No. 83-354
I N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE O F MONTANA
1.984
STATE O F MONTANA,
P l a i n t i f f and R e s p o n d e n t ,
-vs-
DOUGLAS TRIMMER,
Defenda.nt a n d A p p e l l a n t .
APPEAL FROM: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eighth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
I n and f o r t h e County o f C a s c a d e ,
The H o n o r a b l e J o e l G . R o t h , J u d g e p r e s i d i n g .
COUNSEL O RECORD:
F
For Appellant:
Conner, B a i z & O l s o n ; Kenneth R. Olson a r g u e d , G r e a t
F a l l s , Montana
For Respondent:
Hon. Mike G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , Montana
J i m McLean a r g u e d , A s s t . A t t y . G e n e r a l , H e l e n a
J . F r e d Bourdeau, County A t t o r n e y , G r e a t F a l l s ,
Montana; J e r r y G u e n t h e r , Deputy County A t t y . ,
G r e a t F a l l s , Montana
Submitted: J u l y 2 6 , 1984
Decided: January 4 , 1985
Filed: JAN 4 - 1985
Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea delivered the Opinion of the
Court.
Defendant, Douglas Trimmer appeals from a sentence
imposed hy the Cascade County District Court for a conviction
of misdemeanor assault. The trial court sentenced defendant
to the maximum 6 months in jail and $500 fine based on the
penalty provided for misdemeanor assault ($ 45-5-201, MCA).
The court then invoked the sentence enha~cement statute, S
46-18-221, MCA, held that its application was mandatory
because defendant committed the negligent assault with a
weapon, and sentenced defendant to the minimum permitted, two
years in prison. Based on the provisions of the enhancement
statute, the 2-year sentence in prison was ordered served
consecutively to the 6-month jail sentence. Although defen-
dant raises several issues, one of them is dispositive. We
hold the sentence enhancement statute applies only to felo-
nies and the trial court erred in applying it to defendant's
conviction for misdemeanor assault. We vacate the sentence
and remand for resentencing.
The State charged defendant with felony assault under S
45-5-201, MCA, a charge that he purposely or knowingly
wounded several people with a rifle. The jury, however, was
instructed on both felony aggravated assault and the lesser
included misdemeanor offense of assault--a charge that
defendant negligently assaulted several people - - a weapon.
with
See 5 45-5-201, MCA. The jury expressly acquitted defendant
of felony assault but did convict defendant of misdemeanor
assault. The maximum permissible penalty for misdemeanor
assault is 6 months in jail and a $500 fine (§ 45-5-201(2),
MCA) .
At the sentencing hearing the court imposed the maximum
6-month jail term and $500 fine on defendant, but went a step
further and told defendant that the court must also apply S
46-18-221, MCA, the sentence enhancement statute. This
enhancement statute, in certain circumstances where a crime
has been committed with a weapon, mandates an additional
minimum 2-year prison sentence and a maximum 1-0-year prison
sentence. Defendant protested that the sentence enhancement
statute did not apply to misdemeanor convictions, and raised
other obiections, but each objection was overruled. The
trial court then sentenced defendant to a minimum 2-year
prison sentence at the state prison. Because the enhancement
statute requires the sentences to be served consecutively to
the sentence i-mposed for the underlying crime, the trial
court ordered that the 2-year prison sentence be served
consecutivel.y to the 6-month jail sentence. Defendant i s out.
.
on bond pending this appeal.
Defendant asserts both statutory and constitutional
grounds in arguing the additional sentence imposed was im-
proper. Defendant first contends that the sentence enhance-
ment statute applies only to felonies and therefore could not
he applied to his conviction of misdemeanor assault. Assum-
ing the statute does apply, however, defendant attacks the
sentence on several constitutional. grounds. He argues that
as applied to his misdemeanor conviction, the sentence con-
stitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of both
the United States and Montana Constitutions. Defendant also
contends the sentence violates Art. 11, § 22 of the Montana
Constitution because it constitutes excessive punishment.
