No. 12662
I N T E SUPREME C U T O THE STATE O M N A A
H OR F F OTN
1974
THE STATE O MONTANA,
F
P l a i n t i f f and Respondent,
-vs -
WILLIAM TURCOTTE ,
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Twelfth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
Honorable B. W. Thomas, Judge p r e s i d i n g .
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant :
Morrison, E t t i e n & Barron, Havre, Montana
Robert D. Morrison argued, Havre, Montana
For Respondent :
Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena,
Montana
Thomas J. Beers, A s s i s t a n t Attorney General, argued,
He lena , Montana
Ronald W. Smith, County Attorney, Havre, Montana
David G. Rice, Deputy County Attorney, argued, Havre,
Montana
Submitted: May 23, 1974
Decided :
J'& 16 1974
Filed: mL 1 6 1974
Clerk
Mr. Justice Gene B. Daly delivered the Opinion of the Court.
This is an appeal from an order of the district court
of the twelfth judicial district, county of Hill, denying defend-
ant's motion to suppress evidence in a drug case. Appeal was
brought after defendant had plead guilty to the charge contained
in the information and final judgment of the court had been
entered.
The facts relevant to the appeal are: A police officer
of the city of Havre obtained a search warrant January 24, 1973
to search defendant's residence. The search produced evidence
which led to the charge against defendant of possession of
dangerous drugs in violation of section 54-133, R.C.M. 1947, on
January 26, 1973. On March 7, 1973, defendant filed a motion to
controvert search warrant and suppress evidence which was heard
by the district court on March 30, 1973. The matter was taken
under advisement by the court and denied on April 25, 1973. On
July 30, 1973 defendant applied to this Court for a writ of super-
visory control, Cause No. 12566, State of Montana ex rel. William
Turcotte v. District Court of the 12th Judicial District 3f the
State of Montana.
The application was heard ex parte on July 30, 1973 and
the writ denied on procedural grounds the same day. Trial of the
cause was set in the district court for November 1, 1973. On
that day defendant plead guilty to the charge after first advis-
ing the court that he was preserving his constitutional and stat-
utory right to appeal the adverse ruling denying the motion to
suppress, heretofore discussed. His rationale being to petition
the district court to withdraw the guilty plea in the event this
Court rendered a decision favorable to defendant.
The district court judge very carefully questioned defend-
ant on all aspects of a guilty plea and demonstrated in the record
t h a t d e f e n d a n t was making a n i n t e l l i g e n t v o l u n t a r y p l e a and w a s
f u l l y s a t i s f i e d with t h e a s s i s t a n c e of h i s counsel. Thereafter
on November 29, 1973, t h e c o u r t gave d e f e n d a n t a d e f e r r e d imposi-
t i o n of s e n t e n c e and d e f e n d a n t was p l a c e d on p r o b a t i o n .
T h i s a p p e a l d o e s n o t c o n c e r n t h e g u i l t y p l e a o r judgment,
b u t p r e s e n t s two i s s u e s f o r r e v i e w h a v i n g t o do w i t h t h e s e a r c h
of d e f e n d a n t ' s r e s i d e n c e and t h e f a i l u r e t o make a r e t u r n t o t h e
issuing magistrate.
The d i s p o s i t i v e q u e s t i o n b e f o r e t h i s Court i s whether a
v o l u n t a r y p l e a of g u i l t y t o t h e c r i m e of p o s s e s s i o n of d a n g e r o u s
d r u g s f o r e c l o s e s d e f e n d a n t from s e e k i n g r e v i e w of p r o c e d u r e s p r i o r
t o t h e e n t r y of t h e g u i l t y p l e a .
The g e n e r a l r u l e i s t h a t a p l e a of g u i l t y v o l u n t a r i l y and
u n d e r s t a n d i n g l y made c o n s t i t u t e s a w a i v e r of n o n j u r i s d i c t i o n a l
d e f e c t s and d e f e n s e s , i n c l u d i n g c l a i m s o f v i o l a t i o n s o f c o n s t i t u -
t i o n a l r i g h t s prior t o the plea. The r e a s o n i n g i s t h a t a p e r s o n
p l e a d i n g g u i l t y i s c o n v i c t e d and s e n t e n c e d on h i s p l e a , n o t on t h e
evidence. United S t a t e s v . C l a r k , (1972 CA 8 Mo.) 459 F.2d 977,
c e r t . d e n . 409 U.S. 880, 34 L ed 2d 135, 93 S.Ct. 209.
I n T o l l e t t v. Henderson, 4 1 1 U.S. 258, 36 L ed 2d 235, 243,
93 S.Ct. 1602, t h e United S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t h e l d :
"We t h u s r e a f f i r m t h e p r i n c i p l e r e c o g n i z e d i n
t h e Brady t r i l o g y : a g u i l t y p l e a r e p r e s e n t s a
b r e a k i n t h e c h a i n o f e v e n t s which h a s preceded
it i n t h e c r i m i n a l p r o c e s s . When a c r i m i n a l de-
f e n d a n t h a s solemnly a d m i t t e d i n open c o u r t t h a t
h e i s i n f a c t g u i l t y of t h e o f f e n s e w i t h which
he i s c h a r g e d , he may n o t t h e r e a f t e r r a i s e i n -
dependent c l a i m s r e l a t i n g t o t h e d e p r i v a t i o n of
constitutional rights that occurred-prior t o the
entry of the g u i l t y p l e a . H e m a y o n l y attack t h e
v o l u n t a r y and i n t e l l i g e n t c h a r a c t e r of t h e g u i l t y
p l e a by showing t h a t t h e a d v i c e he r e c e i v e d from
counsel w a s n o t within t h e standards set f o r t h
i n McMann."
