No. 87-258
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1988
FRANK WEIGAND,
Claimant and Respondent,
-vs-
ANDERSON-MEYER DRILLING CO.,
Employer,
and
HOME INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL FROM: Workers' Compensation Court of the State of Montana
In and For the Area of Great Falls
The Honorable Timothy Reardon, Judge Presiding
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
David E. Bauer; Marra, Wenz, Johnson & Hopkins, P.C.
Great Falls, Montana
For Respondent :
Donald R. Marble; Marble & Seidlitz, Chester, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: February 4, 1988
Decided: June 21, 1988
Clerk
Mr. Justice John C. Sheehy delivered the Opinion of the
Court.
Defendants Anderson-Meyer Drilling Company and Home
Insurance Company appeal from the judgment of the Workers'
Compensation Court. The Workers' Compensation Court held
that Frank Weigand is not barred from compensation by the
statute of limitations provision, 5 39-71-601 (1), MCA. The
court further held that the Weigand's present condition is
the result of a previous compensable injury and thus the
defendants are liable. We affirm.
The defendants present two issues on appeal. They are:
(1) Whether the Workers' Compensation Court erred in
finding that Weigand satisfied the filing requirements of 5
39-71-601 (1), MCA; and,
(2) Whether there was sufficient evidence to support
the Workers' Compensation Court's conclusion that Weigand's
present condition is the result of his February 11, 1982,
injury.
On February 11, 1982, Frank Weigand injured his left
knee when he slipped on ice and hit his knee cap on the angle
iron steps of the defendant's oil rig. It is uncontested
that Weigand suffered an industrial accident arising out of
and in the course of his employment with Anderson-Meyer
Drilling Company. Anderson-Meyer was enrolled under Plan I1
of the Worker's Compensation Act with Home Insurance Company
being its insurer.
Weigand immediately informed his supervisor of the
injury but was able to finish his shift. Weigand had his
knee examined at Trinity Hospital in Wolf Point. The exami-
nation revealed an injury to the lateral cartilage of the
left knee requiring surgery. The operative report revealed
that Weigand had an "extremely degenerative (shredded) left
lateral meniscus" which was removed during surgery.
Following a brief stay in the hospital Weigand was released
and immediately returned to work.
Subsequent to the accident Weigand assisted the
defendant/employer in completing a Employers First Report,
which was filed with Home Insurance. The attending surgeon
also filed the attending Physician's First Report with the
insurer as well as his bill for $839.69. Trinity Hospital in
Wolf Point submitted a bill to the insurer for Weigand's
surgery in the amount of $2,260.15. These bills were paid by
the insurer along with some smaller additional charges and
are not an issue in the case.
Weigand's work history subsequent to his 1982 injury
consists of oil field jobs and ranch work. While working on
his father's ranch during the summer of 1985 Weigand began
experiencing increasing pain in his knee. Weigand's pain was
not due to a new injury or accident but appeared to be the
result of everyday wear and tear on the previously injured
knee. In August, 1985, Weigand had his knee examined by Dr.
James Hinde. Hinde found that Weigand had a degenerative
left knee. Hinde felt although there was some deterioration
prior to the 1982 injury, the condition was significantly
aggravated by the fall and resulting surgery. Hinde further
found that the 1982 injury and the subsequent surgery are
significant factors in the continued degeneration of
Weigand's knee. Hinde concluded that it was his opinion that
Weigand's degenerative knee condition would preclude him from
engaging in any of his former occupations.
Although the insurer had sent Weigand at least two
letters instructing him to complete a form 54 immediately
following the accident, he failed to do so. (Form 54 is the
standard claim form utilized by insurers). However, Weigand
did file a form 54 compensation claim in March, 1986.
The defendant denied Weigandls claim for compensation
contending that Weigand did not file a claim within one year
as required by 39-71-601, MCA. The defendant further
alleged that Weigandls present difficulties were not the
result of his 1982 injury. On June 10, 1986, the Worker's
Compensation Court held a hearing on the matter. The court
concluded that the requirements of § 39-71-601, MCA, had been
satisfied and that Weigand's current condition is the result
of his injury in 1982. From this judgment the defendants
appeal.
The first issue that must be examined is whether the
Workers' Compensation Court erred in finding that Weigand
satisfied the filing requirements of S 39-71-601 (I), MCA.
