No. 86-482
I N THE SUPREME COURT O THE STATE O MONTANA
F F
1987
STATE O MONTANA,
F
P l a i n t i f f and Respondent,
-vs-
J A C K AMAYA, JR.,
Defendant and A p p e l l a n t .
APPEAL F O :
R M D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Fourth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
I n and f o r t h e County o f M i s s o u l a ,
The Honorable John S. Henson, Judge p r e s i d i n g .
COUNSEL O RECORD:
F
For Appellant:
J. D i r k B e c c a r i , M i s s o u l a , Montana
F o r Respondent:
Hon. Mike G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , Montana
P a t r i c i a J . S c h a e f f e r , A s s t . A t t y . G e n e r a l , Helena
R o b e r t L . Deschamps, 111, County A t t o r n e y , M i s s o u l a ,
Montana; Ed McLean, Deputy County A t t y . , M i s s o u l a
S u b m i t t e d on B r i e f s : May 1 4 , 1987
Decided: J u l y 1 3 , 1987
Filed: JUL 1 3 1987
Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the
Court.
Defendant appeals his conviction of felonious theft
entered in the Fourth Judicial District in and for Missoula
County. We affirm.
Defendant, Jack Amaya, was convicted of the theft of a
late-model truck stolen in December 1984 from a Houston,
Texas suburb. In June 1985, authorities found the truck
impaled on a guardrail on Highway 93 outside of Missoula,
Montana. After checking the vehicle identification number
and receiving information that this truck was stolen, the
authorities removed the truck and secured it for evidentiary
processing. A passerby who was an acquaintance of the
defendant told police that he (passerby) had passed by the
accident scene and had seen the defendant and a companion
attempt to extricate the truck from the guardrail. When the
passerby offered to help by calling the police, the
defendant's companion declined, stating, "They're onto us."
From a photograph, the owner in Texas identified the
truck as his missing vehicle. Fingerprints taken from the
interior of the vehicle were identified as defendant's. The
bumper, which had been imprinted with the dealer's name, had
been burned with a blow torch. A lock-ring from the ignition
was missing and the drive shaft was lying in the truckbed.
Defendant was eventually arrested and charged with the
offense of felony theft. An omnibus hearing was held, and an
omnibus order was entered in which the State noted that it
had "disclosed all evidence favorable to defendant on the
issue of defendant's guilt." Defendant was originally
scheduled to stand trial on April 7, 1986, but failed to
appear. Trial was finally held on May 12, and the defendant
was found guilty by jury verdict. The District Court
sentenced defendant to ten years imprisonment, three years
suspended. Defendant now appeals.
I
On appeal, defendant raises two related arguments.
First, he argues the District Court erred in its refusal to
dismiss the charge based on the fact that the stolen vehicle
was unavailable at the time of trial. During the State's
case in chief, defendant moved for a jury view of the stolen
vehicle. However, the truck had been returned to the owners'
insurance company, which had moved the truck out of state and
had resold it. Defendant moved for dismissal of the theft
charge, contending that a view of the truck was essential to
his defense. The District Court denied the motion.
A
Defendant first argues that the State's "suppression"
of this physical evidence violated SS 46-5-301, -303, MCA.
These statutes outline the procedural requirements for
disposition of evidence seized pursuant to a search, with or
without a warrant.
These statutes are inapplicable. This is not a search
situation, warrantless or otherwise. The authorities found a
vehicle, abandoned on a major highway and reported to be
stolen. The authorities had an obligation to remove the
vehicle and search for evidence. Defendant cannot
persuasively maintain any legitimate expectation of privacy
in a vehicle left under these circumstances. Where no
reasonable or legitimate expectation of privacy exists, there
is neither a search nor a seizure within the contemplation of
the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution or
Article 11, Section 11 of the Montana Constitution . State
v. Bennett (Mont. 1983), 666 P.2d 747, 749, 40 St.Rep. 1133,
1136. In this case, the warrantless search statutes cited by
defendant are simply inappropriate.
Moreover, even were we to treat this as a warrantless
search situation, the defendant, as discussed below, has
failed to make the requisite showing of prejudice to his
substantial rights by the State's alleged failure to comply
with these procedural requirements. See State v. Lenon
(1977), 174 Mont. 264, 277, 570 P.2d 901, 909 (discussing the
requirements contained within the predecessor of § 46-5-301,
MCA). We find no error.
