110. 84-195
I N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF M N A A
O T N
1984
STATE OF MONTANA,
P l a i n t i f f and Respondent,
-vs-
R N L LEE RATY,
O AD
Defendant and A p p e l l a n t .
APPEAL FROM: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
I n and f o r t h e County o f Y e l l o w s t o n e ,
The H o n o r a b l e R o b e r t H . W i l s o n , J u d g e p r e s i d i n g .
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
A l l e n Beck, B i l l i n g s , Montana
For Respondent:
Hon. Mike G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , Montana
H a r o l d H a n s e r , County A t t o r n e y , B i l l i n g s , Montana
C h a r l e s B r a d l e y , Deputy County A t t y . , B i l l i n g s
S u b m i t t e d on B r i e f s : Oct. 2 5 , 1984
Decided: December 1 3 , 1984
Filed: DEc 1 3 ?g8q
Clerk
Mr. Justice John C. Sheehy delivered the Opinion of the
Court.
Defendant Ronald Lee Raty appeals from a judgment of
conviction for aggravated assault, in the Thirteenth Judicial
District Court in Yellowstone County. We affirm in part and
reverse in part.
Raty was charged with two counts of aggravated. assault
stemming from separate incidents. He was accused of stabbing
Covina Fredericks on April 28, 1983 and of assaulting Janet
LaRance in her home on September 8, 1983 and strangling her
with a rope. Trial by jury was held on January 25 through
37, 1984 in Yellowstone County and Raty was acquitted of the
Frederick's knifing but convicted of assaulting LaRance.
The evidence presented at trial showed that on September
8, 1983, Raty appeared at the home of Janet LaRance and rang
the doorbell. When LaRance opened the door Raty entered,
chased her through the house, cornered her, then strangled
her with a rope for 10 or 20 seconds. Raty then released his
victim and fled. JJaRance ran outside and asked two
construction workers for help telling them she had been
attacked. One of the construction workers chased Raty and
caught him a couple blocks from the scene while Raty was
entering his parked car. Meanwhile LaRance called the
police. Raty was taken into custody.
Raty testified a t trial that he went to the LaRance home
thinking that a woman who owed him twenty dollars was inside.
The woman slammed the door on his foot; he batted the door
open and entered the house. Raty did not remember using the
rope, but thought that he put his arm around her neck and his
hand over her mouth.
A t t r i a l d e f e n d a n t Raty put. i n t o i s s u e h i s s t a t e of mind
at t h e t i m e of t h e c r i m e . He i n t r o d u c e d e v i d e n c e aimed a t
showing t h a t h e d i d n o t p o s s e s s t h e r e q u i s i t e m e n t a l e l e m e n t s
of "purposely" or "knowj-ngly" which must b e proven by t h e
State to obtain a conviction for aggravated assault.
Defendant showed t h a t he came from a d e p r i v e d background. He
had been abused a s a child, b e a t e n by his stepfather and
watched h i s mother carted off to a mental h o s p i t a l . Dr.
Tranel, a B i l l i n g s psychologist, t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e defendant
suffered from psychomotor e p i l e p s y which c a u s e d an o r g a n i c
p e r s o n a l i t y d i s o r d e r and marked. b e h a v i o r changes.
I n accord with s e c t i o n 46-14-201, MCA, though section
46-14-212, MCA, d e f e n d a n t n o t i f i e d t h e S t a t e o f h i s i n t e n t i o n
t o r e l y on t h e m e n t a l d i s e a s e o r d e f e c t d e f e n s e . Raty was
examined by a c l i n i c a l team a t Warm S p r i n g s S t a t e H o s p i t a l .
Dr. Harris testified. at trial that in his opinion the
defendant was capable of standing trial and had a
passive-aggressive personal-ity . He testified that the
d-efendant had p o s s i b l e e p i l e p s y by h i s t o r y o n l y and had a low
I.Q. Harris also testified that the defendant had the
c a p a c i t y t o have t h e p a r t i c u l a r s t a t e o f mind which i s a n
e l e m e n t of t h e o f f e n s e c h a r g e d . See s e c t i o n 46-14-213, MCA.
Ronald L e e Raty was c o n v i c t e d o f v i o l a t i o n of section
45-5-202, MCA, aggravated assault, and sentenced, t o the
maximum t e r m o f 2 0 y e a r s i n t h e s t a t e p r i s o n . He was a l s o
sentenced t o 1 0 years t o be served concurrently f o r t h e use
of a dangerous weapon, a r o p e , p u r s u a n t t o s e c t i o n 46-18-231,
MCA .
Appellant r a i s e s t h e following issues:
(1) FJhether t h e e v i d e n c e was s u f f i c i e n t t o prove t o
e l e m e n t of purpose o r knowledge?
(2) Whether the defendant should have been sentenced to
a term of years at the State Mental. Hospital rather than the
Montana State Prison due to diminished mental capacity?
We note that the defendant does not challenge the
constitutionality of Montana's statutes which abolished the
traditional insanity defense. Our recent decision in State
,
v. Korell (Mont. 1984), - P.2d - 41 St.Rep. 2141, held
the statutes, sections 46-14-201, MCA, et seq., are not
unconstitutional. Korell is the law in Montana today and in
its light we must affirm the conviction by the lower court.