When reviewing questions of law in workers' compensation
cases, the standard of review is whether the lower court's
interpretation of the law is correct. Poppleton v. ~ollins,
Inc. (Mont. 1987), 735 P.2d 286, 288, 44 St.Rep. 644, 646.
We conclude that the Workers' Compensation Court correctly
interpreted the law.
In the immediate case it is uncontested that Weigand was
injured in an industrial accident in February, 1982, and that
he failed to file a form 54 within one year. Weigand did,
however, assist in preparing the Employer's First Report.
Thus, the issue before the Court is whether submission of a
form 54 is the exclusive method of filing a claim.
The focal point of the controversy is 5 39-71-601, MCA.
It provides:
Statute - limitation on presentment of claim --
of
waiver. (1) In case oFpersonal injury or death,
all clai.ms shall be forever barred unless presented
in writing to the employer, the insurer, or the
division, as the case may be, within 12 months from
the date of the happening of the accident, either
by the claimant or someone legally authorized to
act for him in his behalf.
In Scott v. Utility Line Contractors (Mont. 1987), 734
P. 2d 206, 44 St.Rep. 547, this Court had an opportunity to
construe $ 39-71-601, MCA, under very similar circumstances.
In Scott, as in the present case, the claimant was injured in
1982 and sought to file a compensation claim in 1986. The
claimant in Scott also did not file the standard workers'
compensation claim form (form 54) for his injury, nor did he
sign the Employer's First Report. However, there was a
completed Employer's First Report submitted to the insurer as
well as a medical report which was also submitted to the
insurer. This Court affirmed the decision of the Workers'
Compensation Court finding Scott presented his claim within
one year, thus satisfying $ 39-71-601, MCA. We held the
Employer's First Report contained ample information to clear-
ly inform the employer and the division of the nature and
basis of Mr. Scott's possible claim. Scott, 734 P.2d at 208,
44 St.Rep at 547. This Court further stated the medical
report included indications that a claim could likely result
from Scott's injury. Scott, supra.
In the present case Weigand immediately told his super-
visor of the accident. FJeigand assisted the employer in
completing the Employer's First Report, which was submitted
to the insurer within two months of the accident. The at-
tending physician's first report was also submitted to the
insurer well within the twelve-month period. In this case as
in Scott, the defendant was provided with and received ample
information to be informed of the nature and the basis of
Weigand's possible claim. We find that the mandate of $
39-71-601(1), MCA, has been satisfied.
This issue is controlled by the holding in Scott. The
facts are nearly identical except as to the time involved.
The earlier case of Klein v. Independent Wholesale Associated
Grocers, et a . (1975), 167 Mont. 341, 538 P.2d 1358, was not
]
discussed in Scott, and here the employer and insurer rely on
Klein. The deciding point, however, is that there was pre-
sented to the employer, and through the employer to the
insurer, by the assistance of Weigand, information in writing
which gave all the details that a further form to be filled
out and presented by Weigand would have given. The purpose
of S 39-71-601 is fulfilled here. We determine to follow the
holding in Scott, and anything contained in Klein or earlier
cases to the contrary on this set of facts is expressly
overruled.
The purpose of § 39-71-601, MCA, is to give the employer
written notice of a worker's claims within twelve months of
the injury or accident in order to allow the employer to
investigate the claim and if necessary prepare a defense.
Scott, supra. The facts of the present case clearly demon-
strate that the objective of the statute has been achieved.
We affirm the judgment of the Workers' Compensation Court
finding that Weigand presented his claim within the time
limits expressed in S 39-71-601, MCA.
The defendants next contend the Workers' Compensation
Court erred in finding that there was substantial credible
evidence to support the conclusion that Weigand's current
condition is the result of his February 11, 1982, injury. We
disagree.
The standard for reviewing the Workers' Compensation
Court's findings of fact is whether the court's findings are
supported by substantial credible evidence in the record.
Poppleton, 735 P.2d at 288, 4 4 St.Rep. at 6 4 6 . In the in-
stant case, Dr. Hinde testified that although Weigand had a
degenerative left knee prior to his 1982 injury the condition
was aggravated by the injury. Hinde further testified that
Weigand's 1982 injury and the subsequent surgery are signifi-
cant factors in the degenerating condition of Weigand's knee.
Our function in reviewing these decisions is only
to determine whether substantial evidence exists to
support the findings and conclusions and we cannot
impose our judgment as to the weight of the
evidence.
