No. 8 5 - 4 4 2
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1986
MARK A. GAUB,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
MILBANK INSURANCE COMPANY,
and KIMBERLY A. TANNER,
Defendants,
and
LARRY TANNER and JUDY TANNER,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Twentieth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Lake,
The Honorable C.B. McNeil, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Ha.sh, Jellison, OtBrien & Bartlett; James C. Bartlett,
Kalispell, Montana
For Respondent:
Warden, Christiansen, Johnson & Berg; Gary R.
Christiansen, Kalispell, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: Nov. 14, 1 9 8 5
Decided: March 20, 1986
Filed: MAR 2 0 1986
Clerk
Mr. Justice L. C. Gulbrandson delivered the Opinion of the
Court.
The plaintiff appeals an ord.er from the Lake County
District Court granting summary jud-gment to defendants Larry
Tanner and Judy Tanner. Plaintiff contends on appeal tha-t
5 61-5-108, MCA, requires any negligence of a minor to be
imputed to the minor's parents when (a.) both parents signed
the minor's application for a driver's license and (b) no
proof of financial responsibility accompanied the minor's
applicati-on for a driver's license. We affirm the District
Court's order granting summary judgment to the parents.
The following facts are taken from the District Court's
order:
Defendant Kimberly A. Tanner drove a motor vehicle
which was involved in a collision with plaintiff's vehicle in
December 1983. She is the minor daughter of defendants Larry
and Judy Tanner. Both parents signed Kimberly Tanner's
application for a driver's license in December 1982. They
maintained liability insurance on the motor vehicle which she
drove at the time of the accident. The amount of insurance
was twice the minimum amount required to satisfy Montana's
financial responsibility laws. The parents provided proof of
liability insurance to the Motor Vehicle Division of the
State of Montana by complying with its directives to the Lake
County Treasurer when they licensed and registered the motor
vehicle. No proof of financial responsibility accompanied
Kimberly Tanner's application for a driver's license.
Plaintiff's sole issue on appeal concerns the meaning
of § 61-5-108, MCA:
Can parents who signed a minor's application for a
driver's license invoke a limit on damages i.n the amount of
their liability insurance coverage when (a) 50th parents
have signed the a.pplication for the minor to obtain a driv-
er's license, and (b) no proof of financial responsibility
accompanied the minor's application for a driver's license?
Section 61-5-108, MCA, states:
(1) The application of any person under
the age of 18 years for an instruction
permit or operator's license shall be
signed and verified before a person
authorized to administer oaths by both
the father and mother of the applicant,
if both are living and have custody of
him, or by the surviving parent, or in
the event neither parent is living or has
custody, then by the person or guardian
having such custody or by an employer of
such minor, or in the event there is no
guardian or employer then by some other
responsible person who is willing to
assume the obligation imposed under this
chapter upon a person signing the appli-
cation of a minor.
( 2 ) Any negligence or willful misconduct
of a minor under the age of 18 years when
driving a motor vehicle upon a highway
shall be imputed to a person who has
signed the application of such minor for
a permit or license, which person shall
be jointly and severally liable with such
minor for any damages caused by such
negligence or willful misconduct, except
as otherwise provided in subsection (3)
of this section.
(3) In the event a minor deposits or
there is deposited upon his behalf proof
of financial responsibility in respect to
the operation of a motor vehicle owned by
him, or if not the owner of a motor
vehicle, then with respect to the opera-
tion of any motor vehicle, in form and in
amounts as required under the motor
vehicle fina.ncia1 responsibility laws of
this state, then the department may
accept the application of such minor when
signed by one parent or the guardian of
such minor, and while such proof is
maintained such parent or guardian shall
not be subject to the liability imposed
under subsection (2) of this section.
Appellant focuses on the last two phrases in subsection
( 3 ) to support his interpretation. He argues that subsection
(3) is available only when "one parent or the guardian of
such minor" signs the application and that it is not avail-
able when both parents or the minor's employee or some other
responsible person signs the application. He also contends
that the proof of financial responsibility must be submitted
at the time of application. The District Court concluded,
from reading 5 61-5-108, MCA, as a whole that in subsections
(1) and (2), the legislature intended a minor should receive
a driver's license only if the application is co-signed by a.
person who shall be responsible for any negligence of the
minor while operating a motor vehicle. The court further
concluded that, in subsection ( 3 ) , the legislature eliminated
this imputed liability for that responsible person so long as
proof of financial responsibility is provided and maintained.
Finally, the District Court concluded that the express lan-
guilge of subsection (3) contains no time limitation within
which proof of financial responsibility must be deposited.
Th.e fundamental rule of statutory con-
struction is that the intention of the
legislature controls ... The intention
of the legislature must first be deter-
mined from the plain meaning of the words
used ... [Citations omitted.]
Missoula County v. American Asphalt, Lnc. (Mont. 1985), 701
P.2d 990, 992, 42 St.Rep. 920, 922. In the search for plain
meaning, "the language used must he reasonably and logically
interpreted, giving words their usual and ordinary meaning."
In re Matter of McCabe (1975), 168 Mont. 334, 339, 544 P.2d
825, 828. A court's function, when construing a statute, is
to ascertain what it contains,
not to insert what has been omitted nor
to omit what has been inserted ... A
statute must be read and considered in
its entirety and the legislative intent
may not be determined from the wording of
any particular section or sentence, but
only from a consideration of the whole
... [Citations omitted.] [Emphasis
added. 1
State ex rel. Cashmore v. Anderson (1972), 160 Mont. 175,
184, 500 P.2d 921, 926-927, cert. den. 410 U.S. 931, 93 S.Ct.
We agree with the District Court's construction of the
statute which considers the statute as a whole. Under appel-
lant's construction, if one parent signs the application and
provides proof of financial responsibility, that parent has
no imputed liability; but if both parents sign and provide
the required proof, both parents have imputed liability.
Similarly, a guardian having custody who signs the applica-
tion and provides the required proof escapes imputed liabili-
ty; but some other "responsible person" having custody who
signs the application and provides the required proof remains
subject to imputed liability. Such an interpretation is
neither reasonable nor logical. "Statutory construction
should not lead to absurd results i.f a rea.sonable construc-
tion will avoid it." State ex rel. Ronish v. School Dist.
No. 1 (1960), 136 Mont. 453, 460, 348 P.2d 797, 801, 78 ALR2d
1012. A reasonable construction of subsection (3), when
considering the statute in its entirety, permits the
person(s) who signed the application to be relieved from the
operation of subsection (2) so long as proof of financial
responsibility is provided and maintained.
If a statute requires construction, a review of the
title of the original bill is a necessary first step to aid
that construction. Matter of Senate Bill No. 23 Ch. No. 491,
M. S. L. of 1973 (1975), 168 Mont. 102, 105, 540 P.2d 975,
976. The title of H. B. 207, the bill which was enacted in
1947 and codified as § 61-5-108, MCA, describes the bill as
". . . providing for the method of application for licenses
for minors by the parents, guardian or other responsible
person and providing for the liability of such parents,
guardian or other person in certain instances; providing for
the release from liability by such parents, guardian or other
person ... " Thus, the title, part of this statute's
legislative history, supports the District Court's construc-
tion, as well.
Section 61-5-108 (3) , MCA, makes no direct reference to
the time within which proof of financial responsibility must
be submitted. It states, in part, " [ i J the event [proof of
n
financial responsibility is deposited], in form and in
amounts as required under the motor vehicle financial
responsibility laws of this state ... " (Emphasis added.)
The plain meaning of this is that so long as the proof com-
plies in form with §§ 61-0-101 et seq., MCA, the Motor Vehi-
cl-e Safety Responsibility Act, there is no imputed liability.
That Act requires the owner of the motor vehicle to certify
that he possesses insurance or one of the listed. alternatives
before the vehicle is registered. Section 61-6-302 (1), MCA.
Without this Court inserting a time limit which has been
omitted from 5 61-5-108 ( 3 ) , MCA, a reading of 5 61-6-302 (I),
MCA, only requires providing proof of motor vehicle insurance
at the time the vehicle is registered. We will not insert a
different time limitation into 5 61-5-108f3), MCA, when the
legislature did not require it. The District Court correctly
reasoned that,
... from the time proof of financial
responsibility is deposited on behalf of
a minor, whether such deposit be made
prior to, simultaneous with, or at any
time after the submission of the
application, that the person or persons
who signed the application are not sub-
ject to the imputed liability of subsec-
..
tion ( 2 ) .
Thus, so lony as liability insurance is, in fact, in force at
the time of an accident, proof offered at any time releases
the signers from imputed liability. Similarly, if proper
proof had been deposited at one time but the insurance was
not in force at the time of the accident, that would be
sufficient proof that financial responsibility had not been
retained and imputed liability would be reimposed.
Appellant cites Moore v. Jacobsen (1953), 127 Mont.
341, 263 P.2d 713, for his contention that the proof of
financial responsibility must accompany the minor's applica-
tion for a license. Moore held that the second subsection
applied and that there was no evidence either party resorted
to the third subsection. This Court noted that the record
did not disclose that proof of financial responsibility had
been deposited "at the time the application wa.s made for a
license, or at any other time." 127 Mont. at 348, 263 P.2d
at 717. The subsequent statement that proof must be made at
the time of application is dicta and not controlling authori-
ty for the case at bar. Further, on motion for rehearing,
this Court stated nothing in the record indicated proof of
financial responsibility was deposited at "any place or any
time," and stated no requirement that proof was required at
the time of application. Moore, 127 Mont. at 365, 263 P.2d
at 726. Moore is distinguishable on the facts from this case
as well. Here, the parents provided proof of financial
responsibility at the time the vehicle was registered and
licensed and the insurance was in effect at the time of the
accident, in contrast to the responsible person in -
Moore,
-
discussed above.
We hold that S 6 1 - 5 - 1 0 8 ( 3 ) , MCA, relieves the person
who signed an application of a minor from the imputed liabil-
ity of subsection (2) so long a-s financial responsibil-ity is
maintained as required under the motor vehicle financial
responsibility laws of this state and that so long as such
financial responsibility is maintained, proof offered at any
time releases the signer from the imputed liability of
subsection (2).
The District Court's order is affirmed.
We concur:
/
Chief Justice