No. 87-402
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1988
GREGG GLASPEY,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vs-
THOMAS WORKMAN, BERNADETTE WORKMAN,
and BERNADETTE'S INC.,
Defendants, Respondents and
Cross-appellants.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Cascade,
The Honorable John M. McCarvel, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Lynch & Best; Elizabeth A. Best, Great Falls, Montana
For Respondent:
Hartelius, Ferguson & Baker; Channing J. Hartelius,
Great Falls, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: Jan. 14, 1988
Decided: February 10, 1988
Filed :
Mr. Justice John C. Sheehy delivered the Opinion of the
Court.
Following a joint motion for summary judgment, the
District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, Cascade
County, issued findings of fact, conclusions of law and
judgment piercing the corporate veil of Bernadette's, Inc.
Glaspey appeals the portion of the judgment which denied
attorneys fees and allegedly denied punitive damages. We
affirm in part and reverse in part.
The issues on appeal are:
1. Did the District Court incorrectly conclude that
there is no statutory authorization for the payment of
attorneys fees when an employee is forced to pierce the
corporate veil in order to collect a judgment for wages?
2. Did the District Court incorrectly conclude punitive
damages are not available under such circumstances?
The controversy at hand arose as a result of the
insolvency of Bernadette's, Inc., a Great Falls eatery.
Glaspey had been employed by Bernadette's, Inc. as a chef,
until June, 1984. At that time, Bernadette's, Inc. failed to
pay Glaspey's wages which were due and owing.
Following a successful wage claim action, Glaspey sought
to collect the amount of the judgment. However, when the
Sheriff of Cascade County attempted to execute on the
judgment, he was only able to obtain $5.49. Glaspey then
initiated the instant action to pierce the corporate veil of
Bernadette's, Inc. His complaint further alleged that
Workman's employment of the corporate veil to escape a wage
claim judgment constituted a species of fraud and breach of
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
The first issue before the court concerns the propriety
of attorneys fees. Glaspey contends the District Court erred
in concluding that there is no statutory authorization for
the payment of attorneys fees when an employee is forced to
pierce the corporate veil in order to collect a judgment for
wages. We agree.
The controlling statute regarding attorneys fees in wage
collection actions is § 39-3-214, MCA, which provides:
39-3-214. Court costs and attorneys' fees.
(1) Whenever - - necessary for the employee to
it is
enter or maintain a suit at law for the recovery or
collection of wages due as provided for by t h G
part, a resulting judgment must include a
reasonable attorney's fee in favor of the
successful party, to be taxed as part of the costs
in the case. (Emphasis added.)
(2) Any judgment for the plaintiff in a proceeding
pursuant to this part must include all costs
reasonably incurred in connection with the
proceeding, including attorneys' fees.
In construing 8 39-3-214, MCA, this Court will adhere to
Montana's well established rules pertaining to the
construction and interpretation of statutes which we recently
affirmed in Murphy v. State of Montana (~ont.19871, - P.2d
- I ,
- 44 St.Rep. 2030, 2032. In Murphy, this Court held:
The intention of the legislature must first be
determined from the plain meaning of the words
used, and if interpretation of the statute can be
so determined, the courts may not go further and
apply any other means of interpretation.
Citing State v. Hubbard (1982), 200 Mont. 106, 111, 649 P.2d
1331, 1333.
It is clear to us from the plain meaning of the words
utilized in § 39-3-214, MCA, that the legislature's intent in
passing the statute was to provide an employee who wins a
judgment for wages due against an employer a vehicle by which
to receive attorneys fees and thus be made whole. Further,
it is equally clear that attorneys fees must be awarded
"whenever it is necessary for the employee to enter or
maintain a suit at law for the recovery or collection of
wages . . ." Section 39-3-214, MCA.
Section 39-3-214, MCA, is applicable to the case at bar
as it was "necessary" for the plaintiff to maintain an action
to pierce the defendant's corporate veil in order to recover
and collect on the previous judgment awarded him on his wage
claim action. As such the action to pierce the corporate
veil was a continuation of the wage claim action and the
plaintiff is entitled to attorneys fees. Section
39-3-214 (1), MCA.
Glaspey also contends that the District Court's alleged
refusal to submit the issue of punitive damages to a jury
constituted error. However, the District Court did not
address the issue in the findings of fact, conclusions of
law, and judgment. Nor did Glaspey provide this Court with a
transcribed record of the proceedings. The purported
statements of the District Court contained within Glaspey's
brief do not constitute a record subject to appellate review.
We, therefore, do not address the issue. See, Lutzenhiser v.
Holsworth (Mont. 1984), 690 P.2d 990, 41 St.Rep. 2102.
We affirm the refusal to submit the issue of punitive
damages to the jury. We reverse the denial of attorney fees,
and remand for a determination of such fees. Costs on appeal
to Glaspey.
::&A- -4-.
&;
/
Justice
We Concur:
Chief Justice