructed regarding mental disease or defect
and criminal intent:
"You must decide 1. whether the defendant had a
mental disease or defect at the time of the acts
alleged in the Information before you, and 2.
whether, if he had a mental disease or defect, it
prevented him from having any of the states of mind
required as a.n element of the offense charged, in
this case, purpose or knowledge.
"You are to determine the meaning of the phrase
'mental disease or defect,' and in so doing you may
apply the common meanings of these words in -
- - - your
experience in life, and you may be guided by the
testimony you find credible and relevant. However,
the term 'mental disease or defect' does not
include an abnormality manifested only repeated
criminalor antisocial conduct." Jurv Instruction
20 (emphazs added to the part to which defendant
-
objects) .
Defendant ' s expert witness, Dr. John G. Watkins , a
clinical psychologist, testified as follows:
"Q. Do you have an opinion as to whether the
mental disease from which he suffers has manifested
itself only through antisocial or criminal conduct?
"A. Well, the experiences in prison, the
experience, for example, of seeing pig's head on
the teacher or of seeing demons, hallucinations,
that would not be antisocial beha.vior. It did not
manifest itself in the stabbing.
"Q. We've also had testimony ...
that in prison
Rodney would at times cut his fingers and smear
blood on his face. Is that antisocial behavior?
"A. Well, it's masochistic behavior. It's
psychotic like behavior. It's not considered
social behavior to mutilate oneself . . ."
In addition to the extensive expert testimony on mental
disease, the jury also heard testimony from defendant's
brother and former cellmates that defendant refused to bathe;
he slept fully clothed, on top of the bed covers, with the
lights on so that evil spirits would not talk to him; that
defendant sat within a pattern drawn on the floor of his
prison cell in order to be protected from evil spirits; that
he had a practice of cutting his fingers, smearing blood on
his face, looking in the mirror and laughing; that he prayed
and talked out loud to himself, waving his hands.
The definition of "antisociaJ- conduct" is not an issue
in this case. We shall not attempt to define that term, as
now used in section 46-14-101, MCA. The evidence outlined
above, including expert testimony regarding masochistic
behavior, establishes that this is not a case where the
mental disease was manifested only by criminal or antisocial
conduct.
Defendant's proposed jury instruction paraphrased the
first part of the jury instruction that was given. The
second paragraph of the proposed instruction defined mental
disease or defect as follows:
"As used in this instruction, the terms mental
disease or defect do not include an abnormality
manifested only by repeated criminal or anti-social
conduct. However, if you find there is other
evidence that the defendant had a mental disease or
defect, you may consider repeated criminal or other
anti-social conduct as a manifestation of a mental
disease or defect."
We find this to be a correct statement of the law. However,
we do not agree with the defendant that the instruction given
by the district court creates a Sandstrom-like presumption.
Here, there is substantial evidence of mental disease
which was not manifested only by criminal or antisocial
conduct. As a result there was no basis for the jury to
presume, based on Jury Instruction No. 20, that the mental
disease of the defendant should be disregarded. The jury was
instructed to find the defendant not guilty if there was a
reasonable doubt as to whether he acted knowingly or
purposely. The instructions given did not allow the jury to
presume that criminal intent existed. In fact, the jury was
specifically instructed to the contrary. While the
defendant's proposed instruction was correct as a matter of
law, we hold that the refusal to give that instruction does
not constitute reversible error.
Defendant also challenges Jury Instruction No. 31, which
states r
"The defendant is presumed to he sane. However,
this presumption is rebutted and disappears
whenever reliable evidence is introduced that
raises a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's
sanity. It makes no difference from which side
this evidence comes.
"From the moment it appears, the burden is at once
upon the State to establish the responsibility of
the defendant, beyond a reasonable doubt."
This is an edited version of an instruction proposed by the
defendant. No objection to the court's amendment was made by
defense counsel. Having failed to object or to identify any
specific grounds for objection, defendant's challenge on
appeal must fail. See State v. Walker (1966), 148 Mont. 216,
223, 419 P.2d 300, 304.
The jury was instructed on (1) the State's burden of
proving each and every element of each charged offense beyond
a reasonable doubt; (2) the State's responsibility of proving
that the defendant acted purposely or knowingly in committing
the charged offenses; (3) that mental disease or defect may
prevent a defendant from acting purposely or knowingly; (4)
that the jury may draw reasonable inferences and conclusions
from the witnesses' testimony about defendant's appearance,
behavior, speech and actions; and (5) in determining whether
the required state of mind for each offense had been proven
beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury may consider testimony
concerning the presence and nature of any mental disease from
which the defendant claims to have suffered at the time of
the offense.
Read together, the jury instructions properly informed
the jury on the law of mental disease or defect and the
burden on the part of the State to establish the necessary
criminal intent beyond a reasonable doubt. Whether his
mental disease affected the defendant's ability to act with
purpose and knowledge was a question of fact for the jury.
The jury answered that question by returning guilty verdicts
on each count.
We hold that the trial court properly instructed the
jury on the law of mental disease or defect and the State's
burden of proof. We affirm the jury verdicts.
Did the District Court act properly when it sentenced
the defendant to 300 years in Montana State Prison without
possibility of parole or furlough?
The consideration to be given to mental disease or
defect in sentencing is contained in section 46-14-311, MCA.
As noted above, this section now requires the sentencing
judge to determine whether the defendant was able to
appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his
conduct to the requirements of the law.
Section 46-14-312, MCA specifies the sentencing
alternatives:
"Sentence - - imposed.
to be (1) If the court finds
that the defendant at the time of the commission of
the offense of which he was convicted did not
suffer from a mental disease or defect as described
in 46-14-311, it shall sentence him as provided in
Title 46, chapter 18.
" (2) If the court finds that the defendant at the
time of the commission of the offense suffered from
a mental disease or defect as described in
46-14-311, any mandatory minimum sentence
prescribed by law for the offense need not apply
and the court shall sentence him to be committed to
the custody of the director of the department of
institutions to be placed in an appropriate
institution for custody, care, and treatment for a
definite period of time not to exceed the maximum
term of imprisonment that could be imposed under
subsection (1). The authority of the court with
regard to sentencing is the same as authorized in
Title 46, chapter 18, provided the treatment of the
individual and the protection of the public are
provided for.
" (3) A defendant whose sentence has been imposed
under subsection (2) may petition the sentencing
court for review of the sentence if the
professional person certifies that the defendant
has been cured of the mental disease or defect. The
sentencing court may make any order not
inconsistent with its original sentencing authority
except that the length of confinement or
supervision must be equal to that of the original
sentence. The professional person shall review the
defendant's status each year."
The choice of either sentencing alternative is dependent
upon prior determination criminal responsibility
irresponsibility, as defined by section 46-14-311, MCA. In
making this determination, the sentencing court shall
consider any relevant evidence presented at the trial and
"such additional evidence as it considers necessary."
Section 46-14-311, MCA. "The judge is not limited to a
consideration of evidence presented at the trial." State v.
Doney (Mont. 1981), 636 P.2d 1377, 1385, 38 St.Rep. 1707,
"[The] defendant must prove to the satisfaction of
thrsentencing court that a t t h e time of the
commission of the offense of which he was
convicted, he was suffering from a mental disease
or defect which rendered him unable to appreciate
the criminality of his conduct or to conform his
conduct to the requirements of law.' A . . .
determination of the existence of mental disease .
.
. rests within the discretion of the sentencing
judge I
' .
Doney, 636 P.2d at 1385, 38 St.Rep. at
1716 (emphasis added).
In addition to the lay witness and expert testimony
presented at trial in this case, the court had psychological
evaluations and a pre-sentence investigation report available
to it. Defense witness, Dr. John G. Watkins, was the only
expert who specifically concluded that the defendant lacked
control over his criminal conduct. Each of the other
psychologists and one psychiatrist supplied substantial
evidence from which the court could conclude that the
defendant was able to appreciate the criminality of his
conduct and had the ability to conform his conduct to the
requirements of the law.
Defendant argues that once the sentencing judge
determined that he suffered from a "serious mental disorder,"
the court was statutorily required to commit him to the
custody of the Department of Institutions to be placed in an
appropriate mental institution. He further argues that
sentencing a mentally ill defendant to prison for 300 years
without possibility of parole or furlough constitutes cruel
and unusual punishment. We disagree.
The American Psychiatric Association and the National
Mental Health Association concur "that expert witnesses
should testify within their areas of specialized knowledge
and not to the ultimate legal issues of whether or not the
accused was legally insane at the time of the alleged act."
National Mental Health Association, Myths & Realities: A
-
Report of the National Commission - - Insanity Defense 41
on the
(March, 1983).
A medical diagnosis of mental illness that requires
treatment and a legal finding of mental disease that relieves
criminal responsibility are distinguishable. It is possible
to be diagnosed as suffering from a mental illness for
medical and treatment purposes and, from a legal standpoint,
still be criminally culpable. If the mental disease does
not satisfy the definition in section 46-14-311, MCA, then a
sentence of imprisonment may properly be imposed.
In State v. Mercer (Mont. 1981), 625 P.2d 44, 38 St.Rep.
312, the defendant appealed a conviction for aggravated
assault and a sentence of 20 years imprisonment. Expert
testimony established that Mercer suffered from an
untreatable mental disorder that prevented him from
conforming his behavior to social norms, but that the
disorder was episodic. His mental disease had purportedly
been evident for many years. The State established that
defendant's story about another being taking control of his
body began only when investigation of the case began to
center on him. The jury found him guilty. The judge
determined that Mercer was "in full possession of his mental
capacity and not suffering from mental disease or defect
which could render him incapable of appreciating the
criminality of his conduct or the ability to conform his
conduct to the requirements of law." Mercer, 625 P.2d at 50,
38 St.Rep. at 318. For the protection of society, defendant
was sentenced as a dangerous offender to 20 years
imprisonment.
We noted in Mercer that the statutory scheme dealing
with the mental competency of criminal defendants "does not
prescribe special rules for sentencing a defendant who was
sane at the time of his crime, but who may be insane at other
times." Mercer, 625 P.2d at 50, 38 St.Rep. at 319. We
concluded that under circumstances where a defendant has not
been adjudicated insane, a sentence of imprisonment does not
violate any statutory or constitutional law.
Defendant cites the following language in support of his
contention that he was entitled to be committed to Warm
Springs Sta.te Hospital rather than sentenced to Montana State
Prison:
". . . The defendant was sentenced and classified
as a dangerous offender based only on his past
criminal behavior and his propensity for antisocial
conduct. If, however, the court had determined that
the defendant were mentally deranged but sentenced
him nevertheless to a penal institution without
providing for adequate treatment, the defendant may
have had grounds to argue that the sentence
violated constitutional prohibitions against cruel
and unusual punishment." Mercer, 625 P.2d at 51,
38 St.Rep. at 319.
We find this argument unpersuasive. The quoted
hypothetical is dicta in Mercer. In addition, section
46-14-311, MCA requires more than just a finding of mental
disease. Where mental disease exists, the court must also
determine its effect upon. the defendant's ability to
appreciate criminality and capacity to conform his conduct,
i.e. whether the disease meets the standa.rd of impairment set
forth in section 46-14-311, MCA.
In State v. Doney (Mont. 1981), 636 P.2d 1377, 38
St.Rep. 1707, the defendant was convicted of attempted
robbery and aggravated assault and sentenced to Montana State
Prison for two 10 year terms to be served concurrently.
Defendant testified that he had no recollection of the
assault. He claimed that his intoxicated and drugged
condition made him incapable of forming the requisite mental
state. The sentencing court refused defendant's request to
be committed rather than imprisoned.
This Court stated on appeal:
". . .
Before such commitment will be ordered,
defendant must prove to the satisfaction of the
sentencing court that 'at the time of the
commission of the offense of which he was convicted
he was suffering from a mental disease or defect
which rendered him unable to appreciate the
criminality of his conduct or to conform his
conduct to the requirements of law. ' Sections
46-14-311 and 46-14-312, MCA. The sentencing judge
is not limited to a consideration of evidence
presented at the trial. A determination of the
existence of mental disease or defect under these
sections rests within the discretion of the
sentencing judge.
"If the mental disease or defect described in
section 46-14-311, MCA, is found, the judge must
order the commitment described in section
46-14-312(2). ...
"Section 46-14-312 (I), MCA, provides that if the
mental disease or defect described in section
46-14-311, MCA, is not found by the sentencing
judge, defendant shall be sentenced as provided in
Title 46, chapter 18." Doney, 636 P.2d at 1385, 38
St.Rep. at 1716.
Affirming the sentence of imprisonment, we held:
" [ T I he determination whether defendant does suffer
from such mental disease or defect lies within the
discretion of the sentencing judge, after his
evaluation of the trial evidence and any other
evidence he may deem necessary. The sentencing
judge was not persuaded that defendant suffered
from a mental disease or defect within the meaninq
- section 46-14-311, -
of MCA. He acted well within
his discretion in denying defendant's request that
he be committed pursuant to section 46-14-312(2),
MCA." Doney, 636 P.2d at 1386, 38 St.Rep. at 1717
(emphasis added) .
In each reference to mental disease or defect, this Court
stressed that the disease or defect must be one described in
section 46-14-311, MCA.
Here, the sentencing court found that defendant ' s
"serious mental disorder" did not meet the standard set forth
in section 46-14-311, MCA. The court further found that the
defendant "is not willing to conform his behavior to the
requirements of law."
We hold that the sentencing court did not abuse its
discretion in determining that defendant's mental disorder
failed to meet the standard set forth in section 46-14-311,
MCA . We find no error in the court's sentencing the
defendant to imprisonment under section 46-14-312(l), MCA.
Defendant next contends that the sentence of an
individual who is mentally ill to the Montana State Prison
for a term of 300 years without the possibility of parole or
furlough is cruel and unusual punishment and a violation of
the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article 11,
Section 22, 1972 Montana Constitution. Defendant argues that
he was sentenced not for his behavior, but for his illness.
The term of 300 years is within the statutory maximum
allowable for a persistent felony offender. Section
46-18-502(2), MCA. As this Court stated in State v. Metz
(1979), 184 Mont. 533, 536, 604 P.2d 102, 104:
"Defendant's sentence is within the maximum
allowable by the persistent felony offender
statute. . . .
As a general rule, sentences within
the maximum statutory limits do not violate the
Eighth Amendment. . . .
Defendant must establish
that his sentence is an exception to this rule.
. .. The evidence presented here does not
establish that the length of the sentence was
unconstitutional.
"The court's 100 year sentence may in defendant's
eyes seem inequitable, but it is not so shocking or
oppressive as to be cruel and unusual punishment.
Challenges to the equitability of a sentence as
opposed to its legality are properly directed to
the Sentence Review Board. " (citations omitted)
Section 46-18-202(2), MCA authorizes the sentencing
court to impose restrictions, as part of the sentence, making
the defendant ineligible for parole or participation in the
supervised release program. Such restrictions may be imposed
where the court finds it necessary to protect society and
states the reasons for the restriction. Here, the court
stated ten reasons for its designation of defendant as a
dangerous offender and imposition of the restrictive
sentence :
"a. Protection of society.
"b. No chance of rehabilitation.
"c. Defendant was convicted by jury of all the
acts alleged in the information.
"d. Defendant's earlier record.
"e. Defendant's behavior at trial and at
sentencing.
"f. Testimony at trial as to the Defendant's
history.
"g. Defendant is not willing to conform his
behavior to the requirements of law.
"h. Defendant is a very dangerous person and will
continue to be such a person.
"i. It is unlikely that the Defendant will ever be
non-violent or not commit further acts that were a
source of the trial.
" j . There is no treatment program which will alter
the Defendant's behavior."
Four of the five psychological and psychiatric
evaluators specifically concluded that the defendant was able
to appreciate the criminality of his conduct and to conform
his conduct to the requirements of law. The one expert whose
diagnosis differed from the others agreed with the others as
to defendant's dangerousness and propensity for crimina.1
violence in the future. In fact, he concluded that the
defendant has the capacity to carry out a "Manson" type
homicide. All of the e~~aluations
support the court's finding
that defendant is a very dangerous person and will continue
to be a danger to society.
Regarding disposition, the various experts advised the
court as follows:
"There is no treatment facility in the state of
Montana which is likely to be more suitable for the
resolution of Mr. Watson's psychological problems
than that available at the Montana State Prison.
Mr. Watson's psychological disorders are not of the
type or severity which would make it in the state's
interest to commit him to a treatment facility such
as Warm Springs State Hospital."
". . . I am very concerned about the degree of
danger which he can pose if his very tenuous
restraining capacity were taxed due to stress, fa-
tigue, or drugs. I would view him as a very
dangerous man who should be handled with the
strictest kinds of controls, whatever the outcome."
". .
. His poor social and vocational adjustment in
a context of chronic substance abuse and frequent
lawbreaking, are consistent with diagnosis of
personality disorders. The prognosis for treatment
is poor and he should be regarded as having a
strong potential for further violent, impulsive
behavior."
"It is essential for the protection of others as
well as himself that he be under institutional
control for a long time. His violent behavior (as
contrasted with his hurglarizings) is best
described as a psychiatric illness. His condition
suggests the need for intensive, individual
therapy, perhaps abreactions to release the
repressed rage. However, neither Warm Springs
State Hospital or the Deer Lodge Prison is probably
prepared to give such treatment. Institutions such
as Atascadero or Vacaville in California desiqned
for the criminally insane are best equipped in this
respect.
"Where-ever he is confined it is important for the
protection of society that he not merely be given a
parole or discharge after a few months, or even a
few years, of good, overt behavior . . ."
"He does not indicate symptoms of psychosis. There
is a failure to accept social norms with respect to
lawful behavior. There is irritability and
impulsivity. There is irresponsibility. There is
chronic use and abuse of alcoholic beverages.
"The defendant, Rodney Watson, does not suffer from
serious mental disease or defect. . ..
"Mr. Watson has the ability to appreciate the
criminality of his conduct, to conform his conduct
to the requirements of law at the time of the
criminal conduct charged."
The pre-sentence investigation report recommended that the
defendant be confined in Montana State Prison for the maximum
time allowable under the law, based upon consideration of the
defendant's prior criminal history, his past failures on
parole supervision, the violent nature of his last crime, and
the fact that there is a poor prognosis for treatment of his
mental disorder.
We hold that the sentencing court did not abuse its
discretion in imposing a sentence with restrictions that the
defendant shall be ineligible for parole or participation in
the supervised release program while serving his term.
The fact that the sentencing judge in this case
requested that the defendant be transferred to another
facility, should the Prison Warden deem it appropriate,
indicates the court's concern regarding post-dispositional
treatment of this offender. It also recognizes the
possibility that more appropriate treatment for defendant's
particular condition, than that available at the Prison, may
become available at a la.ter date; at which time, custody of
the defendant could be transferred.
Defense counsel asserted at the sentencing hearing that
a California facility for the criminally insane might be able
to treat the defendant's disorder; however, no evidence of
available treatment or agreement to enter into a Western
Interstate Corrections Compact was presented.
The record contains no evidence of the type or degree of
psychological treatment that might be made available to the
defendant at the Montana State Prison, nor any evidence other
than defense counsel's assertions that such treatment would
be inadequate.
Defendant's argument that the prison is incapable of
meeting his particular needs is premature. In the event of
deficient care, defendant has the alternative of legal
proceeding against the State. State v. Austad (1982), 197
Mont. 70, 101, 641 P.2d 1373, 1390.
We hold that the sentence given the defendant does not
constitute the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment.
Affirmed.
We concur:
3-4J w
ca
Chief Justice
k4A.Q
-
Justices
Mr. Justice John C. Sheehy, dissenting:
I dissent principally on two grounds, one, that the
court committed instructions-1 error with respect to mental
disease or defect, and two, that the sentence imposed is
cruel and unusual punishment.
For the reader to und.erstand this issue,Iset out the
provisions of section 46-14-101, MCA:
"Mental disease or defect. As used in this
chapter, the termTmental disease or defect' does
not include an abnormality manifested only by
repeated criminal or other antisocial conduct."
The obverse of section 46-14-101, should be that mental
disease or defect does include abnormalities manifested by
other than repeated criminal or other antisocial conduct.
Everybody that has had anything to do with this case
admits that the defendant is suffering, at least medically,
from a mental disease or defect. All the experts who
testified at the trial agreed on this point. The state
prosecutors at the county and state level agree, the District
Court agreed, and now this Court, through its majority
opinion also agrees. In that situation, we must a.sk
ourselves whether the jury was properly instructed so that it
could determine whether at the time he committed the alleged
offense he was suffering from a mental disease or defect so
that he could not have the particular state of mind that is
an essential element of the offense charged.
The court's instruction on this point is as follows:
"INSTRUCTION NO. 2 0
"You must decide 1. whether the defendant had a
mental disease or defect at the time of the acts
alleged in the Information before you, and 2.
whether, if he had a mental disease or defect, it
prevented him from having any of the sta.tes of mind
required as an element of the offense charged, in
this case, purpose or knowledge.
"You are to determine the meaning of the phrase
'mental disease or defect,' and in so doing you may
apply the common meanings of these words and your
experience in life, and you may be guided by the
testimony you find credible and relevant. However,
- term 'mental disease or defect'2- -
the -
include an abnormality manifested only
does not
repeated
-
criminalor other antisocial conduct. " (Emphasis
added. )
Obviously, as far as it went, the instruction is in
accord with section 46-14-101, MCA. However, the defense
offered a clarification to the instruction which would have
added the following language:
"As used in this instruction, the terms mental
disease or defect do not include an abnormality
manifested only by repeated criminal or anti-social
conduct. However, if you find there is other
evidence that the defendant had a mental disease or
defect, you may consider repeated criminal or
anti-social conduct as a manifestation of a mental
disease or defect."
The District Court denied the addition to the
instruction as proposed by the defendant. I think a serious
error occurred at that point.
This is not spoken in criticism of the district judge.
I think the District Court was faced with a statute that is
too vague and ambiguous to be applied. The point that the
defendant's offered instruction was hoping to meet is this:
if the only manifestation of the a.bnorma1.ity is repeated
"criminal or other antisocial conduct" then the jury may not
consider that the defendant acted und.er the influence of a
mental disease or defect; but if in fact there are other
manifestations of abnormality, as all agree there are in this
case, then the jury may consid-er the repeated criminal and
antisocial conduct as further manifestation of the
abnormality.
The term "other antisocial conduct" itself is too broad
to be constitutionally applied. Criminal conduct is, of
course, antisocial. What other conduct may be regarded as
antisocial? By definition, one who is averse to the society
of others is antisocial. The term also includes behavior
which is hostile or harmful to organized society or which is
marked by behavior deviating sharply from the social norm.
Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (1981). Thus, antisocial
conduct runs the broad spectrum from criminal conduct through
vandalism and even to those Montanans who "like their fellow
men the best when they are scattered some."
The term "antisocial conduct" is too broad and vague to
be constitutionally applied. Without a standard to guide the
jury based on the clause, the jury was left with no guidance
in the application of the law to the abnormality claimed by
the defendant. The instructions given to the jury were in
effect a presumption in the vice of Sandstrom, because some
jurors may have excluded all of the defendant's abnormal
behavior as antisocial, and therefore not to be considered as
a manifestation of his mental disease or defect.
It is true that the defendant did not offer, as I search
the record, an instruction defining "antisocial conduct" in
the sense of the statute. Undoubtedly the defendant could
not have found such a standard, but at least the
clarification offered should have been given to the jury that
if the defendant did engage in conduct which was abnormal,
then the jury might also consider his repeated criminal
violations, and his repeated "antisocial conduct."
There is a serious statutory hole here that requires
filling up by the legislature. In the meantime, it is the
duty of this Court to protect the defendant from the
consequences of the District Court taking from the jury a11
consideration of abnormal behavior simply because it falls
within the categories of criminal or antisocial conduct.
As serious to me as the instructional error is the
punishment meted out to the defendant here, three 100 year
terms, to be served consecutivel-y, without possibilj-ty of
furlough or parole.
It is evident that the District Court decided to put the
defendant "on ice" for the remainder of his life. Worse, he
will be preserved in his present state, without hope of
treatment until death overtakes him. To me, this is cruel
and unusual punishment.
Punishment for crimes may be "cruel and unusual" because
of its barbarity, or because it is "excessive" or
"disproportionate" to the offense. Solem v. Helm (1983), 462
U.S. - Edmund v. Florida (1972), 458 U.S. 782; Coker v.
;
Georgia (1977), 433 U.S. 584; Estelle v. Gamble (1977), 429
U.S. 97; Gregg v. Georgia (1976), 428 U.S. 153.
The term "cruel and unusual punishment" comes from the
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The
Eighth Amendment is based upon the "evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." Trop
v. Dulles (1958), 356 U.S. 86, 101, - S.Ct. -1 -
L.Ed.2d -. Montana, in adopting its 1972 Constitution,
purportedly showed it was maturing by adopting Art. TI, ยง 28
to the effect that laws for the punishment of crime shall be
founded on the principles of prevention and reformation.
Punishment, therefore, ought to have a two-pronged objective:
one, preventing the defendant from further crime, but two,
directed toward his rehabilitation. By salting the defendant
away for the rest of his natural 1-ife, the court has
undoubtedly prevented him from future crime against persons
outside the prison walls; but the District Court has also
determined that he is incapable of rehabilitation. The only
evidence of his inability to rehabilitate is his mental
illness. That is why by sentencing him to the Montana State
Prison instead of to Warm Springs, the District Court insured
that he would never be rehabilitated through medical
treatment. From the sentence, therefore, I determine that
its imposition is at once barbarous and excessive.
As the appellant noted in his brief, the sentence is
also disproportionate. Statistics compiled by the Sentence
Review Board of our Court in 1980 show that of the 352
convictions for aggravated assault between July 1, 1978 and
December 12, 1979, only six individuals received prison terms
in excess of 20 years. The defendant was given 100 years,
pursuant to the persistent felony offender statute without
possibility of parole or furlough for his conviction on the
charge of aggravated assault against Andrew Floberg.
Likewise, 947 people were convicted of burglary between July
1, 1978 and December 12, 1979. Of those 947, 3 received
sentences of 40 to 50 years, probably under the persistent
felony offender statutes. None received sentences in excess
of 50 years. The defendant, however, received a sentence of
100 years without the possibility of parol-e or furlough on
his burglary conviction for entering Melissa Smith's
apartment and stealing her purse. The Sentence Review Board
compiled. no statistics for the offense of attempted
deliberate homicide in its 1980 report. I think it rather
obvious that the sentences here are disproportionate and I
would reverse on that ground also.
I would reverse the conviction and remand for a new
trial.
Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea dissents and will file a written
dissent later.
DISSENT OF MR. JUSTICE DANIEL J. SHEA
No. 83-325
STATE OF MONTANA,
Respondent,
VS.
RODNEY EUGENE WATSON,
Appellant.
DATED: January 6, 1985
Mr. Justice Da.niel J. Shea., dissenting:
I agree with the dissent of Mr. Justice Sheehy, and the
arguments expressed therein. 1 feel that jury instruction
no. 20, which merely paraphrases the relevant statutory
languaqe, is confusing and did not fully inform the jury of
the legal concepts involved. I have repeatedly stressed that
jury instructions which merely set forth statutory language
verbatim are not always sufficient. If the language of the
statute is vague or unclear a.s to its meaning, as is the
statute in this case, additional instructions must be given
by the trial court to help the jury fully understand the
relevant legal. principles. The incomplete instruction given
in this case could easily mislead the jury into totally
disregarding the defendant's criminal or antisocial behavior
as an indication of mental disease or defect, even if there
was additional evidence supporting the claim of mental
disease.
Further, I agree that sentencing the defendant to 300
years in the Montana State Prison without the possibility of
parole or treatment constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.
As Justice Sheehy points out, the 1972 Constitution, Art. 11,
28 provides that punishment for crimes shall be based on
prevention - reformation.
and While the preventive aspects of
the 300-year sentence are apparent, any attempt to reform the
defendant is totally lacking.
I would reverse the defendant's conviction and remand
this cause for a new trial.