I n P e t i t i o n of Harold E b e l i n g , 143 Mont. 298, 299, 387
P.2d 302, t h e d e f e n d a n t a f t e r waiving h i s r i g h t t o c o u n s e l , p l e a d
g u i l t y t o t h r e e c o u n t s of b u r g l a r y i n t h e f i r s t d e g r e e . H e later
b r o u g h t a p e t i t i o n f o r w r i t of e r r o r coram n o b i s i n a n a t t e m p t
t o withdraw h i s g u i l t y p l e a and f o r t h e e n t r y of a p l e a of n o t
g u i l t y and f o r t h e a p p o i n t m e n t of c o u n s e l t o r e p r e s e n t him. De-
f e n d a n t c l a i m e d t h a t an i l l e g a l s e a r c h had been made o f h i s h o t e l
room. T h i s Court s t a t e d :
" * * * While p e t i t i o n e r makes much of t h e contended
i l l e g a l s e a r c h , t h e s e m a t t e r s were known t o him be-
f o r e h e made any c o n f e s s i o n s i n c e he w a s p r e s e n t
and knew what was b e i n g done. H i s p l e a of g u i l t y
waives t h e n e c e s s i t y of proof on t h e p a r t of t h e
s t a t e and we f a i l t o s e e where any c a u s e e x i s t s
f o r t h e i s s u a n c e o f any w r i t h e r e i n . "
I n S t a t e v. Lowery, 148 Mont. 7 5 , 80, 4 1 7 P.2d 1 1 3 , t h e
d e f e n d a n t p l e a d g u i l t y b u t l a t e r c h a l l e n g e d t h e competency o f h i s
c o u n s e l and c o e r c i o n o f a c o n f e s s i o n which was n o t used a g a i n s t
him. T h i s C o u r t h e l d t h a t by e n t e r i n g a p l e a o f g u i l t y t h e de-
f e n d a n t a d m i t t e d t h a t t h e murder c h a r g e was w e l l p l e a d and i n s o
d o i n g waived a l l o t h e r d e f e n s e s o t h e r t h a n t h a t t h e I n f o r m a t i o n
c h a r g e s no o f f e n s e .
W e d o n o t d i s a g r e e w i t h d e f e n d a n t ' s argument and a u t h o r -
i t y a s i t c o n c e r n s t h e w i t h d r a w a l of a g u i l t y p l e a b e f o r e t h e d i s t r i c t
court. I n f a c t under t h e p r e s e n t d e f e r r e d i m p o s i t i o n of s e n t e n c e
d e f e n d a n t w i l l be a l l o w e d t o do p r e c i s e l y t h a t .
Defendant seems t o r e a s o n t h a t T o l l e t t i s n o t a u t h o r i t y
f o r t h e f a c t s presented here, because defendant h e r e preserved h i s
constitutional r i g h t s before t h e plea. F i r s t , a conditional plea
i s n o t a l l o w e d i n Montana, s e c t i o n 9 5 - 1 6 0 6 ( e ) , R.C.M. 1947. Second,
d e f e n d a n t had a f u l l h e a r i n g on t h e a l l e g e d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l v i o l a t i o n
o f h i s r i g h t s and t h e t r i a l c o u r t r u l e d a d v e r s e l y t o him. Third,
t h e p l e a o f g u i l t y was p r o p e r l y e n t e r e d , a s d i s c u s s e d above, w i t h
a t y p e o f p l e a b a r g a i n t o withdraw t h e p l e a i f t h e r e was a p r o p e r
a p p e a l t o t h i s Court from t h e motion t o s u p p r e s s e v i d e n c e , which
e v i d e n c e was n o t used a t t r i a l t o c o n v i c t , and i f t h i s C o u r t r u l e d
favorably t o defendant. F o u r t h , t h e r e i s no s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y i n
Montana for a procedure of this type. Section 95-2404, R.C.M.
1947. Fifth, and finally, the case law both federal and state
makes these issues matters of defense at trial and upon a judgment
of final conviction when the evidence is used against defendant
the constitutionality of obtaining the evidence becomes an issue
on appeal.
In Alden v. State of Montana, 234 F.Supp. 661, 664, where
a plea of guilty had been voluntarily entered, Judge Murray held:
"'Complaints in regard to arrest and search are
matters for defense * * *. One who pleads guilty
waives these defenses and is not in a position to
-
successfully move for a writ of habeas corpus on
claims of alleged illegal arrest, search and
seizure. Cf. United States v. Zavada, 291 F.2d 189
(6th Cir. 1961); United States v. Salzano, 241 F.2d
849 (2nd Cir. 1957).' United States ex rel. Hazen
v. Maroney, 217 F.Supp. 328 (D.C. 1963)." (Emphasis
supplied.)
For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is dismissed.
/" Justice 4
We concur: