No. 85-198
I N THE SUPREME COURT O F THE S T A T E O F MONTANA
1987
S T A T E O F MONTANA,
P l a i n t i f f and R e s p o n d e n t ,
-VS-
J E R R Y ELWIN T I B B I T T S ,
D e f e n d a n t and A p p e l l a n t .
APPEAL FROM: D i s t r i c t C o u r t of t h e E i g h t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
I n and f o r t h e C o u n t y o f C a s c a d e ,
T h e H o n o r a b l e J o e l G. R o t h , J u d g e p r e s i d i n g .
COUNSEL O F RECORD:
For Appellant:
John K e i t h , G r e a t F a l l s , M o n t a n a
For Respondent:
Hon. M i k e G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , M o n t a n a
Kimberly Kradolfer, Asst. Atty. General, Helena
P a t r i c k L. Paul, C o u n t y A t t o r n e y , G r e a t F a l l s , M o n t a n a
S u b m i t t e d on B r i e f s : Jan. 8, 1987
Decided: March 1 0 , 1 9 8 7
Filed: MAR 10 1987
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Clerk
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Mr. Justice Fred J. Weber delivered the Opinion of the Court.
Appellant Jerry Tibbits was found guilty of deliberate
homicide by bench trial in the District Court of the Eighth
Judicial District, Cascade County. Mr. Tibbitts was then
sentenced by the District Court to serve 100 years in the
Montana State Prison. We affirm.
The issues are:
1. Did the District Court err when it found that Mr.
Tibbitts acted knowingly in causing the death of the
decedent?
2. Did the District Court abuse its discretion when
sentencing Mr. Tibbitts?
In July 1984, Mr. Tibbitts and several other men worked
for three or four hours at a supply store and then purchased
some beer and drank it behind a Great Falls grocery store.
The decedent joined their group and got in a discussion with
Mr. Tibbitts over some beer and cigarettes. An argument
ensued and Mr. Tibbitts picked up a bottle and hit the dece-
dent twice with the bottle. Mr. Tibbitts then kicked the
decedent and attempted to light his hair while he was
stretched out on the ground. Two eye witnesses testified to
this assault.
Three Great Falls police officers and an ambulance crew
all arrived at the scene within seconds of each other and Mr.
Tibbitts was read the Miranda warning. At least four law
enforcement officers heard Mr. Tibbitts confess to the kill-
ing at the scene and at the hospital where he was taken for a
blood-alcohol sample. One of the officers also testified
that Mr. Tibbitts specifically stated that he knew what had
happened and that he had hit the victim with a beer bottle.
Mr. Tibbitts testified during the bench trial that the
decedent began grabbing beer and cigarettes from him and that
he became "enraged" and began hitting and kicking the dece-
dent. Mr. Tibbitts testified that he had been previously
diagnosed as schizophrenic and that he had previously commit-
ted himself to mental institutions. Mr. Tibbitts also testi-
fied that he did not act in self defense.
The doctor who performed the autopsy testified that the
decedent had bruises and lacerations, a broken nose, and a
fractured sternum from a blow to the chest which almost
separated the decedent's breast bone into two pieces. The
doctor stated that the cause of death was a laceration to the
left atrium which caused bleeding into the pericardium sac
surrounding the heart. This laceration was caused by a blunt
force blow to the chest, such as the one which fractured the
decedent's sternum.
A staff psychiatrist at Warm Springs State Hospital who
examined Mr. Tibbitts testified that the defendant suffered
from paranoid schizophrenia but that he did understand what
was happening around him and was capable of assisting in his
defense. The psychiatrist also testified that Mr. Tibbitts
could become psychotic at times but that in his opinion the
defendant's state of mind did fit within the "knowingly"
definition of § 45-2-101 (33), MCA.
The District Court concluded as a matter of law:
2. That the State did prove beyond a reasonable
doubt and to a moral certainty that the defendant
committed the crime of Deliberate Homicide, a
Felony, under MCA section 45-5-201, by knowingly
causing the injuries which caused the death of Kent
Blackburn.
3. That the evidence of the defendant's mental
disease or defect showed that he did have the
particular state of mind, that being knowledge
under MCA section 45-2-101(33), when the crime
occurred.
4. That the defendant's mental condition, while not
rising to a defense of the crime charged and
proved, can be considered at sentencing under MCA
section 46-14-311 and section 46-14-312.
As a result of the initial sentencing order, a question was
raised regarding the defendant's ability to appreciate the
criminality of his conduct and to conform his conduct to the
requirements of the law at the time of the offense. This
Court remanded the case to the District Court with instruc-
tions to determine for purposes of sentencing the mental
status of Mr. Tibbitts under S 46-14-311 and -312, MCA. The
lower court then entered an order clarifying the sentencing
order which stated:
The Court now clarifies the Sentencing Order by
stating that, pursuant to Section 46-14-311 MCA,
the defendant, at the time of the commission of the
offense of which he was convicted (Deliberate
Homicide, a felony), was suffering from a mental
disease or defect, namely paranoid schizophrenia,
but that said mental disease or defect did not
render him unable to appreciate the criminality of
his conduct or render him unable to conform his
conduct to the requirements of law.
The District Court sentenced Mr. Tibbitts to 100 years in the
Montana State Prison.
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Did the District Court err when it found that Mr.
Tibbitts acted knowingly in causing the death of the
decedent?
The standard of review is that set forth in Jackson v.