Defendant further arques that the statute, as applied to
misdemeanors, is overbroad and vague, and denies him due
process of law and equal protectjon of the law because it
contains no provision for notifying a defendant the statute
will be appl ied to misdemeanors. Finally, defendant argues
the sentence was imposed in violatj-on of the correctional
policy of Article 11, § 22, 1972 Montana Constitution, and of
5 46-18-101, MCA, which attempts to set forth a statutory
policy consistent with the Constitution.
In vacating the sentence we decide only the issue of
v~hether the sentence enhancement statute ($ 46-18-2211 a.p-
plies to misdemeanors. Defendant argues that the statute on
its face can he construed to apply to misdemeanors hecause of
the language "any offense," but that the legislature did not
intend it to be so applied. The State, on the other hand,
argues that the language "any offense," clearly indicates
that the statute applies to misdemeanors, and further, that
if this Court gets to the issue of construing the statute by
referring to the legislative proceedings, those proceedi.ngs
establish an intent that misdemeanors also are covered by the
enhancement statute. Although we aaree with the defendant
that the legislative proceedings establish an intent by the
legislature to apply the enhancement statute only to
felonies, we conclude that the statute, on its face, applies
only to felonies. All that is required to reach this
conclusion is to read the statute in its entirety.
Although the facts leading to the iury verdict do not
bear on our decision on these questions of law, a short
recitation of the facts helps to place the jury verdict in
focus .
On July 11, 1982, defendant and a friend went to an
"after hours" kegqer party at a house in Great Falls. Short-
ly after their arrival, a fight broke out between Robert
Lingafelter and some of the partygoers. Defendant was not
involved in this scuffle. Defendant came out of the house
and he saw Lingafelter lying on the lawn across the street.
Defendant went to Lingafelter, helped him up, and told him to
go home. Lingafelter did go home, but only to return shortly
with a high-powered rifle.
Defendant was inside the house when he heard a shot
Lingafelter had fired into the air. Mass confusion followed
and defendant went outside and saw Lingafel-ter with the
rifle. Another partygoer, Daniel Johns, convinced
Lingafelter to put the rifle down, and when he did so defen-
dant grabbed it and began unloading it. Defendant got one
live shell out and then the rifle jammed. Defendant
dischambered a second live shell, despite attempts by Johns
to grab the rifle. The defendant ran down a nearby alley
with the rifle and began toyinq with it by raising it to his
shoulder and watching through the scope the events at the
house, some 20-30 yards away. Defendant testified that
although he did not remember pulling the trigger, the rifle
suddenly fired. Three people standing in the yard were
seriously wounded. Fortunately, no one was killed.
Essentially based on these events, defendant was charged
with felony aggravated assault and the jury acquitted him of
this charge, although the jury convicted defendant of negli-
gently committing an assault upon the three wounded persons
"with a weapon."
--
Defendant seems to argue that on its face the sentence
enhancement statute does apply to misdemeanors because of the
language -- "3offense." But defendant contends that the
legislative history of the statute shows it was not intended
to apply to misdemeanors, and that to do so would reach the
absurd result of effectively converting a misdemeanor convic-
tion into a felony conviction hy imposing a sentence that
falls within the parameters of 2 felony sentence. The State
contends, on the other hand, that the character of an offense
as a felony or as a misdemeanor is fixed only at the time of
sentencing when the judqe imposes the sentence and, there-
fore, that the legislature must have intended the enhancement
statute to cover misdemeanors as well as felonies. For this
outrageous assertion, the State inappropriately relies on
State v. Maldondgo (1978), 176 Mont. 322, 578 ~ . 2 d296, a
4cs
case that in no way supports a conc3.usion tha-t offenses in
Montana are unclassified until. the time of sentencing.
The State, with Maldonado as its first premise, then
agrees that the statutory language -- "any offense" -- can
only lead to the conclusion that the statute also applies to
misdemeanors. With this so-cal.led clear la~quage a.s its
premise the State then argues that this Court must adhere to
the plain meaning of the statute and cannot insert what has
been omitted or omit what has been inserted. We agree with
the State that the meaning of the statute is plain on its
face, but the clarity we see is not the clarity the State
sees. We reach our decision based on a reading of the entire
statute rather than simply relying on the language "any
offense. "
The sentence enhancement statute, S 46-18-221, MCA,
provides in part:
"Additional sentence for offenses committed with a
dangerous weapon. (1) A person who has been found
guilty of any offense and who, while engaged in the
commission of the offense, knowinqly displayed,
brandished, or otherwise used a firearm, destruc-
tive device, as defined in 45-8-332 (1) , or other
dangerous weapon shall, in addition - - punish-
to the
merit - - c o m m i s s i o n ~ f such offense, - -
- -- -
-.
. for the
--
. -- - - -
--
- he sen-
tenced - a term of imprisonment in the sta-te
to
prison of - - - -
not less than 2 years - - - than 10
or more -
years, except as provided in 46-18-222." (Emphasis
added. )
The State pulls the language in the statute--"any
offensen--totally out of context, and then proceeds to argue
the statute must apply to misd~meanors as well as to felo-
nies. Rut the State ignores the remaining language of the
statute, which, when read in context, shows to any reasonable
mind, the statute applies only to felonies.
It. has lonq been a rule OF sta-tutory construction that a
literal application of a statute which would lead to absurd
results should be avoided whenever any reasonable expl-anation
can be given consistent with the legislative purpose of the
statute. U.S. v. Ryan (1931), 284 U.S. 167, 52 S.Ct. 65, 76
L.Ed. 224; Billings Properties, Inc. v. Yell o~zrstone County
(19641, 1.44 Mont. 25, 394 P.2d 182. If this Court were faced
only with the language relied on by the State--"any
offensew--we could simply rely on this universal rule to show
the State's interpretation would lead to absurd results. But
here it is also clear an interpretation of the statute as a
whole leads to the inescapable conclusion that the legisla-
ture intended the statute to apply to felony convictions
only.
We discuss first our reading of the statute. The en-
-
hancement statute imposes a sentence "in addition - the
to"
punishment which could be imposed by a violation of the
statute involved. This langua~e--"inaddition tow--tells us
the sentence must be tacked on to whatever sentence is im-
posed for the conviction. Clearly, therefore, the enhance-
ment statute does not convert a misdemeanor conviction into a
felony conviction because the enhancement statute imposes a
sentence that must be served in the state prison. And the
1angua.ge of the statute requiring that the additional. sen-
tence (a minimum of two years and a maximum of ten years)
must be served in "state prison," tells us also the legisla-
ture must have intended that felonies only are subject to the
enhancement statute. By statute 5 45-2-101 (36), MCA) , a
misdemeanor conviction can result cn1.y in imprisonment in a
county jail.. Therefore, a prison sentence for a misdemeanor
conviction would be beyond the jurisdiction of the sentencing
court. When placed in context, the language
"in addition to," must cl.early refer to an underlying felony
conviction over which the District Court has jurisdi.ction to
sentence a defendant to the state prison.
We have no difficulty, therefore, in holding the en-
hancement statute applies only to a situation in which the
underlying conviction is for a felony.
And even assuming, based on the State's argument, the
language "any offense" applies to both felonies and misde-
meanors, this interpretation would lead to absurd results.
To literally apply the statute to misdemeanors would in
effect convert a misdemeanor convicti-on into a felony sen-
tence. For example, here the jurv expressly acquitted defen-
dant of the felony aggravated assault charge. If the jury
had convicted defendant, he cou1.d have been sentenced to a
maximum of 20 years in prison ( S 45-5-202, MCA) . However,
the jury prevented a prison sentence by convicting defendant
only of the misdemeanor, which carries with it a maximum
6-month jail sentence ( S 45-5-201(2), MCA, supra).
Although the jury is commonly instructed that it is not
to be concerned with the penalty, it is not unreasonable for
the jury to believe that when it acquitted defendant of the
felony charge he would not still be sentenced to prison for a
misdemeanor because felony sentencing standards were applied.
The application of t.he sentencing enhancement statute to this
case was a gross usurpation of the jury function. The jury
convicted defendant of a misdemeanor and the jury had every
right to believe defendant would be sentenced for a misde-
meanor only and that he would get no more than the maximum
penalty for this misdemeanor assault conviction. When the
jury convicted defendant of the misdemeanor assault charge
only the misdemeanor penalties were available to the trial
court as sentencing options. Those options contained in $
45-5-201(2), MCA, did not include that of sentencing
defendant to a term beyond the maximum six months.
The State's argument also ignores the statutory
jurisdictional scheme to which the enhancement statute must,
be applied. This statutory scheme does not permit a person
convicted of a misdemeanor to be sent to prison, and this is
true regardless of whether the misdemeanor conviction was in
justice court or in district court.
Offenses are primarily classified as felonies and
misdemeanors. A district court only has original
jurisdiction to try felony cases (fj 3-5-302(a), MCA). A
justice court has original jurisdiction over all misdemeanors
($5 3-10-303 ( I ) , MCA) . However, a district court has
concurrent jurisdiction over misdemeanors in two situations.
First, S 3-5-302(2) (a) provides that a district court has
jurisdiction over B misdemeanor offense if it is charged as
part of the same transaction in which a felony is also
charged. And second, S 3-5-302(c) provides that a district
court has jurisdiction over a misdemeanor offense if it is
classified as a lesser included offense of a charged felony.
A justice court has no jurisdiction to impose a prison
sentence; rather, it has only the jurisdiction to impose a
maximum 6-month jail sentence (SS 3-10-303 and 46-2-202,
MCA). The enhancement statute, on the other hand, provides
for a mjnimum 2-year prison sentence up to a maximum 10-year
prison sentence to be added to the sentence imposed for the
underlying conviction. Clearly a justice court would have no
jurisdiction to invoke this enhancement statute because its
jurisdiction is limited to a maximum 6-month jail sentence.
Therefore, a justice court conviction could never result in a
valid application of the enhancement statute.
Nor could a district court ever apply the enhancement
statute to a misdemeanor conviction. Assuming a conviction
in district court for a misdemeanor charge, the district
court nonetheless does not have expanded jurisdiction to
sentence the convicted person to prison. Rather, the court's
jurisdiction to sentence is limited to the maximum sentence
that can be imposed for the particular misdemeanor
conviction. For example, defendant here was convicted of
misdemeanor assault under S 45-5-201(b), MCA, and (subsection
(2)) of the statute authorizes a maximum 6-month jai.1
sentence. In sentencing defendant, the district court would
be limited to a sentence not to exceed the maximum provided
by this statute--6 months in jail.
It is clear, therefore, that before a sentence could be
imposed such as was imposed here, there would first have to
be a massive legislative overhaul of the statutes creating
and defining jurisdiction and creating and setting the
sentencing limits for criminal viol-ations.
Although it is unnecessary to rely on the legislative
proceedings to reach our decision, we nonetheless agree with
the defendant that the legislative proceedings support a
conclusion that the enhancement statute was intended to apply
to felonies only. All of the 1eqi.slative proceedings cited
to us by the parties that relate to the enhancement statute
contain not one reference that sentence enhancement would
apply to misdemeanors as well as felonies. In fact, before
the particul-ar enhancement statute involved here was finally
enacted, the 1-egislature considered other versions, and not
one of those versions indicated that the legislature even
considered that misdemeanors were also to be swept up by the
legis! ative desire to enhance sentences in certain
circumstances.
We vacate the entire sentence and remand for resentenc-
ing. The 6-month jail sentence together with the $500 fine
was within the permissible limits for the misdemeanor assault
conviction, but we are unable to determine whether this
maximum sentence was influenced by the misperceived duty of
the trial court to also sentence defendant to a minimum
2-year sentence in the state prison by application of the
enhanced sentence statute. We therefore vacate the entire
sentence and remand for resentencing on the misdemeanor
assault conviction.
We Concur:
I s p e c i a l l y concur i n t h e r e s u l t , b u t n o t w i t h a l l that
i s s a i d i n t h e Opinion.
*