No. 83-408
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1984
STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vs-
LEE R. CARSON I
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: The District Court of the Fourth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Missoula,
The Honorable James B. Wheelis, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Colleen M. Dowdall, Missoula, Montana
For Respondent :
Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Robert Deschamps, County Attorney, Missoula,
Montana
Submitted on Briefs: January 12, 1984
Decided: March 2, 1984
Filed: 1
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94
Clerk
Mr. Justice Frank B. Morrison, Jr. delivered the Opinion of
the Court.
Defendant appeals a sentence imposed by the Fourth
Judicial District Court, iss sou la County. We affirm.
Between August 4, 1980 and January 20, 1981 Lee Carson
was charged i n Missoula County, Montana with deceptive
practices, two counts of felony theft, forgery and
bail-jumping. He eventually pled. guilty to all counts.
On March 25, 1981 the defendant was sentenced to twenty
years in the Montana State Prison for forgery, and ten years
on each of the remaining charges, to run concurrently. All
of the sentences were suspended. The defendant was placed
on probation and ordered to pay restitution.
Pursuant to a report of violation, a petition to revoke
defendant's suspended sentence was filed on April 30, 1982.
Defendant appeared on September 7, 1982 to deny allegations
and file a motion to dismiss the petition for revocation.
Defendant's motion was denied. On March 22, 1983 the court
found that the defendant had violated his probation. On
April 1, 1983, the defendant moved the court to reopen the
probation violation hearing for new evidence. That motion
was denied.
On May 11, 1983 the defendant was sentenced to twenty
years in the Montana State Prison with thirteen of those
years suspended.
On appeal defendant presents a singular issue:
Whether the sentencing court abused its discretion by
its failure to state the reasons underlying the imposition of
the original suspended sentence.
After entry of plea and as part of the sentence, the
court ordered restitution to be paid in the amount of $856.79
and $1,326.40. Defendant was given six months from Play 13,
1981, to make the restitution.
Defendant failed to pay restitution which caused the
parole and probation officer with the Montana Department of
Institutions to file a report of violation on April 29, 1982.
Immediately thereafter the deputy county attorney of Missoula
County filed a petition to revoke the suspended sentence
alleging that defendant failed to make restitution as ordered
by the court.
Defendant admitted that he had not paid restitution but
moved the court to dismiss the petition to revoke on the
grounds that the original suspended sentence of March 1981
was invalid due to the sentencing judge's failure to state
specific reasons for imposition of the sentence.
The trial judge is granted broad discretion to determine
the appropriate punishment for a conviction. However, the
sentencing court must articulate its reasons underlying the
imposition of any sentence. Although the legislature enacted
a statutory requirement of specificity in 1983, the instant
case must be considered in light of the controlling caselaw
at the time of the original sentencing on March 25, 1981.
The leading case establishing requirement of judicial
disclosure is State v. Strumpf (blont. 1980), 37 St.Rep. 673,
" ... Indeed, it has always been the position of
this Court that the extent of punishment is vested
in the sound discretion of the trial
court .. . That a trial court has a right to
exercise its discretion does not mean that a trial
court should. not disclose the reasons underlying a
discretionary act. Absent these reasons, we as an
appellate court, are left to guess as to why the
trial court made a particular decision."
Respondent would limit the requirement to state reasons
to those decisions imposing a prison sentence. The policy
rationale discussed in Strumpf indicates that the requirement
for specifying reasons with particularity contemplates a
greater purpose than serving as information to the defendant
who is sent to prison. The requisite explanation of judicial
rationale extends to "why the trial court made a particular
decision. " (emphasis added) . State v. Strumpf, supra. The
rationale for judicial disclosure of the grounds underlying a
Court's decision is found in the Montana Canons of Judicial
Ethics.
"In disposing of controverted cases, a judge should
indicate the reasons for his action in an opinion
showing that he has not disrega-rded or overlooked
serious arguments of counsel. He thus shows his
full understanding of the case, avoids the
suspicion of arbitrary conclusion, promotes
confidence in his intellectual integrity and may
contribute useful precedent to the growth of the
law." Canon 19, 144 Mont. XXVI-XXVII.
In the instant case, however, the sentencing judge's
failure to state the reasons for imposition of the
concurrent, suspended sentences resulted in no prejudice to
the defendant and constituted harmless error. Based upon the
reasons recommended by the defendant and his attorney, the
trial judge imposed what the defendant requested: "a lengthy
suspended sentence" with restitution as a condition for
probation. The reasons for the particular sentence were
apparent from the record. of the sentencing hearing. No
substantial right of the defendant was denied; no prejudice
resulted. To remand this cause for resentencing where the
trial judge essentially followed defendant's request would be
a meaningless exercise.
Affirmed.
We concur:
224-t $, @ &
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C h i e f Justice