No. 87-458
I N THE SUPREME COURT O THE STATE O M N A A
F F O T N
1988
STATE O MONTANA,
F
P l a i n t i f f and Respondent,
-vs-
JULIUS A. BLALOCK,
Defendant and A p p e l l a n t .
APPEAL FROM: D i s t r i c t Court o f t h e Tenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
I n and f o r t h e County o f J u d i t h B a s i n ,
The H o n o r a b l e P e t e r Rapkoch, J u d g e p r e s i d i n g .
COUNSEL O RECORD:
F
For Appellant:
John C . S t a n l e y , J r . , G r e a t F a l l s , Montana
For Respondent:
Hon. Mike G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , Montana
George S c h u n k , A s s t . A t t y . G e n e r a l , H e l e n a
S a r a h A r n o t t , County A t t o r n e y , S t a n f o r d , Montana
Submitted: May 5 , 1988
Decided: J u n e 7 , 1988
Clerk
Mr. Justice William E. Hunt, Sr., delivered the Opinion of
the Court.
This is an appeal from the District Court, Tenth
Judicial District, County of Judith Basin. The matter was
initially heard in Justice Court and was appealed to District
Court for a trial de novo. The District Court fined the
appellant $210.00 for violating S 45-6-203, MCA, criminal
trespass. We affirm.
The appellant's issues are as follows:
1. Whether the District Court's "finding" that the
intended criminal act is purposely and knowingly doing the
act that is done, not the purposeful and knowledgeable
intention to commit a crime, led to an incorrect conclusion
that the appellant had "purposely and knowingly" entered the
complaining witness's land?
2. Whether the complaining witness properly posted his
property as directed by 5 45-6-201, MCA?
3. Whether 5 45-6-201, MCA, is unconstitutionally vague
and violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 11, 5
17, of the Montana Constitution?
On March 11, 1987, the appellant, Julius Blalock, was
traveling on a public highway running adjacent to Cyril
Collarchik's land. At one point, he left the highway onto a
dirt road that ran into Collarchik's property. The purpose
of this excursion was to investigate some structures he
thought looked like beehives. At the point the road meets
the highway is a gate which had been left open. On the post,
right of this opening was a rectangular sign measuring 12 x 5
inches and painted fluorescent orange. No written messages
appeared on this sign. All entrances used by vehicles were
similarly marked. The statute relevant to posted notice
against trespassing is § 45-6-201(2), MCA:
(2) To be effective under this section, the notice
provided for in subsection (1) must satisfy the
following requirements:
(a) notice must be placed on a post, structure, or
natural object by marking it with written notice or
with not less than 50 square inches of fluorescent
orange paint, except that when metal fenceposts are
used, the entire post must be painted; and
(b) the notice described in subsection (2)(a) must
be placed at each outer gate and normal point of
access to the property, including both sides of a
water body crossing the property wherever the water
body intersects an outer boundary line.
Both parties agree that Blalock had no knowledge that
the right post marking may have constituted legal notice of
no trespassing. He satisfied his curiosity about the
beehives and began driving out the way he came in when he was
stopped by Collarchik who called the sheriff. When the
sheriff's deputy arrived, Blalock was cited for criminal
trespass.
Initially, we will dispose of appellant's constitutional
claim. Because he did not raise this claim at trial and it
does not fit into any of the statutory and common law
exceptions, Blalock is barred from challenging the
constitutionality of S 45-6-201, MCA. State v. Probert
(Mont. 1986), 719 P.2d 783, 785, 43 St.Rep. 988, 990.
Appellant takes issue with the District Court's
"finding" that
The intended criminal act is purposely and
knowingly doing the act that is done, not the
purposeful and knowledgeable intention to commit a
crime, and the Defendant purposely and knowingly
entered upon the Complainant's property.
Blalock contends that this finding essentially prevents
the use of any defense to the required element of
"knowingly." Much of Blalock's argument focuses on his
assertion that he was unaware that the orange sign meant no
trespassing. He claims that this is a mistake of fact that
provides a defense that prevents him from being found to have
the requisite mental intent to knowingly enter the land
unlawfully. This argument has no merit.
It is well recognized in Montana that one need not form
the intent to commit a specific crime or to intend the result
that occurred to be found guilty of knowingly committing a
crime. See State v. Raty (Mont. 1984), 692 P.2d 17, 19, 41
St.Rep. 2354, 2356-57; State v. Sigler (Mont. 1984), 688 P.2d
749, 754-55, 41 St.Rep. 1039, 1046; State v. Weaver (19811,
195 Mont. 481, 494, 637 P.2d 23, 30.
We hold that the District Court's "finding" correctly
stated Montana law.
In response to Blalock's assertion that he is denied a
defense to the element of "knowingly" we wish to state that
ignorance of the law has never been a defense in Montana.
Section 45-2-103 (5), MCA; State ex rel. Rowe v. District
Court (1911), 44 Mont. 318, 324, 119 P. 1103. Since no
argument has been made that the sign at the relevant entryway
was not in accordance with the posting statute, we will
assume for purposes of this issue that Blalock had legal
notice that the land he entered was off-limits to
trespassers. We affirm the District Court's finding that
Blalock knowingly entered Collarchik's land.
Next Blalock asserts that Collarchik's failure to post
notice at points where a creek traversed his land negates the
effectiveness of his efforts to post at other points of his
property. Because there was no substantial compliance,
Blalock argues, the notice is void.
We decline to discuss at this point the intricacies of §
45-6-201's substantial compliance clause. We do not think,
however, that the legislature intended to deprive a property
owner of his right to allow or refuse entry to whomever he
wants. Since the gate Blalock entered was adorned with the
proper orange markings, he was denied the right to enter the
land. He entered knowingly and was consequently arrested.
Under the specified circumstances of this case, we affirm the
decision of the District Court.
Justices