Virginia (1979), 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61
L.Ed.2d 560, 573:
[W]hether, after viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prosecution, any rational
trier of fact could have found the essential ele-
ments of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
(Emphasis in original.)
This standard was adopted by Montana in State v. Rodriguez
(Mont. 1981), 628 P.2d 280, 283, 38 St.Rep. 578F, 5781.
Using this standard, we consider Mr. Tibbitts' specific
contentions.
First, Mr. Tibbitts maintains that the evidence does not
support the District Court's determination that he acted
knowingly in causing the death of the decedent. The deliber-
ate homicide statute, 5 45-5-102, MCA, provides that Mr.
Tibbitts must have acted knowingly or purposely to be con-
victed of deliberate homicide. The District Court found that
Mr. Tibbitts had acted knowingly when he caused the death of
the decedent. The "knowingly" definition found at
5 45-2-101 (33) provides:
[A] person acts knowingly with respect to conduct
or to a circumstance described by a statute defin-
ing an offense when he is aware of his conduct or
that the circumstance exists. A person acts know-
ingly with respect to the result of conduct de-
scribed by a statute defining an offense when he is
aware that it is highly probable that such result
will be caused by his conduct. When knowledge of
the existence of a particular fact is an element of
an offense, such knowl-edge is established if a
person is aware of a high probability of its exis-
tence. Equivalent terms such as "knowing" or "with
knowledge" have the same meaning.
Mr. Tibbitts argues that he was unable to form the
requisite criminal state of mind because he suffered from the
mental disease of paranoid schizophrenia and was in a psy-
chotic state at the time of the offense. Finally, Mr.
Tibbitts maintains that the District Court's sentencing order
was deficient. This last argument was specifically addressed
by this Court when we remanded with instructions to the
District Court to clarify its sentencing order. The District
Court then wrote a clarification order. As a result, we find
no basis for this argument.
The District Court concluded that Mr. Tibbitts met the
knowingly requirement of 5 45-2-101(33), MCA, that he was
able to appreciate the criminality of his conduct, and that
his mental disease or defect did not negate this ability to
appreciate the criminality of his conduct. The psychiatrist
from Warm Springs State Hospital testified Mr. Tibbitts
understood what was happening around him, was capable of
assisting in his defense, and that in his opinion Mr.
Tibbitts knew that it was highly probable that he would
become involved in violent actions if he drank. Finally, the
psychiatrist testified that in his opinion Mr. Tibbitts'
state of mind did fit within the "knowingly" definition of
5 45-2-101(33), MCA, when he committed the homicide. In
addition, several law enforcement officers who were at the
scene of the homicide right after it occurred testified that
Mr. Tibbitts confessed to the crime. One officer specifical-
ly testified Mr. Tibbitts stated he knew what he had done.
The District Court had all the evidence and testimony before
it when making the determination that Mr. Tibbitts acted
knowingly when he caused the decedent's death. Using the
Jackson test, we find that "any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of [deliberate homicide]
beyond a reasonable doubt." We therefore affirm the District
Court on this issue.
Did the District Court abuse its discretion when sen-
tencing Mr. Tibbitts?
Mr. Tibbitts argues that the District Court abused its
discretion when imposing his sentence by failing to properly
consider the mental disease or defect at the time of the
offense. Relying on 5 46-14-312(2), MCA, and State v. Korell
(Mont. 1984), 690 P.2d 992, 41 St.Rep. 2141, the defendant
maintains that he should be placed in Warm Springs State
Hospital due to his mental defect. Although the District
Court found that Mr. Tibbitts was suffering from a mental
disease or defect at the time of the commission of the of-
fense, it also found that the mental disease or defect "did
not render him unable to appreciate the criminality of his
conduct or render him unable to conform his conduct to the
requirements of the law." As this Court stated in State v.
Doney (Mont. 1981), 636 P.2d 1377, 1385, 38 St.Rep. 1707,
Before such commitment (to Warm Springs) will be
ordered, defendant must prove to the satisfaction
of the sentencing court that "at the time of the
commission of the offense of which he was convicted
he was suffering from a mental disease or defect
which rendered him unable to appreciate the crimi-
nality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to
the requirements of law. l1 Sections 46-14-311 and
46-14-312, MCA. The sentencing judge is not limit-
ed to a consideration of evidence presented at the
trial. A determination of the existence of mental
disease or defect under these sections rests within
the discretion of the sentencing judge.
A defendant can be sentenced to imprisonment if the
sentencing judge finds that the defendant was able to appre-
ciate the criminality of his conduct or conform his conduct
to the requirements of the law. See Korell, 690 P.2d at 996.
Mr. Tibbitts argues that the District Court failed to consid-
er his psychotic mental state at the time of the commission
of the offense and thus his prison sentence should be vacated
with instructions for him to be placed at Warm Springs.
We affirm the District Court's conclusion that Mr.
Tibbitts was able to appreciate the criminality of his con-
duct or conform his conduct to the requirements of the law at
the time of the commission of the offense in accordance with
Doney and Korell. A police officer testified that Mr.
Tibbitts seemed to understand what was going on around him
following the incident. Mr. Tibbitts also testified in a
calm and understanding manner of the events leading up to the
attack and the examining psychiatrist testified that he
believed Mr. Tibbitts fit within the "knowingly" definition
of 45-2-101(33), MCA, when he committed the homicide.
Accordingly the requirements of 55 46-14-311 and -312, MCA,
have been met.
We affirm the District Court.
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