No. 85-487
I N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1986
STATE OF MONTANA,
P l a i n t i f f and R e s p o n d e n t ,
-vs-
GERALD LINCOLN WALKER,
D e f e n d a n t and A p p e l l a n t .
APPEAL FROM: D i s t r i c t C o u r t of t h e T h i r d J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
I n and f o r t h e C o u n t y of P o w e l l ,
T h e H o n o r a b l e A r n o l d O l s e n , Judge p r e s i d i n g .
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For A p p e l l a n t :
B r a d L. Belke, B u t t e , Montana
For R e s p o n d e n t :
Hon. M i k e G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , M o n t a n a
Dorothy McCarter, Asst. Atty. General, Helena
T e d L. Mizner, C o u n t y A t t o r n e y , D e e r L o d g e , M o n t a n a
S u b m i t t e d on B r i e f s : Nov. 21, 1985
Decided: January 2 8 , 1 9 8 6
Filed: JF'N 2 J 1986
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Clerk I
Mr. Justice Fred J. Weber delivered the Opinion of the Court.
Defendant, Gerald Lincoln Walker, entered a plea of
guilty to charges relating to burglary and theft. At his
sentencing hearing, he moved to withdraw that plea. The
Powell County District Court denied his motion, and defendant
appeals. We affirm the District Court's order.
The issues on appeal are:
(1) Did the District Court abuse its discretion in not
allowing defendant to withdraw his guilty plea?
(2) Is defendant's epilepsy a developmental disability
which raises a defense of lack of intent at the time the
crimes were committed?
Defendant was arrested in December, 1984 on charges of
burglary, attempted burglary, and theft. At his arraignment,
the defendant entered a plea of not guilty, and a trial date
was set. In April, 1985 he withdrew his plea and, on the
basis of a plea negotiation with the Powell County Attorney,
entered a plea of guilty. The court ordered. a presentence
investigation.
Thereafter, a question arose concerning the defendant's
fitness to proceed, and, at his counsel's request, he was
sent to Warm Springs State Hospital for an examination. He
was transferred to Galen State Hospital after suffering from
seizures. There, he was placed on medication. Approximately
five days later he returned to Warm Springs, where he
underwent evaluation.
At his sentencing hearing, defendant moved to withdraw
his guilty plea on the basis that he was under a disability
at the time he entered the plea, and was incompetent to enter
a plea. He also contended that the examination at Warm
Springs did not address itself to the issue of whether his
epilepsy (as distinguished from his I.Q.) caused him to lack
the requisite mental state to commit the offenses charged.
The State presented testimony by the psychologist who
examined the defendant at Warm Springs. He testified that he
had spent approximately two hours with defendant, and that he
had access to all of defendant's files, including medical
files, at Warm Springs. His conclusion was that defendant
was competent and did not suffer from a mental disease or
defect. He also testified that, in his opinion, the
defendant could assist in his own defense and understood the
proceedings against him. Defendant1 motion to withdraw his
s
plea was denied and he was sentenced pursuant to the plea
bargain.
Did the District Court abuse its discretion in not
allowing defendant to withdraw his guilty plea?
We consider three important factors in reviewing a
motion to withdraw a guilty plea. They are: (1) the
adequacy of the District Court's interrogation at the time
the plea was entered as to the defendant's understanding of
the consequences of his plea; (2) the promptness with which
the defendant attempts to withdraw the prior plea; and
(3) the fact that the defendant's plea was the result of a
plea bargain. State v. Mesler (Mont. 1984), 682 P.2d 714,
As to the first factor, a trial judge's interrogation
of a defenda.nt seeking to enter a guilty plea is sufficient
if the judge:
... examines the defendant, finds him
to be competent, and determines from him
that his plea of guilty is voluntary, he
understands the charge and his possible
punishment, he is not acting under the
influence of drugs or alcohol, he admits
his counsel is competent and he has been
well advised, and he declares in open
court the facts upon which his guilt is
based.
State v. Lewis (1978), 177 Mont. 474, 485, 582 P.2d 346, 352.
At his change of plea hearing, the defendant submitted
to the court a written "acknowledgement of waiver of rights
by plea of guilty." That document, signed by the defendant,
contained statements that he understood all of the matters
listed above in Lewis. It also contained defendant's
handwritten statement of the facts which were the basis for
his plea of guilty. Before accepting the guilty plea, the
court questioned defendant as to the authenticity and
contents of the acknowledgement.
This Court has held, in a similar fact situation, that
a written acknowledgement combined with oral questioning of
the defendant constituted adequate interrogation under Lewis.
State v. Laverdure (Mont. 1984), 685 P.2d 375, 41 St.Rep.
1570. We conclude that the District Court here conducted an
adequate interrogation of the defendant as to his
understanding of the consequences of his plea. We note also
that the psychological evaluation of defendant did not
support his position that he was incompetent to enter a
voluntary guilty plea.
The matters of the promptness of defendant's motion to
change his plea and the fact that his change of plea was a
result of plea bargain.ing are not in dispute. Although the
promptness of plaintiff's motion to change his plea weighs in
his favor, upon consideration and balancing of all three
factors, we hold that the District Court was within its
discretion in denying defendant's motion to withdraw his
guilty plea.
Is defendant's epilepsy a developmental disability
which raises a defense of lack of intent at the time the
crimes were committed?
The defendant did not produce any evidence in support
of his contention that his epilepsy affected his ability to
form the requisite intent at the time the crimes were
committed. In fact, the results of the mental examination
tend to disprove this theory. We therefore apply the rule
that when a defendant properly pleads guilty, he waives all
factual defenses as well as constitutional violations which
occurred prior to the plea. State v. Hilton (1979), 183
Mont. 13, 597 P.2d 1171. We do not rule on the issue of
whether epilepsy could constitute a developmental disability
negating the element of intent, if properly proven.
The order of the District Co
We concur