No. 87-178
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1987
DARYLE R. MURPHY, as Guardian
Ad Litem for L . C . ,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vs-
STATE OF MONTANA, and THE DEPARTMENT
OF INSTITUTIONS FOR THE STATE OF
MONTANA,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the First Judicial District,
In and for the County of Lewis & Clark,
The Honorable Thomas Honzel, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Anderson, Edwards & Molloy; Donald W. Molloy,
Billings, Montana
Terry Seiffert, Billings, Montana
Gary Wilcox, Billings, P4ontana
For Respondent:
Kim Kradolfer, Agency Legal Services Bureau, Helena,
Montana
Submitted on Briefs: Sept. 17, 1987
Decided: December 10, 1987
.
F-d* "
: ' 1387
Filed:
Clerk
Mr. Justice John C. Sheehy delivered the Opinion of the
Court.
Daryle Murphy in his capacity as guardian ad litem for
Linda Cawley appeals from an order of the District Court,
First Judicial District, Lewis and Clark County, dismissing
plaintiff's claims against the State of Montana and the
Department of Institutions on the grounds that the statute of
limitations had run. We reverse.
The issue before this Court is whether the District
Court properly dismissed the plaintiff's complaint as barred
by the statute of limitations.
The plaintiff was born in 1950. In 1963, at the age of
13, plaintiff was confined to the State Hospital at Warm
Springs. From 1964 until 1975, while confined at the State
Hospital, plaintiff was allegedly subjected to a wide variety
of tortious conduct. The plaintiff was discharged from Warm
Springs in July, 1975. In August, 1976, plaintiff, using a
toy gun, took a hostage and demanded to speak to the Governor
of the State of Montana to complain about conditions at Warm
Springs. Plaintiff was charged with aggravated assault and
was subsequently acquitted by reason of insanity. During the
interim between the plaintiff's discharge from Warm Sprinqs
and the present time, the State has filed six separate formal
commitment proceedings against the plaintiff on the basis of
serious mental illness.
In July, 1986, the plaintiff filed a motion for
appointment of a guardian and Daryle Murphy was appointed
guardian ad litem. Also, in July, 1986, plaintiff filed her
action against the State of Montana and the Department of
Institutions for the State of Montana.
In September, 1986, the defendants introduced a motion
to dismiss plaintiff's complaint as barred by the applicable
statute of limitations. On March 5, 1987, the District Court
granted the defendants' motion and dismissed the plaintiff's
complaint. The plaintiff appeals from the judgment of the
District Court.
The plaintiff's complaint sounds in tort and as such the
statute of limitations is delineated in 27-2-204 and
27-2-401, MCA. The general rule regarding the statute of
limitations for tort actions in Montana is provided i.n S
27-2-204, MCA:
27-2-204. Tort actions--general and personal
injury. ( l r ~ h e period prescribx for the
commencement of an action upon a liability not
founded upon an instrument in writing is within 3
years.
(2) The period prescribed for the commencement of
an action to recover damages for the death of one
caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another is
within 3 years.
( 3 ) The period prescribed for the commencement of
an action for libel, slander, assault, battery,
false imprisonment, or seduction is within 2 years.
However, there are exceptions to the general statute of
limitations when the person entitled to bring the action is
afflicted with singular or multiple disabilities. These
exceptions are delineated in $ 27-2-401, MCA (1985), which
provides:
27-2-401. When person entitled to bring action is
under - disability.
a (1) If a person entitled to
bring an action mentioned in part 2, except
27-2-211 (3), is, at the time the cause of action
accrues, either a minor, seriously mentally ill, or
imprisoned on a criminal charge - under a sentence
or
for a term less than for life, the time of such
disability is not a part of the time limited for
commencing the action. However, the time so
limited cannot be extended more than 5 years by any
such disability except minority or, in any case,
more than 1 year after the disability ceases.
(2) If an action is barred by 27-2-304, any of the
heirs, devisees, or creditors who at the time of
the transaction. upon which the action might have
been founded was- under one of the disabilities
mentioned in subsection (1) may, within 5 years
after the cessation - -
of such disability maintain an
action to recover damages. In such action he may
recover such sum or the value of such property as
he would have received upon the final distribution
of the estate if an adtion had been seasonably
commenced by the executor or administrator.
(3) No person may avail himself of a disability
unless it existed when his right of action or entry
accrued.
(4) When two or more disabilities coexist at the
time the right of action or entry accrues, the
limitation does not attach until they are both
removed. (Emphasis added. )
In construing g 27-2-401, MCA, this Court will adhere to
Montana's well established rules regarding the construction
and interpretation of statutes.
In State v. Hubbard (1982), 200 Mont. 106, 111, 649 P.2d
1331, 1333, this Court stated:
The intention of the legislature must first be
determined from the plain meaning of the words
used, and if interpretation of the statute can be
so determined, the courts may not go further and
apply any other means of interpretation.
