IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTRNA
JUNE MEAD,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
TH0YA.S M. McKITTRICK, individually
and as a District Judge of the Eighth
Judicial District of the State of
Montana; RICHARD G. GASVODA, indiv-
idually and as a member of the Board
of County Commissioners of Cascade
County, Montana; JACK T. WHITAKER and
PATRICK L. RYAN, as members of the
Board. of County Commissioners; and
THE COUNTY OF CASCADE, Montana,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Cascade,
The Honorable R.D. McPhillips, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
James P. Reynolds argued, Helena, Montana
For Respondents:
John Bobinski, Dept. of Admin., argued for Judge
McKittrick, Helena, Montana
Marra, Wenz, Johnson & Hopkins; Charles R. Johnson
argued for County and Commissioners, Great Falls,
Montana
Submitted: June 3 , 1 9 8 6
Decided: October 2 1 , 1986
!9(?1-
Filed:
*
"
Mr. Chief Justice J. A. Turnage delivered the Opinion of the
Court.
June Mead appeals from an order of the Eighth Judicial
District Court, Cascade County, granting d.efendants1motions
to dismiss Mead's wrongful discharge suit.
We affirm.
June Mead raises two issues for our review:
1. Is a District Court judge immune, under
§ 2-9-112(2), MCA, from suit for the summary discharge of his
predecessor's personal secretary?
2. Are the county and county commissioners immune,
under S 2-9-112(1), MCA, from a suit arising from an act of
the judiciary?
June Mead began working for Cascade County as a deputy
clerk in the Clerk of Court's office in 1976. In 1979, Mead
temporarily replaced Judge Coder's personal secretary, who
was on maternity leave. When the personal secretary decided
against returning to work, her position was opened for appli-
cations. Mead applied and was hired for the position.
Mead continued to work for Judge Coder as his personal
secretary until he resigned in late 1983. Thomas McKittrick
was appointed to replace Judge Coder. Immediately upon
taking office, Judge McKittrick informed Mead of his inten-
tion to open her position for applications. Mead applied but
was not granted an interview. Jud.ge McKittrick terminated
Mead's employment on January 6, 1984.
On January 17, 1984, Judge McKittrick sent Mead a
letter giving his reasons for the termination. Mead asserts
that the reasons in the letter merely outline work patterns
she had established under Judge Coder. Mead believes her
termination was unfair because Judge McKittrick had told her
to continue her previous duties.
On July 6, 1984, Mead filed a complaint against Judge
McKittrick, the members of the Cascade County Board of Com-
missioners and Cascade County, alleging: (1) violation of her
right to due process of the law, (2) breach of contract,
(3) breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing, (4) wrongful discharge, and (5) fraud.
Defendants responded with motions to dismiss, alleging
immunity among their defenses. Following oral argument on
the issues, the District Court granted defendants' motions.
The trial judge held that Mead was a court employee rather
than a county employee, and that her employment was
"at-will." Mead appealed the dismissal of her cause but
dropped her breach of contract and fraud claims.
Issue No. 1
Is a district court judge immune, under S 2-9-112(2),
MCA, from suit for the summary discharge of his predecessor's
personal secretary?
Historically, judges have enjoyed absolute immunity for
judicial acts. Pierson v. Ray (1967), 386 U.S. 547, 554, 87
S.Ct. 1213, 1217, 18 L.Ed.2d 288, 294. Montana has codified
the doctrine of judicial immunity in § 2-9-112(2), MCA, which
provides :
A member, officer, or agent of the
judiciary is immune from suit for damag-
es arising from his lawful discharge of
an official duty associated with judi-
cial actions of the court.
The doctrine clothes Montana district courts with inherent
and statutory powers to do all that is necessary to render
their jurisdiction effective. Board of Commissioners of
Flathead County v. Eleventh Judicial District Court (1979),
182 Mont. 463, 470, 597 P.2d 728, 732. The appointment and
removal of key court employees is an effective judicial
action.
The public policy of judicial immunity safeguards
principled and independent decision-making. The contribu-
tions of a personal secretary are a significant part of
judicial efficiency, which is why district court judges have
the exclusive authority to choose their own personal secre-
taries. Section 3-1-113, MCA, is a general grant of power to
the courts: "[Wlhen jurisdiction is ... conferred on a
court or judicial officer, all the means necessary for the
exercise of such jurisdiction are also given." This section
authorizes the district court to hire the employees necessary
to carry out statutorily-mandated duties.