B
Defendant further argues the State's disposition of the
subject vehicle constituted suppression of evidence. He
contends that under § 46-15-322, MCA,' and that under Brady
v. Maryland (1963), 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d
215, and its Montana progeny, the State's inability to
produce the vehicle in effect represented a suppression of
Defendant specifically relies upon 5 46-15-322(1) (e),
MCA, which provides:
(1) Upon arraignment in district court or
at such later time as the court may for
good cause permit, the prosecutor shall
make available to the defendant for
examination and reproduction the
following material and information within
his possession or control:
(e) all material or information that
tends to mitigate or negate the accused's
guilt as to the offense charged or that
would tend to reduce his punishment
therefor.
evidence favorable to the defense and thereby violated
defendant's right to due process.
This Court previously addressed this legal argument in
State v. Craig (1976), 169 Mont. 150, 545 P.2d 649. Therein,
we required that the evidence in question be of some import,
stating:
[t]o obtain a new trial, the accused must
show more than suppression; he must show
the evidence was material and of some
substantial use to him.
Craig, 545 P.2d at 651.
More specifically, we adopted as a test that,
" [nlegligent suppression requires a reversal of a conviction
where the result would have been different had the evidence
been disclosed." Craig, 545 P.2d at 651.
The State now suggests that we adopt the tests
subsequently articulated by the United States Supreme Court
in United States v. Agurs (1976), 427 U.S. 97, 96 S.Ct. 2392,
49 L.Ed.2d 342. In Agurs, the Supreme Court adopted a
three-tiered standard of materiality for allegedly suppressed
evidence. That standard which would presumably fit this
situation renders omitted evidence material if it "creates a
reasonable doubt [of guilt] that did not otherwise exist."
Agurs, 427 U.S. at 112, 96 S.Ct. at 2402, 49 L.Ed.2d at
355.
We recognize the difficulty of engaging in a post-trial
review to determine the cumulative effect of any specific,
isolated item of evidence. However, in this case, under any
definition of materiality we can find no error. We therefore
find it unnecessary to address the Agurs standards.
The defendant has failed to demonstrate how this
"suppression" was in any way material. The State provided
the defendant, and later introduced into evidence without
objection, a series of photographs depicting the vehicle, the
steering column, the ignition switch, and the driver's door.
We agree that in the absence of specific and concrete reasons
for preservation of the vehicle itself, use of photographs
and other evidence of a vehicle can satisfy the prosecution's
obligation. State v. Philbrick (Me. 1984), 481 A.2d 488,
493; Wilson v. State (Ind. 1982), 432 N.E.2d 30, 32-33.
Additionally, ample testimony was presented concerning the
condition of the vehicle. Defendant has been unable to
explain why a jury view of the vehicle itself was necessary
to his defense and why the photographs and general testimony
were unsuitable substitutes. We will not assume that the
vehicle contained exculpatory evidence when there exists no
such indication in the record. We hold that the disposition
by the authorities of the subject vehicle did not violate
defendant's due process rights.
Finally defendant argues that the State violated his
due process rights by failing to disclose evidence of other
current vehicle theft investigations. At trial, a Missoula
police officer divulged that an investigation was pending of
two other vehicles stolen from Texas. Subsequently, the
authorities arrested a suspect who pled guilty to the offense
of theft. Upon defense inquiry, the deputy county attorney
disclosed that the investigative file had not been revealed
to the defense due to the pending criminal investigation and
due to the fact that nothing exculpatory to the defendant was
contained therein. The District Court conducted an in camera
inspection of the investigative reports and, finding nothing
exculpatory to the defendant, refused defendant's motion for
full disclosure. Later during trial, transcripts of
investigative depositions were made available to defense
counsel.
We find no error. Given defendant's apparent theory of
defense, it is difficult to imagine what possible effect this
information could have had on defendant's behalf. The
prosecution's obligation to disclose information is by
necessity limited to information that has a direct bearing on
the case in question. The District Court fashioned an
appropriate remedy by conducting an in camera inspection to
determine whether any of this information was exculpatory.
The court concluded that none of the information was
exculpatory and the defendant has failed to show otherwise.
His speculative arguments on the possible effects of
immediate disclosure of this information are unpersuasive.
The conviction entered below is affirmed.
We concur: 1