No. 85-302
I N THE SUPREME COURT O THE STATE O MONTANA
F F
1986
BILLINGS DEACONESS HOSPITAL, I N C . ,
Plaintiff,
JUDITH K . ANGEL,
Defendant and T h i r d P a r t y
P l a i n t i f f and A p p e l l a n t ,
and
GARY R. ANGEL,
Defendant and T h i r d P a r t y
Plaintiff,
and
TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY,
T h i r d P a r t y Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL FROM: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
I n and f o r t h e County o f Y e l l o w s t o n e ,
The H o n o r a b l e W i l l i a m J. S p e a r e , J u d g e p r e s i d i n g .
COUNSEL O RECORD:
F
For Appellant:
K e l l y & H a l v e r s o n , P.C.; Bradley J. Finn, B i l l i n g s ,
Montana ( J u d i t h Angel)
For Respondent:
Crowley Law F i r m ; L. R a n d a l l B i s h o p , B i l l i n g s ,
Montana (Travelers Insurance)
S u b m i t t e d on B r i e f s : Oct. 3, 1985
Decided: J a n u a r y 2 1 , 1986
Filed: JaN 2 1 1986
Mr. Justice Fred 2. Weber delivered the Opinion of the Court.
In the District Court of Yellowstone County, Billings
Deaconess Hospital, Inc. brought a collection action against
Judith K. Angel and her husband for services rendered to Mrs.
Angel. Mrs. Angel cross-claimed against Travelers Insurance
Company (Travelers) claiming that Travelers should have paid
the medical expenses under workers' compensation coverage.
The District Court ruled it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction. Mrs. Angel appeals. We affirm.
The issues are:
I.. Did the District Court err in dismissing Mrs.
Angel's third-party complaint on the ground that exclusive
jurisdiction to resolve the dispute lies in the Workers'
Compensation Court?
2. May Mrs. Angel challenge the constitutionality of
S 39-71-2905, MCA, for the first time on appeal?
Billings Deaconess Hospital brought an action against
Mrs. Angel for services rendered to her in the sum of
$13,510.23, which included interest up to the date of the
filing of the complaint. Mrs. Angel filed an answer
admitting the essential allegations of the complaint. She
a.lso filed a third-party complaint which alleged that the
medical care and services rendered to her were required as a
direct result of an industrial accident and that the employer
was insured with Travelers. She demanded judgment against
Travelers for all sums that might be adjudged owing by her to
Billings Deaconess Hospital.
The third-party complaint alleged that the indemnity
liability of Travelers arose because Travelers was the
workers' compensation carrier for Yellowstone Boys Ranch and
Mrs. Angel's hospital treatment was related to injuries she
sustained in the course of and arising out of her employment
with Yellowstone Boys Ranch.
Travelers made a motion to dismiss. The affidavit filed
in support of the motion to dismiss established that the same
claim for payment of medical expenses was the subject of a
petition for trial presently pending before the Workers
Compensation Court. That petition was filed by Mrs. Angel on
July 13, 1983 and requested payment of disputed medical
bills. The trial was held before the Workers' Compensation
Court on September 27, 1983. The case has not been submitted
to the Workers' Compensation Court due to delays in taking
post-trial depositions of medical care providers. BY
stipulation of the parties before the Workers' Compensation
Court, jurisdiction over Mrs. Angel's claimed entitlement to
payment for medical bills lies in the Workers' Compensation
Court.
Based upon the record established. in Travelers'
uncontradicted affidavit and following oral argument, the
District Court entered its order dismissing Mrs. Angel's
third-party complaint. She appeals.
I
Did the District Court err in dismissing Mrs. Angel's
third-party complaint on the ground that exclusive
jurisdiction to resolve the dispute lies in the Workers'
Compensation Court?
In substance, Mrs. Angel argues that she was entitled to
the relief claimed in her third-party complaj-nt because of
the provisions of Rule 14 (a), M. R.Civ. P., which in pertinent
part states:
At any time after commencement of the action a
defending party, as a third-party plaintiff, ma-y
cause a summons and complaint to be served upon a
person not party to the action who is or may be
liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff's
claim against him.
Mrs. Angel argues that there is absolutely no language in
Rule 14(a) which bars the third-party compla.int. She further
argues that the District Court has original jurisdiction in
all civil matters under the Montana Constitution. Mrs. Angel
concludes that the District Court was required to determine
that the Workers' Compensation Court had either concurrent or
exclusive jurisdiction. She contends the District Court
should have proceeded to hear the merits of the third-party
complaint or stayed all proceedings in the collection action
until the issue in the third-party complaint was final3.y
resolved by the Workers' Compensation Court.
The District Court dismissed Mrs. Angel's third-party
complaint on the ground that excl-usive jurisdiction to
resolve the dispute rested with the Workers' Compensation
Court. Section 39-71-2905, MCA, states in pertinent part:
. .
. The workers' compensation judge has exclusive
jurisdiction to make determinations concerning
disputes under chapter 71, except as provided in
39-71-516 ...
The exception provided in S 39-71-516, MCA, is not relevant
to the present issue.