We can see no violation of public policy in a
newly-elected or appointed district judge selecting his own
personal secretary. Indeed, public policy is best served
when newly-elected officials are free to select their own key
staff members. Holley v. Preuss (1977), 172 Mont. 422, 427,
564 P.2d 1303, 1306. The efficient and proper administration
of justice requires that judges have personal secretaries
with whom they can work professionally and confidentially.
As such, the personal secretary occupies a distinct and
unique status among district court employees.
"[Tlhe modern judge differs from his predecessor in
that he must rely more on his staff ... A judge's institu-
tional personality, therefore, extends beyond his person."
Forrester v. White (7th Cir. 1986), 792 F.2d 647, 654. ll[I]f
an employee's duties are intimately related to the function-
ing of the [ judicial] process, then personnel decisions
regarding that employee are also part of the process."
Forrester, 792 F.2d at 655.
Immediately upon appointment, Judge McKittrick began an
orderly transition into judicial office. Judge McKittrick
opened Mead's position for new applicants and informed Mead
of this fact.
As we have stated earlier: "The immunity statute ap-
plies to judicial acts with no stated limitation." Knutson
v. State of Montana (Mont. 1984), 683 ~ . 2 d488, 490, 41
St.Rep. 1258, 1260. Such acts naturally include the power to
employ key court personnel.
In conclusion, Mead's discharge was a judicial act,
which is immune under S 2-9-112(2), MCA.
Issue No. 2
Are the county and county commissioners immune, under
S 2-9-112(1), MCA, from a suit arising from an act of the
judiciary?
Section 2-9-112(1), MCA, provides:
The state and other governmental units
are immune from suit for acts or omis-
sions of the judiciary.
In Knutson, 683 P.2d at 490, 41 St.Rep. at 1260, we held that
" [Section 2-9-112 (1)1 applies to protect the state and gov-
ernmental agencies whenever the judicial power of the state
is put to use in a judicial action." Since Mead's discharge
was a judicial act, the county and its commissioners cannot
be liable, because the legislature has expressly immunized
them. Furthermore, the immunity of the defendants is dispos-
itive of any subordinate issues raised by Mead.
Affirmed.
We concur:
Justices
Mr. Justice Frank B. Morrison, Jr. dissents to the maiority
opinion.
The cases are divided on the question of whether
judicial immunity extends to acts of administration. The
terminating of an employee is clearly an act of
administration. Although I realize there is support for the
position of the majority I feel that the better public policy
is to recognize that judges, in the treatment of their
personnel, are subject to the same rules to which others in
society are subject.
Further, I feel that the majority opinion has not
adequately treated the issue of whether the county is
directly responsible for the plaintiff's discharge. One
important fact omitted from the majority opinion is that
Judge McKittrick's decision to terminate the plaintiff was
reviewed and ultimately approved by the county. While the
county is immune for Judge McKittrick's acts, the county is
responsible for its own conduct.
June Mead was employed by Cascade County as a deputy
clerk of court in 1 9 7 6 . In 1 9 7 9 she was assigned to Judge
Coder as a personal secretary. When Judge Coder decided her
services were no longer needed in the judge's office, the
county had the option to reassign her to another position.
We should keep in mind that judgment was here entered on
the pleadings. No discovery has been done and judicial
intervention at this juncture is premature.
I would reverse and remand to allow discovery to go
forward.
Mr. Justice William E. Hunt, Sr., dissenting:
I join in the dissent of Mr. Justice Frank B. Morrison.
I would further dissent and add that because the majority
does not adequately treat the issue of the county's
responsibility in this matter, the county's conduct as an
employer is improperly ignored.
The county is responsible for its own conduct. It did
ratify Judge McKittrick's decision to terminate plaintiff's
employment. As such, S 2-9-112, MCA, is not applicable here.
The county, as plaintiff's employer should be held
accountable for express or implied promises made to plaintiff
regarding her employment.
The county paid plaintiff's salary, provided her with
health insurance benefits and issued a county employee's
manual to her. She was given repeated pronouncement by
various county officials that she indeed was a county
employee. Understandably she assumed she was protected under
terms similar to those in the employee manual.
These objective manifestions of her status as a county
employee entitle her to an opportunity to present evidence on
her allegations that the county breached its duty of good
faith and fair dealing, denied her due process and wrongfully
discharged her.
The District Court's grant of summary judgment to
defendants wrongly denied plaintiff this opportunity. I
would reverse and remand this case to allow discovery to go
forward.