See also State v. Austin (Mont. 19851, 704 P.2d 55, 42
Upon examining § 27-2-401, it is apparent to us from the
plain meaning of the words employed that the legislature
intended to toll the statute of limitations for persons with
a right of action suffering from coexisting disabilities
until "both" of the disabilities cease.
It should be noted that the statute ( § 27-2-401) adopted
in 1987 is not identical to the 1985 version of 5 27-2-401,
MCA. For our purposes, the pertinent change occurred in the
last line of S 27-2-401(4) where the word "all" was
substituted for the word "both." The other changes involve
minor alterations of the last sentence in both subsections
one and two.
We must disagree with the District Court's assertion
that subsection (1) and subsection (4) are in conflict with
each other. It is our opinion that subsection 1 is invoked
when the person entitled to bring an action is laboring under
a single disability. The language utilized in the
delineations of the disabilities which will invoke the
tolling is in the disjunctive, indicating that subsection (1)
is to apply exclusively to those persons with single
disabilities.
We hold that the last sentence in 27-2-401 (11, MCA,
should not be construed as specifying a period of ultimate
repose for the whole statute, rather it is applicable only to
subsection (1).
In contrast, the language utilized in S 27-2-401(4),
MCA, is specifically directed at situations where the person
entitled to bring an action is suffering from two or more
coexisting disabilities at the time the right of action
accrues. Further, the language and wording of subsection ( 4 )
make it abundently clear that the legislature intended that
in such cases the statute of linlitations is to be tolled
until all of the disabilities existing at the time the right
of action accrued are removed.
This Court has previously held that "[a] statute derives
its meaning from the entire body of the words taken
together." Wyse v. District Court of the 4th Judicial
District (1981), 195 Mont. 434, 437, 6 3 6 P.2d 8 6 5 , 8 6 6 .
As we have previously stated there are no conflicts
between the subsections of S 27-2-401, when the statute is
taken as a whole. Subsection (1) applies to situations where
the person with the right of action has a single disability.
Subsection (4) comes into play if two or more disabilities
are present. To interpret the statute in such a manner that
subsection (1) conflicts with subsection (4) is to suggest
that the legislature had little or no understanding of the
law they were enacting. Such an interpretation would render
subsection (4) meaningless. Such a result is not reasonable.
It is a further fundamental role of statutory
construction that the unreasonableness of the
result produced by one interpretation is reason for
rejecting it in favor of another that would produce
a reasonable result. In Re Kay's Estate (1953),
127 Mont. 172, 260 P.2d 391.
Johnson v. Marias River Electric Co-op, Inc. (Mont. 19841,
687 P.2d 668, 671, 41 St.Rep. 1528, 1532.
In analyzing 5 27-2-401, MCA, the District Court
concludes that with the exception of minority, the ultimate
repose for any person entitled to bring an action, whether
suffering from a singular or multiple disability is five
years. Such an interpretation is inconsistent and at odds
with the plain meaning of subsection (2) as well as that of
subsection (4). Section 27-2-401(2), MCA, provides a tolling
of the statute of limitations that could be far in excess of
the District Court's suggested ultimate repose of five years,
as the statute is tolled for the duration of the heir's,
devisee's or creditor's disability plus an additional five
years after such a disability ceases. As 5 27-2-401(2)
clearly indicates there is not a five year period of ultimate
repose and as such the District Court erred in applying such
a limitation to 5 27-2-401 (4).
A legislative body is presumed to have inserted every
provision for some useful purpose. Under the District
Court's construction of the statute, subsection (4) of 5
27-2-401, MCA, serves no useful purpose. In Montana Wildlife
Federation v. Sager (1980), - Mont. - 620 P.2d 1189,
,
this Court stated that it will not interpret a statute so as
to defeat its obvious purpose. We further stated that the
objects sought to be achieved by the legislature are prime
considerations in interpreting a statute. Section 27-2-401,
MCA, shows an objective on the part of the Montana
legislature to afford adequate protection to those
unfortunate citizens who suffer from dual or multiple
disabilities when their right to bring an action accrues.
The statute insures that these Montanans will have the right
to seek full legal redress at a time when they or a guardian
are in a position to do so.
In the immediate case, Linda Cawley was suffering from
two statutorily-defined disabilities, mental illness and
minority. These disabilities coexisted at the time the
allegedly tortious conduct occurred and her right of action
accrued. Although the plaintiff is no longer a minor, the
statute of limitations is still tolled as the evidence
indicates that since the plaintiff's right of action accrued
she has been and continues to be seriously mentally ill.
The plain meaning of the words used in S 27-2-401(4)
clearly indicate that the statute of limitations on Linda
Cawley's claim has not expired and will not expire so long as
she suffers from mental illness.
Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with
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this Opinion.
L. ,I
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Justice r/
We Concur*
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Justices