Ridenour v. Equity Supply Co. (19831, 204 Mont. 473,
483, 6 6 5 P.2d 783, 788, citing Viets v. Sweet Grass County
( 1 9 7 8 ) , 1 7 8 Mont. 3 3 7 , 5 8 3 P.2d 1 0 7 0 .
It is clear from the evidence in the record that sub-
stantial credible evidence exists to support the Workers'
Compensation Court's finding that Weigand's present condition
is the result of his injury of February 11, 1 9 8 2 . The judg-
ment of the Workers' Compensation Court is affi-rmed. The
case is remanded for a determination of benefits.
//'-.--.--'\
Justice
/'
We concur:
/
Justices
Mr. Justice L. C. Gulbrandson, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent and I would reverse the judgment
of the Workers1 Compensation Court finding that the claimant
presented his claim for compensation within the time limits
set forth in 5 39-71-601, MCA.
In my view, the majority has effectively repealed
S 39-71-601, MCA in those cases where an Employer's First
Report has been filed, and a medical bill has been submitted
and paid.
Section 39-71-601 reads as follows:
(1) In case of personal injury or death,
all claims shall be forever barred unless
presented in writing to the employer, the
insurer, or the division, as the case may
be, within 12 months from the date of the
happening of the accident, either by the
claimant or someone legally authorized to
act for him in his behalf.
(2) The division may, upon a reasonable
showing by the claimant of lack of
knowledge of disability, waive the time
requirement up to an additional 24
months.
The Workers1 Compensation Court Judge in Finding of Fact No.
24, found:
The insurer, following the 1982 accident,
sent and claimant received, at least two,
and probably four, letters which stated
as follows:
"We have been advised you are claiming
injury as the result of an accident which
occurred on or about the above date.
Please complete the enclosed Claim for
Compensation in detail and return it
immediately.
If you were an employee of our insured on
the date you were injured, and if your
injury arose out of and in the course of
your employment, you are entitled to
certain medical and disability benefits
as set forth by law.
If you are disabled for more than five
working days and lose wages, you are
entitled to disability benefits. Even
though you may not lose wages as a result
of this injury, you should complete the
enclosed form and return to this office.
Should you have problems at a later date
and this form has not been filed within
one year from the date of accident, all
future claims for disability may be
barred.
If you have any questions regarding the
benefits due you, please contact this
office or the Division of Workers'
Compensation, Helena, Montana."
The claimant did not respond to the insurer's request
and failed to submit a written claim for compensation until
March 6, 1986, more than four years after the injury. The
insurer has thirty days from the receipt of the claim for
compensation to accept or deny the claim. Section
39-71-606(1), MCA, reads as follows:
(1) Every insurer under any plan for the
payment of workers' compensation benefits
shall, within 30 days of receipt of a
claim for compensation, either accept or
deny the claim, and if denied shall
inform the claimant and the division in
writing of such denial.
In this case, claimant's counsel took the position originally
that because the insurer had not denied the March 6, 1986
claim in writing within 30 days as required by $ 39-71-606,
MCA, the insurer should be held to have accepted the claim
even though the injury had occurred more than four years
earlier.
The majority, by dispensing with the legislated
requirement of a written claim for compensation seems to be
creating uncertainty in what should be a certain procedure.
What incident now triggers the thirty day period for an
insurer to accept or deny a claim for compensation? Is it
the receipt of the Employer's First Report, the receipt of a
medical bill by the insurer, or a claim for compensation
filed many years after the injury?
The majority states that Wiegand assisted the Employer
in completing the Employer's First Report but that statement
is not supported in the record and was not found by the
court. The record shows that claimant's brother was employed
on the same drilling rig and later drove the claimant to the
doctor's office in Wolf Point. It appears that sufficient
information was provided to the employer by someone that the
First Report could be submitted but this Court has always
required more in previous cases.
The Workers' Compensation Court found that the
completion of form 54 by the claimant would not have given
the employer any more information than it already had and
suggested that the claimant may have been confused.
Claimant's work history indicates that he had previously
filed a Claim for Compensation for a 1978 injury and
subsequently had filed a Claim for Compensation for a 1983
injury. That claim history would indicate a certain degree
of sophistication and claimant's failure to respond in any
manner to four solicitations of a claim for compensation
should be construed to be a voluntary act.
I would defer to clearly expressed legislative intent
and construe the claim requirements of S 39-71-601, MCA, as
written, and would reverse the judgment of the Workers'
Compensation Court. /