There is sufficient evidence on the record to support
the jury finding that the defendant acted knowingly and/or
purposely when he assaulted Ms. LaRance.
"Purposely" is defined as follows:
"[A] person acts purposely with respect to a result
or to conduct described by a statute defining an
offense if it is his conscious object to engage in
that conduct or to cause that result . . ."
Section 45-2-101 (58), MCA.
"Knowingly" is defined as follows:
" [A] person acts knowingly with respect to conduct
or to circumstance described by a statute defining
an offense where he is aware of his conduct or that
the circumstance exists. A person acts knowingly
with respect to the result of conduct described by
a statute defining an offense when he is aware that
it is highly probable that such result will be
caused hy his conduct . . ."
Section 45-2-101 (33),
I4CA.
Raty remembered the details of the entire incident
except using the rope on LaRance. He testified he thought
LaRa.nce was a girl named. Patty and that he wanted to get her
because she owed him $20.00. Raty remembers running away and
being chased by the constructj-on workers. Raty stated that
he was running because he was chasing someone else. This
testimony tends to show that Raty was aware of his conduct.
He could remember his conduct. He tried to conceal his
reason for fleeing which tend-ed to prove he knew he had done
something wrong. State v. Pierce (Mont. 1 9 8 2 ) , 647 P.2d 847,
39 St.Rep. 1205.
The evidence also shows that Raty acted purposefully.
His conduct was not the result of reflex. Evidence that Ra-ty
possessed the rope prior to entering the LaRance home and
evidence that Raty intended harm to the woman he thought owed
him money tend to prove that it was his conscious object to
engage in the conduct of strangling LaRance. Dr. Harris'
testimony tended to show the defendant possessed the mental
elements of the offense despite the existence of psychomotor
epi-lepsy .
Based on the evidence presented at trial the jury had
sufficient grounds to find the defendant guilty of aggravated
assault beyond a reasonable doubt. We will not disturb that
finding on appeal.
SENTENCING
The appellant contends that he should have been
sentenced to a term of years at Warm Springs State Hospital
instead of sentenced to prison. The disposition of a
defendant who raised the lack of mental state defense is set
forth in Chapter 14, Part 3 of the Montana Code Annotated.
If the jury finds that the defendant had the requisite state
of mind at the time of the offense, criminal guilt is
determined. After guilt has been established, the court, not
the jury, must determine if the guilty person was suffering
at the time of the offense from a mental disease or defect.
Section 46-14-311, MCA. The following procedure is followed.
The sentencing judge must consider any relevant evidence
presented at trial plus any additional evidence presented at
the sentencing hearing to determine whether the defendant was
able to appreciate the criminality of his acts or to conform
his conduct to the requirements of the law at the time he
committed th.e offense for which he was convicted. Section
46-14-311, MCA; Corell, supra. If the defendant is found
mentally i.11 under the above test, he is sentenced to the
care of the director of institutions for a definite period of
time not to exceed the maximum possible sentence. Section
46-14-312(2), MCA. If the defendant is cured from the mental
disease or defect which rendered him incapable of
appreciating the criminality of his act or conforming his
conduct to the requirements of the law he is then transferred
from the State Hospital to prison to serve out the remainder
of his sentence. While in the care and custody of the mental
health professionals at Warm Springs, the mentally ill
convict receives no credit for good time served and is not
eligible for parole.
There is no advantage for one not in need cf care for a
mental disease or defect to request to be sentenced under
section 46-14-312(2), MCA, to the care of the Department of
Institutions instead of to prison.
The defendant, Raty, asked the court to be sentenced to
Warm Springs. The District Court was required to make a
finding pursuant to section 46-14-31-1, MCA, whether or not
the defendant at the time of the commission of the offense
for which he was convicted was suffering from a mental
disease or defect which rendered him unable to appreciate the
criminality of his conduct or to conform hi-s conduct to the
requirements of law.
The court made no such finding. The reasons stated at
the sentencing hearing and in the sentencing order for
imposing a 20-year prison sentence on the defendant were as
follows:
"1) The Court considered the information in the
presentence investigation report.
"2) The defendant has been acquitted by a jury of
one of the counts previously charged against him;
and the Court takes that into consideration.
"3) The Court considered the reality of this case
and that the defendant comes from a very deprived
background as a child and was abused as a child and
the Court is sympathetic toward the defendant
because of that situation.
"4) The Court also realizes that this defendant
has developed into a person whom the Court deems to
be a danger in the community by reason of the acts
he had committed and for which the jury found him
guilty."
The record shows that the District Court did not fulfil
its duty to independently evaluate the defendant's mental
condition. See Korel-1, supra, State v. Watson (~ont.1 9 8 4 1 ,
For this reason we must vacate the sentence and remand
for resentencing.
Affirmed in part.
Reversed in part.
,
' ,
i
i
Justice
We Concur:
Ti--L-$i.~
Chief Justice
P Q