Section 39-71-2905, MCA, was considered at length in
State, Etc. v. Hunt (Nont. 1981), 625 P.2d 539, 38 St.Rep.
421. In that case a petition had been filed with the
Workers' Compensation Court seeking a determination as to
whether Norman Beebe was an employee of one of several
employers or an independent contractor. The Uninsured
Employers Fund sought a writ of prohibition from this Court
contending that the workers' compensation judge had no
jurisdiction to determine which party was Mr. Beebe's
employer. The Uninsured Employers Fund also brought a
separate action in the Fourth Judicial District Court raising
similar issues. In its holding, this Court pointed out that
a claimant or an insurer who has a dispute may petition the
Workers' Compensation Court for determination of the dispute
under S. 39-71-2905, MCA. This Court noted that the workers'
compensation judge has exclusive jurisdiction to make
determinations concerning disputes regarding workers'
compensation. We pointed out that cases handled by the
Workers' Compensation Court had not been limited to disputes
between insurers and employees. This Court concluded that
the dispute related to benefits payable to a claimant, and
under S 39-71-2905, MCA, the Workers' Compensation Court had
exclusive jurisdiction.
Although the Workers' Compensation Court is not
vested with the full powers of a District Court, it
nevertheless has been given broad powers concerning
benefits due and payable to claimants under the
Act. It has the power to determine which of
several parties are liable to pay the Workers'
Compensation benefits ...
and other matters that
go beyond the minimum determination of the benefits
payable to an employee.
We determine that the Workers' Compensation Court
has exclusive jurisdiction of this cause relating
to the benefits of Beebe.
Hunt, 625 P.2d at 542, 38 St.Rep. at 425.
The items in question in the present case are hospital
services. Section 39-71-704(l) (a), MCA, provides that in
addition to the compensation provided under chapter 71 and as
an "additional benefit" separate and apart from compensation,
the insurer shall furnish reasonable services by a physician
and surgeon and reasonable hospital services and medicines
when needed. It is clear that the hospital services here in
question are benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act.
We conclude that the third-party complaint filed by Mrs.
Angel seeks to transfer to a District Court a benefits
dispute, which is presently pending before the Workers'
Compensation Court. The Workers' Compensation Court has
exclusive jurisdiction over that dispute.
We hold. that the District Court correctly dismissed Mrs.
Angel's third-party complaint on the grounds that exclusive
jurisdiction rests in the Workers' Compensation Court.
May Mrs. Angel challenge the constitutionality of
5 39-71-2905, MCA, for the first time on appeal?
Mrs. Angel raised no question as to the
constitutionality of S 39-71-2905, MCA, before the District
Court. In the briefs to this Court, Mrs. Angel argues that
by implication, at least, the grant of exclusive jurisdiction
to the Workers' Compensation Court in § 39-71-2905, MCA, is
inconsistent with the provisions of art. VII, sec. 4, Mont.
Const., which gives the District Court original jurisdiction
in all civil matters at law and in equity. Apparently, Mrs.
Angel seeks an opinion of this Court finding that district
courts have concurrent jurisdiction over industrial accident
claims.
Mrs. Angel's challenge to the constitutionality of
5 39-71-2905, MCA, is not properly before this Court. First,
Mrs. Angel failed to comply with the mandatory statutory
requirement of Rule 38, M.R.App.Civ.P., which states in
pertinent part:
Cases involving guestions where -
the
state is not a party.
1tshall-be the duty of counsel who challenges
the constitutionality of any act of the ~ o n t a n a
legislature in any suit or proceeding in the
supreme court to which the state of Montana, or any
agency thereof, or any officer or employee thereof,
as such officer or employee, is not a party, upon
the filing of the record to give immediate notice
in writing to the court of the existence of said
question, specifying the section of the code or the
chapter of the session law to be construed. The
clerk shall thereupon certify such fact to the
attorney general of the state of Montana.
"Failure to comply with this rule prevents the notice from
being given the attorney general and therefore he has no
opportunity to appear and. defend the acts of the Montana
legislature. Under these circumstances this Court will not
proceed to answer the constitutional questions ... " Grant
v. Grant (1975), 166 Mont. 229, 232, 531 P.2d 1007, 1009;
Bradbrook v. City of Billings (1977), 174 Mont. 27, 31, 568
P.2d 527, 529-30. Mrs. Angel's failure to notify the
attorney general precludes this Court from ruling on the
constitutional issue raised.
Second, as a general rule, constitutional issues must be
raised at the district court level.
This Court has consistently ruled that a
constitutional issue is waived if not presented at
the earliest opportunity.
Dodd v. City of East Helena (1979), 180 Mont. 518, 523, 591
P.2d 241, 244. --
See also Matter of Auth. to Conduct Sav. &
Loan Act., Etc. (1979), 182 Mont. 361, 368, 597 ~ . 2 d84, 88.
We hold that Mrs. Angel may not challenge the
constitutionality of 5 39-71-2905, MCA, because she neither
complied with Rule 38, M.R.App.Civ.P., nor raised this
constitutional issue at the earliest opportunity.
We concur:
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Justices